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“I have referred to [antitrust] as a subcategory of ideology; it is not far-fetched to view antitrust as a
microcosm in which larger movements of our society are reflected and perhaps, in some small but
significant way, reinforced or generated. The walls of ideological subcategories are permeable; battles
fought and won or lost in one are likely to affect the outcome of parallel struggles in others.”1
Bork, Introduction to The Antitrust Paradox, at 10
This thesis considers whether environmental protection factors presently play any role in
Community competition policy, and whether they should play a role.
These questions are likely, on their face, to elicit one of two instinctive reactions. On the
one hand, those familiar with the present movement of the Commission towards more
scientific, economics-based competition analysis, inspired by the so-called “Chicago
School” US-led body of competition theory,2 will probably answer that “non-economic”
factors, including environmental protection, are best dealt with by legislation, not by
competition policy; that such factors will simply distort the efficiency of competition
policy. On the other hand, those aware of the trend towards the use of economics-
driven, “market”-based regulatory instruments in Community and Member State
environmental policies, of the Community’s obligation to integrate environmental
protection requirements into all of its policies, and of the urgent need to increase the
effectiveness of environmental protection, will likely be dissatisfied with this response.
We live in a time where “green thinking” should pervade every aspect of regulation: why
should competition policy be an exception?
This thesis investigates which position is most defensible. More broadly, it has three
overarching aims. The first aim is to set out a sound theoretical framework for analysing
the proper relevance of environmental factors to Community competition analysis, and
to provide practical proposals for how such theoretical analysis should change present
Community competition enforcement practice. The second aim is to bring an
interdisciplinary analysis to bear on the issue. In the present author’s view, a convincing
answer to the above questions demands a broader approach than a purely legal one,
drawing on the disciplines of economics and political science. The third aim is to bridge
the schism which is sometimes evident between academic discourse in the competition
policy and environmental policy fields, in particular by considering the implications of
market-based environmental policy approaches for competition policy.
The thesis is divided into three Parts. Part I takes an environmental policy perspective.
It first considers the principal developments in Community environmental policy which
are of potential relevance to competition policy, focusing in particular on the ambiguous
notion of “sustainable development” and on the requirement laid down in the EC Treaty
to integrate environmental protection requirements into other Community policies.
Second, it examines the distinction between direct environmental regulatory instruments
and market-based (economic) environmental regulatory instruments, and looks at the
most important market-based instruments used in Community environmental policy to
date.
1 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, Basic Books, 1978, 1993 reprint with
new introduction and epilogue), at 10.
2 In the development of which Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, quoted above, played a pivotal role.
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Part II shifts to a perspective from competition theory. It first surveys the approaches
taken by the leading schools of competition thought to the role of non-economic factors
in competition analysis. Second, it focuses on environmental factors, and asks whether,
as a normative matter, they ought to be excluded from competition analysis. Three
theoretical arguments are put forward for why this should not be so, and a theoretical
framework is set out for deciding when and how to take environmental factors into
account in competition decisions.
Part III examines, as an empirical matter, what the present approaches to environmental
factors are in the various fields of Community competition policy, namely Articles 81, 82,
86 and 87 EC, as well as in Community merger policy. Using Part II’s theoretical
conclusions, it considers whether, as a normative matter, these approaches are defensible
and, where this is not the case, proposes alternative approaches.
Finally, Part IV summarises the conclusions of the research.
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Part I: An Environmental Policy Perspective –
Developments in Community Environmental Policy of
Relevance to Competition Policy
In order to understand the potential significance of environmental policy to Community
competition law analysis, it is first necessary to be familiar with certain key features of
this policy. This Part outlines the principal developments in Community environmental
policy since its inception which are of potential importance to competition analysis.
Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the main stages in the evolution of Community
environmental law from 1957 to date, and focuses on two elements of Community
environmental policy of particular importance to competition policy: the ambiguous
notion of “sustainable development” and the imperative of integrating environmental
protection requirements into other Community policies. Chapter 3 examines the
distinction between direct and market-based (economic) environmental regulatory
instruments. Finally, Chapter 4 examines the three market-based instruments used in
Community environmental policy which are of most importance to Community
competition policy: state subsidies and taxes, tradable permit schemes, and voluntary
environmental agreements.
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Chapter 2: The Evolution of Community Environmental Policy and the Role of
Sustainable Development and the Integration Principle
This Chapter aims first to outline the principal formative stages in the development of
Community environmental policy, describing its spectacular growth from an area not
mentioned at all in the 1957 Treaty of Rome to its position 50 years later as, in the
perception of many, one of the pre-eminent EU competences. Second, it takes a closer
look at two features of Community environmental policy which, it will be argued, are of
particular relevance to competition analysis: the aim of “sustainable development” and
the obligation to integrate environmental policy into other Community activities (the
“integration” principle).
1. A swift tour through the evolution of Community environmental policy since
19571
The remarkable development in the Community’s environmental policy may usefully be
broken down into five periods: 1957 – 1972, 1973 – 1986, 1987 – 1992, 1993 – 1998 and
1999 – present.
a. Prelude: 1957 – 1972
The beginnings of the Community’s environmental policy were inauspicious. There was
no express mention of the area at all in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. This was, of course,
due to the essentially economic impetus for the 1957 Treaty: although the achievement
of peace was at the long-term core of the EEC project, this was, following the vision of
Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, to be achieved by setting specific economic aims.2
Nor was this surprising: when the Treaty of Rome was concluded, the field of
“environmental” law, as we now know it, was a relatively new area within the signatory
Member States, though national laws had long existed governing certain aspects of the
current field, such as rules on private property and public health.3 At international level,
a collection of rules was just beginning to emerge in discrete environment-related areas, a
process which had begun with the bilateral fisheries treaties of the mid-nineteenth
century and in which the 1949 United Nations Conference on the Conservation and
Utilisation of Resources (UNCCUR) was a landmark event. These developments
undoubtedly contributed to the subsequent emergence of Community environmental
law.
Despite the Treaty of Rome’s lack of an express “environmental” chapter, 1957 – 1972
nonetheless constitutes the first period of what can now be viewed as the Community’s
environmental policy. As such, it broadly corresponds to what Joseph Weiler has termed
the “foundational period” of Europe – a period in which the Community “assumed, in
stark change from the original conception of the Treaty, its basic legal and political characteristics.”4
Though “environmental” discourse became increasingly prevalent in the late 1950s and
1 See, further, for example, Jans and Vedder, European Environmental Law (Groningen, Europa, 2008),
Chapter 1; Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 740; Sands, 'European Community Environmental Law: The Evolution of a Regional Regime
of International Environmental Protection' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2511; Holder and Lee,
Environmental Protection, Law and Policy, 155; Krämer, “Thirty years of EC environmental law:
perspectives and prospectives” (2000) Yearbook of European Environmental Law 155; McGillivray and
Holder, Locating EC Environmental Law (2001) 2 Yearbook of Environmental Law 67.
2 Thus, by the preamble to the 1957 Treaty, Europe was to be built “through practical achievements which will
first of all create real solidarity, and through the establishment of common bases for economic development.”
3 See Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004) and Sands,
Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 25-35.
4 Weiler, The Transformation of Europe (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2410.
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in the 1960s at international level,5 there was little appetite for Community activity in the
environmental field as the institutions and Member States alike were immersed in the
task of defining the Community legal and political order in this period. At a legal level,
the European Court of Justice was preoccupied with “constitutionalising” the
Community legal order (via the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, implied external
powers, and so on) - which doctrines were quite controversial enough without at the
same time trying to read a Community environmental competence into the Treaty. At a
political level, this period marked the rather painful hammering out of far-reaching veto
rights for Member States in the Council of Ministers (via de Gaulle’s 1965 “empty chair”
policy and the subsequent Luxembourg Accord, in effect preserving a right of veto for
Member States over proposed Community legislation).
Nonetheless, a small amount of Community legislation was adopted in these years on
what would now be considered to be “environmental” matters. In this period, as well as
in the second period (1972 – 1986), two legal bases were used for such legislation, each
requiring unanimity of voting in the Council. The first was Article 100 (now Article 94
EC), empowering the Council to “issue Directives for the approximation of such
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative actions in Member States as
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market”. The second
was Article 235 (now Article 308 EC), empowering the Council to adopt measures where
“action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community” and where
the Treaty had not provided the necessary powers. The Community’s first legislative
attempt to address environment-related issues was the 1967 adoption of a Directive on
the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances:6 based on Article
100, however, it was explicitly aimed at removing the hindrances to trade caused by
differing national legislation on the matter, rather than at environmental protection per
se.7 This early legislation, therefore, was premised on economic, rather than
environmental, reasoning - any achievement of environmental improvement by
Community legislation was, in principle, a side effect.
b. The true beginnings: 1973 - 1986
The first real sign of a distinct Community environmental policy came in the run-up to
the landmark 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm, convened in 1968 by the United Nations General Assembly.8 In this way,
the birth of Community environmental law occurred simultaneously with the beginning
of a new period in international environmental law: as concern mounted for the
“continuing and accelerating impairment of the quality of the human environment”,9 the impetus for
international and regional environmental action grew. Thus, while Article 2 of the Treaty
of Rome, which set out the EEC’s aims, had listed among these aims “a harmonious
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, and
accelerated raising of the standard of living”, the 1972 Paris Summit of the European Council
made clear that to focus solely on economic growth was wrong-headed, declaring that
5 See Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2003), at 32-34.
6 Directive 67/548 OJ 1967 L 196/1 (subsequently amended).
7 However, protection of public health was mentioned as an aim in the preamble.
8 UNGA Res. 2398 (XXIII)(1968). See Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed.,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 36-40.
9 Resolution adopted in July 1968 and a precursor to the convening of the Stockholm Conference:
ECOSOC Res. 1346 (XLV)(1968).
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“economic expansion is not an end in itself. Rather, its aim is to reduce disparities in living conditions
and to improve the quality and standard of living.” The declaration continued,
“as befits the genius of Europe, particular attention will be given to intangible values and to
protecting the environment so that progress may really be put to the service of mankind.”10
The Commission had already, however, got the ball rolling: the Paris Declaration
followed the Commission’s 1970 announcement that it would draw up a Community
action programme on the environment, and the 1971 Commission Communication on
Community environmental policy, in which it proposed using Article 235 (now 308 EC)
as a legal basis for potential Community environmental measures.11 In 1973, the first
Action Programme for the Environment was adopted, in the form of a political
declaration by the Council and the representatives of Member States’ governments
meeting in the Council, due to France’s concern that the Treaty provisions were, in their
then form, not an appropriate basis for a European environmental policy.12 In setting
out the Community’s environmental programme for the next four years, the First Action
programme specified that the Community’s Article 2 task of promoting throughout the
Community a harmonious development of economic activities and a continuous and
balanced expansion “cannot now be imagined in the absence of an effective campaign to combat
pollution and nuisances or of an improvement in the quality of life and the protection of the
environment.”13
By thus reading in environmental protection as a necessary component of the aim of
achieving economic growth, despite the fact that it was not expressly mentioned as an
Article 2 aim of the Community, the programme opened the way for the adoption of
Community environmental legislation. This movement was very much rooted in a what
may be viewed as a form of neo-functionalism, in that the adoption of environmental law
and policy took place as a functional “spillover” from the primary economic aims of the
Community.14 Following the first Action programme, three further Action programmes
were adopted between 1972 and 1987.15 More than 150 pieces of Community
environmental legislation were passed between 1972 and 1987, covering such diverse
areas as environmental impact assessments, waste control, the protection of flora and
fauna, and water and air quality.16 In addition, the Community signed its first
international environmental treaties in this period.17 Such legislation was, by necessity,
based on either Article 100 (where it could be argued that the legislation aimed to help
10 Paris Declaration of the European Council, cited in the preamble to the First Action Programme on the
Environment, OJ 1973 C 112/1.
11 Commission Communication on a Community Policy for the Environment SEC (71) 2616 (July 22,
1971).
12 See Krämer, EC Environmental Law (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 6th edition 2006), ch. 1.
13 Preamble to the First Action Programme on the Environment, OJ 1973 C 112/1.
14 On neo-functionalism generally, see, for example, Haas, “European Integration: The European and
Universal Process” International Organization 4 (1961) 607, Greilsammer, Theorising European
Integration in its Four Periods, 2 Jerusalem Journal of International Relations (1976) 129 and Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2455.
15 Second Programme (1977 – 1981) OJ 1977 C 399/1, Third Programme (1982 – 1986) OJ 1983 C46/1,
Fourth Programme (1987 – 1992) OJ 1987 C 328/1.
16 See, for example, Directive 85/337 on environmental impact assessments OJ 1985 L 175/40, Directive
75/442 on waste OJ 1975 L 194/23, Directive 79/409 on the conservation of wild birds OJ 1979 L 103/1,
Directive 75/440 on surface water OJ 1975 L 194/26, Directive 84/360 on the combating of air pollution
from industrial plants OJ 1984 L 188/20.
17 See, for example, the Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, Decision 75/437 OJ 1975 L 194/5.
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achieve the common market)18 or Article 235 (where no common market rationale could
reasonably be found, but there were non-economic reasons for action at Community
level);19 indeed, most legislation was based on both articles.20 In 1985, the ECJ in the
landmark ADBHU case confirmed the validity of using Article 235 EC as a legal basis
for environmental legislation on the basis that environmental protection was “one of the
Community’s essential objectives” justifying certain limits on the principle of freedom of
trade.21 In so holding, the ECJ gave important approval of the Paris Summit’s approach
that environmental aims were inherent to the Community’s objective of economic
expansion – meaning that, before any appearance of an environmental title in the Treaty,
the enaction of Community environmental legislation lacking any obvious economic
motivation was permissible.22 This significant judgment, with its constitutionalising
effects, was one of the first indications of the pro-environment stance for which the ECJ
has since become known.
c. Formalisation of status: 1987 – 1992
The rather uncertain status of Community environmental policy was formalised by
Article 25 of the Single European Act (SEA) 1986, which inserted a new Title VII on the
Environment into the Treaty,23 making environmental protection an express objective of
the Community. While it was clear that this remained an ancillary, “flanking”, policy to
the primary Community aim of achieving the internal market, the Title nonetheless
contained a specific legal basis for environmental legislation (Article 130s), making it
unnecessary to find an economic justification for the legislation or to use the “catch-all”
Article 235 provision. Voting remained, however, subject to unanimity under Article
130s, though Member States could maintain or introduce more stringent protective
measures than those passed on the basis of Article 130s, if compatible with the Treaty
and notified to the Commission (Article 130t, one of the so-called “environmental
guarantee” provisions).24
In contrast, and equally as importantly for the development of the Community’s
environmental policy, the SEA introduced a new Article 100a allowing internal market
legislation (with some exceptions) to be passed by qualified majority – a revolutionary
development which greatly freed up the legislative process.25 Moreover, environmental
measures passed under this provision had to take “as a base a high level of
18 For example, Directive 80/778 on drinking water OJ 1980 L 229/11, Directive 73/404 on detergents OJ
1973 L 347/51. The practice of basing such legislation on Article 100 was in principle confirmed as
compatible with the Treaty by the ECJ in Case 92/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 1115.
19 See, for example, Directive 79/409 on the conservation of wild birds OJ 1979 L 103/1.
20 See, for example, Directive 85/337 on environmental impact assessments OJ 1985 L 175/40, Directive
84/360 on combating air pollution from industrial plants OJ 1984 L 188/20, and Directive 78/319 on
toxic and dangerous waste OJ 1978 L 84/43.
21 Case 240/83 ADBHU [1985] ECR 531, para 13.
22 The judgment should be seen in the context of what Weiler has termed the “mutation” of jurisdiction
and competences which occurred in the Community between 1973 and 1986, entailing the “brick-by-brick
demolition of the wall circumscribing Community competences.” Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” (1991)
100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2449.
23 Articles 130r-t – present Articles 174 – 176 EC.
24 On the functioning of Article 130t (now Article 176 EC), see, for example, Case C-6/03
Deponiezweckverband Eiterköpfe v Land Rheinland-Pflaz [2005] ECR I-2753.
25 The insertion of this Article led to a myriad of legal basis disputes before the ECJ on the question
whether a given piece of environmental legislation ought to have been passed on the basis of Article 130t
(unanimous voting, consultation of the Parliament) or Article 100a (qualified majority voting, cooperation
procedure with the Parliament), such as Case C-300/89 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) [1991] ECR
2867.
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environmental protection”26 and Member States had the possibility of notifying the
Commission if they deemed it necessary to “apply” national provisions in order to
protect the environment despite the adoption of Community harmonising legislation
(another environmental guarantee provision).27
The SEA expressly set out the objectives of the newly formalised Community
environment policy (Article 130r(1)) – preserving, protecting and improving the quality of
the environment, contributing towards protecting human health, and ensuring a prudent
and rational utilization of natural resources. Importantly, it also set out a number of
what it termed “principles”, which were to form a foundation of the Community’s
environmental policy (Article 130r(2)). These were: (1) the principle that “preventive action
should be taken”; (2) the principle that “environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at
source”; (3) the principle that the polluter should pay; and (4) a type of “integration”
principle, requiring that environmental considerations be “a component of the Community’s
other policies” – a concept which will be discussed in detail below. Although not forming
part of Article 130r(2), another de facto “principle” of environmental law formalised by
the SEA was that of subsidiarity (Article 130r(4)).28 The SEA also made express
provision for the Community to participate in international environmental agreements
(Article 130r(4)).
Pursuant to these changes, a separate Directorate-General for the Environment (at that
time, “DG XI”) was formed in the Commission. These developments had a momentous
effect on the development and formalisation of the Community’s environmental policy.
The amount and scope of Community environmental legislation increased steadily.29
Some of the Commission’s proposals - for example, the proposal for a carbon tax,
discussed in Chapter 4 - were, at the time, too ambitious for the Member States,
however, and were put to one side.
d. Consolidation: 1993 – 1998
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty brought with it a subtle upgrade in the
perceived importance of the Community’s environmental policy compared to other
policies. Immensely politically significant was the first insertion into Article 2 EC - the
fundamental aims of the Community - of an express reference to environmental
protection, including as one of the aims of the Community “the promotion, throughout the
Community, of a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-
inflationary growth respecting the environment.” Though this was criticised by some as a pale
imitation of the true concept of sustainable development, Maastricht also introduced
substantial, more practical, changes for the Community’s environmental policy - most
26 Article 100a(3).
27 See Article 100a(4), “If, after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the Council acting by a qualified majority, a
Member State deems it necessary to apply national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating
to protection of the environment or the working environment , it shall notify the Commission of these provisions. The
Commission shall confirm the provisions involved after having verified that they are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or
a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.”
28 Article 130r(4) provided that, “The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the extent to which the
objectives [of Community environmental policy, set out above] can be attained better at Community level than at the level of the
individual Member States.” The notion of subsidiarity had been present from the beginning in the
Community’s environment policy, featuring prominently in the Community’s First Environment
Programme.
29 Significant legislation passed included including legislation creating the European Environment Agency
and legislation introducing an eco-label for environmentally-friendly products (Regulation 1210/90 on the
Establishment of the European Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and
Observation Network OJ 1990 L 120/1, Regulation 880/92 on a Community eco label award scheme OJ
1992 L 99/1).
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notably, the introduction of qualified majority voting for the environment legal basis
(Article 130s EC, subject to certain express exceptions);30 the formalisation of the status
of the environmental action programmes;31 and the addition of the “precautionary
principle”32 to the principles of the Community’s environmental policy. Further, the
Treaty definition of the “integration principle” was beefed up, from the SEA’s
requirement that environmental considerations be a “component” of other Community
policies to the requirement that, “environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the
definition and implementation of other Community policies” (emphasis added). Finally, the
principle of subsidiarity, which had been inserted by the SEA into the title on the
environment, was elevated to Part One of the Treaty, on the fundamental “Principles” of
the Community (Article 3b) – meaning it was henceforth horizontally applicable to all
areas of Community competence save, by its terms, areas of exclusive Community
competence.33
e. Further promotion: 1999 – present
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in May 1999, marked a further
promotion and concretisation of the Community’s environmental aims. First, it
introduced the promotion of a “high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the
environment” as an Article 2 EC objective of the Community.34 This clearly represented a
significant elevation in status – albeit in the form of a policy guideline, rather than a legal
rule. At the same time, it modified the wording of Article 2 EC to refer to the aim of
promoting a “harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities” (in place of
the SEA’s reference to “balanced development” and “sustainable growth”). Likewise, the Treaty
on European Union was amended to include among its objectives the promotion of
“economic and social progress and [of achieving] balanced and sustainable development.”35 Second, the
integration principle followed subsidiarity in being upgraded from its position in the
Environment Title (former Article 130r EC) to be included in Part One of the Treaty on
the “Principles” of the Community - becoming Article 6 EC, and for the first time
30 See Article 175(2) EC (fiscal measures and measures concerning town and country planning, land use
other than waste management, and management of water resources remained subject to unanimity of
voting).
31 Article 175(3) EC. This led to, inter alia, the avoidance of specific commitments in such programmes,
and a preference instead for language such as “priority areas for action”: see Krämer, “Thirty years of EC
environmental law: perspectives and prospectives” (2000) Yearbook of European Environmental Law
155, 164.
32 Although this is not defined anywhere in the Treaty, the Commission has come close to a definition in
its Communication on the Precautionary Principle (COM (2000)1 final) as a risk management strategy to
be employed “when there are reasonable grounds for concern that potential hazards may affect the environment or human,
animal or plant health, and when at the same time the available data preclude a detailed risk evaluation” (meaning that
the benefit of the doubt may be given to protection of health).
33 In addition, Community financial support for environmental projects was bolstered by the insertion of
Article 130d(2) (present Article 161(2) EC), providing for a Cohesion Fund to be set up in the field of the
environment.
34 It also modified the wording of Article 2 EC to refer to the aim of promoting a “harmonious, balanced and
sustainable development of economic activities”
35 Article 2, TEU, from the Maastricht version of promotion of “economic and social progress which is balanced
and sustainable.” Further important environmental changes brought about by Amsterdam were: (1) the
“environmental guarantee” provisions of Article 95 (ex 100a) EC were expanded to specify that Member
States could, despite the passing of Community harmonisation measures, maintain in force existing
environmental measures or introduce new environmental measures, as long as these measures satisfy the
requirements set out in Articles 95(4) or (5) EC respectively; and (2) the switch in decision-making
procedures for (as it then was) Article 130s EC (present Article 175 EC) from the co-operation procedure
to the co-decision procedure. While this did not as such make passing environmental legislation easier, or
improve the standard of environmental protection, it meant a greater, co-legislative role for Parliament,
thus increasing the democratic credentials of Community environmental legislation.
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specifying the promotion of sustainable development as its principal aim. This change
has, it will be argued, important implications for the principle’s function and the
importance of the duty which it places on those defining and implementing Community
policies and activities.36
As a result of, inter alia, these Treaty changes, we have seen a huge surge from this period
to date in the amount of Community environmental legislation emanating from Brussels,
generally corresponding to the “priority areas” flagged in the applicable Environmental
Action Programmes.37 This has also been reflected in the remarkable increase in the
environmental cases coming before the Court over the last 10-15 years.38 These cases
have dealt with sectoral issues ranging from issues of interpretation of secondary
legislation such as the Waste Directive, the Wild Birds Directive and the Habitats
Directive, to more horizontal “constitutional” issues such as in the landmark ruling that
the Commission is entitled to base proposals requiring Member States to criminalise
serious environmental offences on a legal basis in the EC, rather than the EU, Treaty.39
No significant change was made to the environmental provisions by the Treaty of Nice.40
Nor will the Lisbon Treaty, if and when ratified by all Member States, bring substantial
changes in these provisions. In particular, though environmental values do not feature in
the new Article 2 EU list of values upon which the Union is “founded”, Article 3(3) EU
provides that the Union, “shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the
environment.”41 The Lisbon Treaty retains the Constitutional Treaty’s provision specifying
that one of the goals of the Union’s external relations policy is the “sustainable development
of the Earth” (Article 3 EU). This is confirmed, and more detail added, by Article 10a
EU.42
As regards the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the present
Article 6 EC environmental integration principle has been shifted to Article 11 TFEU,
36 On the implications of this shift, see Wasmeier, The integration of environmental protection as a general
rule for interpreting Community law (2001) CML Rev 159, at 161.
37 For example, the Fifth Environmental Action Programme entitled “Towards Sustainability”, which
covered the period from 1993 to 2001, saw particular legislative activity in the Programme’s eight
“priority” areas: climate change and ozone layer depletion; air quality; nature protection and biodiversity
(e.g., the Habitats Directive); management of water resources; the quality of the urban environment; noise;
regulating coastal zones; and waste management.
38 See further, Jacobs, “The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the Environment”
Journal of Environmental Law 18 (2006) 185. For instance, Jacobs observes that nigh on one third of all
of the Article 226 EC infringement cases lodged before the ECJ are environmental cases: ibid. Insofar as
particular Community environmental legislative and policy measures or Court judgments are of relevance
to competition policy, they will be considered in subsequent Chapters.
39 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879.
40 The institutional changes made in preparation for the challenges of enlargement are clearly equally
relevant to the legislative procedure for environmental legislation, however.
41 It is interesting to contrast this with the arguable “demotion” of competition policy in Article 3 EU, with
the removal from the list of the former Article 3(1)(g) EC activity of “a system ensuring that competition in the
internal market is not distorted” at the behest of French premier Nicolas Sarkozy. The significance of this will
be discussed further in Chapter 6.
42 Article 10a EU includes as part of the EU’s aims in external relations the aim of fostering “the sustainable
economic social and environmental development of developing countries”, though this is explicitly “with the primary aim of
eradicating poverty”. New Article 4 TFEU confirms that competence to make environmental policy is shared
between the Member States and the Union. Note that the term “Community” is deleted from the Treaties
by the Lisbon Treaty, with all references to “Community” becoming references to “Union”.
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under the heading “Provisions having general application”.43 As such, this maintains the
upgrading achieved by the Treaty of Amsterdam from the sectoral, environment-specific
provisions of the Treaty to its horizontally-applicable provisions. Further, other diluted
forms of integration principle have been added under this heading (e.g., on
discrimination and equality), though these are less strongly worded than Article 11
TFEU. Under the environmental title, the Article 174 TFEU aims of the Union’s
environmental policy are amended so as explicitly to include the fight against climate
change as one of the regional or worldwide problems with which the Union’s
international action in the environmental field is tasked with dealing.44 Further, a passerelle
clause is included in the environmental legal basis provision, Article 175 TFEU, whereby
those exceptionally sensitive areas which have to date been subject to unanimity of
voting45 may be made subject to qualified majority voting following a unanimous
decision of the Council and after consultation of the Parliament – without the necessity
for Treaty amendment. Finally, under the title on energy, the aims of the EU’s energy
policy are specified to include “the development of new and renewable forms of energy”.46
2. Focus on sustainable development and the integration principle
From this brief historical overview of the substantial formal changes in Community
environmental law since 1957, we can extract two elements of Community
environmental policy which, it will be argued, are of particular relevance to competition
policy: the aim of sustainable development and the integration principle. These elements
are widely viewed as forming part of the trend towards “modernisation” of
environmental policy, a trend which aims at integrating economic and environmental
interests into decision-making to arrive at what are often termed “win-win” solutions.47
Although formally separate principles of Community law, they are closely linked: each is
premised on the belief that economic growth may be achieved while respecting and even
promoting environmental protection; and each has come under fire for being
unimpeachable in principle, but unattainable in practice. This section analyses the
meaning of each of these principles. The analysis will form the basis of the assessment
of the implications of these principles for competition policy in Parts II and III.
a. The role of the “sustainable development” goal in Community law
and policy
i. Economic origins of the goal
The principle of sustainable development is, in essence, an attempt to “solve” one of the
classic problems with which economists have tried to grapple for years: the
“sustainability” problem. This problem may be summarised briefly thus.48 The human
population is increasing rapidly - according to the UN, the world’s population will
43 It is also present in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to which Article 6 EU accords binding status by
reference, at Article 37, “A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of
the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the
principle of sustainable development.”
44 Article 174(1) TFEU, fourth indent.
45 For example, town and country planning.
46 Article 176a TFEU.
47 See European Commission, “Integration of Environmental Considerations into other Policy Areas – a
Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process” COM (2004) 394 final: “by adapting and building on existing environmental
policy approaches and seeking win-win solutions.”
48 Perman, Ma, McGilvray and Common, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics (3rd ed., Essex,
Pearson Education Limited, 2003), ch. 2.
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increase by 2.5 billion by 2050, from the 2006 figure of 6.7 billion to 9.2 billion.49 Much
of this population is desperately poor. As poverty alleviation which depends on
redistribution from the better-off to the poor encounters resistance from the better-off,
many economists’ standard solution to poverty is economic growth - thus increasing the
size of the “cake” to be distributed.50 However, the world’s resource base is limited, and
the economy and the environment are inextricably inter-related.51 An increase in
population size and per capita affluence will inevitably, in most economists’ view, have a
greater impact on the environment.52 The sustainability problem, from an economist’s
perspective, is therefore: How can poverty be alleviated in a way which does not affect
the natural environment such that future economic prospects suffer?53
There is, as one might predict, a huge spectrum of views among economists as to the
best answer to this question. Some economists think that economic growth has,
ultimately, positive effects on the environment. This view is epitomised by Beckerman,
who argues that, because there is a strong correlation between incomes and the extent to
which environmental protection measures are adopted, “in the longer run, the surest way to
improve your environment is to become rich.”54 Such economists often reach this conclusion on
the basis of what is termed the “environmental Kuznets curve”. Under this view, a
relationship exists between environmental degradation and affluence similar to the
Kuznets curve - that is, the inverted “U” figure which Kuznets posited existed between
inequality in income distribution and affluence (Figure 1 below).
49 UN Press Release of 13 March 2007, POP/952, available at:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/pop952.doc.htm.
50 Indeed, one of the leading economists of the twentieth century, J.M. Keynes, viewed economic growth
as the potential solution to what was taken to be the ultimate economic problem - the problem of scarcity -
such that economists themselves would become redundant.
51 For example, the environment performs essential services enabling economic activity, such as providing
a resource base (e.g. for extraction of minerals), a waste sink, and a base for amenity services (e.g.,
recreation), not to mention its overarching “life support” service to all plant and animal life. See further,
Chapter 8.
52 A useful, though simple, equation used by economists to denote the interrelationship between economic
activity, population and the environment is the “IPAT identity”: I = P x A x T, where I is impact on the
environment, measured as mass or volume; P is population size; A is per capital affluence, measured in
currency units; T is technology, meaning the amount of the resource used or waste generated per unit
production. See Perman et al, note 2 above, at 29.
53 Perman et al, note 48 above, at 16.
54 Beckerman, “Economic Growth and the Environment: Whose Growth? Whose Environment?” World
Development 20, 481-496, (1992).
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Figure 1: Model Kuznets Curve55
In an “environmental Kuznets curve”, the “income inequality” axis is replaced by an
“environmental degradation” axis (e.g., pollution). Essentially, the argument is that, at
the outset of economic development, industrialisation increases and agricultural and
other resource extraction intensifies, meaning that resources are depleted more quickly
than they are generated and waste generation increases sharply. As development
progresses, however, the importance of information-based industries and the services
sector in the economy tends to grow. This factor, combined with greater environmental
awareness, the development of environmental regulation, better technology and more
expenditure on environmental protection, puts a stop to environmental degradation and
ultimately results in environmental improvement.56
If the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis held, this would imply that, far from
there being a conflict between economic growth and environmental protection,
economic growth in fact holds the key to environmental improvement in the long run -
though it is damaging to the environment in the short- and medium-term.
The truth of the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis is, however, hotly disputed as
an empirical matter.57 Many economists argue that there are definite limits placed on
55 Adapted from Kuznets, “Economic growth and income inequality” American Economic Review 49, 1-
28 (1955).
56 See further, Panayotou, Empirical Tests and Policy Analysis of Environmental Degradation at Different
Stages of Economic Development, Working Paper WP238, Technology and Employment Programme,
International Labor Office, Geneva (1993).
57 See further, for example, Panayotou, “Economic Growth and the Environment”, Paper prepared for
and presented at the Spring Seminar of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva,
March 3, 2003, available at: http://www.unece.org/ead/sem/sem2003/papers/panayotou.pdf. For a
scientific (and surprising) view, arrived at after a large scale scientific investigation, that the environmental
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economic growth by the environment and by the fact that natural resources are limited.
This view was epitomised by the work of Meadows et al in their 1972 publication, The
Limits to Growth (also known as the “Club of Rome” report), which was highly influential
at the time.58 Taking as premises the ideas that there are limits to the amount of land
available for agriculture, limits to the agricultural output of land, limits to the amounts of
non-renewable resources available for extraction, and limits to the environment’s ability
to assimilate waste, their conclusions were that, if present growth trends in world
population, industrialisation, pollution, food production and resources depletion
continue, the limits to growth on Earth would be reached sometime within the next 100
years. The most probable result of this, in their view, would be a “sudden and uncontrollable
decline in both population and industrial capacity.” They noted, however, that it may be
possible to change these trends and to achieve a sustainable global equilibrium, so that
the basic material needs of each person on Earth might be satisfied. The authors
updated and reconfirmed their findings in 1992, on the occasion of the UNCED
conference in Rio de Janeiro.59
The original Club of Rome report set the economic foundation for the policy
developments of the early 1970s in sustainable development at international and
Community level.
ii. The emergence of sustainable development as an
international policy goal
Promoted to the fundamental objectives of the Community in Article 2 EC by the Treaty
of Amsterdam, the concept of “sustainable development” was put forward by the 1987
Brundtland Report of the UN’s World Commission on Environment and Development,
entitled Our Common Future. That report coined what has become the classic definition of
sustainable development, as,
“development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.”60
Brundtland went on to set out a broad concept of sustainable development, with two
distinct elements – one social, one environmental: (1) the (social) aim of “meeting the
basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for a
better life”; and (2) the limited nature of environmental resources by the state of
technology and society and by the biosphere’s ability to absorb the effects of human
activities.61 The multifaceted nature of the concept was developed by the 1992 UN
Convention on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in its principle 3, “the
right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of
present and future generations”; and principle 4, “in order to achieve sustainable development,
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be
considered in isolation from it.” The Rio conference led to the development of “Agenda 21”
- a non-binding “blueprint for action” towards a “global partnership for sustainable development”,
Kuznets curve hypothesis only holds true for birds, see Naidoo and Adamowicz, “Effects of Economic
Prosperity on Numbers of Threatened Species”, Conservation Biology, 15(4), 1021 (2001).
58 Meadows, Meadows, Randers and Behrens, The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s
project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York, Earth Island, Universe Books, 1972). See further,
Dobson, Green Political Thought (London, Routledge, 2000).
59 Meadows, Meadows and Randers, Beyond the Limits: Global Collapse or a Sustainable Future (London,
Earthscan, 1992).
60 Brundtland et al, Our Common Future (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987).
61 This acceptance of certain “limits to growth” was an attempt at a compromise between advocates of
economic growth in the 1970s/1980s and those who believed that there were strict limits to growth as the
earth’s resources are finite.
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which was adopted by 178 governments of UN members at the UNCED conference in
1992.62 The theme was continued in the Declaration of the 2002 UN World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, by which the signatories agreed to,
“assume a collective responsibility to advance and strengthen the interdependent and
mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development - economic development, social
development and environmental protection - at the local, national, regional and global
levels.”63
The Johannesburg Declaration illustrates well what have come to be accepted
internationally as the three “pillars” of sustainable development: its economic, social and
environmental elements – bound together by the overarching very long-term aim of
meeting the “needs of future generations”. In particular, Johannesburg represented a
subtle shift in emphasis from the environmental pillar of sustainability to the aim of
reducing - and ultimately eliminating - poverty.64 The extent to which the outcomes of
the UNCED conference and the Johannesburg Declaration have made a real practical
difference to UN members’ laws and policies is, however, highly debatable. Many
commentators are of the view that the practical value of such non-binding, “soft” law
instruments is very little, and that they fail to trammel UN states’ policies liable to result,
for example, in environmental damage.65
iii. Sustainable development as an EU goal: the policy
developments
At EU level, the three-dimensional sustainability concept has become a central pillar of
EU policy. Although, post-Rio, the Community (in conjunction with the Member States)
had issued a first Community sustainable development programme,66 the process was
kick-started again in 2001 with the Commission’s proposal of an EU “Sustainable
Development Strategy” (“SDS”) to the Gothenburg European Council – a proposal very
much inspired by the sustainable development limb of the Community’s Fifth
Environmental Action Programme.67 The Commission’s proposal contained the
62 Agenda 21 was divided into a number of elements: (1) social and economic dimensions of sustainable
development, such as combating poverty, protecting and promoting health, and integrating the
environment and development in decision-making; (2) conservation and management of resources for
development, such as protection of the atmosphere and combating deforestation; (3) strengthening the
role of specific groups in sustainable development, such as young people, business and farmers; (4) means
of implementing the policy of sustainable development, such as research and education. While laudable in
principle, it is questionable whether Agenda 21 has had much practical impact on governments’ policies
internationally. As such, it is arguably a good example of typical “soft” law international recommendations
on sustainable development.
63 Johannesburg Declaration, para 5.
64 The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation stated that, “eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge facing
the world today and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, particularly for developing countries.”
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, para 7.
65 See, for example, for a critical review of the Johannesburg conference and declaration, Wapner, “World
Summit on Sustainable Development: Toward a Post Jo’burg Environmentalism”, (2003) 3(1) Global
Environmental Politics 1.
66 See the Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on
a Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development
OJ 1993 C 138/1.
67 Commission, “A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable
Development” COM (2001) 264 final and Fifth Environmental Action Programme, “Towards Sustainable
Development” OJ 1993 C 138/1.
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following (more or less concrete) elements to tackle what it identified as the key trends
towards sustainability:68
 The improvement of policy coherence. This means that, “All policies must have
sustainable development as their core concern” (emphasis in the original).69 Thus,
“[s]ustainable development should become the central objective of all sectors and policies. This
means that policy makers must identify likely spillovers – good and bad – onto other policy areas
and take them into account. Careful assessment of the full effects of a policy proposal must include
estimates of its economic, environmental and social impacts inside and outside the EU.”70
 Getting prices right to give signals to individuals and businesses, meaning that the
Commission will, “give priority in its policy and legislative proposals to market-based approaches
that provide price incentives, whenever these are likely to achieve social and environmental objectives
in a flexible and cost effective way.”71
 Investment in science and technology for sustainable development, focusing on
“basics and applied research into safe and environmentally-benign technologies, and on benchmarking
and demonstration projects to stimulate faster uptake of new, safer, cleaner technologies.”72
 Improvement in communication and the mobilisation of citizens and business to
create popular “ownership” of the goal of sustainable development, including
encouraging a greater sense of “corporate social responsibility” and “establishing a
framework to ensure that businesses integrate environmental and social considerations in their
activities.”73
 Ensuring that the EU’s internal and external policies actively support efforts by third
countries to achieve more sustainable development.74
Though recognising that it was an “ambitious vision”, the Commission hoped the strategy
would be a “catalyst for policy-makers and public opinion in the coming years and…a driving force for
institutional reform, and for changes in corporate and consumer behaviour.”75 At the Gothenburg
Summit, the European Council welcomed the proposal,76 declaring that it was adding a
68 Namely, combating climate change, ensuring sustainable transport, addressing threats to public health,
such as chemicals pollution, unsafe food and infectious diseases, managing natural resources more
responsibly and stopping biodiversity decline, combating poverty and social exclusion, and meeting the
challenge of an ageing population: Ibid, 4.
69 Ibid, 6.
70 Ibid, 6. See further, Chapter 3.
71 Ibid, 7. See further, Chapter 3.
72 Ibid, 7.
73 Ibid, 8.
74 Ibid, 9. See, Commission Communication, “Towards a Global Partnership for Sustainable
Development” COM 2002 2 final and Regulation 2493/2000 on Measures to Promote the Full Integration
of the Environmental Dimension in the Development Process of Developing Countries OJ 2000 L 288/1.
75 Ibid, 3.
76 See the Presidency Conclusions at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-
r1.en1.pdf.
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third limb to the “Lisbon Strategy”77 and agreeing that a stocktaking of progress on
sustainable development should take place at the annual Spring European Council.78
The EU’s Sixth Environment Action Programme for 2002 – 2012 formed the basis for
implementing the SDS in Community environmental policy.79 This was followed by the
2005 review of the SDS by the Commission and an accompanying European Council
Declaration which, inter alia, urged Member States to review their own national
sustainable development strategies in the light of the EU’s SDS and to consider how to
integrate their policy instruments with EU action.80 This was reaffirmed by the Council
in adopting the final text of the renewed EU SDS in 2006.81
iv. Sustainable development as an EU goal: the practice
In practical terms, sustainable development has two distinct elements at EU policy level:
procedural and substantive.
The first, procedural, aspect of sustainability is impact assessment. The 2001 SDS laid
the foundation for this aspect of the EU’s sustainable development strategy. Following a
2002 Commission Communication, an extended ex-ante impact assessment must be
undertaken by the Commission (and, where Member States exercise the right of
legislative initiative under the third pillar, by Member States) when proposing all major
policy measures.82 Completed Commission Impact Assessements are made public. This
multilateral, procedural approach enables the environmental, economic and social
impacts of legislative proposals to be considered, involving not only DG Environment
and the “lead” DG (i.e., the DG which has primary responsibility for the proposal), but
also other DGs – requiring a sustainability impact assessment for all major policy
proposals.83 Pursuant to the inter-institutional agreement on Better Lawmaking of 2003,
77 I.e., the goal set for the Union in at the Lisbon European Council “to become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better gobs and greater social
cohesion.” See Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, March 23, and 24, 2000,
relaunched in 2005 (Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, March 22 and 23, 2005). A
new cycle of the Lisbon Strategy was launched in 2008 (Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European
Council, March 13 and 14, 2008).
78 In the 2005 SDS review, the Commission recognised this stocktaking commitment had not been
successful, and announced the development of a reinforced review system: “The 2005 Review of the EU
sustainable development strategy: initial stocktaking and future orientations” COM (2005) 37.
79 Decision 1600/2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environmental Action Programme OJ 2002 L
242/1.
80 “The 2005 Review of the EU sustainable development strategy: initial stocktaking and future
orientations” COM (2005) 37; Presidency Conclusions DOC 10255/05, Brussels European Council, June
16 and 17, 2005. The firmly environmentally modernist approach was reaffirmed in the 2005 mid-term
review of the Lisbon Strategy, where the Commission stated its aim as to make, “a renewed Lisbon agenda our
strategy for growth and jobs; allowing us to use the motor of a more dynamic economy to fuel our wider social and
environmental ambition. In this way, Lisbon remains an essential component of the overarching objective of sustainable
development set out in the Treaty: improving welfare and living conditions in a sustainable way for present and future
generations.”
81 See Council Doc. 10117/06 of June 9, 2006: “The EU SDS forms the overall framework within which the Lisbon
Strategy, with its renewed focus on growth and jobs, provides the motor of a more dynamic economy. These two strategies
recognise that economic, social and environmental objectives can reinforce each other and they should therefore advance
together…” (para. 8). The Commission is to submit a progress report on the implementation of the
renewed SDS every two years, starting in September 2007. See, “Progress Report on the Sustainable
Development Strategy 2007” COM (2007) 642 final.
82 Commission Communication on Impact Assessment, COM (2002) 276 final.
83 Defined by the Commission as those presented by the Commission in its Annual Policy Strategy or its
work programme (Ibid, 5): “The principle is that all Commission legislative and all other policy proposals proposed for
inclusion in the Annual Policy Strategy or the Commission and Work Programme as established in the context of the strategic
planning and programming cycle will be subject to the impact assessment procedure, provided that they have a potential
economic, social and/or environmental impact and/or require some regulatory measure for their implementation.”
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the Parliament and Council may, in cases where they amend a Commission proposal
under the co-decision procedure, also carry out an impact assessment on the social,
environmental and economic impacts of the amendments.84 The Commission has
recognised the limitations of impact assessments, flowing from the fact that such
assessments focus on identifying potential consequences of a proposal, without
necessarily offering solutions.85 Nonetheless, the importance of this procedural aspect
was emphasized in the Commission’s 2005 Review of the EU’s SDS, which recommends
that Member States should also carry out impact assessments when spending public
funds or carrying out “programmes” or “projects”.86
The second, substantive aspect of sustainability is the bilateral, sectoral integration of
sustainable concerns into all Community policy areas. In the case of the environmental
protection - as opposed to the social - limb of sustainable development, this is mandated
by the Article 6 EC “integration principle” and is considered separately below.
In addition to the considerable utilisation of the sustainable development concept at EU
policy level, it has sometimes - though rarely - been employed as a legal standard in EU
secondary legislation. The main example is the integration of the sustainability concept
into Community arrangements on foreign development funding, via the insertion of
“conditionality” clauses in funding agreements analogous to those which appear in the
case of human rights standards - i.e., effectively conditioning funding on the third
country’s compliance with the standards indicated.87 It has also, on occasion, been
employed by the ECJ. One of the earliest examples of this is the Opinion of AG Léger
in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte First Corporate
Shipping Ltd,88 where AG Léger observed that sustainable development,
“does not mean that the interests of the environment must necessarily and systematically
prevail over the interests defended in the context of the other policies pursued by the
Community…On the contrary, it emphasises the necessary balance between various
interests which sometimes clash, but which must be reconciled.”89
84 Interinstitutional agreement on better law-making, OJ 2003 C321/1, paras 27-30.
85 “An impact assessment will not necessarily generate clearcut conclusions or recommendations. It does, however, provide an
important input by informing decision-makers of the consequences of policy choices.” Ibid, 3.
86 “The 2005 Review of the EU sustainable development strategy: initial stocktaking and future
orientations” COM (2005) 37 final, at 14. It should be recalled that this procedural approach was not a
new strategy for Community environmental law: in particular, Member States were subject to a binding
obligation to undertake an impact assessment on the likely environmental effects of projects falling within
the scope of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (Directive 85/337 OJ 1985 L 175/40, as
amended) – i.e., projects “likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or
location”.
87 See Regulation 2493/2000 on Measures to Promote the Full Integration of the Environmental
Dimension in the Development Process of Developing Countries OJ 2000 L 288/1, now replaced by the
“External Action: Thematic Programme For Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural
Resources including Energy” COM (2006) 20 final. Additional examples of the use of sustainability in
Community secondary legislation include the integration of sustainability requirements into funding given
out by the LIFE financial instrument, and the relatively frequent use of the concept in the preamble to
Community secondary legislation: See, for example, Directive 92/43 on the conservation of natural
habitats and of wild fauna and flora OJ 1992 L 206/7.
88 Case C-371/98 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte First Corporate
Shipping Ltd [2000] ECR I-9235, which concerned the issue whether, in drawing up a list of proposed “Sites
of Community Interest” under the Habitats Directive, there was an obligation or, alternatively, a discretion
for Member States to take economic interests into account. As sustainable development was mentioned as
an aim in the Directive’s preamble, AG Léger felt it necessary to give a view on what the concept meant,
finding that Member States had a discretion to take economic interests into account, but that it could not
be excluded that economic and social considerations may mean a site is left off the list.
89 At para 54.
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The ECJ did not, however, deal with the matter in its judgment.90
v. Some problems with sustainability as a goal
1. What does it mean?
One of the principal criticisms of the sustainability concept – in its three-limbed, WSSD
and Gothenburg form – is that it is too broad to be useful; it can mean “all things to all
men”.91
A look at how economists view sustainability illustrates this divergence of meaning well.
Some economists, for example, might define a sustainable state as one in which utility -
that is, individuals’ pleasure or happiness - or consumption does not decline over time
(i.e., sustainability as “constant consumption”). Such economists may be further divided
into those holding views of “weak” sustainability (sometimes categorised as
“environmentalism”), and those holding views of “strong” sustainability (sometimes
categorised as “ecologicalism”).92 Though both views start from the definition of
sustainability as constant consumption, they differ over what is necessary to realise this
concept in practice. The difference revolves around the role of “natural capital” - i.e.,
any environmental assets which provide services to the economy, such as water systems,
fertile land, crude oil, forests, fisheries, and the earth’s atmosphere.93 In essence,
proponents of the “weak sustainability” viewpoint believe that there is little inherent
difference between natural and other forms of capital. This means that, in order to
achieve sustainable development, it suffices to maintain or increase the total stock of all
capital - natural, physical and human - even if, taken separately, the value of natural
capital is decreasing. In contrast, proponents of “strong sustainability” propound that
neither physical nor human capital can amount to a true substitute for natural capital:
nature performs ecological services which cannot be carried out by other means.94 The
distinction between strong and weak sustainability is reflected, to a certain extent, in the
different economic disciplines of ecological and environmental economics, respectively.
Still other economists reject the notion of sustainability as constant consumption,
considering a sustainable state to be one in which resources are managed so as to
maintain production opportunities for the future (i.e., sustainability as intergenerational
justice).95 The implications for competition policy of the ambiguity of the notion of
sustainability are considered further in Chapter 6.
90 Further examples of references to sustainability by the ECJ are the Rotterdam Convention cases, Case C-
94/03 Commission v. Council [2006] ECR I-1 and Case C-178/03 Commission v. Parliament and Council [2006]
ECR I-107. The ECJ based its finding that the Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals and
Pesticides in International Trade should have been based on the dual legal basis of Article 133 EC
(common commercial policy) and Article 175 EC (environment) partially on the principle of sustainable
development.
91 See, for example, Jacobs, “Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept” in Dobson (ed.), Fairness
and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), at
22.
92 See further, Chapter 8.
93 This is contrasted with physical capital (plant equipment, buildings etc), human capital (skill stocks which
individuals have), and intellectual capital (the state of technology, viewed separately from particular
individuals).
94 See Pearce and Barbier, Blueprint for a Sustainable Economy (London, Earthscan, 2000), at 23-4. One can
see, for example, the “strong” concept of sustainability in UNESCO’s statement that, “Every generation
should leave water, air and soil resources as pure and unpolluted as when it came on earth. Each generation should leave
undiminished all the special of animals it found on earth.” UNESCO statement, cited in The Economist, “The
Great Race: A Survey of the Global Environment”, July 6, 2002, at 3.
95 See, for example, Perman, Ma, McGilvray and Common, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics (3rd
ed., Essex, Pearson Education Limited, 2003), at 86. However, economists differ on what (b) - the concept
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2. Uncertainty of outcome
A second, related criticism of the concept of sustainable development is that, due in part
to the difficulties in pinpointing its meaning, the concept inherently fails to establish a
pecking order among the three “pillars” of sustainable development – economic, social,
and environmental. As such, it gives policy-makers leeway to choose which of the three
pillars gets priority in drawing up a specific legislative proposal. This leads to the
possibility legitimately to prioritise, in particular, the economic pillar of sustainability - i.e.
the aim of achieving economic growth and development - over environmental aims,
making “deep greens”, in particular, very suspicious of the concept.96
In the international context, for instance, such fears are arguably borne out by the
Johannesburg Declaration and Plan of Implementation which, with their emphases on
reducing poverty as the “greatest global challenge facing the world today”, represented a
shift in focus at UN level from the environmental pillar to the social and economic
pillars of sustainable development. In the EU context, it is arguable that, though
sustainability often features as a green catchword in policy documents and in the
preamble to legislation, it rarely noticeably alters the substantive rules or standards
ultimately adopted (in contrast to the more concrete integration principle, discussed
below). In the European Council’s March 2008 launch of a new cycle of the Lisbon
Strategy (for 2008-2010), for instance, the goal of environmental protection was not
expressly mentioned at all (despite, as we have seen, the Gothenburg Council’s
declaration that sustainable development formed the third pillar of this strategy).97
Indeed, as Krämer aptly notes, a prioritisation of economic goals is still inherent in the
very structure of the EC Treaty - which prima facie prohibits obstacles to intra-
Community trade and anti-competitive practices, for example, but does not as such
prohibit causing significant damage to the environment.98 Such prioritisation is also
evident, for example, in judicial dicta such as that of AG Léger in First Corporate Shipping
considered above - from which the clear inference is that economic (or other)
considerations may, in some circumstances, trump environmental considerations. As a
result, many feel that the practical effect of the sustainability principle in promoting
environmental protection has in fact been minimal.99 Indeed, to some, sustainability’s
of intergenerational justice - actually means. The clearest setting for this analysis is the situation where a
non-renewable resource, of which there is by definition a finite amount in existence, is used in production.
Most economists believe that, rather than there being an absolute obligation to bequeath a certain amount
of the resource to the following generation, we should simply make sure to bequeath satisfactory
substitutes for the particular resource. See, for example, Solow, On the intergenerational allocation of
natural resources, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 88(1), 141 (1986) and Brown-Weiss, Fairness to Future
Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (New York, Transnational
Publication and the United Nations University, 1989).
96 See, for example, Jacobs, “Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept” in Dobson (ed.), Fairness
and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice”, p. 22: “Sustainable development is a
smokescreen put up by business and development interests to obscure the conflicts between ecological integrity and economic
growth, and between the interests of the rich North and poor South.”
97 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, March 13 and 14, 2008. Admittedly,
however, the second part of these conclusions dealt with “Climate Change and Energy” – but as a separate
topic to the launch of the new cycle of the renewed Lisbon Strategy.
98 Krämer, “Thirty years of EC environmental law: perspectives and prospectives” (2000) Yearbook of
European Environmental Law 155, 157, who refers to the proposal of the Avosetta Group that a new
provision be inserted into the EC Treaty that, “Subject to imperative reasons of overriding public interest, significantly
impairing the environment or human health shall be prohibited.” This provision would mirror the structure of
Articles 28 and 30 EC on free movement of goods.
99 Still others contend that this ambiguity of the notion of sustainable development, or its “contestability”,
itself serves a useful purpose in that it stimulates and enhances political debate. See, for example, Jacobs,
“Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept” in Dobson (ed.), Fairness and Futurity: Essays on
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aim of “squaring the circle” between economic, social and environmental goals is
inherently utopian and a virtually impossible task.
b. The role of the integration principle in Community law and
policy100
As we saw above, the present Treaty formulation of the integration principle (Article 6
EC) provides that,
“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation
of the Community policies and activities…in particular with a view to promoting sustainable
development.”101
The idea behind, or rationale of, the principle, in the Commission’s words, is that,
“environmental policy alone cannot achieve the environmental improvements needed as part of sustainable
development.”102 It is clear from the wording of Article 6 EC that the integration principle
is not a means in itself, but rather a means to achieving the ultimate end of sustainable
development. As such, the integration principle comprises a vital, substantive, pillar of
the Community’s sustainable development strategy.103 Examination of how the principle
has been implemented can be usefully divided into two levels: implementation at EU
level, and implementation at Member State level within the scope of EU law.
i. Implementation of the integration principle at EU level
The integration principle has been implemented into EU law and policy at a variety of
institutional levels, including at the levels of the European Council, Council of Ministers,
Commission and Community courts.
At the European Council level, the principle was lent extra political weight by its 1998
launch of the “Cardiff process”, by which different formations of the Council of
Ministers were requested to develop strategies to achieve environmental integration,
starting with energy, transport and agriculture.104 This led, at the Council of Ministers
level, to the development of bilateral integration strategies and programmes for a wide
number of Council formations, including the internal market (which encompasses
competition policy),105 industry,106 development,107 fisheries,108 general affairs and external
Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), at 27. For a counter-
argument, see Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-Making (Oxford, Hart, 2005), at
47.
100 See generally, Borràs Pentinat, “The Process of the Integration of Environmental Protection into Other
European Union Policies” in Fajardo de Castillo et al (eds.), Strengthening European Environmental Law in an
Enlarged Union (Aachen, Shaker 2004), Lenschow (ed.), Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies
in Europe (London, Earthscan 2002), Alves, “La Protection intégrée de l’environnement en droit
communautaire”, Revue juridique de l’environnement, 2/2003 p. 1, Wasmeier, “The integration of
environmental protection as a general rule for interpreting Community law” (2001) CML Rev 159.
101 This type of integration - the integration of environmental objectives into other sectoral policy areas (i.e.
those areas referred to in Article 3 EC) - has been termed “external” integration by some commentators.
This is contrasted with “internal” integration – the rejection of divisions traditionally made within
environmental policy itself. Examples of “internal” integration include the rejection of medium-specific
environmental regulation, as illustrated by Directive 96/61 on integration pollution prevention and
pollution control OJ 1996 OJ L 257/26.
102 Commission, “Integration of Environmental Considerations into other Policy Areas – a Stocktaking of
the Cardiff Process” COM (2004) 394 final, 2.
103 See the Gothenburg European Council conclusions adopting the EU’s Sustainable Development
Strategy, June 15 and 16, 2001.
104 The Cardiff Summit followed a Commission Communication, “Partnership for Integration” (COM(98)
333), which identified a variety of necessary steps to translate Article 6 EC into concrete results.
105 See the Council’s report to the Helsinki European Council, November 1999, doc. No. 13622/99.
106 Ibid.
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relations109 and economic and financial affairs110 formations, in addition to the energy,111
transport112 and agriculture113 formations. The need for the Council and the Commission
to implement these strategies was emphasised by the 1999 Helsinki European Council, as
well as by the 2001 Gothenburg European Council, in the context of its acceptance of
the EU Sustainable Development Strategy and its addition of a third environmental pillar
to the EU’s Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. 114
At the Commission level, the integration principle has various manifestations, as
announced in its 1998 Communication “Partnership for Integration” - a policy document
mirroring the principle’s legal promotion by the Treaty of Amsterdam to become one of
the Community’s fundamental principles.115 First, a variety of bilateral sectoral
environmental integration strategies have been developed by the Commission in a wide
range of policy areas, mirroring the Council’s sectoral strategies. The sixth (current)
Environmental Action Programme further emphasises this approach, setting out a
variety of thematic strategies for integration. In addition, in 2004, the Commission
undertook to carry out an annual stocktaking of the progress of the Cardiff process,
which complements its annual environmental policy review.116 A number of less
significant institutional changes, such as designation of an environmental liaison official
in the Directorates-General other than DG Environment, have also taken place.117
Finally, the procedural requirement that the Commission must undertake an impact
assessment when proposing all major policy measures, discussed above as a component
of the EU’s SDS, clearly also contributes to achieving greater integration of
environmental concerns into other policy areas.
A number of recent legislative and policy initiatives, some of which we will focus on in
later chapters, are outcomes of the application of the holistic approach dictated by the
integration principle. These include the 2003 shift in approach in the Common
Agricultural Policy from direct payments to farmers for production to “single farm
payments” conditioned on farmers’ contributions to rural development measures,
including respect for environmental standards;118 the inclusion of renewable energy and
107Ibid.
108 See the Council Conclusions on integration of environment and sustainable development into the
Common Fisheries Policy, April 26, 2001, doc. No. 7885/01.
109 See the COREPER Report 7791/01of 4 April 2001, adopted at the General Affairs Council of 10 April
2001. See also, the movement to develop a “Green Diplomacy Network”, which is aimed at creating an
informal network of environmental experts within foreign ministries, an initiative launched by the
Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003.
110 See the Council’s Report to the Nice European Council of November 27, 2000 doc. No. 13054/1/00.
111 See the Council’s adoption of an energy integration strategy, November 1999, doc. No. 9994/99.
112 See, for example, Council Resolution, “Follow-up to the Cardiff/Helsinki Summit on the integration of
environment and sustainable development into the transport policy”, doc. No. 7329/01.
113 See the Council’s adoption of an agriculture integration strategy, November 15, 1999, doc. No.
13078/99.
114 Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, December 10-11, 1999; Presidency
Conclusions of the Gothenburg European Council, June 15-16, 2001. Wurzel, “The EU Presidency and
the Integration Principle: An Anglo-German comparison” (2001) European Environmental Law Review 7,
has underlined the crucial role of the Member State which holds the 6-month rotating Council Presidency
in implementing the integration principle by tabling “cross-cutting” environmental aspects in discrete
sectoral Council formations.
115 Commission Communication, “Partnership for Integration” COM (98) 333 final.
116 See “Integration of Environmental Considerations into other Policy Areas – a Stocktaking of the
Cardiff Process” COM (2004) 394 final.
117 McGillivray and Holder, Locating EC Environmental Law (2001) 2 Yearbook of Environmental Law
139, 154.
118 See, for a summary, Commission Press Release IP/04/1540 of December 23, 2004.
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biofuel targets in the EU’s energy package; and, importantly for our purposes, the
broader use of market instruments in the EU’s environmental policy (discussed in
Chapter 4) and the adoption of Guidelines on Environmental State aid (discussed in
Chapter 15). The integration principle has also been used to quell industry’s concerns
that higher environmental standards within the Community will damage global
competitiveness. Again, the Commission’s line has been, in the words of Commissioner
Verheugen, “nothing that is ecologically wrong can be economically right.”119 These attempts to
integrate the concerns of industry and environmental protection go to the core of our
present analysis, and will be discussed further in later Chapters.
At the ECJ level, one can see a drive towards integration from a relatively early stage in
the Court’s jurisprudence. This has certainly got stronger since the promotion of the
integration principle to Article 6 EC, and arguably has increased since then.120 The
following three examples illustrate this drive well.
First, the Court’s jurisprudence holding environmental protection to be a “mandatory
requirement” justifying indistinctly applicable restrictions on free movement of goods
resulting from national legislation represents a manifest attempt to reconcile internal
market and environmental goals. This movement began with the Danish Bottles judgment,
just after ADBHU (discussed above) and in tandem with the insertion of explicit
environmental aims for the Community by the SEA (in the form of present Article 174
EC).121 Even more significantly, as will be discussed further in Chapter 7, the ECJ has, in
certain cases, accepted environmental justifications for directly discriminatory (distinctly
applicable) Member State measures which restrict the free movement of goods contrary
to Article 28 EC. Such judgments, which include the Walloon Waste, Dusseldorp, Aher-
Waggon, PreussenElektra and, more recently, Inn Valley judgments,122 go against the ECJ’s
standard internal market case law, according to which the only acceptable justifications
for distinctly applicable measures are those set out in Article 30 EC (where
environmental protection, as such, does not feature).123 In some of these cases - most
notably, PreussenElektra - the Court has expressly referred to the Article 6 EC integration
principle in coming to its conclusion to this effect. Similarly, a process of integrating
environmental considerations has taken place in public procurement law (environmental
119 SPEECH/06/371 of June 13, 2006, “Sustainability and Competitiveness”. He continues, “the renewed
Lisbon strategy [for growth and employment] and the European strategy for sustainability do not contradict but complement
each other…More growth can only be sustainable growth…Modern European industrial policy is integrated, inter-disciplinary
policy.” See also, Speech of Commissioner Dimas in November 2006 setting out eight reasons why being
green is “good for business” and declaring, “It is perfectly possible for industry to be green and profitable at the same
time – and that the most successful businesses will be those that learn to reap the benefits from the continued public and
political attention to environmental issues.” SPEECH/06/676 of November 9, 2006, “Environment and
Industry: How Ambitious Environmental Standards Can Promote Business Competitiveness in Europe?”
120 See, for example, the Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-227/02 Wood Trading [2004] ECR I-11957: “In
future, the principles framing environmental law could be accorded increased importance.”
121 Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4607, Case 240/83 ADBHU [1985] ECR 531.
122 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431,
Case C-320/03 Commission v Austria (Inn Valley) [2005] ECR I-9871.
123 This has led many commentators - including Advocates General Jacobs and Geelhoed - to call for the
express recognition of environmental protection as equivalent to the express Article 30 EC derogations.
See the Opinion of AG Jacobs in PreussenElektra and the Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Commission v Austria,
note 122 above. The possibility of inserting environmental considerations into Article 30 EC as an express
ground for derogating from the principle of free movement of goods was considered and rejected by the
authors of the Treaty of Amsterdam. This is despite the fact that the result of the above judgments
effectively implies that the Court, in some cases, equates environmental considerations to Article 30 EC
express derogations. As a result, the present situation is, not least from a legal certainty perspective,
unsatisfactory.
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criteria are acceptable in awarding public service contracts)124 as well as in environmental
state aid.125
Second, the Court has relied on the integration principle in a number of legal basis
judgments. In its Titanium Dioxide judgment, for example, the Court expressly relied on
the integration principle to justify its conclusion that the proper legal basis of the
Directive on waste from the titanium dioxide industry was Article 95 (then 100a) EC, on
internal market legislation, rather than Article 175 (then 130s) EC, on environmental
legislation.126 Most recently, the ECJ relied on Article 6 EC in its controversial judgment
in the Environmental Criminal Penalties case, holding that,
“in the words of Article 6 EC ‘[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the
definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities’, a provision which
emphasises the fundamental nature of that objective and its extension across the range of those
policies and activities.”127
Third, the Court has considered Article 6 EC as an aid to the interpretation of secondary
legislation,128 including when deciding how to apply Article 174(2) EC principles of
Community environmental law.129
Importantly, however, the Court has stopped short at pronouncing the integration
principle to be justiciable in the sense of giving rights to individuals or providing a self-
standing ground of annulment of Community legislation, though some of its Advocates
Generals would have gone this far.130 One of the most convincing views from the bench
on the role of Article 6 EC is that of AG Geelhoed in Austria v Parliament and Council
(Ecopoints) who equates Article 6 EC to a general principle of Community law analogous
to the principle of proportionality: review of the legality of Community legislation for
compliance with the integration principle is possible, but annulment will only take place
where there has been a “manifest error” of the Community legislature in failing to take
124 See Opinion of AG Mischo and judgment in Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus [2002] ECR I-7213, Directive
2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply
contracts and public service contracts OJ 2004 L 134/114, Directive 2004/17 coordinating the
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors OJ
2004 L 134/1, and Commission Communication, “Public procurement for a better environment” COM
(2008) 400/2 (Commission proposing that, by 2010, 50% of all tendering procedures should be green, in
the sense of compliant with endorsed common core green public procurement criteria).
125 See Chapter 15.
126 Case C-300/89 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) [1991] ECR I-2867, paras 22 – 24. See
analogously, Case C-17/90 Pinaud Wieger [1991] ECR I-5253 (confirming a similar approach towards the
common transport policy) and Opinion 2/00 [2001] ECR I-9713, where the Court confirmed that Article 6
EC was “in full harmony” with the Titanium Dioxide doctrine, and Case C-336/00 Huber [2002] ECR I-7699.
See also, the Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-94/03 Commission v Council (Rotterdam Convention) [2006]
ECR I-1.
127 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879, at para 42. See also, the Opinion of AG Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer and Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (Ship-Source Pollution), judgment of October 23,
2007, not yet reported.
128 See, for example, the Opinion of AG Kokott, Case C-304/01 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-7655
(interpretation of fisheries legislation).
129 See, for example, Joined Cases T-74/00 etc Artegodan [2002] ECR II-4945 (precautionary principle),
Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-126/01 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769 (polluter pays principle). See also,
the Opinion of AG Alber in Case C-444/00 Mayer Parry Recycling [2003] ECR I-6163.
130 See, for example, Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099:
“Article 6 is not merely programmatic; it imposes legal obligations”. AG Cosmas in Case C-321/95P Greenpeace
[1998] ECR I-1651 recommended that the integration principle should be capable of direct effect.
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the requirements of the principle into account in drawing up legislation.131 Thus, he
opines that,
“[a]lthough [Article 6 EC] is drafted in imperative terms, contrary to what the Republic of
Austria asserts, it cannot be regarded as laying down a standard according to which in defining
Community policies environmental protection must always be taken to be the prevalent interest.
Such an interpretation would unacceptably restrict the discretionary powers of the Community
institutions and the Community legislature. At most it is to be regarded as an obligation on the
part of the Community institutions to take due account of ecological interests in policy areas outside
that of environmental protection stricto sensu. It is only where ecological interests manifestly have
not been taken into account or where they have been completely disregarded that Article 6 EC may
serve as the standard for reviewing the validity of Community legislation.”132 (emphasis added)
The Court never had an opportunity to rule on the matter, as Austria withdrew its action
prior to judgment.133 However, it will be argued in Chapter 6 that AG Geelhoed’s view
fits excellently with the post-Amsterdam position of Article 6 EC in Title I on
“Principles” of the Community.
ii. Implementation of the integration principle at Member
State level
The integration principle is a norm directed not only at Community institutions (in the
“definition and implementation of Community policies”, using the terminology employed by
Article 6 EC), but also at Member States (in the “implementation” of Community policies).
This should, it is submitted, be interpreted to mean that it applies to Member States
when acting within the scope of Community law - i.e., in situations to which Community
law applies (whether or not they are acting to “implement”, in the narrow sense of the
term, Community secondary legislation) - in order to ensure the Article’s effet utile. The
words “definition and implementation” of Community policies make it evident that the
principle applies to all stages of preparing, adopting, implementing and enforcing
Community law.134 Accordingly, the Commission, in its 2004 stocktaking of the
implementation of the integration principle, cites two ways in which Member States
could improve this. A first is via stringent implementation of Community impact
assessment legislation – namely, the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and
the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive.135 A second is by regularly
exchanging “good integration practice” at national, regional and local level.136 More broadly,
the national sustainable development strategies which most Member States have now
131 See, analogously, for the proportionality principle, for example, Case 331/88 FEDESA [1990] ECR I-
4023.
132 Case C-161/04 Austria v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-7183, Opinion paras 59 – 60.
133 Order of the Court of September 6, 2006. See also, Case T-461/93 An Taisce and WWF v Commission
[1994] ECR II-733 and Case T-585/93 Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v
Commission [1995] ECR II-2205. In each of these cases, it was argued that a Commission decision should
be annulled for failure to comply with the integration principle. However, the Court did not decide the
issue in either case, as each was declared inadmissible.
134 See further, Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into other EC policies (Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 200), 3.
135 European Commission, “Integration of Environmental Considerations into other Policy Areas – a
Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process” COM (2004) 394 final, 36. See Directive 85/337 on the assessment of
the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment OJ 1985 L 175/40, as amended, and
Directive 2001/42 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment
OJ 2001 L 197/30. See also, the Declaration attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam that, “the Commission
undertakes in its proposals, and that the Member States undertake in implementing those proposals, to take full account of
their environmental impact and of the principle of sustainable growth.”
136 European Commission, “Integration of Environmental Considerations into other Policy Areas – a
Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process” COM (2004) 394 final, 36.
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developed will, in the Commission’s view, contribute to successful integration.137 An
excellent example of integration at Member State level is the recent decision of UK
central government that all ministries must integrate the carbon cost of their decisions
into decision-making.138
iii. Some problems with the integration principle
As a policy guideline, the integration principle has been a qualified success. Though, as
with sustainability, few would deny it to be a laudable aim, it suffers from similar
indeterminacy as a guideline for policy-makers and as a legal standard: how are policy
areas to be integrated, and how is the success of such integration to be measured? This
problem has led to the complaints of certain commentators that, rather than using the
integration principle to integrate environmental interests into other policies, the tables
have been turned: the principle has been used to integrate business and other non-
environmental interests into environmental policy. The outcome, it is argued, is often
marginalisation of the environmental agenda, rather than vice versa.139
Given this indeterminacy, it is no surprise that the integration principle has, to date, had
limited practical effects. Numerous commentators have concluded that, as an empirical
matter, the objective of integrating environmental policy considerations into broader EU
policy areas has, to a large extent, not been realised.140 Indeed, the Commission itself
recognised this in 2004, concluding that the Cardiff process had, to date, brought “mixed
results”:
“As many of the “low hanging fruits” of integration have already been picked, future efforts to
reverse persisting unsustainable trends will need to focus increasingly on structural reforms, which
may generate tensions with established interest groups in the sectors concerned. In addition, action
at national level is needed to deliver on the commitments made at the Union level, as in many areas
Community competence is limited.”141
In order to do better, the Commission recommended more consistency in application,
more political commitment, better implementation and review and clearer priorities. The
renewed SDS adopted by the Council in June 2006 also made clear that the EU
institutions’ work in implementing the integration principle is far from over, prescribing
137 See, for example, the UK’s sustainable development policy, outlined at http://www.sustainable-
development.gov.uk/. Similarly, a new pilot ministry dealing with sustainability issues (“le ministère de
l’Ecologie, du Développement et de l’Aménagement durables”) was created in France in July 2007.
138 See the report of the Guardian, December 22, 2007.
139 See, for example, Unfried, Review of Lenschow, Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in
Europe (2004) 13(3) RECIEL 352, who gives the example of the actions of British Prime Minister Blair,
German Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac in 2003, in urging the Commission to ease the
regulatory burden on the chemicals industry in the context of finalising the REACH regime.
140 See, for example, Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into other EC policies (Groningen, Europa
Law Publishing, 2003), who takes the examples of the Community’s Common Agricultural Policy,
Common Transport Policy and energy policy; and the Report of the UK House of Commons
Environmental Audit Committee, which warned that, “the [EU’s] sectoral integration strategies produced to date
have been bland statements of intent suggesting little action or timetable for action.” Environmental Audit Committee,
First Report. EU Policy and the Environment: An Agenda for the Helsinki Summit. Report and Proceedings of the
Committee, together with Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, HC 44, House of Commons, Session
1999/2000, p. vi.
141 European Commission, “Integration of Environmental Considerations into other Policy Areas – a
Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process” COM (2004) 394 final, 3.
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improved internal policy coordination between the different sectors dealt with by the
institutions.142
From a policy perspective, therefore, one might argue that, as with the sustainability goal,
the most important practical effect of the integration principle in policy-making to date
has been primarily procedural: policy-makers are, via impact assessments, required to
demonstrate that they have at least considered the sustainability implications of their
proposals (and, as part of this, whether the proposal complies with the integration
principle). Nonetheless, as discussed above, from a legal perspective, the ECJ shown
itself to be willing to invoke the integration principle in a number of contexts and in
situations of conflict. The potential relevance of the integration principle to competition
policy will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
Should the Treaty of Lisbon enter into force, there is an argument that the force of the
environmental integration principle will be diluted given the insertion within the
“provisions having general application” section of other integration clauses (for example
on discrimination and equality). The better view, however, would seem to be that the
very different wording of these clauses serves to distinguish them, and the consequences
flowing from them, from present Article 6 EC.143
142 Though the General Affairs Council “should ensure the horizontal coordination of the EU SDS”, the other
Council formations “should verify implementation in their respective areas of responsibility.” Council conclusions,
doc. No. 10117/06 of June 9, 2006.
143 See, for example, Article 5b TFEU: “In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” (emphasis
added).
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Chapter 3: Forms of Environmental Regulation: Direct Regulation and Market-
Based Instruments
1. Introduction
Having examined the legal framework set out in the Treaty for the EU’s environmental
policy, focusing on the most important aspects of this policy for our purposes - sustainable
development and the Article 6 EC integration principle - we now turn to the question: How
can the aims of the EU’s environmental policy most effectively be achieved? What
regulatory techniques are available to the EU in achieving its environmental policy aims, and
what are the merits and demerits of these techniques? The aim of this Chapter is to outline
these techniques - the regulatory “toolbox” - and to explore and explain the significant
increase in the use of “economic” or “market-based” instruments of environmental
regulation in recent years. This shift has, as will be demonstrated later, important
implications for the interface between environmental and competition policy.
2. The distinction between direct regulation and economic instruments and how
regulators decide which instrument to use1
A variety of regulatory options exists in environmental policy, which for the purposes of this
research may usefully be divided into two general categories.2
The first is “direct” regulation, otherwise known as “command and control” regulation.
Essentially, such regulation involves a state-prescribed “command” backed by the state’s
authority to impose a negative sanction, the “control”.3 In the environmental sphere,
therefore, command and control regulation normally entails the adoption of standards by the
state or its environmental protection bodies, which standards are enforced by public
authorities and/or private persons via the courts. In this regulatory scenario, public
authorities clearly play a central role - setting the standards and enforcing them. Direct
regulation is often characterised by the use of permits (otherwise known as licensing or
authorisation) systems, or (exceptionally) complete prohibition (for example, of an activity or
substance). Enforcement techniques differ by jurisdiction, but may involve national courts,
via the imposition of civil or criminal penalties (as is normal, for example in the UK), and/or
non-judicial public enforcement agencies, via the imposition of “civil” or “administrative”
penalties or the revocation of licences granted.
The second category of environmental regulatory technique is the use of “economic”
instruments, otherwise known as “incentive”- or “market”-based instruments, to protect the
environment. As will be seen below, the essential feature of these instruments is that the
market is used to provide incentives to guide behaviour towards an environmentally-
1 On environmental regulatory techniques, see Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed.,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 154 – 170, Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and
Decision-Making (Oxford, Hart, 2005), Chapter 7, Ackerman and Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law”
(1985) 37 Stanford Law Review 1333, Stewart, “The Importance of Law and Economics for European
Environmental Law”, (2002) Yearbook of European Environmental Law 856, Galizzi, “Economic Instruments
as Tools for the Protection of the International Environment”, 6 European Environmental Law Review 155
(1997).
2Some authors adopt slightly different methods of categorisation, or would differ on the precise definition and
scope of each category. See, for example, the Commission Communication on Impact Assessment COM
(2002) 276 final.
3 See, for example, Abbot, “Environmental Command Regulation” in Richardson and Wood (eds.)
Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford, Hart, 2006).
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favourable outcome, for instance by “internalising” environmental costs which would
otherwise be treated as external (and so could lead to market failure).4 Economic
instruments came into vogue in EU environmental policy in the 1990s sparked by a similar
rise in interest in the US, which had been provoked at least in part by Ackerman and
Stewart’s landmark 1985 article “Reforming Environmental Law.”5 In contrast to command
and control regulation, market-based regulatory techniques rely heavily on the actions of
market players - i.e., not public, but private bodies. For this reason the huge increase in their
use at EU level (though command and control techniques still predominate) may be viewed
as forming part of a wider shift from “government” to “governance”, as will be discussed
below.
A variety of factors may play a part in a regulator’s choice of which instrument is best for
controlling a specific type of pollution. These include:6
 Cost effectiveness (i.e., whether the instrument attains the target at the least cost, ideally
by equalising the marginal cost of abatement of all firms involved in pollution control);
 Long-run effects (i.e., whether the effect of the instrument remains constant, strengthens
or weakens over time);
 Dynamic efficiency (i.e., whether the instrument creates continuous incentives to
improve production in ways that reduce pollution);
 Ancillary benefits, such as “double dividends” (where revenues from, for example,
environmental taxes go towards reducing other distortionary taxes);
 Equity (i.e., the implications which the instrument has for distribution of wealth);
 Dependability (i.e., can the instrument be relied upon to achieve the target);
 Flexibility (i.e., can the instrument be adapted quickly to deal with changed conditions,
information or targets);
 Costs of use under uncertainty (i.e., are the efficiency losses considerable if used with
incorrect information);
 Information requirements (i.e., the amount of information which the instrument
requires, and the cost of acquiring this information if the regulators do not already
possess it).
 The impact which the choice of instrument may have on competitiveness, for instance of
a region or state.7 Competitiveness in this sense has a number of aspects: for example, it
4 As expressed by a Commission-convened Working Group of Member State Experts on the Use of Economic
and Fiscal Instruments in EC Environmental Policy back in 1991, “Economic instruments affect through the market
mechanism costs and benefits of alternative actions open to economic agents, with the effect of influencing behaviour in a way which is
favourable for the environment.” Commission of the European Communities, 1990. Report of the Working Group of
Experts from the Member States on the Use of Economic Instruments in EC Environmental Policy (Brussels, Directorate-
General Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection, 455. See (1991) 14 Boston College International
and Comparative Law Review 447.
5 Ackerman and Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law” (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review 1333
6 See Perman, Ma, McGilvray and Common, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics (3rd ed., Essex,
Pearson Education Limited, 2003), 202-205; and Baumol and Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy:
Exernalities, Public Outlays and the Quality of Life (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall 1988).
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may refer to competitiveness of the businesses hit by the tax compared to other
businesses; or, more broadly, the macroeconomic competitiveness of the regulatory
regime in comparison to other jurisdictions (regulatory competition). The use of certain
environmental instruments has widely been viewed as having a negative effect in terms
of regulatory competition (with direct regulation and environmental taxation being
examples of instruments which may arguably dissuade investment and thus reduce a
jurisdiction’s international competitiveness).8 Equally, however, the competitiveness
issue can be viewed from the opposite perspective: ambitious environmental standards
may ultimately benefit, rather than hinder, companies’ competitiveness – by, inter alia,
giving them a “headstart” and allowing them to corner emerging markets in
environmental technologies; or even by “insulating” EU firms from foreign
competition.9
The instrument ultimately chosen in a given situation by the regulator depends, to a large
extent, on what weight the regulator chooses to give to these (and possibly other) criteria.
Clearly, no one instrument is “best” for all types of pollution.
3. Direct regulatory techniques in Community environmental law
a. Background
For centuries, “environmental law” did not exist as a discrete body of regulation in most
present EU Member State. Rather, issues which would now be viewed as environmental
were left to be dealt with by private law alone, primarily via the law of non-contractual
liability (tort) and property law.10 Gradually, however, it became evident - with the onset of
the industrial age - that this approach was not sufficient. By the 1970s, separate bodies of
regulatory rules began to emerge in Community Member States, laying down public law
standards of environmental protection to be observed by citizens and to be enforced by
public authorities - i.e., using the technique of direct regulation. As we have seen in Chapter
2, this tendency was mirrored at Community level by the gradual development of
Community environmental law, beginning in the 1960s with the regulation of hazardous
7 See further, Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1998). Under “public choice” theories, a final factor in the regulator’s choice may be whether
the instrument can be used to grant a benefit to any pressure groups which may be exerting political pressure:
see Chapter 7.
8 See, for example, OECD, Environmental taxes and competitiveness: An overview of issues, policy options and research needs
(COM/ENV/EPOC/DAFFE/CFA(2001)90/FINAL) (Paris, OECD, 2003). Some commentators, however,
dispute the influence of a state’s environmental policy on firms’ location decisions: see, for example, Ulph and
Valentini, “Environmental Regulation, Multinational Companies and International Competitiveness”, in
Welfens (ed.), Internationalization of the Economy and Environmental Policy Options (Berlin, Springer, 2001), at 25.
9 See, for example, Porter and van der Linde, “Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), Fall 1995, 97; speech of Commissioner
Dimas of November 9, 2006, “Environment and Industry, How ambitious environmental standards can
promote business competitiveness in Europe?” (SPEECH/06/676); and speech of Commissioner Verheugen,
“Sustainability and Competitiveness”, June 12, 2006 (SPEECH/06/371).
10 A classic example in UK tort law is the rule of private nuisance in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330;
[1861–73] All E.R., laying down the rule that, “the person who for his own purpose brings on his lands […] anything likely
to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril and is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape.” Per Blackburn J. See also Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2
AC 264.
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substances, and followed in the 1970s with legislation regulating a wide range of
environmental issues using directly regulatory techniques.11
Direct regulation remains the primary regulatory tool of Community environmental policy.
It is characterised by what Dryzek has termed “administrative rationalism”:12 a reliance on the
(presumed) good sense and good information of (government) bureaucrats to set the right
environmental standards, and on public resources to enforce them.13
b. Principal forms of Community environmental direct regulation
Community environmental direct regulation may be, broadly, divided into four main
categories.14
A first type is the establishment of environmental quality standards. These set down
(maximum) permitted levels of pollution or environmental interference. They may be set for
a given environment (e.g., a habitat designated as a “Special Area of Conservation” under the
Habitats Directive)15 or environmental medium (e.g., water, air), which may in turn be
subdivided by geographic location (e.g., ground water, surface water).16 In the present state
of environmental policy, some interference or pollution is normally permitted - i.e., “zero-
tolerance” policies are rare, reflecting the balance currently thought appropriate between
economic growth and environmental protection, and a recognition that human activity
inevitably causes a certain amount of pollution or damage to our environment.17 Instead, a
“threshold of intolerability” is selected by the rule-maker.18 In exceptional cases, however,
little or no environmental interference is permitted. This may be appropriate, for example,
in the biodiversity area: for instance, particularly ecologically important sites may need to be
kept free from interference, or endangered species may need absolute protection by the
law.19
11 See, for example, Directive 75/442 on waste OJ 1975 L 194/23 and Directive 79/409 on the conservation of
wild birds OJ 1979 L 103/1.
12 Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), 79.
13Another way of characterising direct regulation is as “substantive” law - whereby governments lay down
detailed, value-based substantive programmes and rules - in contrast to “formal” private law (private law, such
as tort and property law), and “reflexive” law (which is aimed at provoking self-reflection and self-correction by
those regulated, instead of using commands). See Abbot, “Environmental Command Regulation” in
Richardson and Wood (eds.) Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford, Hart, 2006), 63 – 64. She draws in
this regard on the work of Gunther Teubner, “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law” (1983) 17
Law and Society Review 239.
14 See Abbot, ibid, 64. These categories are not set in stone. Contrast, for example, Sands, Principles of
International Environmental Law (2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 155, and Lubbe-Wolff,
“Efficient Environmental Legislation – On Different Philosophies of Pollution Control in Europe” (2001) 13
Journal of Environmental Law 79, 80.
15 Directive 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora OJ 1992 L 206/7.
16 See, for example, Directive 2000/60 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water
policy OJ 2000 L 327/1.
17 See Sands, note 14 above, at 156.
18 Examples from Community law include the Community’s rules on the quality of drinking water, which lay
down microbiological and chemical parameters which must not be exceeded by drinking water at the point of
entry into Member States’ domestic distribution systems: see Directive 80/778 relating to the quality of water
intended for human consumption OJ 1980 L 229/11.
19 In Community law, examples include the “Annex A” species of the Community’s Regulation on endangered
species trade in which is only authorised in exceptional circumstances, and Council Regulation 338/97 on the
protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein OJ 1997 L 61/1 (the Basic Regulation).
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A second type of environmental direct regulation is the establishment of product-specific
standards - for example, standards establishing maximum levels of pollutants to be used in
the manufacture of a product, or specifying the permitted design, marketing or use of a
product.20
A third type of environmental direct regulation is the establishment of emission standards,
which set maximum levels for pollutants emitted from installations, activities or products.21
A fourth and final type of environmental direct regulation is the use of process, or technical,
standards – by which is meant requiring the use of a particular technology, technique, or
practice in carrying out a (normally industrial) activity, or in the design of an installation.22
A common way of effecting each of these categories is by making the particular polluting
activity subject to a non-transferable permit (otherwise known as a licence or authorisation).
Permitting is not, however, a technique specific to direct regulation, as will be seen when we
examine the Community’s emissions trading scheme, which is based around the idea of
transferable permits. Equally, permitting is not the only enforcement method available for
classic direct regulation; legislators may also simply rely on direct enforcement by
environmental or other enforcement agencies.23
Going beyond this basic categorisation, two important current trends in Community direct
environmental regulation can be identified.
First, there is a major trend at present towards what is termed “flexibility” in direct
regulation: that is to say, the use of broad, “framework”-style Directives, leaving Member
States much discretion on how to implement the objectives of the Directive in a manner
appropriate to the specific environmental conditions of their country (or indeed allowing
them to differentiate per locality). This contrasts with the tendency in the 1970s and 1980s
for Community legislation to impose fixed minimum standards for the Community as a
whole, leaving little discretion to Member States to take local environmental conditions into
account, or to use different instruments, in implementation. This movement, which was
particularly evident in the Community’s Fifth Environmental Action Programme, has been
attributed by some to the need for more effective environmental legislation, as well as
concerns about the EU’s international competitiveness.24 One of the trailblazers of this
trend is the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive, which represents
regulatory “flexibility” as to the permit conditions containing installations’ emissions limit
Clearly, the effectiveness of even a complete ban on interference turns on the extent to which it is properly
enforced.
20 Community law examples include Community rules specifying how certain chemicals which are particularly
hazardous for the environment should be packaged, labelled and used (see Directive 67/548 on the
classification, labelling and packaging of dangerous substances [1967] OJ 196/1 and the new REACH
Regulation, Regulation 1907/2006, OJ 2006 L 396/1.
21 An example in the Community context is Directive 96/61 on integration pollution prevention and pollution
control OJ 1996 OJ L 257/26 (now Directive 2008/1 OJ 2008 L 24/8). Operators of industrial installations
covered by Annex I of the IPPC Directive (around 50,000 at present, according to the Commission) are
required to obtain an authorisation (environmental permit) from the authorities in the Member States. See also,
Directive 2000/76 on the incineration of waste OJ 2000 L 332/91.
22 Examples in the Community context are Directive 2006/12 on waste OJ 2006 L 114/9 and Directive 91/689
on hazardous waste OJ 1991 L 377/20.
23 See Harman, “Environmental Regulation in the 21st Century” (2004) 6 Environmental Law Review 141.
24 See, for example, Macrory and Turner, “Participatory Rights, Transboundary Environmental Governance
and the Law” 39 (2002) CML Rev 489, 358.
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values. Rather than setting the permit conditions and emission limit values out in
Community legislation at a specified, fixed and uniform level for Community-wide
application, they are set via the decision of Member States’ licensing authorities, in
conjunction with the installation, on what represents the “Best Available Technology”
(BAT) in the industry at the time.25
Second, there is a trend towards “proceduralisation” of direct regulation: that is to say, the
use of direct regulation not directly to set down substantive standards (i.e., to establish
“substantive law” in the sense used above), but rather to establish procedures aimed at
evaluating the effects of regulatory or administrative action on the environment. These
procedures may be purely internal, such as the Commission’s own requirement to carry out
an Impact Assessment for each major policy proposal, evaluating its compatibility with the
sustainable development concept (although these are subsequently published).26
Alternatively, they may include external elements, such as provision for the participation of
interested third parties (whether from industry, environmental interest groups, or the general
public) in the regulatory process.27 In this scenario, proceduralisation achieves a dual aim:
demonstrating expressly to the public that the final decision represents the culmination of a
thorough reasoning process, in which the regulator has taken all relevant environmental
factors into account, as well as, increasing the democratic credentials of the ultimate decision
taken.
c. Some merits and demerits of direct regulation
Direct regulation is well-suited to certain areas of environmental regulation: in particular,
setting pollution limits for specific installations (e.g., large industrial installations as covered
by the IPPC Directive). It has the benefit of enabling very specific limits to be prescribed
per industry, while still leaving some scope for flexibility via the adaptation of regulatory
requirements to local conditions. This is particularly evident with the new, more flexible
approach to standard-setting using BAT standards, as adopted in the IPPC Directive. It is
also, however, to be seen in more traditional direct regulation - an example being emissions
standards, which, although prescribing the ultimate maximum emissions from an installation
or product, do not prescribe the way in which the standard must be achieved.
Further, it is generally accepted that direct regulation is the only way of protecting certain
especially precious natural resources – e.g., to preserve biodiversity, endangered species, or
special habitats. Market mechanisms and private law rights are insufficient to achieve such
protection: as the “beneficiaries” of such resources (humanity as a whole) cannot easily be
25 Directive 96/61on integration pollution prevention and pollution control OJ 1996 OJ L 257/26 (now
Directive 2008/1 OJ 2008 L 24/8). Under the IPPC Directive, BAT is determined after a Commission-
organised exchange of information between experts from the EU Member States, industry and environmental
organisations, which exchange of information results in the adoption and publication by the Commission of
“BAT Reference Documents” (BREFs). In addition, licensing authorities have flexibility, in determining
permit conditions, to take into account the technical characteristics of the installation, its geographical location
and local environmental conditions.
26 Commission Communication on Impact Assessment, COM (2002) 276 final.
27 See, for example, the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (Directive 85/337 OJ 1985 L 175/40, as
amended, which includes the possibilities for the “public concerned” to express an opinion on the project and the
participation of administrative bodies dealing with nature protection.
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charged with the cost of protecting them, insufficient market incentives exist for the owners
or managers of these resources to preserve them.28
Direct regulation also has legal certainty and transparency advantages. From the perspective
of those trying to comply with the legislation - e.g., industry - the requirements to be met by
direct regulation are normally relatively clear and certain (though, where standards are more
flexible – as with Best Available Technology standards – requirements become less certain).
From the general public’s perspective, direct regulation lays down a (more or less) precise,
visible and consistent standard to be met by industry (or whatever party at which the
legislation is directed), thus (potentially) increasing public confidence in governmental efforts
to improve environmental standards.29
Nonetheless, one can identify numerous disadvantages with direct regulatory methods. We
will confine ourselves in this Chapter to six potential problems with the direct regulatory
technique.
i. Time lag
The first can be called the “time lag” problem, which stems from the fact that, with
traditional direct regulation, standards are fixed by the regulator at given points in time.
Though more or less frequent revisions to the standards may be built into the system, even
the most ambitious revision program will likely fail to keep up with technical innovations in
the industry, or indeed to changes in environmental or economic conditions. Indeed, one of
the benefits of traditional direct regulation - certainty for industry - would be compromised
if the standards set were to change too frequently. As a result, direct regulation may
disincentivise innovation: industry has little incentive to develop more cost-effective,
efficient methods of reducing pollution if this would mean going beyond their legal
obligations under the applicable standard set down by law.30
A related disadvantage of direct regulation focuses on traditional permit systems. As
mentioned above, such permit systems form one of the primary means of implementing
standards imposed on significant polluters by direct regulation, in industries such as
chemicals, power generation and waste managements. Where permits are given out for free
- as is normally the case - installations have no incentive to reduce pollution to below the
permitted level. Nor, as traditional permits are non-transferable, are installations
incentivised to lower their pollution in order to be able to sell (part of) their permitted
amount for profit. This leads us to one of the points of contrast between traditional direct
regulation permits and the Community’s Emissions Trading Scheme, discussed in detail in
Chapter 4.
ii. Information deficit and regulatory costs
A second disadvantage of direct regulation may be termed the “information deficit”
problem: governments often do not know what type of regulation, or which standards, are
best for an industry. Rather, it is industry, not regulators, which has the “best” information
28 See further, the discussion of environmental externalities and the “tragedy of the commons” scenario
discussed in Chapter 8.
29 See Harman, “Environmental Regulation in the 21st Century” (2004) 6 Environmental Law Review 14, at
145-6.
30 See contra, however, Porter and van der Linde, “Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), Fall 1995, 97.
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which would be necessary to set effective and efficient standards. This rigidity may lead to a
risk of over- or under-regulation (for example, in the case of anti-pollution regulation, new
pollutants may appear frequently, which can only later be taken into account if using a
traditional standard-setting mechanism). In addition, that information which regulators can
obtain is costly to gather, meaning that standard-setting is a relatively costly means of
regulating. These additional costs for regulators, added to the extra costs for those regulated
entailed by complying with permits which may not, in fact, contain optimal conditions for
environmental protection, mean that direct regulation can be an unduly costly affair (whether
compared to other regulatory methods with similar results; or compared to the benefits of
the legislation).31
The drive towards “flexibility”, mentioned above, is an attempt to remedy each of these
problems. Many, however, consider this drive – in particular its star player, the BAT
technique – to be at best a qualified success. Though the BAT approach certainly helps to
solve problems of information deficit, with industry providing much of the information
required to regulate, it cannot, for example, realistically enable continuous reassessment of
what amounts to “best available technology” (as demanded in order properly to deal with
the time lag problem).
iii. Dependence on enforcement
A third, and major, disadvantage of direct environmental regulation is that its effectiveness
necessarily depends on effective enforcement - which in turn depends on the government’s
resources and enforcement policy of the day. It is fair to describe enforcement of
environmental law as the Achilles Heel of contemporary Community environmental policy
(though, of course, it is not a problem specific to Community or environmental law).32 As
the Community has no “environmental enforcement agency” - proposals to this effect made
by some commentators have been vociferously rejected by Member States wary of
encroachment on what they perceive as their sovereignty territory - Community direct
regulation is dependent for effectiveness on a combination of variables, or conditions of
effectiveness. In particular, the effectiveness of such direct regulation depends on:
 Member States’ enforcement authorities’ taking action against individual non-complying
operators. Such enforcement may be via administrative tools of enforcement (such as
withdrawing a permit, or imposing administrative penalties), or via criminal law tools of
enforcement. In each case, as the ECJ has long held, the starting point is, in principle,
national procedural autonomy: Member States are free to choose how to penalise
breaches of Community law, subject to the principles of equivalence (remedies must be
equivalent to those for comparable breaches of national law) and effectiveness (remedies
must not render the enforcement of Community rights impossible or excessively
difficult).33 However, a certain (limited) amount of harmonisation of remedies has taken
31 This may to some extent be remedied by the use of “bespoke” permits, the conditions of which are tailored
to the individual operator. The downside of such permits is, however, that costs to the regulator are increased
by the cost of negotiating the bespoke permit. See further, Holder and Lee, Environmental Protection, Law and
Policy (2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007).
32 See, for example, Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-Making (Oxford, Hart, 2005 and
Farber, “Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law” (1999)
23 Harvard Environmental Law Review 297.
33 See, for example, Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595.
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place at Community level.34 The most notable recent example is the agreement on the
text of a Directive partially to harmonise remedies by requiring Member States to
establish criminal sanctions for certain serious environmental offences in May 2008 by
the European Parliament and the Council, following the ECJ’s Environmental Criminal
Penalties judgment of October 2007.35 Nonetheless, it by no means follows from the
creation of a criminal offence on the books of national criminal law that Member States’
prosecutors will have the time, resources, or inclination, to pursue all or most of such
offences.
 The enforcement of Community law (or an implementing national law) by private parties
through their national courts. However, this faces a number of potential problems.
First, certain Member States employ restrictive standing rules for “diffuse”
environmental interest claims, some of which require proof of a “sufficient interest” or
“right” at stake.36 Environmental claims are notoriously difficult to categorise as
traditional rights-based private law claims. Second, broader problems of access to justice
often exist, in particular as regards funding. These tend to be a particular issue for
environmental claims, due essentially to “tragedy of the commons”37 reasoning, i.e.,
individuals do not generally have an economic interest in bringing cases to protect public
environmental resources.38 As a result, private environmental enforcement of
Community law does not at present play a major role in most Member States.
 Article 226 EC and Article 228 EC actions brought by the Commission against Member
States for failure to fulfil their Treaty obligations. Again, this is dependent on finite
Commission resources.39 Further, there is a risk that Member States will ignore a Court
34 See, for example, Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading within the Community OJ 2003 L 275/32 and Articles 5 and 6 of Directive 2004/35 on
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage OJ 2004 L
143/56.
35 See Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879 and Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (Ship-
Source Pollution), judgment of October 23, 2007, not yet reported, and the legislative resolution of the European
Parliament of May 21, 2008 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the protection of the environment through criminal law (COM(2007)0051 – C6-0063/2007 –
2007/0022(COD)) and the Press Release of the Council of May 21, 2008.
36 This is also, of course, a major problem in actions brought by environmental interest groups against
Community institutions before the Court of First Instance: see, for example, Case T-585/93 Stichting Greenpeace
Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-2205. However, the ECJ has to a certain
extent encouraged the reliance on Community environmental law by individuals before national courts in cases
such as Case C-201/02 Wells [2004] ECR I-723 and Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld [1996] ECR I-5403, where it
interpreted its doctrine that Directives cannot be relied upon in national courts by individuals against other
individuals (i.e., do not have horizontal direct effect) in a restrictive manner.
37 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
38 Note, however, the relevance of the Aarhus convention (UNECE Convention of June 25, 1998 on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters) to this
area, one of the pillars of which is the requirement of sufficient access to justice in environmental matters.
This is implemented in the EU, in this regard, by Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public participation in
respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment OJ 2003 L 157/17.
39 This problem has, however, to some extent been alleviated by the acceptance of the doctrine of “general and
persistent breach” by the ECJ – a doctrine which holds that, where the Commission has adduced evidence of a
“systemic and consistent” tolerance of breaches of Community environmental law up to the reasoned opinion,
showing “sufficient” proof of a general and persistent breach by the Member State, the burden of proof shifts
onto the Member State to show that it complied with Community law. See Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland
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ruling against them: while Article 226 EC judgments were given more “teeth” by the
Treaty of Maastricht’s introduction of Article 228(2) EC (providing for the possibility of
bringing a new action for the imposition of penalty payments or fines where a Member
State has failed to comply with a Court ruling),40 certain Member States continue to be
tardy in complying.41 Nonetheless, environmental enforcement constitutes a significant
proportion of the ECJ’s workload, which hands down an average of one judgment per
week on environmental matters.42
In sum, the enforcement of Community direct environmental regulation is at present
essentially dependent on the policy priorities and resources of the Commission, on the one
hand, and Member States’ authorities, on the other. Neither can hope to have enough
resources to achieve anything close to “full” enforcement, nor is anything close to this being
achieved at present.43 As a result, it is fair to say that, at present, standards set by direct
regulation give a false sense of security as to the state of the European environment.
iv. Regulatory “capture”
A fourth disadvantage of direct regulation is what is known as the “capture” phenomenon:
in setting standards, regulators are susceptible to “capture” by well-funded interest groups,
i.e., the procurement of favourable regimes or opt-outs for their particular group, or even
just the use of data which are acceptable to one interest group (but not necessarily another).
This well-documented44 phenomenon poses major problems for the democratic credentials
of the resulting legislation. Such problems of democratic legitimacy are further reinforced by
the fact, mentioned above, that prioritisation of enforcement is largely a matter of discretion
for the enforcer (whether the Commission or national enforcement bodies): there is no
“litmus test” defining which non-compliance cases are pursued and which are treated more
leniently. To a certain extent, this is remedied by the “proceduralisation” trend in
Community environmental law, also discussed above, insofar as impact assessments enhance
transparency and (sometimes) allow for public participation. However, even in this scenario,
regulators inevitably have discretion as to how and to what extent they take the public’s
comments or contributions into account in making the final decision.
v. Diffuse source pollution
Fifth, while direct regulation can be very effective in pursuing single-source pollution
problems (e.g., controlling emissions from particular industrial installations), it is not always
suitable for tackling environmental harms caused by diffuse, generalised sources. A good
[2005] ECR I-3331, which concerned twelve separate complaints, which were dealt with together in a single
case via this doctrine.
40 Article 228(2) EC has been used on numerous occasions in environmental cases: see, for example, Case C-
387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-5047 and Case C-278/01 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4947.
41 For example, at the year-end of 2004, 81 environmental judgments had not been complied with from that
year: Seventh Annual Survey of the Implementation and Enforcement of Community Environmental Law
2005, SEC (2006) 1143, Commission Staff Working Paper.
42 See further, Jacobs, “The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the Environment”
Journal of Environmental Law 18 (2006) 185.
43 See Seventh Annual Survey of the Implementation and Enforcement of Community Environmental Law
2005, SEC (2006) 1143, Commission Staff Working Paper.
44 See, for example, the large body of “public choice” theory commentary, such as Makkai and Braithwaite, “In
and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture” (1995) 1 Journal of Public Policy 61
and, for an economic perspective, Buchanan and Tullock, “Polluters’ profits and political response: direct
controls versus taxes”, The American Economic Review, 65(1) 401 (1975). See further, Chapter 7.
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example is climate change, which is caused by carbon dioxide emissions from a multitude of
sources, some natural, some human-made. It would be impossible for one body - or even
numerous bodies - to gather information on and regulate all of these sources and enforce
this regulation. Another, broader, example is the environmental harm, seen in a globalised
manner, caused by the habits of consumers in general - i.e., the inherent, global effect on the
environment of purchase-driven, capitalist society. Taking the Community’s Waste Strategy
as an illustration, while recycling targets and making waste-disposal operators subject to
licence may limit environmental damage to some extent, clearly the underlying problem for
this strategy is the level of consumption in the first place. For this reason, reduction in
consumption is priority number one of the Community’s waste policy, with re-use and
control of waste processing appearing further down the list of priorities.45
vi. Fragmentation of approach
A sixth, related disadvantage is the tendency of direct regulation techniques, in pursuing
single-source pollution problems, to adopt a (medium-, industry- or installation-) fragmented
approach, rather than an “internally” integrated approach looking at the total effects on the
environment of, for example, a particular installation. This is one of the main issues which
the novel approach of the IPPC Directive seeks to address - by using a permitting technique
which is not confined to a single medium (e.g., water, air), but which covers a plant’s
emissions into a variety of different media. This approach represents what is known as
“internal” integration - the integration of different media-specific approaches to
environmental regulation (in contrast to Article 6 EC’s external integration of environmental
considerations into non-environmental policy areas).
d. Conclusion: the limits of direct regulation
In sum, direct regulation has clearly, in many respects, treated the Community very well as a
regulatory technique for environmental problems; but it has its limits. Moroever, European
regulators are becoming acutely aware of this. The view of Sir John Harman, Chairman of
the UK’s Environment Agency, is illustrative:
“[Direct regulation] has a long successful history of substantial benefit for people and the environment.
Great smogs are a thing of the past. Our air, rivers, beaches and drinking water are the cleanest they
have been since before the industrial revolution. But regulators, like society as a whole, face new
challenges, and must adapt to them…[C]lassic environmental regulation has proved a powerful force for
good over the last century, but the times they are a-changing. The world is more complex, attitudes and
expectations have shifted, and our regulatory model must respond. The acid test is the environmental
outcome of our regulatory activity.”46
To a certain extent, the Community has reached a plateau in the effectiveness of direct
regulatory techniques in its environmental policy.47 Landmark Community legislation has,
from the 1970s onwards, been passed in those areas which lend themselves naturally to this
45 See, for example, Commission Communication, “Taking sustainable use of resources forward - A Thematic
Strategy on the prevention and recycling of waste” COM (2005) 666 final.
46 Harman, “Environmental Regulation in the 21st Century” (2004) 6 Environmental Law Review 141.
47 See, more generally, Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1997), 418, who notes that, “…the administrative state may be running out of steam in the environmental arena, or
experiencing diminishing returns to effort. This would accord with experience in other policy areas such as crime, public health,
industrial development, and education. It is relatively easy to achieve substantial initial gains, because the relatively easy and most
visible problems will be attacked first. It is very hard to show sustained improvement on any dimension once these initial gains have
been made (though occasionally a technological breakthrough may allow more substantial change).”
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form of regulation - such as biodiversity regulation, the regulation of waste and the
regulation of particular dangerous substances. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however,
the pace of such legislative activity has slowed. With most of the obvious candidates for
direct regulation covered, and some of the disadvantages of direct regulation becoming
evident - in particular, its tendency to disincentivise innovation and investment in new,
greener technologies - the Community began in earnest to look for alternative, more efficient
regulatory tools. Certain of these tools (in particular, regulation using BAT standards) have
been a success, but a limited one. It is in this context that the emergence of market-based
instruments, and the recent significant increase in their popularity, must be viewed.
4. Market-based instruments in Community environmental policy
As already mentioned, “economic”, “incentive-” or “market”-based instruments essentially
work by using market mechanisms to create incentives for actors to change their behaviour.48
This category of instrument, which has grown increasingly popular in the EU since the
1990s, is hailed by some commentators as a (partial) solution to many of the problems
associated with direct regulation, such as the problems of stifling of innovation, the
information deficit, and the relatively high cost of direct regulation.49
a. The development of market-based instruments
i. Theoretical origins
The origins of the much of the current “wave” of environmental economic instruments can
be traced back to the hugely influential “Law and Economics” movement.50 In the
environmental context, this movement has found expression in instruments and principles
which seek to adopt an economic solution to the problem that many environmental
resources amount to “public goods” in the economic sense. By this is meant resources
characterised, first, by lack of “rivalry” or “nondiminishability” (i.e., one agent’s
consumption is not at the expense of another’s consumption) and second, by lack of
excludability (i.e., agents cannot be prevented by other agents from using the resource).
Where resources fall within this category, this generally leads to inefficient outcomes,
preventing the “invisible hand” of the market mechanism from functioning properly. Where
the public good is an environmental resource, Hardin’s celebrated “tragedy of the
commons” argument posits that this can lead to overexploitation of the resource.51 In
economic terms, another way of putting this is that environmental damage is, traditionally,
viewed as a negative externality; that is, a situation where one actor’s production or
consumption decisions have an unintentional negative impact on another’s utility or profit,
for which no compensation is made.52 This means that, in the absence of corrective policy,
the operation of the market will result in more pollution being produced than efficiency
48 Perman, Ma, McGilvray and Common, note 6 above, at 217.
49 See, for example, OECD, Evaluating economic instruments (Paris, OECD, 1998).
50 Though tracing its roots back to Jeremy Bentham, has flourished in the US and is epitomised by the writings
of academics such as Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi, Richard Posner and, in the environmental field, Richard
Revesz and Richard Stewart. For an overview of Law and Economics thinking, see Posner, Economic Analysis
of Law and Stewart, “The Importance of Law and Economics for European Environmental Law”, (2002) 2
Yearbook of European Environmental Law 1.
51 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” 162 Sci. 1243 (1968), taking its name from the fact that, historically,
resources such as pastureland and fisheries were owned in common.
52 See, Perman et al, note 6 above, at 134 and Frank, Microeconomics and Behaviour (6th ed., New York, McGraw-
Hill/Irwin, 2006), at 607.
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requires (i.e., market failure), because market actors do not have to pay for the cost to society
of their pollution.
Environmental economic instruments aim to tackle this problem by “internalising” negative
environmental externalities into market actors’ decision-making processes. This is normally
achieved by placing a price on pollution – whether this price is decided upon by the State (in
the case of environmental charges and taxes) or by market operators themselves (in the case
of tradable permit systems). Alternatively, some economic instruments work by ensuring
that environmentally-friendlier market operators have, more generally, a market advantage
(for example, voluntary agreements). Each of these instruments is discussed in Chapter 4.
As the common thread in these approaches is the use of market mechanisms to incentivise
environmentally-friendlier behaviour, economic instruments are, in principle at least, an
obvious choice for proponents of sustainable development: in theory, they provide an
economically efficient, welfare-maximising way of achieving environmental goals.
ii. Development in international, EU and Member State policy
Driven by the failure of many types of direct regulation successfully to improve
environmental conditions, the movement towards employing economic instruments to “use”
the market to attain better environmental results has essentially developed since the
beginning of the 1990s at international, Community and Member State levels.
At international level, the use of economic instruments has been championed, in particular
by the OECD since the 1990s.53 An example is the Declaration of the 1992 UN Rio
Conference, Principle 16 of which proclaimed,
“National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs and the
use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear
the cost of pollution with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and
investment.”
This was followed by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992, Article
4(2)(e) of which requires developed country contracting parties to “coordinate as appropriate
with other such Parties, relevant economic and administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of
the Convention.” Article 4(2)(e) in turn laid the foundation for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol which,
in authorizing certain greenhouse gas emissions trading arrangements, set the scene at
international level for one of the most important economic instruments in use today -
tradable permit systems, discussed below.
At Community level, the move towards the use of economic instruments also began at the
beginning of the 1990s. Thus, the Commission proposed the first international
environmental tax in 1992 which, though it never got through the Council, would have
levied a tax on certain fossil fuel products on the basis of carbon dioxide emissions and
energy content.54 The Community’s Fifth Environmental Action Programme (EAP),
“Towards Sustainability”, represented a major shift of environmental instruments into the
regulatory “spotlight”. One of the principal “themes and priorities” of this EAP was
53 One of the first formal references at UN level to the benefits of economic instruments is to be found in the
Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference held in Geneva in 1990, cited in Sands,
Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 154.
54 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy,
COM (92) 226 final.
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“Broadening the Range of Instruments” used in Community environmental law. This was dealt
with in Chapter 7 of the EAP, which states that,
“In order to bring about substantial changes in current trends and practices and to involve all sectors of
society, in a spirit of shared responsibility, a broader mix of “instruments” needs to be developed and
applied. Environmental policy will rest on four main sets of instruments: regulatory instruments,
market-based instruments (including economic and fiscal instruments and voluntary agreements),
horizontal supporting instruments (research, information, education etc) and financial support
mechanisms.”55
The EAP went on to identify five particular types of economic instrument on which the
Community would focus: charges and levies, fiscal incentives, state aids, environmental
auditing and environmental liability.56 Tradable permits were mentioned as an “alternative” to
these instruments, to be studied in further depth.57 This approach was combined with
accentuation of the Article 6 EC integration principle, discussed in Chapter 2 above. Indeed,
the use of economic instruments has often gone hand-in-hand with emphasis on the
integration principle and sustainable development at the Community policy-making level,
being recommended in the Commission’s 2001 Sustainable Development Strategy58 and its
2004 Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process.59 In furtherance of this objective, a wide number
of Community measures were taken between 1993 and 2003, the most important of which
are discussed below. The current, Sixth, Environmental Action Programme of the
Community continues the emphasis on a market-based approach to environmental
regulation, including the need for policy integration in pursuit of sustainability as one of its
“strategic approaches”.60 The approach is also evident in the Commission’s 2005 Review of the
Community’s Sustainable Development Strategy61 and, most obviously, in the Commission
Green Paper of March 2007 dedicated to the topic of market-based instruments in
55 Fifth Environmental Action Programme, “Towards Sustainable Development” OJ 1993 C 138/1, 68. Article
3 of the 1998 Review of the Fifth EAP confirmed this general focus. This Article provides that, “The
Community will develop, apply or otherwise encourage a broader mix of instruments in order to bring about substantial changes in
current trends and practices in sustainable development, taking account of the subsidiarity principle. 1. In relation to the
development, at an appropriate level, of effective market-based and other economic instruments as a means of implementing policy,
special attention will be given to: (a) environmental accounting; (b) examining constraints on the introduction of economic
instruments and identifying possible solutions; (c) the use of environmental charges; (d) identifying subsidy schemes which adversely
affect sustainable production and consumption practices with a view to their reform; (e) encouraging the application of the concept of
environmental liability at Member State level; (f) voluntary agreements which pursue environmental objectives while respecting
competition rules; (g) encouraging the use of fiscal instruments to achieve environmental objectives, inter alia by considering possible
legislative initiatives in this area during the course of the Programme and continuing the study of the potential wider benefits of such
instruments, notably in the context of the general economic objectives of the Community, such as employment, competitiveness and
growth….”
56 Ibid, 71 – 72.
57 Ibid, 71.
58 Commission, “A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable
Development” COM (2001) 264 final, at 7.
59 Commission, “Integration of Environmental Considerations into other Policy Areas – a Stocktaking of the
Cardiff Process” COM (2004) 394 final.
60 Decision 1600/2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environmental Action Programme OJ 2002 L
242/1, Preamble, recitals 13 – 14 and Article 2(3) and Article 3(5).
61 “The 2005 Review of the EU sustainable development strategy: initial stocktaking and future orientations”
COM (2005) 3, one of the key strategies of which was to get “prices and incentives right”.
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environmental policy, where the Commission states that, “…market-based instruments and fiscal
policies in general will play a decisive role in delivering the EU’s policy objectives.”62
At Member State level, varying degrees of enthusiasm about economic instruments still
persist, with Member States holding better environmental records generally tending to be the
first to use such instruments. Early examples were Sweden (with its espousal of
environmental taxation) and Denmark and Germany (with their deposit-refund systems).
More recently, the UK has embraced economic environmental instruments firmly,
introducing a Landfill Tax in 1996 and its own voluntary national tradable permits scheme
for carbon dioxide equivalent emissions in 2002, which was the world’s first economy-wide
greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme.63
b. Some merits and demerits of market-based instruments64
The huge increase in the popularity of environmental economic instruments begs the
question: Why are environmental regulators turning to the market?
i. Advantages of market-based instruments
There are four main categories of advantage which economic instruments, considered in
general, enjoy in contrast to direct regulation.
1. Internalisation of externalities
As we have seen, failure to achieve such internalisation is a major defect with direct
regulation, meaning that regulators try to “second-guess” the costs of pollution, and that the
burden is placed on government agencies to enforce environmental policy, despite having
insufficient resources to do so. By internalising externalities, thus remedying market failure
at the micro level - “bringing the environment into the boardroom”65 - the idea is that use of
economic instruments not only increases the effectiveness of environmental protection
policy, but also achieves a more “just” outcome as, consistently with the polluter pays
principle, those actors which cause environmental damage are the ones charged with paying
the price for it (rather than the burden of remedying the damage falling on society as a
whole).
2. Cost-effectiveness
Second, economic instruments can often be more cost-effective than direct regulation,
achieving an environmental aim (a societal “benefit”) at the least “cost” to society. This is
often because the regulated party has the best information to be able to choose whichever
62 Green Paper on market-based instruments for environmental and related policy purposes, COM (2007) 140
final, at 2. In this Green Paper, the Commission has, inter alia, mooted the establishment of a “market-based
instruments” forum to stimulate exchanges of Member States’ experience, and raised the question of applying a
market-based instrument to emissions in the maritime sector.
63 See further, http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/uk/index.htm. For a database
of economic environmental instruments in use in the EEA at present, maintained by the OECD and European
Environment Agency, see http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/index.htm.
64 See further, for example, Ackerman and Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law” (1985) 37 Stanford Law
Review 1333, Stewart, “The Importance of Law and Economics for European Environmental Law” (2002) 2
Yearbook of European Environmental Law 1, Galizzi, “Economic instruments as tools for the protection of
the international environment” (1997) European Environmental Law Review 155, Rehbinder, “Environmental
Agreements: A new instrument of environmental policy” (European University Institute, Jean Monnet Chair
Paper RSC No 97/45).
65 Harman, “Environmental Regulation in the 21st Century” (2004) 6 Environmental Law Review 141, at 147.
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way of achieving a given environmental result is least costly, giving in-built flexibility to the
process. In contrast to command and control regulation, therefore, polluters who can
reduce pollution more cheaply than other polluters have an incentive to do so flowing from
market-based instruments.66 In addition, economic instruments may be cost effective
because of the reduced amounts spent on enforcement - in comparison to enforcement-
heavy direct regulatory methods.67
3. Fewer problems of time lag and informational deficiency
Third, from an informational perspective, the use of economic instruments can be seen as
avoiding the “time lag” problem which faces regulators using direct regulation: market
actors are better placed to know what the best and most efficient technology is at present,
and to develop such technology to gain a market advantage. The use of economic
instruments thus provides market actors with an ongoing incentive to develop new
technology by putting a price on pollution. This results in what economists term “dynamic
efficiency benefits”, whereby the market’s incentive structure operates to reward successful
environmentally friendly behaviour.68 Moreover, the use of economic instruments avoids
the undesirable “uniformity” of legislation and informational difficulties so often a hallmark
of direct regulation. As a result, in situations of uncertainty - where firms’ marginal
abatement costs are not known with accuracy to the regulator, as is very often the case in the
environmental context - market-based instruments by and large achieve the most cost-
efficient results.
4. More democratic
Fourth, economic instruments are viewed by some as more “democratic”, as decisions to act
are in principle taken not by the regulator, but by individual market players. By thus
increasing participation, such instruments form part of a broader transition which can be
dubbed a movement from “government” to “governance” - i.e., the movement from one or
more centralised regulators to include a broader base of involved and informed non-
governmental participants in environmental performance.69 This makes a lot of sense from a
practical perspective, given the major enforcement and informational problems with which,
as we have seen, direct regulation is faced - in particular at Community level, in the absence
of any Community environmental “police force” on the ground - and fits well with the
subsidiarity principle. More broadly, it also alleviates the problem of “capture” of the
regulator by interest groups, which, as we have seen, may pose problems for the legitimacy
and effectiveness of direct regulation.
ii. Disadvantages of market-based instruments
66 Perman, Ma, McGilvray and Common, note 6 above, at 234, summarising the conclusions of Tietenberg,
Economic instruments for environmental regulation, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6(1), 17 (1990).
67See the studies simulating the effects of policies using economic instruments in reducing air pollution in
different areas of the United States; a review of the results from 11 of them found that, on average, the cost of
achieving a given environmental objective through command and control policies was six times higher than for
cost-minimising instruments such as emission taxes and tradable permits: OECD Observer, “Do Economic
Instruments Help the Environment”? (Paris, OECD, 1997).
68 See Perman et al, note 6 above, at 236.
69 See further, Holder and Lee, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy (2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2007, 164 – 167.
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Economic instruments also have their disadvantages, which may be grouped into four
general categories.
1. Market failure
First, the market does not always work properly, which may mean that environmental goods
are priced wrongly. This is usually due to flaws in the way in which the market is set up in
the first place. For instance, there may be informational difficulties in setting the price of
such goods where this must be set centrally, as with environmental taxes; or, in a market for
tradable permits, where the market is flooded with permits; or where there are insufficient
players on the market. In addition, the market structure is simply not suitable for certain
environmental aims, with the preservation of the biodiversity of protected or endangered
species being a good example. Short of giving property rights over certain species or
habitats to individual legal or natural persons (which many people would find unacceptable
for such resources), there are few ways in which the costs of damage to such unique
resources can properly be valued and “charged” to those who damage them.70 Sunstein has
termed this the idea of “incommensurability”: where the loss of a resource would mean losing
something unique and qualitatively distinctive.71
2. Ethical problems
Second, many “deep green” thinkers have difficulty with the very idea of putting a price on
environmental goods, which effectively can be seen as giving a right to damage such goods
to those who can afford to pay for it (in contrast to direct regulation, where it is possible, at
least ostensibly, to prevent damage occurring at all). In a similar sense to the positions of
“strong sustainability” we looked at in Chapter 2, they have a problem with the very idea that
environmental protection should be allowed to depend on purely economic choices made in
the market, using a cost-benefit analysis to maximise individual “welfare”. They criticise
such “economic rationalism” as reducing the importance of the environment to its usefulness as
an input to the economy: the right to pollute can be bought like any other commodity, thus
potentially removing any stigma which might otherwise attach to polluting activities.72
3. Democratic concerns
Third, some critics have participation concerns about economic instruments, in that they
reserve the right to participate in actions affecting the environment to economic (market)
70 See, however, the Commission in its Green Paper on market-based instruments for environmental and
related policy purposes, COM (2007) 140 final, which explicitly rejects the idea that such instruments may
never be appropriate to protect biodiversity. It gives the examples of imposing charges and fees for hunting
and fishing permits; and granting subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy to compensate landowners
for undertaking environmental improvements to their land. A further example taken by the Commission is the
US-developed instrument of “habitat banking”, whereby a region sets a target for how much land it wants to
keep for wildlife conservation, then leaves it up to the free market to find the most cost-effective way of
achieving this goal. If a developer wants to destroy valuable habitat, it must purchase a permit to do so from
someone who has created a piece of valuable habitat elsewhere. See further, Press Release of the European
Science Foundation of October 12, 2007, “Buying and selling habitats to help wildlife”. Note, however, that
the Commission does not suggest that market instruments are appropriate to ensure protection of rare or
endangered species.
71 Sunstein, “Two Conceptions of Irreversible Environmental Harm”, Chicago, John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 407 of May 2008.
72 See further, for example, Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1997), 118.
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actors, which have vested interests in growth and profit.73 Linked to this concern are
criticisms related to distribution, which argue that the very nature of many market-based
instruments means that lower-income persons will inevitably be at a disadvantage in a market
context: only those who can afford to pollute will continue to be able to do so.74
4. Certain costs are inevitable
Fourth, it is not the case that economic instruments can work without any regulatory
framework; rather, they require a certain amount of supervision by regulators and the setting
of the broad framework for their operation. This clearly entails a certain amount of cost,
albeit not as much as for direct regulation. Taking emissions trading as an example once
again, clearly a huge amount of organisation and supervision are involved in setting up the
markets, distributing the emissions allowances, and making sure that allowances are not
exceeded (and if they are, penalising this).
In sum, it is clear that economic instruments in themselves cannot provide all the regulatory
answers, and need to be used in combination with - not to replace - direct regulation. In
cases where direct regulation is particularly effective - e.g., regulation of “point-source”
pollution from large industrial installations, particularly involving more damaging pollutants,
or regulation of biodiversity - direct regulation is often a better choice than market-based
instruments.75 Nonetheless, in a substantial variety of scenarios, market-based instruments
offer a more efficient and more effective means of achieving environmental protection goals.
The next Chapter takes a closer look at the functioning of three of the economic
instruments which, it will be argued, are of most relevance to Community competition
policy: environmental taxation, tradable permit systems and voluntary agreements.
73 See, for example, Krämer, “Thirty years of EC environmental law: perspectives and prospectives” (2000)
Yearbook of European Environmental Law 155, 185: “Community environmental law cannot be developed without
Community environmental lawyers…Placing this law into the hands exclusively of administrations or, worse, vested interest groups,
could have disastrous effects on the law, as it could become placebo law.”
74 Johnson, “Economics v. equity: do market-based environmental reforms exacerbate environmental
injustice?” 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 111 (1999), at 118.
75 Green Paper on market-based instruments for environmental and related policy purposes, COM (2007) 140
final, at 3.
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Chapter 4: Focus on Market-based Instruments most Relevant to Community
Competition Policy
This Chapter focuses on the three most instruments of most relevance to competition policy
analysis: (1) Environmental state subsidies, including environmental taxes and other forms of
state subsidy; (2) Tradable permit schemes, and especially the Community’s Emissions
Trading Scheme; and (3) Regulatory reliance on voluntary initiatives, such as voluntary
agreements or other initiatives undertaken under the auspices of “corporate social
responsibility”. The Chapter concludes with a section introducing some implications of
trends in environmental regulation for the Community’s competition policy, which leads into
the discussion of this competition policy in Parts II and III.
1. State subsidies and taxes
a. Development and usage
The taxation of pollution and the grant of state subsidies on pollution abatement are among
the most commonly-used, and oldest,1 forms of environmental instrument.
In the case of environmental taxes, their rationale is essentially that increasing the price of
environmentally harmful products or activities via imposing a tax or charge will internalise
the product’s or activity’s environmental cost, by sending out a price signal which will
influence market actors’ decision-making. In this way, decisions taken in the market will
reflect all relevant costs, rather than just the producer’s private costs, meaning that the
profit-maximising pollution level will be the same as the socially efficient level.2 This
solution to the “tragedy of the commons” problem has, since first formally proposed by the
economist Arthur Pigou early in the 20th century,3 become classic (though Pigou’s concept of
an environmental tax has attracted numerous critics in the interim, one of the most
prominent being Ronald H. Coase).4 A further potential reason for using charges or taxation
as an instrument is to raise finance for the government (whether for governmental
environmental activities or otherwise). Often, however, due to public pressure and the wish
to minimise obstacles to economic growth, green taxes are intended to be “fiscally neutral” –
i.e., another existing tax is reduced or removed when the green tax is introduced.5
Examples of environmental charges and taxes currently in use at the Community level are
few.6 This is due mainly to the reluctance of Member States to allow the Community to
1 France, for example, has had a charge for water effluent in place since the late 1960s. Some distinguish a
charge from a tax on the basis of the destination of the proceeds (in the case of a charge, the proceeds go for
environmental purposes only; in the case of a tax, the proceeds go into the general public “pot”), though this
distinction is not universally adopted. See, Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed., Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2003, at 161.
2 See Perman, Ma, McGilvray and Common, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics (3rd ed., Essex,
Pearson Education Limited, 2003), at 218. Perman et al note that, from an economic perspective, it will be
profitable for firms to reduce pollution as long as their marginal abatement costs are less than the value of the
tax rate per unit of pollution: ibid.
3 See Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London, Macmillan & Co., 1932), 183: hence the appellation “Pigouvian
taxes.”
4 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
5 In the UK, for example, fiscal neutrality of green taxation is the explicit goal. See Harman, “Environmental
Regulation in the 21st Century” (2004) 6 Environmental Law Review 141.
6 See generally, Commission Communication on environmental taxes and charges in the Single Market, COM
(97) 9 final.
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legislate on fiscal matters, which is still subject to unanimity of voting under the legal bases
for indirect taxation (Article 93 EC – i.e., taxation not collected directly from the taxpayer,
such as VAT) and direct taxation (Article 94 EC – i.e., taxation collected directly from the
taxpayer, such as income tax). One of the key areas in which proposals have been made for
Community-level environmental taxation is the taxation of energy and energy products. As
mentioned above, the Commission’s 1992 proposal of a carbon tax never got past the
Council.7 In 2003, however, a Directive on an Energy Tax was passed, imposing a very
limited tax on energy products.8 The Commission is currently considering revisions to the
Energy Tax Directive, including dividing the Community minimum levels of taxation into
separate energy and environmental elements, meaning separate taxes at national level in the
form of an energy tax and an environmental (emissions) tax.9 In its Green Paper of March
2007 on market-based instruments, the Commission raised the issue of increasing the
number of environmental taxes at Community level; for example, imposing a harmonised
landfill tax with EU-wide minimum rates.10 In addition, Commissioner Dimas has,
informally, suggested that Community environmental taxes might be appropriate in areas
such as water pricing, sustainable waste management, the reduction of local air pollution and
habitat banking.11
At the Member State level, a large number environmental charges and taxes have, as
mentioned above, been in use in certain Member States for many years. In 2006, revenues
from environmental taxes in the EU represented 2.6% of GDP.12 Examples include charges
7 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy,
COM (92) 226 final. The proposal would have harmonised tax on certain fossil fuel products, with tax being
levied on the basis of carbon dioxide emissions (at a rate of three dollars per barrel) and energy content -
though levying of the tax would have been dependent on the adoption of similar measures by the OECD. It is
interesting to note that similarly, across the Atlantic, a 1993 proposal from Clinton for an energy tax failed.
8 Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of
energy products and electricity OJ 2003 L 36/31. The Directive extended the concept of Community-imposed
minimum tax rates in the energy sector - which had only ever applied to mineral oils - to coal, natural gas and
electricity. However, a number of very important sectors are exempted from the Directive, including electricity
producers and the air and fisheries sectors. Member States may, however, choose to tax energy products
(including electricity) “for reasons of environmental policy” and, conversely, may give a partial or full exemption for
certain areas seen as environmentally-friendly, such as biofuels or energy products used in buses, rail and trams.
See further, Case C-226/07 Flughafen Köln/Bonn, judgment of the ECJ of July 17, 2008.
9 See Green Paper on market-based instruments for environmental and related policy purposes, COM (2007)
140 final, at 7. A further example of a - sectoral - environmental tax adopted at Community level is the
Eurovignette Directive, Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain
infrastructures, OJ 1999 L 187/42, as amended. Further, the Commission has included in its proposal for
passenger car related taxes the introduction of a carbon dioxide-dependent element in the tax base of annual
circulation and registration taxes. Proposal for a Council Directive of 5 July 2005 on passenger car related
taxes, COM (2005) 261.
10 Green Paper on market-based instruments for environment and related policy purposes, ibid.
11 See Reuters report of March 19, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL1958084220070319. The Commission has, for
example, stated that it will propose cuts to the VAT rate on environmentally-friendly products as part of its
wider overhaul of reduced VAT rates to be tabled in 2008, following a Franco-British proposal of November
2007. See, for example, EU Observer, “EU capitals set for clash over taxes”, November 14, 2007.
12 Eurostat, News Release 92/2008 of June 26, 2008. See also Johansson and Schmidt-Faber, “Environmental
Taxes in the European Union 1980-2001: first signs of a relative “green tax shift”, Statistics in focus:
Environment and Energy (Theme 8 – 9/2003, Eurostat), who note that environmental tax revenues for the EU
Member States in 2001 amounted to €280 billion (2.7% of GDP), or more than four times the 1980 figure. See
also OECD, Evaluating economic instruments (Paris, OECD, 1998).
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for water use;13 charges on waste discharge;14 air pollution charges and taxes;15 noise charges;
user charges for the cost of collection and treatment services; product charges for products
which pollute when manufactured, consumed or disposed of;16 taxes on modes of transport
which are perceived as less environmentally friendly;17 and taxes on energy, such as on
carbon- or sulphur-based fuels, going further than Directive 2003/96,18 or on certain
methods of producing energy.19 73% of the revenue generated from EU environmental
taxes in 2006 was sourced from energy taxes.
A related environmental economic instrument is the grant of State subsidies to certain firms
or sectors on environmental grounds. These may take the form of grants, preferable loan
conditions, or tax breaks for environmentally-superior products.20 The Commission has
placed a good deal of emphasis on the importance of subsidies in achieving environmental
goals, indicating in its Green Paper on market-based instruments its belief that
environmental subsidies may be “particularly relevant” as an instrument to achieve the EU’s
goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% by 2020 and the binding target of
20% renewables of energy production by 2020.21
Clearly, the major issue for present purposes regarding environmental taxes and subsidies is
the extent to which they are compatible with the Community’s State aid rules. This is
discussed in detail in Chapter 15.
b. Merits and demerits of environmental taxation and subsidies
One of the main virtues of environmental taxation is its simplicity: in contrast to the point-
source nature of direct regulation, tax is a relatively easy way of sending price signals with a
view to changing behaviour more generally. As an instrument, taxation has a number of
potential advantages. First, it can be applied across-the-board - rather than primarily to large
installations, as is sometimes the case for direct regulation due to enforcement costs. As a
result, taxation has the potential to reach smaller firms and individuals which are hard and
costly to regulate individually. Taxes and charges thus often have the advantage of being
easier to administer than other (non-price based) economic instruments, such as tradable
permits. Second, in the case of installations subject to other environmental standards,
13 While some Member States have long imposed such charges, the number so doing has increased following
Directive 2000/60 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy OJ 2000 L
327/1, by which Member States must introduce by 2010 water-pricing policies which encourage efficient water
use, in particular so that water users bear the costs of such usage - including external environmental and
resource costs - under the polluter pays principle.
14 For example, the UK’s landfill tax.
15 For example, France’s charge on sulphur oxide emissions; Sweden’s charge on nitrogen oxide emissions and
carbon dioxide emissions; or the UK’s climate change levy for IPPC installations.
16 For example, taxes on fertilizers, pesticides, batteries, packaging or plastic bags - such as the tax on plastic
bags in Ireland.
17 For example, Swedish taxes on air tickets and motor vehicles.
18 For example, the Swedish taxes on electricity consumption and electricity production.
19 For example, the Swedish taxes on hydro and nuclear forms of energy production.
20 Certain subsidies - for example, those providing grants or exemptions from environmental taxes to
particularly “dirty” industries hardest hit by environmental standards – can, however, have the undesirable
long-run effect of increasing the size of the targeted industry through increasing their income.
21 Green Paper on market-based instruments for environmental and related policy purposes, note 9 above, at 5.
Note that the 10% target for biofuels proposed in that Green Paper has since been revised, in light of concerns
that this would exacerbate the global food crisis, with MEPs voting on July 7, 2008 to reduce the target to 4%
by 2015.
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taxation can provide an incentive for those regulated to do better than the standard, and thus
to innovate - an incentive which, as discussed, is often lacking where standards alone are
used.22 Third, taxes may raise revenue which can be invested back into environmentally-
friendly technologies and the like. Alternatively, such revenue may be channelled into
reducing other distortionary taxes in the economy, thus providing what some economists
term a “double dividend”.23 In general, taxation works best when there is an alternative,
cleaner option to which firms or individuals can switch; where (relatively small) price signals
will have an effect on market behaviour; and where it is not necessary to have a lot of
exemptions to the system, so that it can stay simple.
There are, however, a number of disadvantages pertaining to use of taxes and charges as an
instrument of environmental protection.
First, though the concept of “internalising externalities” via adding a Pigouvian tax makes
sense in theory, in practice it is extremely difficult to estimate the correct “value” of the
particular externality. As a result, it is very difficult to set the tax at a level which will be
effective in incentivising environmentally-friendly behaviour, without being excessive (as a
tax set too high will, just as a tax set too low, lead to inefficiencies).24
Second, as increases in taxation are generally unpopular, environmental tax legislation may
be littered with exemptions for certain sectors, or goods, from the taxation scheme, often
due to political compromise and lobbying. To this extent, the taxation approach is thus still
susceptible to being criticised on grounds that legislators may be “captured”, just as we saw
in the case of direct regulation. Indeed, the EU’s own Energy Tax Directive of 2003 is a
good illustration of this phenomenon.25 This has the potential to compromise severely the
effectiveness of environmental taxation regimes.
Third, taxation may, depending on the design of the tax system, raise issues of distribution
and justice. If the same type of basic consumer goods or activities are subject to equal
amounts of environmental tax - which makes sense from an environmental perspective - this
will impact more severely on the lowest earners in society, meaning that, in the case of taxes
on essentials (such as energy) environmental taxes have the potential to be regressive rather
than redistributive.26
22 See, for example, Hemmelskamp and Leone, “Do Environmental Taxes and Standards Induce Innovation?”,
in Welfens (ed.), Internationalization of the Economy and Environmental Policy Options (Berlin, Springer, 2001).
23 See, for example, Backhaus, “The Law and Economics of Environmental Taxation: When should the Ecotax
kick in? 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 117 (1999).
24 An example is the UK’s Landfill tax, introduced in 1996, which it is now acknowledged did not succeed in
changing consumer behaviour because it was set at too low a level. See, for a proposed solution to this issue,
Backhaus, “The Law and Economics of Environmental Taxation: When should the Ecotax kick in?” 19 Int’l
Rev. L. & Econ. 117 (1999), who favours ecological taxation via a tax credit on personal or corporate income
taxes on certifications of an ecological improvement scheme. See also, OECD Observer, “Integrating
Environment and Economy” (Paris, OECD 1997).
25 Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of
energy products and electricity, note 8 above. See, on the damage to effectiveness caused by routine and
widespread exemptions from environmental tax regimes, Ekins and Speck, “Competitiveness and Exemptions
from Environmental Taxes in Europe”, Environmental and Resource Economics 13, 369 (1999).
26 See OECD, Evaluating economic instruments, note 12 above, and the Commission’s Green Paper on market-
based instruments, note 10 above, at 5. See also, Hamm, “Die Ökosteuer - eine ordnungspolitische
Fehlleistung” ORDO Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, Lucius & Lucius,
2001) 1.
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Fourth, taxation is a rather blunt instrument for achieving environmental goals: it does not
ensure environmental outcomes; and it may take a long time (if it ever happens) before
individuals’ behaviour changes. As a price-based instrument, the environmental outcome is
not, therefore, as certain as in the case of instruments which place a definite quantitative
“cap” on pollution (such as cap-and-trade tradable permit schemes, discussed below).27
Further, such behaviour may revert immediately back to the environmentally-unfriendly
stance should the tax be removed. This means that the environmentally-beneficial effects
are dependent on the vagaries of politics - a new administration may simply abolish the tax.28
More fundamentally, without changing peoples’ underlying attitudes and beliefs about the
aims of the tax, environmental taxes may result in people going to great lengths to avoid the
tax, whether legally or illegally.29 A classic example is charges for removing and processing
domestic refuse: without belief in the need for proper and environmentally-friendly refuse
disposal, such charges may be counterproductive, resulting in illegal dumping (“fly tipping”)
in the countryside (as, for example, has been a major problem in Ireland).30
2. Tradable permits
a. Concept
The second form of economic instrument of potential relevance to competition analysis is
the tradable permit. In its simplest meaning, this indicates the creation of a regime whereby
polluters are granted (or sold) a limited number of pollution rights; should they pollute less
than allowed by their permit, they may sell the excess to other polluters. In this way,
tradable permit schemes can minimise costs, by encouraging firms which would find it costly
to reduce their emissions to purchase the right to pollute from firms for which the cost is
lower. In principle, such schemes can allow for economic development to be reconciled
with environmental protection, by allowing new industrial activities in the area covered by
the scheme without increasing the total volume of emissions from that area.31 One of the
most common uses of tradable permit schemes at present is trading in emissions allowances
- i.e., permits to emit certain pollutants, often shortened to “emissions trading schemes”.32
Emission trading schemes may be divided into two categories: “cap and trade” (“absolute”
regimes) or “baseline and credit” systems (“relative” regimes). 33
“Cap and trade” regimes generally set a total “cap” or absolute maximum quantity of
emissions (measured over a specified period of time) on all emissions from the sources
27 See further, Green Paper on market-based instruments, ibid, at 4.
28 See Dobson, Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 3 – 4.
29 Moreover, some economists argue that the obligation imposed by environmental taxes may lead to
motivational “crowding-out effects”: that is, citizens who would otherwise have been motivated to undertake
voluntary environmentally beneficial actions, for instance out of public spiritedness, may feel less inclined to do
so when coerced by taxes. See Grepperud, “Environmental voluntary behaviour and crowding-out effects:
regulation or laissez-faire?” Eur J Law Econ (2007) 23: 135-149.
30 See, Report of the Irish Environmental Protection Agency, The Nature and Extent of Unauthorised Waste Activity
in Ireland (Wexford, EPA, 2005), available at www.epa.ie.
31 See OECD, Evaluating economic instruments, note 12 above.
32 Note, however, that the term emission trading scheme is misleading, as trading takes place not in the
emissions themselves, but in the allowances to emit the pollutant(s) covered by the scheme.
33 Relative and absolute systems have, on occasion, been linked together – as was the case with the UK’s
greenhouse gas allowance (absolute) trading regime, which allowed trading with sectors which had negotiated
Climate Change Agreements with the government and which had relative targets. See Lefevere, “Greenhouse
Gas Emission Allowance Trading in the EU: A Background” (2003) Yearbook of European Environmental
Law 149, 159 and 161.
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covered by the regime. This quantity is then allocated as individual “allowances”, either free
of charge or by auction - a process which, in effect, creates new transferable property rights.
After the allocation, sources can either choose to reduce their emissions and sell the excess,
or increase their emissions and buy others’ excess allowances. These choices are made on
the basis of the market price of the allowances and the “marginal costs” of the emissions
reductions for that source - i.e., the cost to the source of reducing pollution by one unit, as
compared to the cost to the source of purchasing the necessary allowance. Sources have the
possibility, therefore, of acting in the most cost-effective manner. Such trading systems have
a fixed compliance period, at the end of which sources must be able to show that they have
sufficient allowances to cover their actual emissions. In addition, the cap may be reduced
over time, to improve environmental quality. Examples of current “cap and trade” systems
are the scheme envisaged by the Kyoto Protocol and the Community’s Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS), both of which are discussed in further detail below.
In contrast, “baseline and credit” systems have relative targets: no total “cap” of emissions is
fixed; rather, a relative target is set by defining a “baseline”. The baseline is usually
expressed in terms of the source’s emissions efficiency compared to its activity. Unlike cap
and trade regimes, however, allowances are not allocated up-front, but when a source
demonstrates that it is performing better than its baseline. The idea is, however, that (as
with cap and trade systems) sources which can reduce their emissions more cheaply than the
market price for allowances will do so, and sources for which reduction is more expensive
than the market price for allowances will purchase extra allowances. However, due to the
relative targets in baseline and credit systems, they do not give the same certainty of
environmental outcome which cap and trade systems have in principle (though as we will
see, not always in practice). Conversely, many installations prefer relative targets, as any
increase in production can be countered by increasing efficiency via, for example, installing
less polluting equipment, thus increasing efficiency without penalising production activity.34
Overall, typical components of a tradable permit scheme are: a binding (absolute or relative)
target; a unit of trade (for emissions trading, normally one tonne of carbon dioxide
equivalent); a system for distributing allowances to participants; and a compliance period, at
the end of which participants must have enough allowances to cover their emissions, failing
which they are subject to a penalty.35
b. Development and usage internationally36
One of the first emissions trading schemes widely recognised as successful was the United
States’ sulphur dioxide emissions trading scheme, brought in by the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act and which subsequently inspired the Kyoto Protocol and the EU’s ETS.37
34 A number of Member States – including Germany, the Netherlands and the UK – had, prior to the
Community’s ETS, negotiated relative (voluntary) target emissions agreements with industry. See Barth and
Dette, “The Integration of Voluntary Agreements into Existing Legal Systems” (2001) 1 Environmental Law
Network International Review 20. Likewise, the Netherlands’ domestic nitrous oxides trading scheme is also a
relative scheme, setting a relative target in amounts of nitrogen oxide emissions per unit of energy consumed.
35 See Harman, “Environmental Regulation in the 21st Century” (2004) 6 Environmental Law Review 141.
36 On this, see Freestone and Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2005). On potential design(s) of international emissions trading systems, see OECD,
Markets for Tradeable CO2 Emission Quotas: Principles and Practice (Paris, OECD, 1995).
37 For a recent description of the US’s two main trading regimes, see Schwarze and Zapfel, “Sulfur Allowance
Trading and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market: A Comparative Design Analysis of Two Major Cap-
and-Trade Permit Programs?” (2000) 17 Environmental and Resource Economics 279. See also, the US’s
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The US’s scheme followed much academic debate in the US about the merits of tradable
permits, including an influential 1985 article by Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart
advocating a reform of environmental law by the use of tradable permit schemes. As they
saw it, the US’s then-reliance on direct environmental regulation “wastes tens of billions of dollars
every year, misdirects resources, stifles innovation, and spawns massive and often counter productive
litigation…” The introduction of an emissions trading scheme would, by incentivising those
polluters with lowest marginal abatement costs to clean up their act, “at one stroke, cure many of
the basic flaws of the existing command-and-control regulatory systems.”38 They were proven right: the
US’s switch to a tradable permit scheme for sulphur dioxide emissions reduced such
emissions by 50% over ten years.
At international level, by far the most important example of an emissions trading system at
present is that set up by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. This followed Article 4(2) of the UN’s
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), which allowed developed
country contracting parties and other Annex I parties to implement policies and measures in
mitigation of climate change required under that provision “jointly with other parties”. This was
subject to decisions taken by the conference of the UNFCC parties at its first session
“regarding criteria for joint implementation.”39 The 1992 Framework Convention gave no details
as to the mechanics of such joint implementation: this came with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.40
The Kyoto Protocol works as follows. Annex B to the Protocol sets per-country targets for
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions for all developed countries (Framework
Convention “Annex I” parties) from 2008 – 2012 (the “first commitment period”). These
targets or “caps” are based on a percentage of the country’s 1990 greenhouse gas emissions.
Developing countries, however, were not made subject to any “cap” on greenhouse gas
emissions. By Article 4 of the Protocol, a group of developed countries may form a
“bubble”, allowing them to agree on a single reduction target applicable to them and to then
redistribute this target among members of the group. The EU has chosen to use such a
bubble mechanism: its target as a region is that aggregate emissions of a “basket” of six
greenhouse gases must be reduced by 8% over 2008 – 2012 compared to 1990 emissions
proposed Climate Security Act, which would have instituted a cap and trade scheme whereby the federal
government would set an overall limit on emissions; and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the North
East of the US, which is an agreement among ten north eastern states to cut emissions from power plants by
10% between 2009 and 2018. Emissions will be capped from January 1st, 2009. On June 6, 2008, the Climate
Security Act failed to gain enough votes to continue in the US Senate. See The Economist, November 17,
2007, Clarke, “Summary of the Recently Departed Climate Security Act: A look at what’s coming in US federal
climate change law?” (2008) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 260 and Meckling, “Corporate
Policy Preferences in the EU and US: Emissions Trading as the Climate Compromise?” 2 Carbon and Climate
Law Review (2008) 171.
38 Ackerman and Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law” (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review 1333, at 1333 and
1341. See also, Gehring and Streck, “Emissions Trading: Lessons from SOx and NOx Emissions Allowance
and Credit Systems: Legal Nature, Title, Transfer and Taxation of Emission Allowances and Credits 35
Environmental Law Reporter (2005) 10219.
39 UN 1992 Framework Convention, Article 4(2)(a) and (d).
40 In the negotiations running up to the Protocol, it was in fact a group led by the United States (under Clinton)
which pushed for an emissions trading approach; this was opposed by the EU, which favoured a more
command-and-control-inspired list of binding policies. See Lefevere, note 33 above, 154.
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levels.41 Should a group of countries fail to meet their target as members of the “bubble”,
however, each country is held to its individual Annex B requirement.
Three flexible mechanisms are detailed in the Protocol, each forms of emissions trading, as
means of achieving the targets. These are: (1) Joint Implementation (JI) (Article 6); (2) The
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Article 12); and (3) International Emissions
Trading (IET) (Article 17).
 JI and CDM. These are “project-based” mechanisms, which allow countries, rather
than reducing emissions at “home”, to invest in emission reduction or sequestration
projects in other countries in order to reach their target. Credits - which are termed
“Emission Reduction Units” (ERUs) for JI and “Certified Emission Reductions” (CERs)
for CDM - are granted by comparing the actual emissions of such projects with the
emissions which would have occurred had the investment not taken place (the “baseline”
emissions). In the case of JI projects, these take place in developed countries, while
CDM projects take place in developing countries;
 IET. This is the true emissions trading mechanism provided for by the Kyoto
Protocol, inserted practically at the last moment (the last night) of negotiations after
much pressure from the US and other countries, and despite the Community’s
resistance. As a result, the details of the mechanism are not established in the Protocol
itself.42 Annex B (developed country) parties may avail of emissions trading to meet their
targets. However, “any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of
meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments” under the Protocol. Meat was
added to the bones of the IET with the adoption of the Marrakech Accords in 2002. In
the run-up to Marrakech, it was agreed that domestic action shall constitute a “significant
element” of developed countries’ action to meet their targets.43
In addition, it was expressly agreed that non-state entities could participate in Article 17 IET
- which had not been clear from the text of that provision - under the responsibility of the
country which authorised them to do so. As a result, Kyoto, as specified by Marrakech, left
the door open for individual countries or regions to decide upon a system whereby non-state
actors could participate in emissions trading. The EU’s 2003 Directive on an Emissions
Trading Scheme represented the first such regional system. In the interim, certain Member
States - in particular, the UK and Denmark - adopted their own, national, emissions trading
systems.
The Kyoto Protocol was implemented on behalf of the Community by Decision 2002/358,
which confirmed the EU’s use of the JI bubble system set out in Article 4 of the Protocol.44
The actual quantity of emissions (in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent) allocated to the
Community and its Member States under the Protocol’s first commitment period was
established in Decision 2006/944.45 In a flurry of activity and declarations at the beginning
of 2007 (which coincided with the review of the Community’s Energy Policy), the
41 By 2006, the EU-15’s emissions had dropped by 2.7% below the base year: see Commission press release of
June 18, 2008 IP/08/965.
42 Article 17 of which provides that the parties, “…shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in
particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading.”
43 See the Bonn Agreements of 2001, on what is known as the “supplementarity” issue.
44 See Article 2 of Decision 2002/358 OJ 2002 L 130/1.
45 Decision 2006/944 OJ 2006 L 358/87.
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Commission issued a Communication making explicit its view that, globally, climate change
must at all costs be kept to a maximum of two degrees increase above pre-industrial levels.46
This was endorsed by the European Council in its Brussels summit of March 2007.47
c. The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)48
Though emissions trading schemes had existed prior to the EU ETS at national level,49 the
EU ETS went far beyond their scope. It has justifiably been described as “the largest
experiment to date with the creation of regulatory property.”50 The speed at which the transition was
made to a Community-wide trading scheme was remarkable - particularly in view of the
Member States’ differing obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and their differing views on
the importance of combating climate change.51 Most commentators would likely have
agreed with Point Carbon’s view in September 2001 that the having a Community-wide
46 See Commission Communication, “Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celcius: the way ahead for
2020 and beyond” COM (2007) 2 final.
47 The Spring 2007 European Council also agreed on a non-binding goal of “a 30% reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 as [the EU’s] contribution to a global and comprehensive agreement for the period beyond
2012, provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced
developing countries to contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.” Presidency
Conclusions 7224/07 CONCL/1. Such commitment on the part of other developed countries and advanced
developing countries has not yet been forthcoming.
48 A multitude of literature has sprung up on this. See, for example, Lefevere, “Greenhouse Gas Emission
Allowance Trading in the EU: A Background” (2003) Yearbook of European Environmental Law 149, Peeters,
“Emissions Trading as a New Dimension to European Environmental Law: The Political Agreement of the
European Council on Greenhouse Gas Allowance trading” (2003) European Environmental Law Review 82,
Mortensen, “The EU Emission Trading Directive” (2004) European Environmental Law Review 275, Pâques
and Charneux, “Du Quota d’Émission de gaz à effet de serre” 3 (2004) Revue Européenne de droit de
l’environnement 226, Pâques, “La directive 2003/87/CE et le système d’échange de quotas d’émission de gaz à
effet de serre dans la Communauté européenne”, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 40(2) (2004) 250,
Bazelmans, “De implementatie van Europese handel in emissierechten in Nederland” Milieu & Recht 31(4)
(2004) 214, Kelly, “An Evaluation of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme in Practice” (2006)
European Environmental Law Review 175, Ellerman and Buchner, “The European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results”, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 2007 1(1):66.
49 Prior to the EU ETS scheme, there were some examples of emissions trading schemes in the EU, e.g., the
UK’s ETS, which started in 2002, ran until 2006, and combined a system whereby installations (voluntarily)
accepted a cap in return for an incentive payment, with a baseline-and-credit system intended to assist
businesses in reaching pollution reduction targets in the Climate Change Agreements that had been negotiated
between industry and the government. See Dahlgreen, “Emissions Trading in the United Kingdom: The
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (Amendment) and National Emissions Inventory Regulations
2005 and the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Regulations 2005” Enviro LR 8 2 (134); and Torre-Schaub,
“La naissance d’un nouveau marché: le système britannique de commerce d’allocations d’emissions de gaz à
effet de serre”, Revue Internationale de Droit Economique (2004) 227. Others included: the Danish CO2
trading system, which started in 1999, and was limited to the electricity utility sector; the Dutch program
soliciting Joint Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project credits intended to
promote the cost-effective achievement of the Netherlands' Kyoto obligations; and BP’s voluntary emissions
trading program imposing a greenhouse gas emissions limit (internal to the corporation) on its operating
entities in many parts of the world. See further, Ellerman and Buchner, “The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results”, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
2007 1(1):66.
50 Anttonen, Mehling and Upston-Hooper, “Breathing Life into the Carbon Market: Legal Frameworks of
Emissions Trading in Europe”, (2007) European Environmental Law Review 96, at 97.
51 Ellerman, Buchner and Carraro (eds.), Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme: Rights, Rents and
Fairness (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 3.
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trading scheme in place by 2005 was a “low-probability scenario.”52 Part of the reason why it
was possible to bring in the ETS so swiftly was that, in contrast to the approach of many
major US business interests, most significant EU business players did not oppose the
concept of a trading scheme in principle.53 The EU’s scheme entered into force on January
1, 2005, initially providing for a pilot phase (Phase I) from 2005 – 2007, with Phase II
corresponding to the first commitment period of Kyoto.
In terms of scope, to date the scheme only applies to carbon dioxide emissions from certain
activities, listed in Annex I of the Directive (for example, certain energy activities and certain
activities in the production and processing of ferrous metals and in the mineral industry).54
This list corresponds to a significant extent to those installations covered by the IPPC
Directive and means that the scheme at present covers approximately 12,000 installations
comprising 45% of the EU’s total carbon dioxide emissions. In July 2008, the European
Parliament voted to include aviation activities within the ETS from 2012 onwards.55 In
Phase II, Member States may choose unilaterally to apply the ETS to other activities,
installations and greenhouse gases, subject to Commission approval. The mechanism of the
ETS is essentially as follows.
Grant of permits. National “competent authorities” grant greenhouse gas emission permits
to installations, under Articles 5 and 6 of Directive 2003/87. These permits allow the
installations to engage in one of the activities falling within the ETS’s scope56 and impose
conditions of monitoring and reporting carbon dioxide emissions on installations. In
addition, such permits include an obligation for the installation to surrender allowances equal
to its total emissions in each calendar year, within four months of the end of that year.57
NAPs. Member States were obliged to draw up “National Allocation Plans” (NAPs) for
Phases I and II in turn, which plans state the total quantity of allowances that the Member
State intends to allocate from that period and how it proposes to allocate them. The plans
“shall be based on objective and transparent criteria, including those listed in Annex III, taking due account
52 Point Carbon, The Carbon Market Analyst, September 2001, cited in Ellerman, Buchner and Carraro (eds.),
ibid, at 3.
53 Only two sectors successfully lobbied against being included in the ETS: the chemicals and aluminium
sectors. See Meckling, “Corporate Policy Preferences in the EU and US: Emissions Trading as the Climate
Compromise?” 2 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2008) 171 for an interesting historical analysis of changes in
corporate approaches to emissions trading. A major opponent to the introduction of trading schemes was the
Global Climate Coalition, a business group from which many (US and EU) firms withdrew in around 1996-
1997.
54 Directive 2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the
Community OJ 2003 L 275/32 (the “ETS Directive”). The Commission has proposed that this be extended in
Phase 3, for example, to ammonia and aluminium producers, and to nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbon gases:
see Commission Proposal for a Directive to extend and improve the functioning of the EU ETS, COM (2008)
30 final.
55 Airlines must cut their carbon dioxide emissions by 3% in 2012, and by 5% from 2013, with 85% of
allowances being distributed by free allocation. See Commission’s Proposal of December 2006 for a Directive
amending Directive 2003/87 so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading within the Community, COM (2006) 818 final, an amended version of which was approved
at second reading in the European Parliament.
56 ETS Directive, Article 4.
57 ETS Directive, Article 5.
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of comments from the public”.58 Among the factors listed in Annex III are that the NAPs must
not provide for more allowances to be issued than is consistent with the Member State’s
meeting its Kyoto obligations; and must deal with the possibility of new entry to the market
(which may be difficult where Member States use a “grandfathering” system of allocation of
allowances, explained below).59 The NAPs are submitted to the Commission for approval,
which must respond within three months. While the Commission was initially rather lenient
towards Member States’ plans (resulting in too many allowances being distributed by
Member States, as discussed below), it has, following criticism, taken a more demanding
approach.60 Member States must base decisions to allocate individual allowances on their
National Allocation Plan.61
Allocation of allowances. Member States must allocate allowances to emit one tonne of
carbon dioxide equivalent (also known as “European Union Allowances” or “EUAs”). In
doing so, Member States were obliged to allocate at least 95% of the allowances free of
charge from 2005 – 2007; for 2008 – 2012, this figure was 90%. It is the allowances - and
not the permits - which are tradable and valid for emissions during the period for which they
are issued. Many Member States choose to allocate the free allowances on the basis of a
“grandfathering” system - i.e., on the basis of the market incumbents’ existing activities, the
implications of which will be discussed below. However, importantly, decisions on
allocation of allowances, “shall be in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty, in particular
Article 87 and 88 thereof.”62 The Commission has issued guidance to Member States on
allocating allowances.63 When deciding upon allocation, Member States “shall take into account
the need to provide access to allowances for new entrants.”64 The Commission in its 2003 Guidelines
on Allocation listed three possible ways of allocating allowances to new entrants: a Member
State may have new entrants buy all their allowances on the market, it may make use of the
possibility to set aside some allowances for periodic auctioning, or it may foresee a reserve in
the national allocation plan to issue allowances to new entrants free of charge.
58 ETS Directive, Article 9. See the template NAP with explanatory notes in the Commission’s 2005
Communication on Further Guidance on Allocation Plans for the trading period 2008 – 2012 of the Emissions
Trading Scheme COM (2005) 703 final.
59 Article 11 and Annex III, ETS Directive. See the Commission 2005 Communication on Further Guidance
on Allocation Plans for the trading period 2008 – 2012 of the Emissions Trading Scheme, ibid, and
Commission Communication, "Building a global carbon market - Report pursuant to Article 30 of Directive
2003/87/EC" COM (2006) 676 final.
60 Where a Member State’s NAP is rejected, the Member State may appeal this rejection: see, e.g., Case T-
374/04 Germany v Commission, judgment of November 7, 2007, not yet reported, where the Commission’s
rejections of the German Phase II NAP was partially annulled, and Case T-178/05 UK v Commission [2005]
ECR II-4807, in which the CFI annulled the Commission’s rejection of the UK’s proposed amendment to its
NAP for the first commitment period. See also, the Order of the Court in Case C-6/08 P US Steel Košice v
Commission, in which the ECJ confirmed the CFI’s ruling that a company whose allowances were reduced
following the Commission’s decision ordering Slovakia to reduce the total number of allowances allocated
under its National Allocation Plan did not have standing to challenge this decision.
61 Article 11(1) ETS.
62 Article 11(3) ETS.
63 Communication from the Commission on guidance to assist Member States in the implementation of the
criteria listed in Annex III to Directive 2003/87, COM/2003/830 final and Communication on Further
Guidance on Allocation Plans for the trading period 2008 – 2012 of the Emissions Trading Scheme, note 59
above.
64 Article 11(3), ETS Directive.
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The holding of allowances is not limited to operators of installations. Article 19 of the ETS
Directive provides that “any person may hold allowances”, meaning that allowances may be
purchased by third parties.65
Pooling. By Article 28, Member States may allow operators of installations to form a
“pool” of installations from the same activity for Phase I and/or 2 of the ETS, on
application to the competent authority. In this case, the operators must nominate a trustee
to “take over” the individual operators’ ETS responsibilities – i.e., to be issued with the total
allowances for the group, to be responsible for surrendering allowances, to be liable to
penalties in the event of failure to do this etc. Should a Member State be minded to allow
such a pool, it must notify the Commission, which may within three months reject an
application, giving reasons. Any penalty which the trustee fails to pay falls to be paid by the
constituent individual members of the pool.
Monitoring and enforcement. Installations subject to permits are, along with Member
States, responsible for monitoring emissions. They are guided in this respect by the
Commission’s Guidelines 2004/156, which build on the principles for monitoring and
reporting set out in Annex IV to the ETS.66 Should an operator fail, in the period 2005-
2007, to surrender sufficient allowances by April 30 of each year to cover its emissions the
previous year, it is liable to a penalty per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted of €40.
This penalty must increase to €100 per tonne in the ETS’s second period. Importantly,
payment of the penalty does not release the operator from the obligation to surrender
allowances for those excess emissions in the next year. Further, Member States “shall ensure
publication” of the names of operators in breach. Subject to these “harmonising” provisions,
penalties for infringement are for the Member States to decide upon, though they must be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.67
Trading. Member States must also establish national registries to ensure correct accounting
and trading in allowances68 (though the Commission also maintains a separate “central
administrator” to maintain a transaction log of the transfer of allowances), and must submit
an annual report on the functioning of the system to the Commission.69 Member States’
registries, and the EU’s transaction log, are to be connected to the UN’s international carbon
credit registry from December 2008,70 which will mean that carbon credits issued under
Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism can be transferred to Member States’ registries.
Linkage. Specific provision is made in the 2003 Directive for the interaction of the ETS
with the IPPC regime, providing that IPPC permits should not include an emission limit
value for ETS-covered gases “unless it is necessary to ensure that no significant local pollution is
caused.”71 In addition, Directive 2004/101 links the ETS with the Kyoto Protocol’s project
mechanisms (JI and CDM), by allowing operators to use not only ETS allowances (as
65 For example, hedge funds or even – in principle – environmental groups who wish to “decommission”
allowances to reduce pollution, though lack of funds makes this unlikely.
66 See Article 15 and Annex V, ETS Directive.
67 Article 16 ETS Directive.
68 See Regulation 2216/2004 for a standardised and secured system of registries OJ 2004 L 386/1.
69 Article 21, ETS Directive.
70 See Commission press release of August 6, 2008, “Emissions Trading; Commission to connect EU with UN
carbon credit registry before December” IP/08/1246.
71 Article 26, ETS Directive (i.e., to avoid the occurrence of the “hot spot” phenomenon, by which a large
amount of pollution accumulates in a locality).
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distributed by Member States pursuant to their National Allocation Plan) but also JI and
CDM credits (ERUs and CERs) as allowances to be surrendered in order to satisfy their
ETS obligations.72 Member States were to specify in their National Allocation Plans the
percentage of ERUs and CERs which each installation can use to satisfy their ETS
obligations.73 Further, provision is made in Article 25 of the Directive for the linkage of the
ETS with other greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes, via the conclusion of agreements
with other developed countries (“Annex B” Kyoto countries) providing for the mutual
recognition of allowances between the schemes, though this has not taken place as yet. In
October 2007, the EU’s ETS was extended to the EEA countries, Norway, Liechtenstein,
and Iceland.74
The future. The Commission is considering the extension of the scope of the ETS in a
variety of ways, including gases and installations/activities covered.75 It is also considering
linking the ETS with third countries’ national or sub-national emissions trading schemes,76
and other fine-tuning of the scheme.77 More fundamentally, in its January 2008 proposals to
revamp the ETS, the Commission has put forward the idea of implementing a single EU-
wide cap after 2012 and harmonising criteria for granting allowances, with a major increase
in auctioning allowances.78 This would mean that Member States would no longer have to
produce NAPs, as allowances would effectively be granted according to objective criteria set
at Community level. A further possibility which has been mooted by, inter alia, French
president Sarkozy and Commission president Barroso, is the introduction of “carbon tariffs”
on imports from countries which have not signed up to international climate change
obligations (which could include, for instance, the United States and China), in order that
EU firms are not placed at a disadvantage by the ETS’s emissions caps.79
72 See further, Bazelmans, “De koppeling van CDM en JI aan het Europese emissiehandelssyteem”, Nederlands
tijdschrift voor Europees recht 6 (2004) 151.
73 See Decision 2006/780 on avoiding double counting of greenhouse gas emission reductions under the
Community emissions trading scheme for project activities under the Kyoto Protocol OJ 2006 L 316/12,
which requires Member States to ensure that no ERUs or CERs are issued for emission reductions from
installations which participate in the ETS, and Langrock and Sterk, “The Developing Market for CERs:
Current Status and Challenges Ahead” JEEPL 2(2005) 101.
74 See Decision 146/2007 of the EEA Joint Committee, not yet published in the OJ.
75 See Commission Communication, "Building a global carbon market - Report pursuant to Article 30 of
Directive 2003/87/EC" COM (2006) 676, Commission Proposal for a Directive to extend and improve the
functioning of the EU ETS, COM (2008) 30 (proposal to extend to ammonia and aluminium producers, and to
nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbon gases), and Commission proposal for a Directive on the geological storage
of carbon dioxide, COM (2008) 18.
76 The primary potential partners (i.e., who have trading schemes in place for at least part of the territory) are
Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland, as well as the US state California. See Mace and
Anderson, “Transnational Aspects of a Linked Carbon Market” 2 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2008) 190
and, further, the launch of the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) in October 2007, an
international forum for governments and public authorities involved in emissions trading systems.
77 For example, in its Green Paper on market-based instruments for environmental and related policy purposes,
COM (2007) 140 final, the Commission raised the possibility of fine-tuning the boundaries between the 2003
Energy Taxation Directive, discussed above, and the EU’s ETS, to avoid overlap between the two systems
while minimising “loopholes” whereby certain operators might fall outside both schemes.
78 Commission Proposal for a Directive to extend and improve the functioning of the EU ETS, COM (2008)
30 final.
79 See the speech of Commission president Barroso of January 21, 2008, “Europe’s climate change
opportunity”, SPEECH/08/26 and Financial Times, “Sarkozy warns China of carbon tariffs”, November 27,
2007.
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d. Merits and demerits of tradable permit systems
Tradable permit systems may, depending on their design, have a variety of advantages. First,
they are potentially economically efficient, in that they can in principle achieve
environmental protection while ensuring that allowances end up with those who value them
most. Participants can choose whether or not it is cost-effective for them to achieve lower
emissions than the quantity of allowances allocated (and sell the excess), and they can make
their choice on their own terms (i.e., they can choose the timing of pollution, and where
improvements should be made, themselves). As such, they represent a “least-cost” solution
to achieving environmental aims: those who can improve their environmental performance
at the least cost will do so. In economists’ terms, this means that overall pollution
abatement costs decrease.80 Second, as with most economic instruments, tradable permits
thus provide incentives to improve environmental performance, while offering the
possibility of offsetting investment costs in new technology and potentially providing firms
which do so with a competitive advantage. As such, the schemes turn the “burden” of
reducing pollution into an opportunity to gain a market advantage, thus increasing overall
environmental benefits compared to traditional command and control techniques.81
Realisation of these benefits, however, is contingent on the correct set-up and smooth
functioning of the market. Thus, tradable permit systems work best where: there are in fact
different options for firms, such that it is open to them to choose which one is most cost-
effective for them; where the environmentally beneficial outcome can be accurately
measured and is binding (something which is easier to achieve with “cap-and-trade” rather
than relative target schemes); where the number of participants is relatively high and varied
(i.e., the market is fairly liquid), so that comparative cost advantages can be realised; in “cap-
and-trade” schemes, where the cap is set at a level which will in fact achieve environmental
protection; where allocation of allowances is done accurately, so as to remain within the limit
of the cap; and where accurate verification and monitoring of emissions is possible (i.e., the
gases being traded must be susceptible to accurate measurement, and suitable, trustworthy
bodies must be entrusted with the task).
Even if these requirements are satisfied, certain problems remain with use of a tradable
permit system. Some, such as ethical and distributional concerns, are common to all or most
economic instruments, and have been considered above. More particularly, use of a relative
target (as many national systems do) does not guarantee environmental protection, for the
reasons outlined earlier.82 Further, even with cap-and-trade systems, the overall nature of the
“cap” (i.e., the fact that the cap merely sets a limit on the total amount of emissions from the
overall area covered by the scheme) may entail the occurrence of “hot spots” – i.e., high
pollution occurring in a localised area. As long as this does not push the area as a whole
over the limit of the cap, cap-and-trade systems do not preclude such an outcome.
80 Thus, for example, one of the leading US economic commentators on market based instruments, Tietenberg,
concluded in 1992 that the US sulphur dioxide emissions trading scheme had unquestionably and substantially
reduced the costs of complying with the US Clean Air Act, with an accumulated capital saving of over $10
billion (in addition to the recurrent savings in operating costs). Tietenberg, in Markandya and Richardson (eds)
The Earthscan Reader in Environmental Economics (London, Earthscan, 1992).
81 Ibid.
82 See, contra, Peeter, Weishaar and de Cendra, “A Governance Perspective on the Choice between “Cap and
Trade” and “Credit and Trade” for an Emissions Trading Regime (2007) European Environmental Law
Review 191, who advocate use of a relative cap system (credit and trade) for the EU’s ETS.
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In the case of the EU ETS, however, the method of distributing allowances has proven to
be, at least initially, the most serious problem threatening the effectiveness of the scheme.83
As outlined above, the EU’s ETS opted to require Member States to distribute at least 95%
of allowances for free in Phase I and at least 90% in Phase II. In Phase I, however, only
four governments chose to exercise the auctioning option: Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania,
and Ireland, for a proposed 5%, 2.5%, 1.5%, and 0.75% of their respective totals (though in
the end Denmark and Lithuania failed to carry out any auctions).84 EU-wide, only 0.12% of
total allowances were ultimately auctioned.
Member States’ over-allocation of free allowances in Phase I proved to be a major flaw in
the ETS’s operation during this period.85 This was likely done in an attempt to give their
industries a competitive advantage over other Member States’ industries, or simply because
they were not willing to accept possible (short-to-medium term) stagnation of growth of
their national industries as a result of limiting allowances. The problem stemmed at least
partly from the fact that data on the level of emissions per installation were simply not
available to the requisite degree of accuracy at the beginning of the EU ETS.86
The release of the 2005 emissions data in April and May 2006 revealed that the number of
allowances distributed to installations in 2005 exceeded those installations' emissions by
about eighty million tons, or about 4% of the total EU cap. This meant the market was
flooded with allowances and prices dropped significantly towards the end of Phase I (from a
starting trading price of €6). This is clearly demonstrated by the following Figure, which
shows a sudden flooding of the market with allowances in April 2006, causing the price to
dip by over €20, followed by a drop in price from September 2006 onwards due to the fact
that installations could not “carry over” Phase I allowances for use in Phase II.
83 See, Rousseaux, “L’allocation des quotas d’émission de gaz à effet de serre: un aspect determinant du future
marché européen” 484 Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne (2005) 31 and Ellerman, Buchner
and Carraro (eds.), Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme: Rights, Rents and Fairness (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
84 Ireland also ultimately auctioned that part of its New Entrant Reserve which it had not used up at the end of
Phase I, which amounted to 1.05% of its total allocations. For the EU ETS as a whole, with an average annual
allocation of almost 2.2 billion EUAs, slightly less than three million EUAs-or 0.13 percent-were, in 2007,
designated for auctioning (though this was subject to a potential small increase where countries chose to
dispose of any allowances remaining in their new entrant reserves.) See Ellerman and Buchner, “The European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results”, Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy 2007 1(1):66 and
85 See Commissioner Dimas, SPEECH/07/265, “Improving environmental quality through carbon trading”:
“The credibility of emission trading in Europe, but also worldwide, hinges on our capacity to rectify [the over allocation of CO2
quotas] for the second trading period.” CO2 emissions from installations participating in the ETS increased by 0.3%
in 2006 - compared to the 3% growth in EU GDP. This was welcomed by Commissioner Dimas, who
commented that it was “very encouraging to see that the mechanics of the EU ETS are working well…” (See Commission
press release, “Emissions trading: strong compliance in 2006, emissions decoupled from economic growth”,
IP/07/776).
86 See Ellerman and Buchner, “The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and
Early Results”, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 2007 1(1):66.
61
Figure 1: Performance of the ETS Carbon Market
Source: MIT Energy Institute
Key: Red curve - prices for Phase 1 allowances (i.e. which could be used up to December 2007)
Black curve - prices for future Phase II allowances
By July 2008, however, the price of Phase II allowances had risen to €29.33. Some market
analysts predicted an eventual rise to €45,87 based partly on business’ reactions to the
Commission’s proposals of January 2008. The rise in price of EUAs had a direct effect on
business with, for example, the leading polluter in the UK - a coal-fired power station -
blaming carbon prices as being one of the factors behind a significant drop in profits in the
first half of 2008. In a bid to reduce carbon emissions (and thus increase profits), the power
station has announced a deal to develop a biomass co-firing facility.88 Though such
examples illustrate the potential effectiveness of the EU’s ETS,89 EUA price levels have not
remained consistently high, dropping to €14 by December 2008.
In addition to the problems associated with over-allocation of EUAs, the “grandfathering”
method of allocating EUAs itself raises serious issues for new entrants, the competition
difficulties which are discussed in Part III. Moreover, the fact that most EUAs are allocated
87 See IDEAcarbon’s Summer 2008 Global Carbon Report.
88 See the report of BusinessGreen.com of August 5, 2008, “Drax blames carbon price for falling profits”.
89 Indeed, it is fair to regard the fact that overall carbon dioxide emissions from ETS businesses increased by
just 0.68% in 2007 (in comparison to GDP growth of 2.8%) as a sign of the (belated and limited) success of the
ETS in its first phase. See Commissioner Dimas’ (rather optimistic) conclusion that emissions “would most likely
have been significantly higher without the EU ETS” Commission press release of May 23, 2008, IP/08/787.
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for free, with resultant “windfall profits” for installations which sell off freely-allocated
allowances, causes evident distributional concerns. Auctioning allowances is a perceived
solution to some of these problems. Accordingly, the Commission has encouraged Member
States to use the possibility of auctioning 10% of the allowances in Phase II as far as
possible, emphasising that this can raise revenue to fund the administrative costs of the ETS
and can go towards purchasing ERUs or CERs to meet Member States’ Kyoto allowances.
Evidently, however, Member States remain free to ignore this encouragement – and most
have, due presumably once again to fears of placing their domestic industries at a
competitive disadvantage by increasing operational costs. Nonetheless, many more
governments have chosen in Phase II to exercise the option to auction allowances, including
Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy for a proposed 9%, 7%, 4% and
5.7% of their respective totals. This means that almost 4% of EUAs are proposed to be
auctioned in this phase – still a small figure, but a significant increase compared to Phase I.
The Commission’s intention that this trend should continue are clear: in its January 2008
proposals, the Commission envisages that free allocation will diminish considerably in
importance from Phase III onwards.90
3. Voluntary Environmental Agreements
A third market-based environmental instrument relevant to competition policy is the use of
“voluntary agreements” and similar voluntary initiatives on the part of firms. Numerous
types of corporate voluntary initiatives to protect the environment are currently in use within
the EU, all of which can fairly be categorised as falling under the broad (and lately rather
fashionable) umbrella phenomenon of “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR).91 The
Commission has defined CSR as,
“a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis...It is about enterprises deciding to
go beyond minimum legal requirements and obligations stemming from collective agreements in order to
address societal needs… In Europe, the promotion of CSR reflects the need to defend common values
and increase the sense of solidarity and cohesion.”92
90 Commission Proposal for a Directive to extend and improve the functioning of the EU ETS, COM (2008)
30 final.
91 See Lyon and Maxwell, Corporate Environmentalism and Public Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2004) (who describe corporate environmentalism as “the most notable trend in environmental policy since the 1990s”),
Bergkamp, “Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A New Sustainability Paradigm” (2002)
European Environmental Law Review 136, Vironneau-Georges, “Le débat sur la responsabilité sociale des
enterprises (RSE) à nouveau sur l’agenda politique européen?” (2008) Revue du Marché common et de l’Union
européenne 393, and De Schutter, “Corporate Social Responsibility European Style” (2008) 14(2) European
Law Journal 203.
92 Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility, “Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs:
Making Europe a pole of excellence on CSR” COM (2006) 136 final, and Communication from the
Commission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A business contribution to Sustainable Development
COM (2002) 347 final.
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The CSR concept has awakened massive interest in policy-makers at national,93 Community
and international level,94 who have latched onto it eagerly as fitting perfectly with the goals
of “sustainable development” and “integration” – i.e., as a way of combining growth and
enterprise with environmental protection. At the EU level, the Commission has stated its
ambition to make the Community a “pole of excellence” in CSR and that “CSR matters to each and
every European, since it represents an aspect of the European social model.”95 The current attention
being paid to CSR by policy-makers within the EU is reflected by the decision to make it one
of the priorities of the 2008 French presidency of the Council.96
a. The rationale behind corporate environmentalism: why would businesses
voluntarily be green?
The validity of the CSR concept is hotly disputed - to an even greater degree than the
sustainability principle. Many view CSR as little more than a cosmetic exercise, with little
ultimate practical effect on the behaviour of businesses. Indeed, it is argued, this
ineffectualness is a good thing: it is inherent in the model of capitalism that firms compete
between themselves to make money, and this is what managers are accountable to
shareholders for. It is not legitimate - and indeed may breach managers’ duties to
shareholders - for the former voluntarily to try to achieve other goals at the same time. The
“triple bottom line” which the UN and the Commission advocate - aiming not just to make
money, but also to protect the environment and to improve social justice - distracts attention
from ultimate managerial duties.97
This criticism can be averted if, and insofar as, CSR - and corporate voluntary environmental
initiatives in particular - can be shown to be good for business, rather than amounting to
philanthropy. This approach, rooted in “environmental realism”, is part of the reason why
many “deep Greens” are inherently against voluntary corporate approaches. Nonetheless, it
is an approach adopted by many policy-makers in practice, including EU policy-makers. A
good example is the message of the EU’s Environmental Commissioner, Commissioner
Dimas, that,
93 Within the EU, particularly within the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Spain, and France. In France, for
example, much attention was given to CSR in the context of the Grenelle de l’environnement launched in July 2007
by the French government as a forum for discussion between the State and representatives of civil society,
resulting in the proposal of a variety of measures. See Vironneau-Georges, “Le débat sur la responsabilité
sociale des enterprises (RSE) à nouveau sur l’agenda politique européen?” (2008) Revue du Marché common et
de l’Union européenne 393.
94 See, for example, the “Global Partnership” approach taken in the UN’s Johannesburg Conference of 2002,
Chapter 3. For a sceptical view, however, see Naomi Klein in The Guardian, ‘The Summit that couldn’t save
itself’, September 4, 2002: “…post-Enron, it’s hard to believe that companies can be trusted to keep their own books, let alone
save the world. And unlike a decade ago, the economic model of laissez-faire development is being rejected by popular movements
around the world.”
95 Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility, “Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs:
Making Europe a pole of excellence on CSR”, note 92 above. The Commission has backed the launch of a
European Alliance on CSR, a political process to increase the uptake of CSR amongst European enterprises.
96 Vironneau-Georges, “Le débat sur la responsabilité sociale des enterprises (RSE) à nouveau sur l’agenda
politique européen?” (2008) Revue du Marché common et de l’Union européenne 393. See also, the 2008
launch of the “Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan” by the
Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions COM (2008) 397/3.
97 See, for example, The Economist, January 22nd, 2005 “The good company”.
64
“[e]xpecting individual businesses to be moral or to care about the greater economic good is missing the
point. The bottom line for companies is their own profit…The real reason why the world’s top
companies are going green is because it makes excellent business sense. And I am pleased that this is
the case because it is the best guarantee that this is a trend that will last.”98
There are a variety of reasons why it might make business sense for a firm to act in an
environmentally responsible manner.
First, consumers may prefer purchasing certain products from firms perceived as “green”.
Equally, taking the broader stakeholder analysis, potential investors may prefer to invest in
firms which are perceived as being “green” - either out of moral conviction, or - increasingly
- following advice warning of the likely rise in environmental standards in the future.99 In
turn, a good corporate image may increase staff motivation and help recruit the best
employees. Inversely, being shown to engage in environmentally-unfriendly practices can be
damaging to business.100
Second, firms may voluntarily engage in environmentally-beneficial activities because it will
help them develop cutting-edge environmentally-friendly technology, which will give them
an edge on the market - i.e., the “first-mover” advantage.101 The EU is casting itself as a
market leader in this respect. In 2006, EU eco-industries accounted for around one third of
the global markets, and exports were growing at around 8% a year.102
Third, firms may be keen to take action to reduce environmental costs, such as energy costs
or the costs of cleaning up pollution. Such clean-up costs may in turn flow, for instance,
from environmental standards or other environmental instruments.
Fourth, firms might choose voluntary environmental initiatives to avoid regulation - and the
concomitant costs of compliance, potential inefficiency, and loss of control over the
applicable standard and regime. In many instances, the wish to anticipate government policy
changes and influence law-making may be the primary motivation for businesses in entering
into voluntary initiatives. Where an environmental problem has not yet been addressed by
government, firms invest resources into voluntary environmental initiatives as a tactic to
reduce oversight by regulators.103 Moreover, empirical economic research suggests that this
98 Speech of Commissioner Dimas of November 9, 2006, “Environment and Industry, How ambitious
environmental standards can promote business competitiveness in Europe?” (SPEECH/06/676). Thus, for
example, in a survey carried out by KPMG, 74% of those companies who engaged in corporate responsibility
reporting in 2005 stated that they did so for economic reasons: KPMG 2005 Corporate Responsibility Survey,
available at www.kpmg.nl.
99 See, for example, the report of the Financial Times, “Investors warned over cost of greenhouse gas”, June
13, 2005, citing a Carbon 1000 report from Henderson Global Investors.
100 For example, many importers of tropical wood have been forced to ensure that their wares are certified after
the move of many large retailers, such as Home Deport, IKEA and B&Q, to promise not to sell products made
with uncertified wood. See The Economist, Special report on the logging trade, March 25, 2006.
101 See the Report commissioned for the Commission in 1999 on the importance of the eco-industry export
market, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/industry_employment/pdf/eco.pdf and Porter
and van der Linde, “Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 9(4), Fall 1995, 97 (who argue that such innovation promotes dynamic efficiency in the
market, which, in their contention, has replaced static efficiency as a new paradigm of international
competitiveness).
102 See the speech of Commissioner Dimas of November 9, 2006, “Environment and Industry, How ambitious
environmental standards can promote business competitiveness in Europe?” (SPEECH/06/676).
103 In this way, CSR can become “a codeword for abandoning to market mechanisms certain questions which might otherwise
be the target of regulatory approaches” (De Schutter, “Corporate Social Responsibility European Style” (2008) 14(2)
65
may be a tactic that works104 and can lead to lower abatement costs.105 One high-profile EU
example of such incentives in action was the choice of the EU car industry to enter into
agreements on emissions standards, which was essentially made to avert the regulation of the
matter at EU level - an attempt which ultimately ended in failure in 2007, when the
Commission lost patience and put forward a proposal to legislate on the matter due to the
failure of the voluntary initiative.106 In other instances, government itself may (whether
formally or informally) be the instigator of voluntary agreements, with the aim of
encouraging industry to cooperate in setting and achieving environmental goals.
b. Types of voluntary corporate initiative
Voluntary environmental agreements. “Environmental agreements” - voluntary
agreements between firms which supplement regulatory requirements - are an increasingly
popular voluntary initiative. There is no universally accepted definition of an
“environmental agreement”, though evidently the notion of “agreement” necessarily implies
that the measures can be distinguished from unilateral environmental initiatives made by a
single undertaking. The definition used by the Commission in 2002 Communication on
Environmental Agreements is a useful starting point:
“Environmental agreements at Community level are those by which stakeholders undertake to achieve
pollution abatement, as defined in environmental law, or environmental objectives set out in Article 174
EC.”107
Environmental agreements may be grouped into two categories. The first is self-regulation,
where the agreement is put in place solely by market actors, on a voluntary basis. Such
agreements are normally made between undertakings. They may be in the form of binding
agreements108 or “gentlemen’s agreements”.109 Very often, self-regulation agreements
contain reporting and monitoring provisions, to give some level of assurance to public
authorities that the agreement is effective and credible. At EU level, the Commission has
expressed its approval for this form of agreement, stating that it may “consider it preferable not
European Law Journal 203, at 204). See also, Lyon and Maxwell, Corporate Environmentalism and Public Policy
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), who analyse the company-regulator relationship from a game
theory perspective.
104 See, for example, Decker, “Corporate Environmentalism and Environmental Statutory Permitting” 46 J.L.
& Econ. 103.
105 See, for example, Conrad, “Voluntary Environmental Agreements vs. Emission Taxes in Strategic Trade
Models” Environmental and Resource Economics 19, 361 (2001).
106 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting emission performance
standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community's integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions
from light-duty vehicles COM (2007) 856 final.
107 Communication on Environmental Agreements, COM (2002) 412 final. This definition was also used by
the Commission in its Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, at point 179. Interestingly, the
Commission fails to mention the concept of co-regulatory covenants involving government used in certain
Member States, such as the Netherlands, in the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, seeming far more
comfortable with the concept of agreements between private operators. See also the elements listed in De
Clercq., Bracke, Baeke, Ameels. And Seyad, Het gebruik van vrijwillige instrumenten bij de realisatie van duurzame
ontwikkeling – Module 2: Vrijwillige milieubeleidsovereenkomsten (Gent, Universiteit Gent, 2001), at 2-3.
108 Common in, e.g., Germany, Austria, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. See Rehbinder,
“Environmental Agreements: A new instrument of environmental policy” (European University Institute, Jean
Monnet Chair Paper RSC No 97/45).
109 Common in, e.g., Netherlands and Portugal. See Rehbinder, ibid.
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to make a legislative proposal where agreements of this kind already exist and can be useful to achieve the
objectives set out in the Treaty.”110
The second form of environmental agreement is co-regulation. This indicates a situation
where the legislator or regulator establishes the key elements of the regulation - which may,
for instance, include the regulatory objectives, the deadlines and mechanisms relating to
implementation, methods of monitoring the application of the legislation and any sanctions
which are necessary to guarantee the legal certainty of the legislation111 - and the firms
subsequently agree on the means of implementing it. The technique is common in the US,
where it is often known as the “public voluntary programme” technique. As such, these
voluntary agreements still have - to a greater or lesser extent - some element of regulatory
input. Co-regulation may take the form, for example of contracts concluded between the
government/administration and industry, as is common in the Netherlands.
In a report of 1999, the OECD identified a total of 312 environmental agreements
concluded in the EU Member States.112 At EU level, the Commission has signalled its
cautious approval and encouragement of the use of environmental agreements in
Communications of 1996 and 2002. It was by no means clear prior to these
Communications that the Commission would adopt such a position: in fact, it had previously
seemed to hold a negative attitude to voluntary agreements.113 In its 2002 Communication, it
indicated that it would take the following criteria into account when assessing whether use of
environmental agreements is appropriate in a given situation:
 Does the environmental agreement deliver an increased level of protection of the
environment?
 Is the agreement cost-effective for the Community institutions’ administration (for
example, in reducing monitoring costs)?
 Are the parties concerned representative?
 Are the objectives of the agreement set in clear and unambiguous terms?
 Has civil society - industry, environmental NGOs, and civil society in a broad sense -
been informed of the agreement?
 Does the agreement contain a well-designed monitoring system?
 Is the agreement compatible with the goal of sustainable development?
 Are the incentives provided by the agreement compatible with other factors and
incentives present, such as market pressure, taxes and national legislation?
The Commission concludes by stating that it “wishes to encourage the preparation of voluntary
environmental actions as well as environmental agreements at Community level, over a wide range of
110 Communication on Environmental Agreements, note 107 above, at 5.
111 Ibid.
112 OECD, Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy - an Assessment (Paris, OECD, 1999).
113 See Van Calster and Dekeletaere, in Orts and Deketelaere, Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to
Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe (The Hague, Kluwer, 2001), who describe the negative
comments made about the concept of voluntary agreements by the then-Commissioner of the environment
directorate-general prior to adoption of the 1996 Communication.
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sectors…”114 It has formally recognised voluntary agreements on a number of occasions. The
normal course of action is for the Commission to adopt a Recommendation confirming the
content of the industry’s engagement, or simply acknowledging the environmental
agreement by exchange of letters.115 The Commission has stressed, however, that such
action can “never” mean that it forgoes its right of initiative.116 In some cases, a
Recommendation may be accompanied by a monitoring Decision. The Commission first
adopted such a Recommendation in 1989, regarding an engagement by the aerosol industry
to limit use of CFCs to products where they were absolutely essential. This resulted in a
Council Resolution followed by three specific Commission Recommendations addressed to
aerosol manufacturers, foam plastic producers, and the refrigeration and air-conditioning
sector. The approach has been followed on a variety of other occasions.117
At a national level, certain Member States have far more experience in the use of
environmental agreements than others.
The Netherlands, for example, has long had an explicit government policy of using voluntary
environmental agreements and has the most extensive experience with regulatory agreements
of all the Member States.118 Initially, gentlemen’s agreements were used, with a movement in
more recent years towards binding contracts. The Dutch Ministry of Housing, Land-use
Planning and the Environment is normally a party to these contracts, which are subject to
the participation of the public and intervention of the Dutch Parliament.119 The Dutch
government has published official guidelines for agreements (aanwijzingen voor convenanten),
which cover topics such as when the use of an environmental agreement is appropriate,
114 Communication on Environmental Agreements, note 107 above, at 13.
115 See further, Schnabl, “The Evolution of Environmental Agreements at the Level of the European Union”,
in Croci (ed.), The Handbook of Environmental Agreements (Berlin, Springer, 2005), which contains an annex of all
of the environmental agreements approved by the Commission up until 2004.
116 Communication on Environmental Agreements, note 107 above, at 5.
117 See, for example, the recommendations issued acknowledging a voluntary agreement on the labelling of
detergents in 1989 (Commission Recommendation 89/542/EEC OJ 1989 L 291/55), and the
recommendations acknowledging voluntary agreements between associations of European, Japanese and
Korean car manufacturers on the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions from passenger cars (Commission
Recommendation 1999/125 OJ 1999 L 40/49, Commission Recommendation 2000/303 OJ 2000 L 100/45
and Commission Recommendation 2000/304 OJ 2000 L 100/57). As discussed above, the latter are now
intended by the Commission to be replaced by formal “direct” regulation - to the consternation, in particular,
of certain German car makers: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community's integrated approach
to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles COM (2007) 856 final.
118 See further, Bressers and De Bruijn, “”Environmental Voluntary Agreements in the Dutch Context” in
Croci (ed.), The Handbook of Environmental Agreements (Berlin, Springer, 2005); Rehbinder, “Environmental
Agreements: A new instrument of environmental policy” (European University Institute, Jean Monnet Chair
Paper RSC No 97/45). One of the principles of the Dutch First Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) in 1989
was the idea of “internalisation”, whereby target sectors would agree with the state on the policy options and
voluntarily assume a fair share of pollution reduction, and would then draw up their own plans for meeting the
required goals through self-regulation: see Liefferink and Mol, “A Comparative Analysis of Joint
Environmental Policy-making”, in Mol, Lauber and Liefferink (eds), The Voluntary Approach to Environmental
Policy: Joined Environmental Policy-making in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), at 205.
119 Ibid. Examples of agreements concluded include the “Basic Metals Covenant” concluded between the
Foundation for Primary Metals industry and competent public authorities (in particular, the Ministry for
Housing, Land-use planning and the Environment), whereby participating firms signed up to cut a wide range
of emissions as well as waste, radiation, noise and odours. Industry “targets” are translated into requirements
for individual firms through a “Company Environmental Plan”, negotiated between individual firms and the
competent authorities. The Covenant is open to be signed by all firms in the industry.
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which parties are eligible to conclude agreements, and which type of clauses parties should
consider including in agreements.120 The guidelines make clear that all agreements concluded
must comply, inter alia, with Community law.121
An excellent example of the Dutch system in action is its implementation, until recently, of
the Community’s successive Packaging Directives by means of environmental agreements on
packaging. Initially concluded in 1991, new versions of these environmental agreements
(convenanten verpakkingen) was concluded in 1997 and 2002 under the auspices of the Dutch
legislation implementing the applicable Directive on packaging and packaging waste, the aim
being that the Directive’s requirements would be achieved by means of the agreements, in
conjunction with ministerial regulation.122 Article 2 of the 1997 Dutch Ministerial Regulation
on Packaging and Packaging Waste provided that the producer or importer is exempted
from a number of the Regulation’s obligations if it is party to a convenant containing (at the
least) binding provisions covering the obligations flowing from the Directive.123
Importantly, the fact that the agreements applied in conjunction with the relevant Dutch
legislation meant that free-riders under the agreements were still bound to comply with
certain minimum legislative standards.124 The environmental agreements were private law
contracts, hence enforceable by parties to the contract in case of breach, and were published
in the Dutch official journal (the Staatscourant) as well as notified to the European
Commission. As such, they constitute a good illustration of binding voluntary agreements,
complete with monitoring provisions. Though, since 2006, the Dutch system has changed
from relying on environmental agreements, to placing the Directive’s re-use and recycling
obligations on individual producers or importers,125 the Dutch were undoubtedly pioneers in
using binding voluntary agreements in this way, and their system has been influential in
subsequent systems developed in other states.126
Voluntary agreements are also relatively common in Germany where, like the Netherlands,
the German Federal government has adopted a policy of favouring self-regulation in
environmental matters. In Germany, the most prevalent form of self-regulation in
environmental policy consists in “self-commitments” – unilateral declarations of firms or
industry representative bodies. Such self-commitments do not take the form of formal
120 Aanwijzingen voor convenanten, Staatscourant 2003, nr. 18/pag. 9.
121 See Guidelines 9 (an agreement shall not contravene national or international law) and 23 (in case of doubt
about the compatibility of an agreement with Community law, the proposed agreement should be shown to the
Commission).
122 See, for example, implementing Directive 94/62 on packaging and packaging waste OJ 1994 L 365/10, the
1997 Dutch Ministerial Regulation on Packaging and Packaging Waste (Ministeriële Regeling Verpakkingen en
Verpakkingsafval) Staatscourant 1997, nr. 125/pag. 14. Environmental agreements were concluded between
government and industry in 1991, 1997 and 2002 (convenanten verpakkingen I-III). See Besluit beheer verpakkingen
en papier en carton (decision on the management of packaging, paper and cardboard) of April 7, 2005 and
Vogelaar, “Verpakkingen en verpakkingsafval: de richtlijn 94/62/EEG en haar tenuitvoerlegging in
Nederland” in Deketelaere and Wiggers-Rust, Actualiteiten Europees Milieurecht, Brugge, Die Keure, 1997, 95.
123 See Vogelaar, ibid, at 103 and 116.
124 See Seerden in Orts and Deketelaere, Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in
the United States and Europe (The Hague, Kluwer, 2001).
125 See the Besluit Beheer Verpakkingen en Papier en Karton of March 24, 2005, implementing Directive
2004/12 OJ L 47/26.
126 See further, the discussion of the French, German, Austrian and UK approaches in Chapter 10.
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agreements, but are normally concluded after discussions with the competent authorities,
who in turn often recognise the commitments informally (for example, via a press release).127
Voluntary agreements have also been used in Denmark, Flanders and the UK, albeit in
widely differing ways. In the cases of Flanders and Denmark, legislation has been passed
setting out a framework for binding voluntary agreements. In each case, the provisions have
been little used by industry to date, and thus have not enjoyed the success seen, for example,
in the Netherlands.128 In Denmark, a provision on binding agreements was included in the
Danish Environmental Protection Act in 1991.129 In Flanders, legislation was passed in
1994, providing that voluntary agreements must be concluded in the form of a contract
between representatives for the sector at issue which have been given an express mandate to
negotiate on behalf of the sector. Each draft contract is published in the official journal and
public bodies must be consulted.130 In the UK, some of the principal examples of voluntary
environmental agreements are the “Climate Change” Agreements signed in 2001 between
the UK government and 48 sectoral associations in the industrial, commercial and public
sectors.131
An interesting question is why the use of voluntary agreements between Member States
diverges so greatly. It is not possible to pinpoint a single reason for this divergence; rather,
the answer seems to lie in an assortment of factors, including the variable stringency and
reach of national environmental policies, the commitment of the national government to
deregulation, and the political and administrative culture of a country. In general, it would
seem that Member States where the political decision-making culture tends to be more
127 See further, Rehbinder, “Environmental Agreements: A new instrument of environmental policy”
(European University Institute, Jean Monnet Chair Paper RSC No 97/45). An example is the 1995 declaration
of the Federation of German industry on Global Warming Prevention made between 16 industrial
organisations representing major parts of German industry, by which Germany industry committed to reduce
their CO2 emissions or energy consumption by 20% by 2005. For a critical analysis, see Morgenstern and
Pizer, “How Well Do Voluntary Environmental Agreements Really Work?” (2007) 164 Resources 23.
128 This may be due to differences in the level of encouragement given by the government to enter into
negotiated agreements (high level of encouragement in the Netherlands), differences in the design of the
legislative provisions (more flexibility in the Netherlands), and/or differences in the industrial and consumer
cultures in these countries. See further, Bracke, Albrecht and De Clercq, “The use of negotiated environmental
agreements: from gentlemen’s agreements to binding contracts”, Working Paper 2006/415, Universiteit Gent,
Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde, who argue that increased emphasis on enforcement of agreements and
penalisation of breach deters industry from entering into the voluntary agreement in the first place, and De
Clercq., Bracke, Baeke, Ameels. And Seyad, Het gebruik van vrijwillige instrumenten bij de realisatie van duurzame
ontwikkeling – Module 2: Vrijwillige milieubeleidsovereenkomsten (Gent, Universiteit Gent, 2001).
129 See, for example, the Danish voluntary agreements on energy efficiency first entered into in 1996, as part of
a set of “green” taxes being imposed on industry, discussed in Liefferink and Mol, “A Comparative Analysis of
Joint Environmental Policy-making”, in Mol, Lauber and Liefferink (eds), The Voluntary Approach to
Environmental Policy: Joined Environmental Policy-making in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000).
130 See further, De Clercq., Bracke, Baeke, Ameels. And Seyad, Het gebruik van vrijwillige instrumenten bij de realisatie
van duurzame ontwikkeling – Module 2: Vrijwillige milieubeleidsovereenkomsten (Gent, Universiteit Gent, 2001).
131The agreements formed part of a policy mix including an energy tax, climate change levy and emissions
trading system. Under the agreements, energy intensive business users can receive up to an 80% reduction in
the amount of climate change levy they have to pay, in return for meeting energy efficiency or carbon saving
targets. Such agreements cover around 12,000 sites representing around 44% of UK industry. See
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/business/ccl/index.htm and Morgenstern and
Pizer, “How Well Do Voluntary Environmental Agreements Really Work?” (2007) 164 Resources 23.
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consensus-based generally favour voluntary environmental agreements, whereas countries
favouring more legalistic processes tend to prefer command and control regulation.132
Two further specific types of corporate voluntary initiative bear individual mention. These
may, or may not, take the form of voluntary agreements between firms.
Voluntary environmental management standards. The first is the use of eco-
management standards in accounting, auditing and reporting. This aims at increasing the
information available to corporate stakeholders on a firm’s environmental performance and
is thus at least in part motivated by the desire, discussed above, to achieve beneficial
corporate publicity and improve the corporation’s image. A firm’s decision to participate in
an environmental management initiative may be purely unilateral, or may involve agreeing on
a framework for environmental management standards with other firms. In the US,
commentators have gone so far as to describe the voluntary environmental management
movement as the “third phase” in the evolution of environmental policy - following initial
phases of command and control regulation and market-based approaches.133
At international level, a relatively successful framework for environmental reporting has
developed in the form of non-binding guidelines issued by the “Global Reporting Initiative”
(GRI), which was launched in 1997 by the “Ceres” group of investors and environmental
organisations.134 The GRI standards are now used by 1200 firms worldwide and have been
hailed as the de facto industry standard, with 40% of firms which engaged in corporate
responsibility reporting in 2005 using these standards.135 The ultimate aim is to build the
GRI guidelines into an international reporting framework which is as widely accepted as the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Additional initiatives exist for particular
types of environmental information - in particular, information on the carbon dioxide being
emitted by individual firms.136 In 2005, according to a survey carried out by KPMG, 52% of
the world’s 250 largest firms produced separate corporate responsibility reports (which
include environmental information); whereas 64% included corporate responsibility
information in their general financial reports.137
132 See Rehbinder, “Environmental Agreements: A new instrument of environmental policy” (European
University Institute, Jean Monnet Chair Paper RSC No 97/45), who refers to “the value system of society” as
playing an important role.
133 See, e.g., Case, “Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics
Perspective” 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 379 (2005), at 384.
134 By the end of the decade, 35% of the world’s 250 largest companies voluntarily produced formal corporate
environmental reports, many of them based on GRI guidelines. Ibid, at 389.
135 See further, http://www.ceres.org/ceres/, KPMG 2005 Corporate Responsibility Survey, available at
www.kpmg.nl and http://www.globalreporting.org/Home (GRI home page).
136 The Carbon Disclosure Project - a voluntary, not-for-profit body - is the largest provider of such
information, covering 2,400 companies’ emissions in 2007. See http://www.cdproject.net/. This Project was
set up and is run by a large group of institutional investors, with an estimated $41 trillion under management,
and is aimed inter alia at informing these investors - and the general public, as the information collected is freely
available - of the climate change performance and risks associated with individual companies.
137 KPMG 2005 Corporate Responsibility Survey, available at www.kpmg.nl. The greatest incidence of
participation in corporate responsibility reporting within the EU is in the UK, with 71% of its top 100
companies participating.
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The EU has a voluntary environmental audit and management scheme (EMAS), the
framework for which is provided for by legislation (now Regulation 761/2001).138 In order
to be registered under EMAS, an undertaking must:
 Conduct an environmental review of its activities, products and services in accordance
with the requirements set out in the EMAS Regulation;
 Have environmental auditing carried out in accordance with the requirements set out in
the EMAS Regulation;
 Prepare an “environmental statement”, which pays “particular attention to the results achieved by an
organisation against its environmental objectives…”;
 Have the above three steps verified to make sure that they meet the Regulation’s
requirements; and
 Forward the validated environmental statement to the Member States’s competent
authority and, after registration, make it publicly available.139
As such, EMAS is more about procedure and public information than definite
environmental standards. In particular, no single reporting framework is mandated by
EMAS; thus, EMAS-reporting firms may use various performance indicators, and are not
required to use (for example) the GRI’s indicators. EMAS is expressly without prejudice to
other Community or national law, though Member States “should consider” how EMAS
registration may be taken into account in implementing environmental legislation “in order to
avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by both organisations and competent enforcement authorities.”140
Voluntary eco-labelling. A second common type of corporate voluntary initiative is
voluntary eco-labelling, i.e., labelling a product with a standardised sign indicating that it is
(more) environmentally friendly. Voluntary eco-labels are, by their nature, not unilateral
initiatives: the framework for the eco-label may be set up by the State or, in some cases, by a
group of firms or private actors. A plethora of labels exists at national level in Member
States.141 Some rely on a framework set up by the State to a greater or lesser extent - for
138 Regulation 761/2001 OJ 2001 L 114/1. A framework for environmental reporting has developed at
international level. Non-binding guidelines have been issued by a body named the “Global Reporting
Initiative” (GRI), launched in 1997 by the “Ceres” group of investors and environmental organisations. In
2005, according to a survey carried out by KPMG, 52% of the 250 largest companies produced separate
corporate responsibility reports (which include environmental information), whereas 64% included corporate
responsibility information in their general financial reports. See also, the accounting directive Directive
2006/46 OJ 2006 L 224/1, which encourages firms falling within its scope to include environmental
information in their annual report (though there is no obligation to report on non-financial matters, contrary to
the Commission’s original proposal); and the proposed revision to the EMAS Directive annexed to the
Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the regions, on the Sustainable Consumption and Production and
Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan COM (2008) 397/3.
139 EMAS Regulation, Article 3. The environmental statement “shall be presented in a clear and coherent manner in
printed form for those who have no other means of obtaining this information”: EMAS Regulation, Annex III.
140 EMAS Regulation, Article 10.
141 Examples of national eco-labels include: The Blue Angel (Germany), The Green Spot (Austria), NF-
Environnement (France), Umweltzeichen Bäume” (Austria), Miliukeur (Netherlands), AENOR-Media
ambiante (Spain), The Soil Association Organic Standards (UK) and the White Swan (Iceland, Norway, Sweden
and Finland). See further, Lavallée and Bartenstein, “La regulation et l’harmonisation internationale des
programmes d’écolabels sur les produits et les services” (2004) Revue Internationale de Droit Économique 47.
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example, the organic food label of the Red Ø in Denmark, the AMA food label in Austria,
or the Milieukeur EKO label in the Netherlands. Others are wholly private initiatives - for
example, the organic EKO label in the Netherlands.142 The principal such regulation at
Community level is the Community’s Eco-Label Regulation. Like EMAS, it is wholly
voluntary.143 Certain products are excluded from the system, including hazardous chemicals,
food, drink and pharmaceuticals. Applicant manufacturers must apply to the relevant
national competent authority to be awarded the EU’s “flower” eco-label. Although the Eco-
Label Regulation sets out broad criteria for the award, detailed requirements are developed
through the Community Eco-Labelling Board, composed of national competent authorities
and a “consultation forum” comprising a “balanced participation of all relevant interested parties
concerned with that product group.”144
Other, product-specific, EU labelling measures co-exist with the Flower label, some of
which are mandatory, some voluntary. An example of a mandatory measure is the energy
class rating system, introduced in 1994, which identifies refrigerators, freezers and other
household equipment which are particularly economical in terms of electricity
consumption.145 Similar initiatives have been undertaken for buildings (on a voluntary basis),
with “energy efficiency certificates” being awarded for energy-efficient structures.146 The
Commission has announced a review of these measures aiming at a more integrated
approach, in order to exploit “potential synergies between the different instruments.”147
c. Merits and demerits of corporate voluntary initiatives
Used wisely, voluntary initiatives may result in more commitment and enhanced
environmental standards than regulation simply imposed from “above”.148 Though they are
not appropriate for all situations, and generally do not receive a good press, they may reach
142 Liefferink and Mol, “A Comparative Analysis of Joint Environmental Policy-making”, in Mol, Lauber and
Liefferink (eds), The Voluntary Approach Environmental Policy: Joined Environmental Policy-making in
Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000).
143 Regulation 1980/2000 on a revised eco-label award scheme OJ 2000 L 237/1, Article 1. The objective of
the EU eco-label is “to promote products which have the potential to reduce negative environmental impacts, as compared with
the other products in the same product group, thus contributing to the efficient use of resources and a high level of environmental
protection. This objective shall be pursued through the provision of guidance and accurate, non-deceptive and scientifically based
information to consumers on such products.” See also, the proposed revision to the eco-label Directive annexed to the
Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the regions, on the Sustainable Consumption and Production and
Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan COM (2008) 397/3.
144 Ibid, Article 15. Grant of the eco-label can have further consequences: for example, when granted to an
energy-using product, the eco-label means that the product is considered to comply with Directive 2005/32 on
the eco-design of energy-using products OJ 2005 L 191/29, as amended.
145 Ratings range from A++ rating to G. See Directive 92/75 on the indication by labelling and standard
product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by household appliances OJ 1992
L/297/16. See also, Directive 2005/32 establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for
energy-using products OJ 2005 L 101/29 and Regulation 106/2008 on a Community energy efficiency labelling
programme for office equipment OJ 2008 L 39/1.
146 See further, the Commission’s Green Paper on Energy Efficiency (COM (2005) 265 final).
147 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the regions, on the Sustainable Consumption and Production and
Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan COM (2008) 397/3, at 3.
148 In the Commission’s words, “It is clear…that environmental agreements can bring qualitative benefits such as consensus
building; broader sharing of information; awareness raising among enterprises; and improving environmental management in
businesses.” Communication on Environmental Agreements, note 107 above, at 4.
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parts of the economy which direct regulation fails to reach.149 In this way, regulators can
make use of what Thaler and Sunstein term the “nudge” effect: rather than expressly
commanding companies to behave in a certain manner, regulators become “choice
architects”, ensuring that the regulatory framework incentivises, or nudges, companies
voluntarily to act in an environmentally friendlier manner.150
In the case of voluntary agreements, these work best where regulators have a “stick” to hold
over the participating firms (normally the threat of bringing in heavier-touch regulation), and
a small number of relatively large firms wish to participate (thus enabling the regulator to
keep an eye on standards).151 Voluntary agreements allow firms to decide on the means of
achieving outcomes - which in principle constitutes a major advantage, as firms are better
placed than regulators to know the most cost-effective way to achieve a given environmental
outcome. (More controversially, self-regulatory voluntary agreements often allow firms to
decide on what the outcomes themselves should be.) In addition, voluntary agreements
allows firms swiftly to adapt to what are often complex, fast-changing environmental issues
in the marketplace, thus beating “time lag” problems, and can alleviate the need for
(detailed) regulation, which cuts enforcement and compliance costs alike. Such advantages
have led countries like the Netherlands to reject the possibility of providing a detailed
legislative framework for environmental agreements, such as exists in Denmark, on the basis
that this could result in the loss of the benefits of flexibility of the voluntary agreements
approach.
Empirical research on the beneficial effects of voluntary agreements for the level of
environmental protection has been limited to date. However, conclusions have so far been
mixed. In a survey of environmental agreements used in various EU Member States and in
the US, the Environmental Law Network Institute concluded that, in the majority of cases,
voluntary agreements contribute to a higher level of environmental protection than would
exist without the agreement.152 Others, however, have concluded that the effectiveness of
voluntary agreements depends on the type of pollution which firms are trying to tackle: in
the case of climate change or carbon reduction goals, voluntary agreements are, it is argued,
less effective, because of the non-localised nature of such pollution.153
Aside from any benefits in the level of environmental protection as such, voluntary
environmental initiatives may have other advantages. In particular, voluntary management
initiatives and voluntary participation in eco-labels have clear environmental “democracy”
benefits, in that they increase transparency, access to environmental information and
participation (not only by participating firms, but also by consumers purchasing eco-
149 See Harman, “Environmental Regulation in the 21st Century” (2004) 6 Environmental Law Review 141, 149.
150 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (New Haven, Yale
University Press, 2008).
151 See the list of conditions compiled by UNICE in 1995 in order for voluntary environmental agreements to
be successful: clearly defined goals; a transparent negotiating process; involvement of top management in the
sector; discouragement of free riders; and the presence of measures to encourage participation such as tax
breaks and the threat of stricter legislation in the absence of compliance. See further, Van Calster and
Dekeletaere, in Orts and Deketelaere, Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the
United States and Europe (The Hague, Kluwer, 2001).
152 Environmental Law Network International (ed.), Environmental Agreements: The role and effect of environmental
agreements in environmental policies (London, Cameron May, 1998), at 6.1.
153 Morgenstern and Pizer, “How Well Do Voluntary Environmental Agreements Really Work?” (2007) 164
Resources 23.
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friendlier products), in line with the goals of the Aarhus convention.154 In turn, the
availability of information has been shown to improve environmental protection levels and
the effectiveness of environmental standards, through providing people with the knowledge
on which to take action - whether market action (choosing/refusing to purchase a product)
or otherwise.155
In contrast, the first, and principal, disadvantage with voluntary initiatives of all genres lies in
their very essence: they are by definition not compulsory. Moreover, in the case of voluntary
agreements, they are often not binding and thus are unenforceable. As such, their
effectiveness in terms of environmental outcome is not guaranteed, meaning they cannot be
used for immediately serious environmental risks. This problem can be seen for practically
all types of voluntary initiative - from voluntary agreements whose targets are not respected
by participants (such as occurred with the EU car emissions agreement), to eco-management
and audit schemes and certain eco-labels which have had a very low participation rate to
date.156 Clearly, therefore, voluntary initiatives are not normally appropriate for use to tackle
localised grave environmental risks.157
Similarly, in the case of voluntary environmental management initiatives, the flexibility
inherent in such initiatives, while a major advantage to firms, can also critically damage their
effectiveness, both in raising standards of environmental protection and in increasing the
“green” profile of the firm. Empirically, there is conflicting evidence on whether
environmental management schemes actually improve environmental quality.158 This was
confirmed by the Community’s interim review of the EMAS regulation in 2005, where praise
for EMAS was mixed.159 In terms of public perception, the success of the publication of an
environmental report by firms, or the inclusion of an environmental section in the annual or
financial report, depends on the reliability of the information and whether consumers
and/or shareholders will find it convincing. Rather, more cynical members of the public
may well suspect that a report amounts to “greenwash”, reflecting only the aspects of
154 The Aarhus goals apply here, however, by extension only, as Aarhus does not as such cover private bodies
(save when private bodies are performing public functions under the control of a public body): Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Maters, done at Aarhus on June 25, 1998, Article 2(2)(c).
155 See, for a law and economics perspective, Kennedy, Laplante and Maxwell, “Pollution Policy: The Role for
Publicly Provided Information” 26 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt 31 (1994). The authors conclude that social
welfare is indeed improved in such cases by the provision of information to the public, insofar as the
consumption of the polluting product does decrease.
156Freeman, Pierce and Dodd, Environmentalism and the New Logic of Business (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2000).
157 See likewise, Rehbinder, “Environmental Agreements: A new instrument of environmental policy”
(European University Institute, Jean Monnet Chair Paper RSC No 97/45): “…self-regulation as a rule cannot - or at
least should not - be used for the prevention of clearly unacceptable risk, but, rather, in areas where environmental risks or resource
consumption below the level of unacceptability shall be reduced for precautionary reasons.” See likewise, Eickhof,
“Selbstverpflichtungen im Bereich des Umweltschutzes” (2004) ORDO 269.
158 The REMAS project showed that evidence collected by a survey of 500 companies participating in such
schemes from 2002 – 2006 demonstrated improved environmental performance. See www.remas.info.
159 See the EVER report, “Evaluation of EMAS and the Eco-label for their Revision”, December 26, 2005,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index_en.htm: “EMAS-registered organisations find that it is a
useful tool for improving environmental performance both in the short and long term. They perceive their performance as better than
that of other organisations, although most quantitative studies have not been able to confirm this…EMAS is not generally seen as
a benchmark. Little more than 60% of the interviewed companies and stakeholders think that EMAS is regarded and used as
‘best practice’…”
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environmental performance which the undertaking is willing to reveal, obscuring or omitting
negative information. The EU’s EMAS system fails to solve this problem, insofar as it fails
to require firms to abide by a single set of environmental indicators. As a result, inter alia, of
these failings, EMAS currently suffers from very low participation rates.160 One hopes that
the revision of the EMAS scheme announced by the Commission in 2008 will improve its
effectiveness.161
In contrast, voluntary participation in eco-labels seems, thus far, to show greater potential to
achieve concrete improvements in environmental performance. The success of a given eco-
label depends, however, on the extent of corporate participation in the label, as well as on
consumers’ awareness of and trust in the label - each of which can vary considerably per
label. In the case of the EU’s Eco-Label, the results have - in contrast to the results of
EMAS - been relatively positive. In its 2005 review of the Eco-Label Regulation, the
Commission concluded that,
“the EU Eco-label is frequently able to actually produce…an improvement in environmental
performance…[it] is also able to induce an improvement in the performance of other companies in the
supply chain of the participants (e.g. providers of intermediate goods and services).”162
Similarly, eco-labelling has been credited by the US Environmental Protection Agency with
reducing volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions in Germany, and with increasing
paper recycling in Korea.163
Second, certain voluntary initiatives are susceptible to the criticism that they are
“undemocratic”, in the narrow sense that they do not involve elected representatives or their
agents. In particular, in the case of voluntary agreements which replace, or partially replace,
legislation, this puts the decision of which environmental standard will be adopted into the
hands of firms, rather than regulators (which normally removes the possibility for public
participation and consultation in the run-up to setting the standard). This may ultimately
result in a lower standard being set than would have occurred via direct regulation, and/or a
failure to comply with standards due to lack of any penalty system.164 Clearly, whether this is
so depends the structure of the particular agreement: for instance, whether the task of
setting the outcomes is left to participating firms (as with self-regulation) or regulators (as
with many co-regulatory arrangements), and whether an effective monitoring system has
been put in place.165 Further, public participation in the process of negotiating and
160 See the table of participating firms in MEMO/08/513, “Questions and Answers on the Revision of the
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme”, Commission memo of July 16, 2008.
161 See Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the regions, on the Sustainable Consumption and Production and
Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan COM (2008) 397/3.
162 See the EVER report, note 159 above.
163“Economic Incentives for Pollution Control”, US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC
(1999).
164 Hansen argues that voluntary agreements may result in lower standards of environmental protection because
environmental agreements place responsibility for environmental performance in the hands of corporations
which may be less susceptible to influence by environmental NGOs. Hansen, “Aspects of the Political
Economy of Environmental Voluntary Agreements” in Croci (ed.), The Handbook of Environmental Agreements
(Berlin, Springer, 2005).
165 Likewise, as Alberini and Segerson note, voluntary agreements backed by the credible threat of regulation
are far more effective in terms of environmental outcome than agreements without such a threat. Alberini and
Segerson, “Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality” Environmental and Resource
Economics 22, 157 (2002), at 177. For these reasons, many commentators argue that CSR can only truly be
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monitoring environmental agreements - as takes place in some Member States, such as the
Netherlands - clearly increases the democratic credentials of such agreements.
A third criticism of voluntary initiatives is that they may not always make economic sense,
depending on how they work in practice. For instance, where an industry (rather than
individual polluters) is targeted by a voluntary agreement, there may be an incentive for some
firms to “free ride”: an undertaking may feel that, though there may be a risk of regulation if
the industry as a whole fails to meet its goals, it can individually get away with not
participating in the voluntary initiative.166 Furthermore, the transactions costs of entering
into ad hoc voluntary environmental agreements may mean that other (economic)
instruments may prove more cost-effective in a given situation.167
In sum, voluntary initiatives have in some circumstances certain clear advantages in
comparison to direct regulation and, in the right context, they may offer an important
contribution to achieving a higher level of environmental protection. However, their use is
not always appropriate - and even where in principle appropriate their success in achieving
environmental protection goals (and, where relevant, environmental governance goals)
depends on how the initiative is constructed and functions in practice. This qualified
endorsement is also evident in the Commission’s conclusion in its 2002 Communication on
voluntary agreements that such agreements,
“are not an environmental panacea, nor will they be the optimal instrument in all circumstances, [but]
they have a potentially valuable role to play in complementing - but not replacing - other policy
instruments, notably legislation.”168
4. Implications of environmental regulation for competition policy: An introduction
Having looked at the most important trends in environmental regulation within the
Community, what are the implications of these trends for competition policy? What, if any,
significance does the increased use of economic environmental policy instruments have for
competition policy? Prior to discussing the approach of competition law to environmental
factors in Parts II and III, it is useful to introduce briefly some potential competition issues
raised by environmental regulation in general, and by economic environmental instruments
in particular.169
a. Potential competition problems raised by environmental regulation
First, the increase in the use of market-based instruments means that competition law may
be applicable to large areas of environmental policy where, had direct regulation been used, it
would not have applied. In the case of state subsidies, taxes and tradable permit schemes,
this can occur via those areas of Community competition law applicable to State measures
which restrict competition on a market - for example, Articles 86 and 87 EC. In the case of
effective if grounded in a framework set by the legislator. See, for example, De Schutter, “Corporate Social
Responsibility European Style” (2008) 14(2) European Law Journal 203, at 235.
166 See further, Alberini and Segerson, “Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality”
Environmental and Resource Economics 22, 157 (2002).
167 See the conclusion of Environmental Law Network International (ed.), Environmental Agreements: The role and
effect of environmental agreements in environmental policies (London, Cameron May, 1998), at 6.2 and Keeler, who
criticises voluntary agreements on cost-effectiveness grounds in comparison to “cap and trade” tradable permit
systems. Keeler, “Contract-based trading programs” Contemporary Economic Policy 22(4) 526 (2004).
168 Communication on Environmental Agreements, note 107 above, at 4 and Alberini and Segerson, note 166.
169 See generally, OECD, Competition Policy and the Environment (Paris, OECD, 1996).
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voluntary agreements, it can occur via those areas of Community competition law applicable
to private undertakings - for example, Articles 81 and 82 EC.
Second, and more broadly, environmental policy instruments can be relevant to competition
analysis through raising barriers to entry into the market, which can in turn deter innovation.
This may occur through traditional “command-and-control” regulation via, for example,
environmental regulation requiring expensive pollution control equipment to be added to
new or existing plants, or requiring waste from certain products to be collected and disposed
of free of charge.170 Further, there may be a risk of environmental regulators being
“captured” by incumbent firms, who may be able to manipulate regulatory outcomes so as to
make new entry more difficult. In some cases, the barriers to entry created by environmental
regulation may be so great that they indirectly lead to the creation or entrenchment of
substantial market power on the market, which may in turn enable the abuse of market
power to the detriment of consumers. For example, Member States may choose to grant
only limited permits to operate on a market - such as a market for the recycling of waste - if
they feel this is necessary due to the need to achieve a minimum scale of operation where
costs of recycling are high. Undertakings granted such permits may as a result hold a
position of dominance, which may in some cases be abused. For similar reasons, Member
States may choose to grant exclusive rights to an undertaking performing a given
environmental service, thus excluding all potential competitors.
Economic instruments may also increase barriers to entry, by putting a price on pollution
emitted, thus increasing overall running costs in an industry. This may occur, for example,
where Member States tax environmentally-unfriendly activities. It may also occur when
Member States operate tradable permit systems to control pollution. For example, the use
of “grandfathering” methods of allocation in emissions trading schemes may mean that new
entrants into the market are subject to greater costs than incumbents. Similarly, the use of
an auctioning system may raise barriers to entry, where, for example, a large incumbent
undertaking can outbid potential rivals because it has greater resources at its disposal. In
addition, voluntary instruments may raise barriers to entry where, for example, firms agree
on industry standards via voluntary agreement, which standards are very difficult or
impossible for new entrants to attain. Similarly, participation in voluntary eco-labels may
become a de facto requirement in order for a product to be stocked by retailers.171 More
generally, the time involved in going through the process of obtaining a permit (whether a
170See, for instance, for an analysis of the barriers to entry created by the EU’s Directive 2002/96 on Waste
Electric and Electronic Equipment OJ 2003 L 37/24, Mock and Perino, “Wasting Innovation: barriers to entry
and European regulation on waste electronic equipment” Eur J Law Econ (2008) 26:1-10, who criticise the fact
that the Directive requires the costs of disposing of “historical waste” (products sold before August 13, 2005)
to be shared proportionately among producers in proportion to their current market shares - meaning that new
entrants to the market effectively have to subsidise the disposal of their competitors’ products.
171 See, for instance, Grolleau, Ibanez and Mzoughi, “Industrialists hand in hand with environmentalists: how
eco-labeling schemes can help firms to raise rivals’ costs” Eur J Law Econ (2007) 24: 215-236, who conclude
that eco-labelling schemes can provide firms with a legitimate way to disadvantage rivals, frequently foreign
rivals, by defining distinct product categories to prevent competitors from differentiating their products; and
defining eco-label criteria and monitoring procedures to increase competitors’ costs. A good example is the
EU’s eco-label scheme for copy paper, which has led to complaints by US paper importers that it amounts to a
severe trade barrier, as retailers in some EU countries refuse to allocate substantial shelf space to non-labelled
products: ibid, 224.
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tradable permit or traditional permit) may, in some circumstances, constitute a barrier to
entry.
Third, environmental regulation may sometimes facilitate collusion between undertakings.
This may arise, for example, where environmental regulation limits the number of
competitors on a market - for example, by restricting the number of permits which may be
issued. It may make it easier for competitors to keep an eye on each other or, for example,
to share out markets among each other. It may also arise where environmental regulation
facilitates the sharing of information between competitors, as, for example, may occur under
the auspices of coordination in the context of voluntary regulatory initiatives, such as
voluntary agreements and voluntary standard-setting via eco-labels; or even by close
cooperation between undertakings on a pollution control scheme. Such fora in principle
present opportunities for competitors to meet and discuss a range of commercially sensitive
topics, whether related to the environmental matter at hand (e.g., product planning of
environmentally-friendlier products) or by way of “spill-over” from the interaction.172
b. Potential competition benefits of environmental regulation
It is not all bad news. It would be wrong to ignore the potential competitive up-side of
environmental regulation. For instance, environmental regulation can create markets. This
can occur directly or indirectly. Directly, for example, by the creation of markets for
tradable permits. Indirectly, for example, where the use of economic instruments, by placing
a price on pollution, incentivises the development of new technologies for pollution
abatement - thus adding to the dynamism of the market.
More generally, the development of consumer preferences for environmentally-friendlier
goods, as witnessed by the rise in voluntary environmental initiatives discussed above, may
lead to an additional factor on which firms can compete, which may in turn lead to market
expansion and, ultimately, to the emergence of new, separate markets for environmentally-
friendly goods.
172 See, for instance, Commission decision of September 3, 2004, COMP/E-1/38.069 Copper Plumbing Tubes, at
point 152; Commission decision of December 5, 2001 Citric Acid OJ 2002 L 239/18, at point 92; Commission
decision of December 11, 2001 Zinc Phosphate OJ 2003 L 153/1; Commission decision of November 30, 2005
COMP/38354 Industrial bags, point 385.
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Part II - A Perspective from Competition Theory
This Part considers the relevance of environmental factors from the perspective of
competition theory. Chapter 5 examines the goals of EU competition law and the
approaches taken by the leading schools of competition thought to the role of non-
economic factors in competition analysis. Chapters 6 to 8 focus on environmental
factors, and consider whether, as a normative matter, such factors ought to be excluded
from competition analysis. These Chapters set out three theoretical arguments why this
should not be so, and propose a theoretical framework for when and how such
considerations should be taken into account in Community competition law
enforcement.
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Chapter 5: Theoretical Foundations - The Goals of Community Competition
Policy and its Approach to Non-Economic Factors
1. Introduction
In order to understand what role environmental factors can or should play in EU
competition policy, an essential first step is to return to the vexed question: What can we
say are the goals of Community competition law at present? It is one of the curiosities of
Community competition policy that there is - still - no consensus on the answer to this
question.1 To structure our consideration of this issue, the first section of this Chapter
revisits briefly some important models of competition thought, considering their views
about the goals of competition policy, the extent of their influence on Community
competition policy, and their approaches to the relevance of environmental protection in
competition policy. These models are often referred to as “schools” of competition
theory - the Ordoliberal, Harvard, Chicago and post-Chicago schools, a practice which,
for ease of reference, will be continued here.2 In the light of this discussion, the second
section considers some examples of the relevance of non-economic goals, other than
environmental protection, to Community competition policy to date. It will be
concluded that Community competition policy at present is based on, and has been
influenced by, a blend of competition theories. The “European School”, if one wishes to
call it that, might be described as a mixture of Harvard School and Chicago School
approaches, set in a broader framework heavily influenced by ordoliberalism. This will
form the backdrop to the consideration in Chapters 6-8 of the role environmental factors
should, from a theoretical perspective, play in Community competition policy.
2. Four important schools of competition theory, their influence on Community
competition policy, and their approaches to the role of environmental
protection
a. Ordoliberalism3
Overview. Ordoliberalism is far more than a theory of competition: it is an overarching
vision of the role which the economy should play in society. It originated in the
University of Freiburg, Germany in the 1930s, founded by the economist Walter Eucken
1 Rein Wesseling, for instance, wrote in 2000 that Community antitrust policy is characterised by a
“fundamental ambivalence” as to its goals (Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford, Hart,
2000), 96). Writing in 2002, Roger Van den Bergh went further, concluding that, “[t]here has never been a
comprehensive discussion about the goals of EC competition law…” (Van den Bergh, “The difficult reception of
economic analysis in European competition law”, in Cucinotta, Pardolesi and Van den Bergh (eds.), Post-
Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2002), at 36).
2 Any attempt to group a variety of views into a “school” often leads to (not quite accurate) generalisations.
Though effort will be made below to specify particularly important divergent views within the same
“school”, some generalisations certainly remain as this is not the juncture for an exhaustive account of
individual school members’ views. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the exercise is an instructive one, in
suggesting potential influences for the current and future approaches of EU competition policy to
environmental factors.
3 For accounts of ordoliberal theory, see Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting
Prometheus (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), ch. VII, Gerber, “Constitutionalizing the Economy: German
Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the “New” Europe” (1994) 42(1) American Journal of Comparative
Law 25, Lemke, “‘The birth of bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s lecture at the Collège de France on neo-
liberal governmentality” (2001) 30(2) Economy and Society 190, Sally, “Ordoliberalism and the Social
Market; Classical Political Economy from Germany (1996) 1(2) New Political Economy 233, Streit and
Wohlgemuth, “The market economy and the State: Hayekian and ordoliberal conceptions”
Diskussionsbeitrag 06-97, Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen (1997), Vanberg,
“The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism”, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional
Economics 04/11, Walter Eucken Institut (2004) and Walter Eucken’s major work on economic policy,
Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Principles of economic policy) (7th ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2004).
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and lawyer Franz Böhm, who were later joined by the lawyer Hans Grossmann-Doerth.
This “Freiburg School” sought to find a third way between the Scylla and Charybdis of
Nazi totalitarianism and communism. Their solution was grounded in liberalism, but
with a twist. They agreed with classical liberal theory that economic freedom and a
competitive economic system were crucial for both economic prosperity and for political
freedom. However, they rejected classical laissez-faire liberalism, with its belief in a
minimal role for the state. Rather, their “neo-liberal” vision was of a competitive market
embedded in a constitutional framework, which would serve to guard against competitive
distortions, to ensure the equitable distribution of resources in society, and to prevent
undue government intervention in the market. This combination of liberalism and
Ordnung (loosely translatable as “order”)4 resulted in the Freiburg School’s
Wirtschaftsverfassungspolitik (constitutional economic policy), by which the state’s role was
to set the “rules of the game” in which Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” could function.
The resultant competitive order (Wettbewerbsordnung), constituted and regulated by a
“policy of order” (Ordnungspolitik), would be compatible with the Rechtsstaat - the state
based on the rule of law. In contrast to laissez-faire liberalism, thus, the Ordoliberals
believed that the free market order could not exist spontaneously in the absence of
government. Rather, it could only exist within the framework of an economic
constitution which must be “consciously shaped”,5 carefully cultivated and protected by the
state. The construction and cultivation of this framework necessarily involved political
choices “as to how the economic life of the nation is to be structured.”6
Eucken’s Ordnungspolitik was based on eight “constitutive” principles and four
“regulative” principles.7 The constitutive principles, which formed the fundamental
principles establishing the form of a market economy, included the principles of price
stability, open markets, private property, freedom of contract, and legal responsibility for
one’s own acts. In turn, the role of the regulative principles was to ensure the
effectiveness of the constitutive principles. The most important regulative principle was
the principle of creating and maintaining competition policy, which Böhm described as
“the moral backbone of a free profit-based economy.”8 From the ordoliberal perspective, the aim
of competition was the restriction of private economic power, and the prevention of the
harmful effects flowing from such power - a view based in part on the conviction that
the existence of powerful cartels in Germany in the 1930s had helped Hitler remain in
power. This distrust of private economic power, and the accompanying emphasis on
economic freedom as a fundamental right, meant that anti-monopoly law was central to
ordoliberal competition policy. In their view, monopolies should be prohibited or, where
they already existed, abolished. Where abolition was not possible, the conduct of
monopolies should be controlled so that they behaved “as if” they were subject to
4 Eucken distinguished between two types of “order”: the order of any society where ordinary economic
transactions take place, and the normative ideal of Ordo, which he defined as the order that “corresponds
to reason or to the nature of men”: Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Principles of economic policy)
(7th ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 372. The Ordo concept thus has its origins in natural law theory, a
line tracing from the philosophies of antiquity to Saint Augustine onwards. See Sally, “Ordoliberalism and
the Social Market; Classical Political Economy from Germany (1996) 1(2) New Political Economy 233.
5 Eucken, The Foundations of Economics - History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic Reality (Berlin, Springer,
1992), at 314.
6 See Böhm, Eucken and Grossmann-Doerth, “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936” in Peacock and Willgerodt
(eds) Germany’s Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution (London, Macmillan, 1989), at 24.
7 See further, Sally, “Ordoliberalism and the Social Market; Classical Political Economy from Germany
(1996) 1(2) New Political Economy 233.
8 Böhm, “The non-state (“natural”) laws inherent in a competitive economy, in Stützel et al (eds.) Standard
Texts on the Social Market Economy (Stuttgart, Fischer, 1982), at 110.
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competition - i.e., as if they did not enjoy monopoly power.9 Ultimately, the aim was to
achieve what the ordoliberals termed “performance” competition (Leistungswettbewerb):
competition on the merits to provide better products and services for consumers.10 This
would be achieved when a state of “complete competition” (vollständiger Wettbewerb) was
reached - that is, where no firm in the market had the power to coerce other firms in that
market. Moreover, in order to avoid what would in modern public choice theory be
termed the “capture” of enforcers via lobbying, and to ensure the maintenance of the
Rechtsstaat, the ordoliberals required competition law to be enforced by an independent
competition office, subject to review by the courts.
The ordoliberal emphasis on freedom of competition, and distrust of market power, is
still evident in what has been termed the Austrian school of economics, as epitomised by
writers such as Erich Hoppmann - though, as his compatriot Hayek had before him,
Hoppmann rejects the ordoliberals’ view of the role of the state as overly
interventionist.11
More broadly, going beyond ordoliberalism per se, ordoliberal ideas in turn inspired the
concept of the “social market economy” (Soziale Marktwirtschaft), a phrase coined by the
economist Alfred Müller-Armack in 1946. The model of the social market economy was
essentially in agreement with most aspects of ordoliberal theory, but placed greater
emphasis on the equitable distribution of the benefits of a market economy throughout
society.12 Thus, Müller-Armack envisaged the use of the free market to produce the
required amount of wealth, which could then be redistributed according to the
requirements of social justice.13 This model was a core concept in the foundational
period of the Federal Republic of Germany, espoused by Ludwig Erhard as economics
minister from 1949-1964 and subsequently as chancellor from 1964-1966.
Ordoliberal ideas had a major influence in early Community economic policy, including
in Community competition law.14 Their importance was due partly to the fact that, when
the Treaty of Rome was being drawn up in 1955 and 1956, Germany was on the verge of
completing the legislative process for its own national competition law which ultimately
came into force on the same day as the Treaty of Rome.15 Thus, the structure of present
9 The notion of requiring monopolists to behave “as if” subject to competition is widely considered to be
one of the weakest elements of ordoliberal theory, as it is a standard which seems virtually impossible to
measure and enforce.
10 This was contrasted with Berhinderungswettbewerb, or competing by means of hindering the activities of
other producers on the market. See Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Principles of economic policy)
(7th ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2004), at 43 and 329.
11 See further, Van den Bergh and Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: a Comparative
Perspective (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006).
12 See Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1998), at 237 and Sally, “Ordoliberalism and the Social Market; Classical Political Economy from Germany
(1996) 1(2) New Political Economy 233.
13 See Ebner, “The intellectual foundations of the social market economy: Theory, policy and implications
for European integration” (2006) 33(3) Journal of Economic Studies 206 and Joerges and Rödl, “‘Social
Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?” EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2004/8 (2004).
14 See Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules (2nd ed., The Hague, Kluwer,
2002), at 10, who describes the Freiburg School as the “academic cradle of EC competition law.”
15 See Weitbrecht, “From Freiburg to Chicago and beyond - the first 50 years of European Competition
law” European Competition Law Review (2008) 81, who notes that the fact that the Rome Treaty, unlike
the European Coal and Steel Treaty, did not include rules on merger control was probably also due to the
German influence, as Germany had concluded that for its own national competition law it did not need
substantive merger control provisions (in the end, these were not brought in until 1973). Nonetheless, the
Treaty of Rome’s competition provisions were certainly inspired by those of the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty, and in particular its Articles 65 (on restrictive agreements) and 66(7) (on abuse of
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Articles 81 and 82 EC reflects ordoliberal thought, with a very broadly-worded
prohibition of restrictive agreements (Article 81(1)), subject to justification (Article
81(3)), and a prohibition of “abuse” of a dominant position (Article 82) reminiscent of
the “as if” standard for monopolists discussed above.16 Moreover, Walter Hallstein, the
first President of the European Commission, was closely associated with ordoliberalism,
as was Hans von der Groeben, one of the two principal drafters of the Spaak Report (on
which the original Treaty of Rome was based) and the first competition Commissioner.
In addition, the director-general of the Commission’s competition directorate has
traditionally been German (a tradition which was broken with the appointment of Philip
Lowe in 2002).
Despite this undoubted initial influence, ordoliberal competition theory has, for the
moment, to a certain extent gone out of fashion at EU level.17 In particular, the Freiburg
emphasis on the right to economic freedom, and its suspicion of market power, has led
to its association with favouring (even less efficient) “competitors” over the goal of
“competition”.18 Ordoliberal theory was also associated with a very wide definition of the
scope of Community competition law, meaning at times that innocuous contractual
provisions fell under the Article 81(1) prohibition even if they had no anti-competitive
economic effects19 - an approach now abandoned in particular in the area of vertical
agreements. Nonetheless, ordoliberal ideas still permeate much of EU economic policy,
and have recently been emphasised in the rise to prominence of the “social market
economy” concept in the EU context, with the Lisbon Treaty explicitly including
working towards a “highly competitive social market economy” among the EU’s goals.20
Role of environmental factors. It is not entirely clear from their writings what role the
fathers of ordoliberalism would have attributed to environmental factors in competition
policy. Nonetheless, there are, in the present author’s, view significant grounds for
concluding that a strict separation of environmental and “pure” economic efficiency
grounds is inconsistent with the ordoliberal vision.
In the first place, it is fundamental to the ordoliberal viewpoint that an “integrated policy
perspective” (Ganzheitsbetrachtung) must be adopted by regulators, by which is meant that
each individual economic decision had to be seen as part of the greater “blueprint” of the
economic constitution.21 Implementation of the Ordnungspolitik necessitates a
dominant position). In turn, the inclusion of these provisions in the ECSC Treaty was arguably due to
Jean Monnet, who wrote in his Mémoires that such inclusion constituted “une innovation fondamentale en Europe,
et l’importante legislation antitrust qui règne sur le marché commun trouve son origine dans ces quelques lignes pour lesquelles
je ne regrette pas de m’être battu quatre mois durant” (Monnet, Mémoires (Paris, Fayard, 1976), 413.
16 See further, Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1998).
17 See, for instance, Monti EC Competition Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 24. Faull
and Nikpay (eds.), The EC Law of Competition (2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), a book
written by officials and ex-officials of the Commission’s competition directorate-general, omit
ordoliberalism entirely from their discussion of competition theory. Clearly, the mere fact that
ordoliberalism might have been the economic model best reflecting the intentions of the Treaty authors
themselves at the time of drafting the Treaty does not, in itself, mean that an ordoliberal interpretation of
the Treaty provisions should now be preferred: an “intention”-based interpretative technique has rarely
been used in the context of the EC Treaty, due inter alia to the absence of travaux préparatoires for the Treaty
of Rome and the preference for systematic interpretation.
18 A criticism with which the Community has repeatedly been faced, in particular in cases of conflict with
the US Federal Trade Commission in cases like GE/Honeywell OJ 2004 L 48/1.
19 See, for example, early cases such as Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière [1966] ECR 235.
20 See Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union. This was retained from the EU’s failed European
Constitution, which tasked the Union in Article I-3 with working for a social market economy.
21 See Gerber, “Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the
“New” Europe” (1994) 42(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 25, at 48 and Eucken, Grundsätze der
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comprehensive, holistic approach to the community’s legal, political and economic
systems. For instance, Eucken rejected the notion of “functional” economic theory,
whereby thinking is divided per policy area (agricultural policy, monetary policy,
employment policy, etc). Such a functional approach, he felt, ignores the interaction
between policy areas inter se within the economic order, and ignores the effects of one
policy decision on other policy areas and on the economic order as a whole.22 In turn,
the economic order is interdependent with the other orders within society.23 Such
reasoning requires the rejection of a narrow compartmentalisation between the aims and
decisions of competition policy and those of other policies in the broader economic
order, including environmental policy. Thus, Eucken warned that, standing alone,
competition law would be of little or no value.24
This aspect of the ordoliberal approach resounds strongly, it is submitted, with the
argument - taken up in Chapter 6 - that certain non-economic factors should play a role
in Community competition policy due to the systematic structure of the EC Treaty itself.
Article 2 EC, which sets out the objectives of the Community, includes the establishment
of a common market and the achievement of a high level of competitiveness within the
Community among these objectives; Article 3(1)(g) EC provides that this is to be
achieved by running “a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted”, of
which the competition provisions specified in Title VI, Chapter 1 EC form part.
However, Article 2 EC makes clear that this goal is only one of many for the Community
and, as is well-known, sets down no hierarchy between those goals. Rather, the EC
Treaty should be viewed as a system, with ambiguous provisions being interpreted in the
light of this system and of the Community’s overall goals.25 This “teleological” approach
is famously consistently espoused by the Community Courts when interpreting
Community law. The competition field has been no exception. Classic examples of
judgments in which the ECJ has interpreted the competition provisions in the light of
the overall scheme of the Treaty, and its wider aims set out in Article 2 EC, include Walt
Wilhelm and Continental Can.26
Second, the ordoliberal effort to define a new relationship between law, the economy and
society was based in part at a rejection of the legal positivism of Germany in the 1920s,
and its acceptance that legislation was the sole source of law - to the exclusion of
fundamental values and common aims.27 Rather, the ordoliberal approach is that such
Wirtschaftspolitik (Principles of economic policy) (7th ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2004), at 304. This
integration imperative has had a major influence on the structure of German governmental departments,
with virtually all departments dealing with the economy having “principles sections” (Grundsatzabteilungen)
to ensure that individual policy decisions make sense in the broader economic policy context: Gerber,
“Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the “New” Europe”
(1994) 42(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 25, at 68.
22 See further, Sally, “Ordoliberalism and the Social Market; Classical Political Economy from Germany
(1996) 1(2) New Political Economy 233. This integration imperative is still evident in the writings of
present ordoliberal theorists: see, for instance, Oberender and Zerth, “Soziale Ziele und
marktwirtschaftliches Gesundheitswesen - schlußendlich kein Gegensatz! Anmerkungen zum
Spannungsfeld von Wettbewerbspolitik und Sozialrecht” ORDO Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, Lucius & Lucius, 2006) 262.
23 Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Principles of economic policy) (7th ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck,
2004), pp. 9, 11, 14.
24 Gerber, “Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the “New”
Europe” (1994) 42(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 25, at 57.
25 See, for instance, Giorgio Monti, who writes that, “[i]nterrelationship among policy areas is a defining feature of
the EC.” Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” 39 CML Rev (2002) 1057, at 1093.
26 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhem [1969] ECR 1, Case 6/72 Continental Can [1973] ECR 215.
27 See, for example, Böhm, Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsshöpferische Leistung
(Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1937), at ix-xii.
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fundamental values were inherent to the economic constitution upon which the market
economy, and competition, were based. Indeed, the choice of a community’s economic
constitution is, in itself, a political decision which should be based on that community’s
values. Moreover, no attempt should be made to hide the values upon which the
economic constitution is based: they should be clearly and easily identifiable.28 One of
Eucken’s associates writes of Eucken that,
“The battle that he waged…for a free order for the economy and the society did not emerge from
economic theory. It was a battle for the eternal truths of humanity. For him, the economic theory
was only a means to develop an “Ordnung” that was to liberate those values from their threatened
encirclement by chaotic, anarchic, collectivistic and, finally, neo-liberal forces.”29
It follows, it is submitted, that if the value of environmental protection is considered to
be fundamental to the economic constitution of a given community, an ordoliberal
reading would conclude that decisions made in the area of competition policy should
take environmental policy factors into account. It will be argued in the following
Chapter that, in the EU context, environmental protection indeed constitutes one of the
fundamental values of the Treaty of Rome, a Treaty which represents what ordoliberals
would term the EU’s “economic constitution”.30
Third, looking more broadly at the concept of a social market economy, it is possible to
argue that environmental protection can form part of the concept of a social market
economy, depending on the community at issue. This argument has been made
forcefully by Fikentscher,31 who argues in the German context that, without protection
or respect for the environment,
“the necessary conditions are not fulfilled for a the preservation of a free and social economic value
system…The protection of the environment forms an integral part of the social aspect of our free
market system.”32
In his view, a healthy environment forms part of the framework conditions necessary in
order for a social market economy to function, as it is a pre-condition to all economic
activity. Chapter 8 returns to the economics of this argument, amplifying it in the
specific context of competition policy. However, the observation should be made at this
stage that while, post-Lisbon, working towards a social market economy will constitute
one of the EU’s goals, it is not at all evident what that concept means in the EU (rather
than nation-state) context, given the EU’s limited social policy competences at present.33
As a result, in the EU context, we must limit ourselves to the proposition that, insofar as
28 See Streit and Wohlgemuth, “The market economy and the State: Hayekian and ordoliberal conceptions”
Diskussionsbeitrag 06-97, Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen (1997), at 14.
29 Miksch, “Walter Eucken” (1950) 4 Kyklos 279, cited in Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century
Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), at 240. Neo-liberal is probably used here in
the sense of untrammelled free market liberalism as espoused, for instance, by Hayek. See also, Streit and
Wohlgemuth, “The market economy and the State: Hayekian and ordoliberal conceptions”
Diskussionsbeitrag 06-97, Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen (1997)
30 See, considering the Treaty of Rome to be the EU’s economic constitution, Gerber, Law and Competition
in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), at 264, Joerges and Rödl,
“‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?” EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2004/8 (2004) and
Zuleeg, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften” in Wirtschaftspolitische und
Gesellschaftspolitische Ordnungsprobleme der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 73 (Würzburg, Schriftenreihe des
Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration, 1978).
31 Fikentscher, “An Environment-Conscious Constituted Market Economy” in Freiheit als Aufgabe
(Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1997), at 12.
32 Ibid, at 14.
33 See Joerges and Rödl, “‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?” EUI Working Paper LAW
No. 2004/8 (2004), who conclude that this addition to the EU’s goals will likely have little significance in
practice.
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the EU is working towards social market economy, environmental protection should be
seen as a constituent part of that goal.
b. The Harvard School
Overview. A second important model of competition theory is that developed by a
group of theorists such as Edward Mason and Joe Bain of Harvard University, which has
since become known as the “Harvard School”. This School emphasises the importance
of the attributes of markets in competition analysis: in particular, the causal links between
market structure, market conduct or behaviour, and market results or performance (the
“Structure-Conduct-Performance” or “SCP” analysis). SCP analysis was originally
central to Industrial Organisation (IO) theory, though its importance has diminished in
modern IO theory, which tends to focus on “new industrial organization” ideas based on
developing industry-specific models of firm behaviour.34 In essence, the theory holds
that the structure of a market has a major influence on market actors’ conduct on that
market, and ultimately on the performance of that market. As a result, the competitive
inquiry is centred on market structure, focusing on questions such as:
 What are the economic characteristics of the product? Is it a consumer or producer
good, and is it differentiated or standardised?
 How concentrated is the market? How easy it is to enter the market? High market
concentration and barriers to entry are viewed as damaging under the Harvard
School approach. In this respect, Harvard School theory resembles ordoliberal
competition theory.
 What are the conditions of demand? How many buyers are there in the market and
how well do buyers know the product’s characteristics?
 What are the distribution channels for the product?
The goal of antitrust policy was not to achieve the unattainable state of “perfect”
competition, but rather to attain a level of “workable” competition, a standard based on
compliance with a range of criteria formulated to judge whether an industry is
competitive.35 Moreover, in a similar way to ordoliberalism, antitrust policy was viewed
as an integral part of general economic policy strategy, meaning that it could be used as
an instrument in achieving broader societal goals.36 Thus, non-economic goals were
included within the legitimate goals of antitrust policy.37 Market performance should be
evaluated on a number of different levels: how resources are allocated among different
market actors; stability of employment; and - importantly, and in contrast to Chicago
School theorists - whether the distribution of income is equitable. In this analysis,
antitrust policy was a means of ensuring the fairness of business conduct.38 Where
market performance is considered unacceptable on the basis of these criteria,
government interference in private markets may be justified.39
34 See Church and Ware, Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach (Boston etc, McGraw-Hill, 1st ed.,
2005), at 10, and Hildebrand, note 14 above, at 126.
35 See the criteria formulated by Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3rd ed.,
Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1990), at 5.
36 See Budzinski, “Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics” (2008) 32 Cambridge Journal
of Economics 295, at 299 and Van den Bergh and Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: a
Comparative Perspective (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), at 31.
37 See, for instance, Kaysen and Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1959).
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, and see Hildebrand, note 14 above, at 128.
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Harvard School thinking has had considerable influence on EU and US competition
policies. In the US, its heyday is generally considered to have been the period up to the
1970s, when Chicago School ideas rose to prominence. Nonetheless, some US
commentators such as Einer Elhauge view many of the US Supreme Court’s recent
judgments as siding with the Harvard School in cases where the Chicago and Harvard
School approaches are in conflict:40
“when it comes to actual conclusions, the [the US Supreme Court] has been much more comfortable
with the moderate prescriptions of the Harvard School than with the radical revolution advocated
by the Chicago School.”41
In the EU, Harvard School thinking has retained a far greater degree of influence than in
the US, and it would be fair to say that it remains one of the principal lodestars of EU
competition policy.42 The Harvard School’s emphasis on market structure and its
suspicion of highly concentrated markets is still evident in EU competition policy (for
instance, in the continued relevance of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index - the sum of
the squares of the market share of all firms in the market - to EU competition analysis).
Moreover, the concept of “workable competition”, with its inherent ambiguity,
necessarily leaves room for a large amount of administrative discretion in enforcing
competition law, which is clearly present in the EU context. Indeed, the ECJ in Metro I
expressly referred to “workable competition” as an appropriate way of achieving the
goals of the EC Treaty, though it is unclear whether the Court intended this to be
understood in the specific sense of economic theory.43
Nonetheless, the Harvard approach has not been accepted wholesale within the EU. For
instance, the Commission’s recent indications that it may accept “efficiencies” defences
in the Article 82 EC and mergers areas are at odds with a pure Harvard approach,
illustrating the increased influence of Chicago School ideas. Moreover, EU policy has
traditionally been seen as rejecting the notion that analysis of the market structure alone
could be a sufficient basis for competition decisions; rather, the structure must be
examined along with firms’ conduct and the (likely) negative effects flowing from such
conduct.44 It is interesting to contrast this with the Commission’s submission to the CFI
in British Airways that,
“Article 82 EC does not require it to be demonstrated that the conduct in question had any actual
or direct effect on consumers. Competition law concentrates upon protecting the market structure
from artificial distortions because by doing so the interests of the consumer in the medium to long
term are best protected.”45
40 See Elhauge, “Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?” Competition
Policy International 3 (2007) 2, at 59. See further, Van den Bergh and Camesasca, European Competition Law
and Economics: a Comparative Perspective (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), at 33 (“the competition law of the
European Union can best be described as a piecemeal policy which aims at workable competition in the common market”).
41 Elhauge, ibid, at 77.
42 See, to this effect, Hildebrand, “The European School in EC Competition Law” (2002) 25(1) World
Competition 3 and Van den Bergh and Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: a Comparative
Perspective (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), at 34.
43 Case 26/76 Metro I [1976] ECR 1875.
44 See, for instance, Peeperkorn and Verouden in Faull and Nikpay (eds.), The EC Law of Competition (2nd
ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), at 1.17.
45 Case T-219/99 British Airways [2003] ECR II-5917, at para 264.
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Though the CFI ultimately decided the issue using (potential) effects based-
reasoning,46 the submission provides a striking example of the continued influence
of Harvard-style reasoning within the Commission.
Role of environmental factors. As discussed above, the Harvard School did not view
competition policy as a policy area which could, or should, be separated from the
broader, overarching economic policy which a society adopted to achieve its goals.
Rather, competition policy could validly be used to achieve other societal goals, including
non-economic goals such as employment stability and redistribution. It follows that -
just as was concluded above for ordoliberalism - there is no reason of principle why, on a
Harvard School approach, environmental factors should be excluded from competition
analysis. Moreover, if environmental protection were found to be one of the
fundamental goals of a given society - as, Chapter 6 will argue, is the case for the EU - it
is submitted that a Harvard School analysis would at the very least allow, and potentially
require, this to be taken into account in that society’s competition law.
c. The Chicago School
Overview. The third school of competition theory we will consider emerged in the
1970s in the US, as represented by thinkers such as Aaron Director, Robert Bork,
George Stigler and Richard Posner. The “Chicago School” approach - so called because
espoused by much of the economics faculty of the University of Chicago at that time,
though this is no longer the case now - was revolutionary, rejecting much of the accepted
wisdom in antitrust thinking up to that time. It had four key features.47
First, the Chicago School authors viewed neo-classical microeconomics, and in particular
price theory and the presumption of profit maximisation, as the core of antitrust. The
economic concept of consumer welfare was the exclusive goal of antitrust. Consumer
welfare was defined in terms of economic - allocative and productive - efficiency, as
follows:
 Allocative efficiency exists where, in conditions of perfect competition, consumers
can obtain the goods or services they need at the price which they are willing to pay,
meaning that resources are allocated exactly according to their wishes. Under
conditions of perfect competition, allocative efficiency is ensured because price and
marginal cost are equal.48
 Productive efficiency exists where, in conditions of perfect competition, goods and
services are produced at the lowest cost possible, meaning that as little of society’s
resources are used as possible in the production process.49 For example, firms with
46 Ibid, para 293: “BA cannot accuse the Commission of failing to demonstrate that its practices produced an exclusionary
effect. In the first place, for the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 82 EC, it is not necessary to demonstrate
that the abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets concerned. It is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate that the
abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition, or, in other words, that the conduct is
capable of having, or likely to have, such an effect.” On appeal, the Commission (understandably) supported the
CFI’s formulation of the effects-based threshold: see Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission [2007]
ECR I-2331, para 95.
47 See, in general, Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, Basic Books, 1978, 1993
reprint with new introduction and epilogue); Posner, Antitrust Law (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1976).
48 See Bishop and Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (2nd ed.,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), 2.17.
49 Thus Bishop and Walker, ibid, write, “In perfect competition, economic profits for efficient firms are zero and so
inefficient firms must lose money. Perfect competition leads to firms being productively efficient because the pursuit of the
maximum possible profits given firms an incentive to reduce costs as far as possible and, unlike in many other models of
competition, firms that do not have costs as low as their rivals will exit the market due to losses.” 2.16.
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too much market power may be productively inefficient, whether due to X-
inefficiency (a lack of competition in an industry giving rise to inefficient costs levels)
or rent-seeking behaviour (the cost of creating and retaining market power).
In Chicago School analysis, markets would ideally be Pareto efficient – where nobody
can be made better off without making someone worse off. Recognising that this is
virtually impossible to achieve in practice, however, the more attainable goal of Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency is often used, holding that a scenario is more efficient if it is possible for
the “winners” in the competitive process to compensate the losers and still be better off
themselves. From a Chicago School viewpoint,
“The antitrust laws…have only one legitimate goal, and that goal can be derived as rigorously as
any theorem in economics….the only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the
maximization of consumer welfare…”50
Consumer welfare, in this sense, is at its greatest when society’s economic resources are
allocated so that consumers can satisfy their wants as fully as technological constraints
permit.51 Bork gives four reasons why maximising consumer welfare should be the sole
goal of antitrust:
 It would enhance predictability in the courts and would avoid arbitrary or anti-
consumer rulings;52
 It would place “intensely political and legislative decisions” in the legislature’s hands
instead of in the courts’ hands;
 It therefore maintains the integrity of the legislative process; and
 It would avoid “unreal economic distinctions” to which antitrust courts trying to “avoid
the appearance of complete subjectivism” would be driven.53 As a result, the efficiency
of the outcome of competition is key, and not (as with ordoliberalism and the
Harvard School) the protection of the process of competition or reducing market
concentration.
Second, Chicago School commentators criticised the interventionism of the US anti-trust
authorities at the time, stressing the efficiency rationales behind vertical restraints and
vertical mergers in particular.54 They questioned the Harvard School’s Structure-
Conduct-Performance thesis, which in their view gave too much importance to market
structure, concentration and barriers to entry. Moreover, they harshly criticised the
tendency in the US at the time to favour producers, or competitors, over consumers. In
Bork’s case, for instance, one of his primary concerns was to disprove the “theories” of
certain US commentators (and some judges) by which competition law should also aim
at protecting competitors in a competitive process and ensuring “fragmentation” of the
system of industrial organization (what he terms “small-firm” welfare).55 In his view, this
50 Bork, note 47, at 51. Thus, the task of antitrust is essentially to “improve allocative efficiency without impairing
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.” Bork, note 47 above, at 90-
91. Consumer welfare is generally indicated by the amount of consumer surplus, that is, the aggregate
measure of the surplus of all consumers, indicated by the difference between the consumer’s valuation of
the good considered (or his willingness to pay for it) and the actual price (see Hildebrand, note 14 above).
51 Bork, ibid, at 429.
52 Bork, ibid, at 82.
53 Bork, ibid, at 85.
54 Thus, Bork complains in 1978 that the “modern condition” of antitrust exhibited “the paradox of great
popularity and vigorous enforcement coupled with internal contradiction and intellectual decadence” (Bork, ibid, at 309).
See also, Posner, “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis” 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1979) 925.
55 Bork, ibid, at 54.
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required judges to perform a task that lay outside their remit: the balancing of conflicts
between producer and consumer welfare, which would mean balancing of policy goals.56
In his view, this went against the principle of legal certainty and defeated the intent of the
drafters of the Sherman Act, as this was a matter for the legislature alone.57 Further, it
could often result in judgments which damaged consumer welfare.58
Third, an important element of the Chicago School approach is that competition policy
should be insulated from all non-economic or ethical concerns. As long as efficiency is
achieved, the question whether the distribution of resources is equitable within society or
not is irrelevant to competition policy (again, in contrast to the ordoliberal and Harvard
School approaches). It is then up to government, insofar as it wishes to do so, to
redistribute wealth using regulation such as taxation. Thus, Bork writes that,
“consumer welfare…has no sumptuary or ethical component, but permits consumers to define by
their expression of wants in the marketplace what things they regard as wealth….”59
Thus, while competition policy may perhaps be viewed as guaranteeing ex ante equity (i.e.,
that firms have the same chances in the marketplace on a level playing field), it should
never be concerned with ex post equity (equity in the outcome of the market mechanism).
As soon as one moves away from efficiency analysis, the economist is not qualified to
pronounce on which solution is “better” or “worse”.60
A final element of Chicago School thinking was that the market should be left to its own
devices, without state intervention, to function on the basis of what Stigler called the
“survival of the fittest” - an approach which has been termed “Economic Darwinism”.61 The
role of the State should be confined to providing a minimum legal framework in which
competition can take place. In this regard, Chicago School thinking was deregulatory
and, politically, very conservative.62
In the US, the Chicago School became almost immediately influential in the debate on
the goals of competition policy, and led to significant judgments by the US Supreme
Court such as the landmark GTE-Sylvania judgment of 1977, in which the Supreme Court
decided that non-price vertical restraints should be subject to a rule of reason.63 By the
1980s, the US Department of Justice seemed to consider efficiency as the exclusive goal
of antitrust.64 One can, for instance, see the influence of Chicago School thinking in US
56 He argued that, “the case-by-case resolution of [conflicts between producer and consumer welfare] is the great difficulty in
any approach that leaves conflicting policy goals in the hands of judges.” Bork, ibid, at 46.
57 Bork, ibid, at 79: “the case law provides no guide whatever for judging…trade-offs” between values.
58 “…because [antitrust] pretends to one objective while frequently accomplishing its opposite, and because it too often forwards
trends dangerous to our form of government and society, a great deal of antitrust is not even respectable as politics.” Bork,
ibid, at 418. Similarly, Posner emphasises that, “the protection of small business - whatever its intrinsic merit - cannot
be attained within the framework of antitrust principles and procedures.” Posner, Antitrust Law (Chicago, University
of Chicago Press, 1976), at 4.
59 Bork, ibid, at 429.
60 See, for example, Harberger, “Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive
Essay” 9 J Econ Lit (1971) 785, at 785, who argues that welfare outcomes, “may be exceedingly important,
perhaps the dominant factors governing any policy decision, but they are not part of the package of expertise that distinguishes
the professional economist from the rest of humanity. And that is why we cannot be expected to reach a professional consensus
concerning them.”
61 Hildebrand, note 14 above, at 145.
62 Antitrust should focus on the following types of behaviour: (1) The suppression of competition by
horizontal agreement; (2) Horizontal mergers creating very large market shares; and (3) Deliberate
predation in order to drive rivals from the market, or prevent or delay rivals’ entry, or discipline existing
rivals. Bork, note 47 above.
63 433. U.S. 36 (1977).
64 See Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Policy after Chicago” 84 Mich L Rev 213, at 223.
91
merger policy, such as the 1997 Merger Guidelines’ recognition of efficiencies which can
flow from bigger firms.65
In the EU, Chicago School thinking has had less obvious influence, though this has
arguably increased in recent years. For instance, the original broad scope of the
competition rules adopted by the ECJ in early cases such as Consten & Grundig and Société
Technique Minière, in which the concept of “restriction of competition” under Articles 81
and 82 EC was very broadly defined, would clearly have run contrary to a Chicago
School, minimum-intervention, view of competition policy (though these judgments
preceded the emergence of Chicago School theory).66 A further illustration of non-
“Chicago compliant” policy is the EU’s prohibition on absolute territorial restraints in
vertical distributorship agreements, which Chicago scholars might sometimes view as
justifiable in order to avoid “free riding” by the distributor.67 In contrast, the
Commission’s recent implication that non-economic goals may not be relevant to Article
81(3) EC analysis,68 and its recognition that efficiencies may play a role in Article 82 EC
and merger analysis, illustrate that the Chicago School has indeed had some influence
across the Atlantic.69
Though it is true that the Commission has explicitly moved towards a more “economic”
(less formalistic) approach to competition policy,70 it would be simplistic to view this in
itself as implying a move towards the Chicago School. Though the Chicago School
approach is certainly economics-based, so too are other competition models, such as the
ordoliberal model we examined above.71 More fundamentally, it is true that there are
many statements by the Commission, its Commissioners and officials, and the
Community courts describing consumer welfare as a key goal of competition policy. An
example is the judgment of the CFI in GlaxoSmithKline, holding that,
“the objective of Article 81(1) is to “prevent undertakings, by restricting competition between
themselves or with third parties, from reducing the welfare of the final consumer of the products in
question…”72
65 See the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission on April 2, 1992, revised version of April 8, 1997 and Van den Bergh and Camesasca,
European Competition Law and Economics: a Comparative Perspective (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), at 48.
66 Joined Cases 56 & 58/64 Consten & Grundig [1966] ECR 299, Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière [1966]
ECR 235. Note that some place the beginning of the “economisation” process even earlier. See, for
example, Weitbrecht, “From Freiburg to Chicago and beyond - the first 50 years of European Competition
law” European Competition Law Review (2008) 81, at 85, who argues that the process began after the
enactment of the first Merger Regulation.
67 See Regulation 2790/1999 OJ 1999 L 336/21 and Van den Bergh and Camesasca, European Competition
Law and Economics: a Comparative Perspective (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), at 49.
68 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty OJ 2004 C 101/97.
69 On which, see Chapters 12 and 13.
70 Key examples of the change are the adoption of the vertical antitrust guidelines and vertical block
exemption regulations at the end of the 1990s (Regulation 2790/1999 OJ 1999 L 336/21 and Guidelines
on Vertical Restraints OJ 2000 C 291/1), the appointment of a Chief Economist, assisted by a team of
industrial economists, within DG Competition, and the launch of a review of Article 82 EC, aimed at
making competition analysis under this provision more economic (DG Competition discussion paper on
the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005). In his
farewell speech of October 28, 2004, Commissioner Monti concluded that “a major trend of [his] mandate has
been to ensure that competition policy is fully compatible with economic learning.”
71 See likewise, Budzinski, “Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics” (2008) 32 Cambridge
Journal of Economics 295.
72 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline [2006] ECR II-2969, para 118 (currently under appeal as Joined Cases C-
501, 513, 515 and 519/06 P). See also, for example, the classic definition of abuse under Article 82 EC
given in cases such as Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, discussed further in
Chapter 12; in the context of Article 81 EC, Joined Cases T-213/01 and T-214/01 Österreichische
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Similarly, the Commission, in its 2004 Guidelines on the application of Articles 81 and 82
of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements, observed that,
“[t]he aim of Article 81 as a whole is to protect competition on the market with a view to
promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources…”73
It would be wrong, however, to deduce from such statements that this implies a narrow,
Chicago School view of competition policy. In the first place, while they certainly imply
a more economic, efficiency-based view of competition policy, they do not imply
agreement with the range of very specific beliefs held by the Chicago School as described
above. In the second place, it may unduly presumptuous to suppose that the concept of
consumer welfare in such statements is, in the absence of specification, intended to refer
to the narrow technical meaning ascribed to it by Chicago School theorists (i.e.,
maximising allocative and productive efficiency), rather than a more general meaning.74
Moreover, in the case of the Commission, it has exhibited no great consistency in
describing the goal of Community competition policy as that of consumer welfare.75
More generally, in the academic field, reasoning inspired by Chicago-style analysis has led
certain EU commentators to reject the legitimacy of any goals other than that of
economic efficiency to Community competition policy. The leading exponent of this
Postsparkasse and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft v Commission [2006] ECR II-1601, para 115; and the statement
by Mr Justice Fennelly (formerly Advocate General at the ECJ), “The entire aim and object of competition law is
consumer welfare”, judgment of the Irish Supreme Court in The Competition Authority v O’Regan [2007] IESC 22,
at para 106.
73 Guidelines on Technology Transfer OJ 2004 C 101/2. A further example is the 1996 Green Paper on
Vertical Restraints, where the Commission stated that, “the interest of the consumer is at the heart of competition
policy. Effective competition is the best guarantee for consumers to be able to buy good quality products at the lowest possible
prices” (COM (96) 721 final, para 54), and the speeches of then Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti
describing the promotion of consumer welfare as lying “at the heart” of his mandate (see, for instance, his
speeches of October 22, 2004 and October 28, 2004). See also, the speech of Director General Philip
Lowe at the St Gallen Competition Law Forum, “Preserving and Promoting Competition: a European
Response”, “…competition is not an end in itself, but an instrument for achieving public interest objectives, notably
consumer welfare.”
74 Some economists, however, conclude from statements such as these (as well as, for instance, the
wording of Article 81(3) EC) that Community competition policy values consumer over producer welfare,
and thus does not (in contrast to many US commentators) adopt a “total welfare” efficiency analysis. See,
for instance, Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), at
20, and Bishop and Walker, “Economists have traditionally focused on social welfare. They do not make a value
judgement between consumers and producers and so treat €1 of gain to either group as being of equal value…However, it is
clear that EC competition law does not treat consumer welfare and producer welfare as being of equal importance. Consumer
welfare is valued above producer welfare, although this is nowhere made explicit in EC law…” Bishop and Walker, The
Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (2nd ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell,
2002), 2.22. See, in contrast, for example, Carlton and Perloff’s definition of consumer welfare (from a US
perspective) as the sum of consumer surplus (amount above price paid that consumer would willingly
spend, if necessary, to consume the units purchased) and producer surplus (the largest amount that could
be subtracted from suppliers’ revenue and yet supplier would still willingly produce): Carlton and Perloff,
Modern Industrial Organisation (4th ed., Essex, Addison Wesley, 2004).
75 See, for instance, the Commission’s submission to the CFI in Case T-219/99 British Airways [2003] ECR
II-5917, discussed above in the context of Harvard School theory, and the Commission’s XXIX Report on
Competition Policy, 1999 (Brussels, Commission of the European Communities 2000), at 6: “The first
objective of competition policy is the maintenance of competitive markets. Competition policy serves as an instrument to
encourage industrial efficiency, the optimal allocation of resources, technical progress and the flexibility to adjust to a changing
environment.” It is interesting to note that Neelie Kroes has not been explicit about what she sees as the
goals of competition policy, preferring to characterise her approach as “pragmatic” rather than
“ideological”, as she stated in a 2006 speech to the Fordham Competition Law Conference: “I am not
interested in having competition for the sake of it. I am not interested in taking ideological stances concerning policy agendas.
My priority is policy measures that are sound, pragmatic, and really work in real life, modern solutions which match up to the
challenges of today's market place” (SPEECH/06/499).
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view is Giuliano Amato in his eloquent 1997 book, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power.76 As
with the Chicago School theorists discussed above, Amato argues that competition law
works best when purely economic factors are taken into account: the job of taking other,
broader, considerations into account is one for the legislator alone. His main argument
for this conclusion is that, if competition authorities attempt to carry out this function –
for which they are not qualified - it will skew their decisions, leading to an economically
inefficient outcome, and amounting to an usurpation of legislative duties.77 In Amato’s
view, Community competition goals are inextricably influenced by those of the US
regime, which he sees as the “genetic origin of antitrust law.”78 In his view,
“no criticism, on the theoretical or academic level, has succeeded in dismantling the Chicago
School.”79
Sharply criticising cases in which the Commission and Courts have seemed to take non-
economic factors into account, such as industrial policy in cases like ENI/Montedison,80 as
well as the Community authorities’ tendency to over-regulate dominant firms via Article
82 EC, he pleads that antitrust should be “liberalised” from objectives extraneous to it,
and in particular from industrial policy and regional policy.81 To aid this result, in his
view, an independent Community antitrust body should be created, as the Commission
constitutes a “structurally political body.”82
The issues raised by Amato - in particular, the proper role of Community competition
enforcers and the relationship between the US and EU competition regimes - go to the
core of the present research and will be revisited in detail over the course of the next
three Chapters. However, two initial remarks can be made.
First, Amato’s position on the role of non-economic factors in Community competition
policy is explicitly aspirational. Amato himself admits that his belief in a “pure”,
efficiency-focused competition policy does not accord with the reality of Community
competition practice to date. This is undoubtedly true, and the final part of this chapter
gives further illustrations of situations where non-economic factors have been taken into
account in Community competition practice. Similarly, Amato’s vision of the creation of
an “independent” Community antitrust body does not represent present reality, but
rather an ideal situation if, as he proposes, Community competition policy were to
become purely efficiency-focused.
Second, Amato’s position is clearly strongly influenced by his belief that US and
Community competition policies are ultimately very similar in their make-up and goals.
76 Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Oxford, Hart, 1997). See also, the discussion of Odudu, The
Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), in Chapter
6 and, for instance, Maks, “The “New” Horizontal Agreements Approach in the EU: An “Economic”
Assessment” (2002) 37(1) Intereconomics 28.
77 Thus, for example, the economist Roger Van den Bergh comments that, “[t]he goal of market integration
continues to put a heavy mortgage on European competition law; in terms of quality, the price to pay is inconsistencies and
possibly even perverse effects”: “The difficult reception of economic analysis in European competition law” in
Cucinotta, Pardolesi and Van den Bergh (eds.), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law (Cheltenham,
Edward Elgar, 2002), at 37.
78 Amato, note 76 above, 2, though he admits that “[t]he European story appears radically different in its
development,” (ibid, at 39), being founded on the Freiburg School (ibid, at 41): in his view, the Freiburg
School represented “the absolute need to give a solid institutional framework for the competitive economy to prevent both
the formation of [private] power and the creation with it, by linking up with public power, of a conglomerate that could
engender tragedies like the one Germany was then living through.”
79 Ibid, at 24.
80 ENI/Montedison OJ 1987 L 5/13.
81 Amato, note 76 above, at 117.
82 Ibid, at 124.
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Though it is true that some similarities exist between the US and Community
approaches, it has been argued above that fundamental differences persist between them,
both of design and aim. Most fundamentally, from a systematic perspective the
Community’s competition rules form part of the EC Treaty, meaning that the goals of
the Community’s competition policy are embedded in those of the Treaty itself - a
framework most certainly not present in the case of US competition policy. Further,
from a legal perspective, the wording and structure of Articles 81 and 82 EC differ
considerably from those of the relevant US Statutes (principally, the Sherman Act and
the Robinson-Patman Act), and the US has no real equivalent of Articles 86 and 87 EC
(i.e., dealing with anti-competitive State measures such as State aid and exclusive rights).
This is important because, as we have seen, Chicago School writers such as Bork
grounded much of their criticism of pre-1970s case law on the premise that this case law
had gone against the intention of the drafters of the Sherman Act.83 Ultimately, it is
submitted, Community competition policy (at least at present) rests on a different
mixture of competition theories - a different “blueprint” - than US antitrust policy.
Role of environmental factors. The Chicago School approach to the role of
environmental factors in antitrust policy is prima facie clear: it has none. As discussed
above, one of the tenets of Chicago School theory is that factors unrelated to economic
efficiency should be excluded from antitrust analysis. The fact that such exclusion might
be unethical, or run counter to societal values, is irrelevant to Chicago School theorists: it
is the role of the legislature, not antitrust, to deal with these issues. It follows that, unless
environmental factors are viewed as forming part of the efficiency goal - a question
considered in Chapter 8 - Chicago School theory holds that they must be excluded from
antitrust analysis.
d. The Post Chicago School(s)
Overview. The fourth and final wave of competition theory which we will consider is
what has come to be known as “post-Chicago” theory - a heading which groups together
post-1970s thinkers who have taken issue with the Chicago School’s approach on a
variety of different grounds. As such, it is more accurate to speak of post-Chicago
“schools” of thought, rather than a single “school”. Some of these writers seek to argue
that, despite the apparent dominance of the Chicago School in the US, it “just as its
predecessors, is mortal.”84 Others (those commenting from what Hovenkamp terms “inside”
the model) accept the fundamental premises of the Chicago School approach, but seek to
add certain qualifications to its economic model. As it is not possible here to detail all
post-Chicago criticisms, we will confine ourselves to the most relevant criticisms in
assessing the role of environmental factors in competition policy.
A first criticism is that, even if one accepts the basic premises of the Chicago School - for
instance, that efficiency is the sole goal of antitrust - Chicago School theory is too
simplistic. For example, it oversimplifies the concept of efficiency, in focusing only on
allocative and productive efficiency. This overly static approach ignores dynamic
efficiency, which should also be included in the measure of welfare. Dynamic efficiency
refers to what Schumpeter famously termed the process of “creative destruction”, in which
innovative activities lead to new markets, new industries and the death of old markets
and industries.85 In this perspective, monopolies may at times be necessary to ensure that
83 Bork, note 47 above, at 405.
84 See Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Policy after Chicago” 84 Mich L Rev 213, at 215 and Hovenkamp in
Cucinotta, Pardolesi and Van den Bergh (eds.), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law (Cheltenham,
Edward Elgar, 2002), who describes post-Chicago views as “another swing in antitrust’s ideological pendulum.”
85 See Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, Harper, 1975).
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firms engage in risky innovative activities, which ultimately benefit consumers - for
instance, investing in the R&D necessary to discover new drugs in the pharmaceutical
industry.
A second criticism from inside the model is that the Chicago School model ignores the
importance of strategic behaviour - that is, behaviour designed to reduce the
attractiveness of competitors’ offers. 86 Thus, one of the innovations of post-Chicago
theory was to emphasise the potential danger of raising rivals’ costs via strategic
behaviour such as litigating against non-dominant competitors. In this way, in Harvard
School terminology, market conduct can in fact influence market structure (in contrast to
the Harvard School model holding that structure influences conduct).
A third post-Chicago development has been the development of “contestable market”
theory, which criticise the traditional Chicago School approach as paying insufficient
attention to the role of potential competition. In this analysis, market structure becomes
virtually irrelevant in a perfectly contestable market, defined as one with no entry or exit
costs.87 This means that the focus of competition law becomes not concentration as
such, but rather tackling the erection of barriers to entry by private undertakings or by
the state.
Fourth, more broadly, many criticise the Chicago School’s simplified economic models
as of limited usefulness in tackling the economic complexities of the real world, without
being capable of coping with dynamic market realities.88 The Chicago School approach
is, it is argued, too theoretical, relying too heavily on economic theory, rather than facts,
to decide cases.89 Indeed, this criticism has been levied at economic, efficiency-based
approaches to competition policy in general, on the basis that it may often be wholly
impractical, for instance, for a court or competition authority solely to concern itself with
maximising efficiency, as they may lack the information which might enable them to
assess which solution is more “efficient”. This criticism bears close resemblance to an
argument sometimes made in favour of excluding all consideration of non-economic
factors in Community competition policy, which is that including such factors in
competition analysis infringes the principles of legal certainty and justiciability.90 In
reality, it is evident that focusing purely on efficiency goals in competition analysis may
pose equally difficult problems of justiciability.
Fifth, many commentators have rejected the notion that antitrust can ever be made
wholly apolitical.91 They argue that placing efficiency at the heart of antitrust is, in itself,
86 Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Policy after Chicago” 84 Mich L Rev 213, at 261.
87 See, for instance, Baumol, “Contestable Markets: an uprising in the theory of industry structure” 72 AER
1 (1982).
88 See, Hovenkamp in Cucinotta, Pardolesi and Van den Bergh (eds.), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust
Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2002), at 5 and Fox, “The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust” 75 Cal L Rev
917.
89 See, for example, Hovenkamp, ibid, at 4: “post-Chicago” antitrust…has relatively less confidence in markets as such,
is more fearful of strategic anticompetitive behaviour by dominant firms, and has a significantly restored faith in the efficacy of
government intervention.”
90 Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2006), at 7: “the extent to which non-efficiency goals trump efficiency is a constitutional question external to competition law
that ultimately requires resolution at the constitutional level.” Balancing Treaty goals within the competition
provisions would mean that these provisions would become “non-justiciable”. See also, Maks, “The “New”
Horizontal Agreements Approach in the EU: An “Economic” Assessment” (2002) 37(1) Intereconomics
28, “…it might be a proper choice for competition policy to concentrate on its traditional core business and not to bungle
around with environmental externalities in an ineffective way such that its core task of maintaining workable competition is
hampered.”
91 Fox, “The Modernization of Antirust: A New Equilibrium” 66 Cornell L Rev 1140 (1981), Sullivan,
“Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: what are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?” 125 U Pa
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a fundamentally political exercise.92 Moreover, many reject the notion that the sole
concern of antitrust should be that an economically efficient outcome be achieved. As
such, they take issue not only with the specific Chicago School approach, but more
broadly with the economic, efficiency-based approach to competition analysis in general.
In the US, for instance, Fox and Sullivan have argued that antitrust should protect the
competitive process, with antitrust laws setting “fair rules of the game”.93 Indeed,
Hovenkamp rejects the very idea that efficiency concerns can be separated from
distributional concerns, as the efficient allocation of resources in any given society is
“substantially a function of the way that society’s wealth is distributed initially.”94
Role of environmental factors. It will be clear from the above that it is impossible to
identify any one single approach to environmental factors from a “post-Chicago”
perspective. The fundamental distinction in this regard is between what we have termed
post-Chicago commentators “inside” the economic efficiency model, and those
“outside” the model. In the former case, as the premise of maximising efficiency is
accepted, environmental factors can only be relevant insofar as they form part of
efficiency analysis (or insofar as they form part of one of the post-Chicago additions to
efficiency analysis, such as dynamic competition or the theory of contestable markets).
In the latter case, however, the notion of an exclusive economic efficiency goal is
rejected, meaning that prima facie environmental protection may, depending on its
importance as a societal goal, legitimately play a role in competition law.
3. Some examples of the relevance of non-economic goals to Community
competition policy to date
It has been argued above that current Community competition policy displays attributes
of a mixture of theoretical models, combining elements of the Chicago School with
Harvard School and ordoliberal influences. Although economic welfare and efficiency
comprise important goals of Community competition policy, there is little evidence of an
exclusive focus on economic efficiency. As Budzinski puts it, Community competition
policy is not based on a “monoculture”, but rather on a constantly evolving diversity in
competition economics.95 Consistently with this, there are numerous examples where
“non-economic” goals (i.e., goals other than economic efficiency in the narrow sense)
have played a part in the application to date of Community competition law by the
Commission, the Community courts, and national courts and competition authorities.96
L Rev 1214 (1977); Pitofsky, “The Political Content of Antitrust” 127 U Pa L Rev 1051 (1979). See also,
for example, Lande, “Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide
Antitrust” 58 Antitrust L. J. (1989) 631. In the EU, context, see generally Chapter 6 and, for instance,
Mortelmans, “Towards Convergence in the Application of the Rules on Free Movement and on
Competition?” 38 CML Rev (2001) 613 and Vogelaar, “Modernisation of EC Competition Law, Economy
and Horizontal Cooperation between Undertakings” (2002) 37(1) Intereconomics 19.
92 See, for instance, Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust 127 U Pa L Rev 1051 (1979) and
Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Policy after Chicago” 84 Mich L Rev 213. More recently, writers such as Fred
McChesney have argued, in the context of the US system and using public choice theory, that it is
unavoidable that politics affect antitrust enforcement: “Public Choice: Do Politics Corrupt Antitrust
Enforcement? Economics versus politics in antitrust” 23 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 111 and 133 (1999). He
reasons that, in the US, antitrust enforcement is the responsibility of the state attorney general - who is
normally an elected official, and thus can be “captured”.
93 Fox and Sullivan, “Antitrust - Retrospective and Perspective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are
We Going?” 62 NYU L Rev 936, at 959.
94 Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Policy after Chicago” 84 Mich L Rev 213, at 247.
95 Budzinski, “Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics” (2008) 32 Cambridge Journal of
Economics 295.
96 Whish, for example, comments that, “[i]n reality…many different policy objectives have been pursued in the name of
[Community] competition law, some of which are not rooted in notions of consumer welfare in the technical sense, and some of
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Market Integration. The goal of achieving greater integration within the single market
has undoubtedly played an important role in Community competition policy.97 Clearly,
the Community competition regime differs fundamentally from the US regime and
national competition regimes insofar as one of the primary goals of the EC Treaty (and
thus, on a systematic analysis, the competition rules) is to prevent barriers to the
achievement and functioning of a single market - a goal which does not necessarily
follow from the narrow goal of achieving economic efficiency.98 Thus, Article 2 EC
provides that,
“the Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively
approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities…”
In this respect, the competition rules act as a complement to the Community’s rules on
free movement - in particular Article 28 EC - which seek to prevent the maintenance of
barriers to trade via Member State rules or practices. The Community’s “antitrust” rules
– i.e., Articles 81 and 82 EC – aim at preventing such barriers from being maintained by
private agreements; while the Community’s State aid rules prevent the use of State
subsidies, which could similarly hamper the achievement of an integrated market by, for
example, hindering imports from or artificially buoying exports to other Member States.99
The Community courts and the Commission have frequently confirmed the relevance of
the market integration goal to competition analysis. Thus, for instance, in its XXVth
Report on Competition Policy, the Commission observed that,
“[a]n essential aim of European competition policy is to ensure that the completion of the internal
market brings consumers and the European economy as a whole all the benefits of a Community-
wide market.”100
which are plainly inimical to the pursuit of allocative and productive efficiency…There is no single, unifying policy which binds
EC…law together: there is no simple premise from which decisions flow through the application of logic alone. In particular,
competition policy does not exist in a vacuum: it is an expression of the current values and aims of society and is as susceptible
to change as political thinking generally” (Whish, Competition Law (5th ed., London, Butterworths, 2003) at 17).
See also, Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2006), 160 who recognises that the Court has, in fact, taken certain non-economic considerations
into account in the past, but argues that this was only done due to political stagnation at the time in other
areas of Community policy, and that the use of the teleological approach can be justified, if at all, only in
times of political stagnation or emergency. See also, the speech of Director General Philip Lowe at the St
Gallen Competition Law Forum, “Preserving and Promoting Competition: a European Response”,
“…competition is not an end in itself, but an instrument for achieving public interest objectives, notably consumer welfare.”
97 See Motta, note 74 above, Bishop and Walker, note 48 above, Hildebrand, note 14 above.
98 The single market imperative may, however, contribute to greater economic efficiency in some cases,
however, as firms in isolated markets may not be able to exploit efficiency advantages as minimum efficient
scale may greater exceed national demand: See Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of
Article 81 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), at 13.
99 In this sense, Pescatore writes that, “the first objective of the competition rules is to contribute to establishing and
maintaining a single market in the Community and to preventing the re-erection of economic barriers by private agreements”
(Pescatore - Public and Private Aspects of Community Competition Law (1987) 10 Fordham Int'l L. J.
373). See also, the XXIX Report on Competition Policy, where the Commission stated its view that the
second objective of Community competition policy “is the single market objective. An internal market is an
essential condition for the development of an efficient and competition industry.” Commission, XXIX Report on
Competition Policy, 1999 (Brussels, Commission of the European Communities 2000), at 6.
100 At 23. See also, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints OJ 2000 C 291/1 at 7. Some commentators have
raised the possibility that, with the decentralisation of enforcement of Community competition law
brought by Regulation 1/2003, the single market imperative will lose force, being applied by national
competition authorities not used to taking account of market integration - though if this were to happen,
the Commission would likely “reclaim” such cases and/or the Community courts would be called on
ultimately to resolve the matter. See Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81
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This approach was epitomised by, amongst others, the ECJ’s Consten & Grundig
judgment, in which it held that - irrespective of whether they were efficient - market-
partitioning vertical restraints were illegal under Article 81 EC.101 To a certain extent, the
major progress made to date in achieving the single market, has led the Commission to
place less emphasis in recent years on the market integration goal in the competition
policy context.102 Nonetheless, both the ECJ and the Commission continue to place
considerable emphasis on the market integration function of Community competition
law. A recent example is the Sot. Lelos judgment where the ECJ held that, in view of the
Treaty’s goal of achieving market integration, market-partitioning practices of a dominant
undertaking aimed at avoiding parallel exports between Member States amount, in
principle, to an abuse.103
Industrial policy. Possibly the most controversial potential non-economic goal of them
all, the interrelation between industrial policy and Community competition policy has
long been dogged by controversy. In the past, certain goals of industrial policy have, on
occasion, been accepted as valid objectives even in the context of the Community’s
competition rules, one of many examples being the treatment of agreements to reduce
structural overcapacity.104 Indeed, the very idea of State aid - which, though in principle
prohibited, may be exempt under the conditions of Article 87(3) EC - is itself an
embodiment of industrial policy.105 However, Commissioner Monti and Commissioner
Kroes have each, on their successive watches, fervently denied that, where industrial
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), at 21 and Wesseling, “The Draft Regulation Modernising the
Competition Rules: The Commission is married to one idea” 26 EL Rev 357.
101 Joined Cases 56 & 58/64 Consten & Grundig [1966] ECR 299. See, similarly, for instance, Case C-
234/89 Delimitis [1991] ECR I-935, Case 161/84 Pronuptia [1986] ECR 353, Case T-77/92 Parker Pen [1994]
ECR II-549, Case C-551/03 P General Motors [2006] ECR I-3173. See, however, Case T-168/01
GlaxoSmithKline [2006] ECR II-2969 (under appeal as Joined Cases C-501, 513, 515 and 519/06), where the
CFI held that, in the specific context of the pharmaceutical sector where regulation largely protects
medicine prices from the full force of supply and demand, it cannot be presumed that an arrangement
limiting parallel trade will have a negative effect on competition such that it should be viewed as having the
object of restricting competition. See further below, Chapter 10.
102 An example is the Commission’s White Paper on Modernisation, which comments, “At the beginning, the
focus of [competition policy’s] activity was on establishing rules on restrictive practices interfering directly with the goal of
market integration…The Commission has now come to concentrate more on ensuring effective competition by detecting and
stopping cross-border cartels and maintaining competitive market structures…”COM (99) 101 final, point 8 of the
summary. See the conclusion of Röller and Stehmann, former Chief Economist and member of the Chief
Economist’s team at DG Competition respectively: “With progress made toward realisation of the internal market,
the relative importance of the market integration goal has declined. As a result, policy statements today stress efficiency,
consumer welfare, and competitiveness.” Röller and Stehmann, “The Year 2005 at DG Competition: The Trend
towards a More Effects-Based Approach” 29(4) Review of Industrial Organization (2006) 281. See also,
Baquero Cruz, who criticises this tendency on the basis that competition law forms part of the “economic
constitutional law” of the Community, which is aimed at market integration and achieving the single
market - a goal which has not yet fully been achieved: Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement:
The Economic Constitutional Law of the European Community (Oxford, Hart, 2002).
103 Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot. Lelos kai Sia, judgment of September 16, 2008. In so holding,
the ECJ upheld, inter alia, the Commission’s argument that the refusal by an undertaking in a dominant
position to supply medicinal products to wholesalers with the aim of restricting parallel trade constitutes in
principle an abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 EC: see para 32 of the judgment.
104 See, for example, BPCL/ICI OJ 1984 L 212/1, ENI/Montedison OJ 1987 L 5/13. Commissioner Van
Miert was a vocal proponent of the position that non-economic factors cannot be “taken out” of
Community competition policy. Writing in 1995 during his mandate, he observed, “Competition policy can be
seen rather as one instrument among others, which fosters the achievement of the Community’s basic objectives. The
Community’s competition policy does not operate in a vacuum. It must take into account its effects on other areas of the
Commission action, such as industrial, regional, social and environmental policies…Competition policy, in turn, plays a role
in the preparation and introduction of other policies” (1995) “An Active Competition Policy or Economic Growth”
in Frontier-Free Europe, Monthly Newsletter, European Commission, Luxembourg, June 1995, at 1
105 See further, Chapter 15.
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policy amounts to industrial protectionism, it can ever play a role in Community
competition policy.106 In so doing, the Commissioners have clashed swords repeatedly
with major European leaders - as well as other Commissioners, such as present
Commissioner for Enterprise, Günter Verheugen.
A recent example is the clash with French president Sarkozy over his insistence on the
removal from the text of the Lisbon Treaty, signed on December 13, 2007, of the
reference to “free and undistorted competition” as an activity of the EU (which had been
included as Article I-3(2) of the Constitutional Treaty). This was done with a view to
protecting national “champions”.107 Although Commissioner Kroes and other high-level
Commission officials have - naturally - sought to play down the significance of this
change as being pure semantics,108 there is a risk that the competition acquis will be
weakened by this development, in combination with the excision of present Art. 3(1)(g)
from the Lisbon text and given the Community courts’ use of teleological
interpretation.109 Nonetheless, this risk should not be exaggerated, particularly as Article
119 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union specifies that the Union’s
economic policy is to be conducted “in accordance with the principle of an open market economy
with free competition.”110
Sectoral policies: transport; energy; agriculture. Community competition policy has
traditionally been applied to certain sectors in a qualified manner. This is so for reasons
of policy (unrelated to economic efficiency) and due to their perceived special features,
leading in many cases to specific Community secondary legislation regulating the extent
of the application of the competition rules. In some cases, the trend is for such sectors
to be brought gradually back into the application of the general competition rules
(subject to the existence of specific secondary legislation).111 Special treatment is,
however, given to the agricultural sector, due to the important role of market
organisations.112 This position was originally enshrined in Regulation 26, as replaced by
106 See, for instance, the speech of Commissioner Kroes at the Fordham Competition Law conference of
2006: “the answer to the challenges faced by industry in today’s globalising economy is not to seek to shield industry from the
forces of competition, but to put in place the conditions which will allow industry to flourish in an increasingly competitive
environment. [I]t is time to put old-fashioned industrial protectionism to bed, and instead to develop a modern, proactive
industrial policy which embraces change and paves the way for our future competitiveness.” (SPEECH/06/499).
107 See, for example, the report of June 25, 2007 of the EU Observer, “Sarkozy claims “competition”
victory at summit” and the press release of M. Sarkozy at the time: “[W]e have obtained a major reorientation on
the objectives of the Union. Competition is no longer an objective of the Union or an end in itself, but a means to serve the
internal market… ”
108 See, for example, the letter of June 27, 2007 to the Financial Times from Mr Michel Petite, the Director
General of the European Commission's Legal Service, in which he rejected the arguments of Financial
Times columnist Wolfgang Munchau that the removal of the competition principle from the then-Reform
Treaty threatened the status of competition in the single market.
109 Riley, “The EU Reform Treaty and the Competition Protocol: undermining EC competition law”
(2007) European Competition Law Review 703. See also, Drijber, “Het Hervormingsverdrag van de EU:
stap vooruit of stap achteruit?” (2007) 5/6 Markt en Mededinging 131.
110 See also, the Protocol to the Treaties on European Union and on the Functioning of the European
Union on the internal market and competition, which states that “the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the
Treaty on European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted.”
111 The transport and the energy sectors are good examples. Though Regulation 141 (OJ Spec. Ed. 1959-
1962 291) originally exempted the transport sector as a whole from the application of Regulation 17,
Regulation 1017/68 applying the rules of competition to road, rail and inland waterway (OJ Spec. Ed. 1968
302) limited its scope to maritime and air transport. Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L 1/1, the successor to
Regulation 17, applies to all types of transport, repealing Regulation 141 and amending inter alia Regulation
1017/68.
112 Article 36 EC provides that, “The provisions of the chapter relating to rules on competition shall apply
to production of and trade in agricultural products only to the extent determined by the Council.” See
further, Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics (Oxford, Hart, 2007), at 51.
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Regulation 1184/2006, and is evident in the way in which the Court has applied
competition law to the agricultural undertakings.113
The protection of intellectual property. The goal of protecting certain intellectual
property rights is evident in some areas of Community competition policy. An inherent
tension exists between patent law and competition law, essentially because the latter aims
at protecting competition, while the former creates monopolies which aim at eliminating
competition to reward innovation. Courts and regulators, therefore, must reconcile the
tension as best they can by determining whether the benefit to innovation resulting from
a given restraint offsets any anti-competitive effect.114 The approach presumes that
patent and other intellectual property rights merit special treatment compared to other
property rights. An evident result of this approach in the Community context is the
Block Exemption on Technology Transfer and the accompanying Guidelines on the
application of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements.115
Defence. Although, in principle, the EC competition rules apply to the defence
industry, Article 296 EC provides that Member States may refuse to disclose information
if this could run “contrary to the essential interests of [their] security”. Further, Member States
may take measures which are considered “necessary for the protection of the essential interests of
[their] security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war
material.” As a result, where Member States can show that the application of the
competition rules would run counter to their security interests, such application may be
limited.116
Redistribution? It is arguable - though a highly controversial proposition - that the
dispersal of economic power and the redistribution of wealth - the promotion of
economic equity - may be viewed as a further goal of Community competition policy.
For instance, it might be argued that, to the extent that Community competition policy
favours consumer welfare over producer welfare in Article 81(3) EC, it can be viewed as
having certain redistributive objectives.117 As discussed above, such an interpretation
would rely on the Harvard School and ordoliberal influences in Community competition
policy, but would be anathema to those adopting a Chicago School analysis.
Other “lateral” policies. In a number of cases, the Community courts and
Commission have, explicitly or implicitly, taken special account of a variety of “lateral”
Community policies in applying competition law. These cases will be discussed in detail
in Part III’s Chapters dealing with the specific areas of Community competition law.
Such policy areas include social policy, employment policy,118 health policy, and cultural
113 Regulation 26 applying certain rules of competition to the production of and trade in agricultural
products OJ 1962 30/993, Regulation 1184/2006 applying certain rules of competition to the production
of and trade in agricultural products OJ 2006 L 214/7. Examples of the Court’s approach here are the
judgments in Case C-137/00 Milk Marque [2003] ECR I-7975 and Joined Cases T-217/03 and 245/03
FNCBV [2006] ECR II-4987.
114 Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics (Oxford, Hart, 2007), 191, citing Kaplow,
“The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal (1984) 97 Harv L Rev 1813.
115 Regulation 772/2004 OJ 2004 L 123/11 and Guidelines on Technology Transfer OJ 2004 C 101/2.
This could, however, be viewed as coming within the goals of “economic efficiency” in its post-Chicago,
Schumpterian sense of encouraging dynamic efficiency, and thus not to amount to a “non-economic” goal.
116 However, Article 296 EC is specified only to apply to products intended for “specifically military purposes.”
117 See further, Chapter 11.
118 Se the cross-sectional clause in the Treaty, Article 127(2) EC, “The objective of a high level of employment shall
be taken into consideration in the formulation and implementation of Community policies and initiatives.”
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policy.119 They also include areas such as sport, in which the Community has not
traditionally been viewed as having a “policy” as such.120
Having thus identified the mixture of competition theories underlying present
Community competition policy and their approaches to environmental factors, and
having identified the relevance of a range of non-economic factors to Community
competition practice, we turn now to consider the specific case of environmental
protection, and what role it should play in Community competition analysis.
119 See Psychogiopolou, “EC Competition Law and Cultural Diversity: The Case of the Cinema, Music and
Book Publishing Industries” 30(6) EL Rev (2005) 83 and Mayer-Robitaille, “Le statut ambivalent au regard
de la politique communautaire de concurrence des accords de nature culturelle et des aides d’Etat relatives
à la culture” (2004) 40(3) RTD eur 477.
120 See, however, the Lisbon Treaty, which gives the EU coordinating competence in the area of sport.
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Chapter 6: Should Environmental Goals Play a Role in Community Competition
Policy? Theoretical Perspectives I: A Systematic Argument
1. Introduction
This Chapter, and the following two Chapters, shift to a normative perspective, assessing the
merits of the theoretical arguments for and against taking environmental protection
considerations into account in Community competition policy. They focus on what are, it is
submitted, the three best arguments why environmental protection goals should play a role
in Community competition policy. These arguments will, respectively, be grounded in
reasoning based on the system of the Treaty and its underlying principles (the “systematic”
argument, Chapter 6), on governance theory (the “governance” argument, Chapter 7) and on
economic theory (the “economic” argument, Chapter 8). The conclusion will be that these
arguments are convincing, and should inform any application of Community competition
law to environmentally-relevant issues. This conclusion is important for Part III, which
considers the application of the specific Treaty competition provisions in practice.
2. The Systematic Argument
The first argument that Community competition policy should take environmental
considerations into account returns to a theme touched upon already: the idea that the
Treaty should be viewed as a coherent “system.” In essence, this argument holds that,
where possible and where Treaty provisions are sufficiently open-textured to be open to
interpretation, they should be interpreted so as to help, and not hinder, the Community’s
other policy objectives.1 This approach holds, it is argued, in interpreting Community
competition law just as in interpreting the rest of Community law.2 Applied to the
intersection between competition and environmental policies, this argument can be divided
into two limbs. The first is environment-specific, based on Article 6 EC. The second is
more general, based on the systematic links between the EC Treaty’s competition and free
movement provisions.
i. The Meaning of Article 6 EC
As we saw in Chapter 2, this Article - also known as the “integration principle” - provides
that,
“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of
the Community policies and activities…in particular with a view to promoting sustainable
development.”3
In itself, a systematic approach would not, without more, allow a conclusion on which
Treaty policy should get priority in case of conflict. Indeed, as we have seen, Article 2 EC
itself lays down no hierarchy between the Community’s objectives. The crucial question is
whether, in the case of environmental protection, the presence of Article 6 EC in the Treaty
changes matters.
1 See, for example, Pescatore, The Law of Integration (Leiden, Sijthoff, 1974), at 41, who writes that, “the structure of
the European Community and its law form a system, that is to say, a structured, organised and finalised whole. The Community
thus benefits from the resources and the dynamics of the system…” See also, Vedder, Competition Law and Environmental
Protection in Europe: Towards Sustainability? (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2003).
2 See, for example, Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford, Hart 2000), at 4:
“Interpretations of Community substantive law generally, and of EC antitrust law in particular, are interrelated and dependent
upon institutional, procedural, political and economic aspects of the system.”
3 This will become Article 11 TFEU under the Lisbon Treaty.
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Status of Article 6 EC. As discussed in Part I, the integration principle forms one of the -
substantive - pillars of the EU’s goal of sustainable development. As we saw there, it has
been implemented (at least in principle) at all levels of EU decision-making, including at
European Council, Council of Ministers and Commission level. However, the precise status
of Article 6 EC - and, in particular, whether it constitutes a formal “general principle” of
Community law - is not specified in the EC Treaty. Though one might be forgiven for
concluding that it constitutes such a general principle due to its post-Amsterdam positioning
in Part I of the EC Treaty (headed “Principles”), such positioning is clearly not in itself
sufficient to determine the matter, which is ultimately for the Community courts alone to
decide.
In this regard, the jurisprudence of the Community courts to date confirms, it is submitted,
that Article 6 EC should be considered as a general principle of Community law.4 In
particular, in common with other such general principles, Article 6 EC has been relied upon
as a tool in interpreting Treaty provisions as well as secondary Community law,5 as a
limitation on the scope and exercise of the Community’s competence (for instance, in legal
basis case law),6 and as a limitation on, and justification for, Member States’ actions within
the scope of Community law (for instance, in free movement of goods case law).7 Indeed,
this general principle could arguably be viewed as flowing not just from Article 6 EC, also
from the national “constitutional traditions” oft cited by the Court as a source of general
principles, with many Member States according constitutional status to the environmental
protection.8 Admittedly, the mere qualification of Article 6 EC as a general principle of
Community law does not, in itself, allow a comprehensive definition of its effect in the
Community legal order: the Mangold judgment, in particular, has led to much uncertainty
about whether general principles of Community law (in that case, the “general principle” of
non-discrimination on grounds of age) have horizontal direct effect.9 Nonetheless, the
4 See further, Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into other EC policies (Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2003), Wasmeier, “The integration of environmental protection as a general rule for interpreting
Community law” (2001) CML Rev 159.
5 See, for example, the Opinion of AG Kokott, Case C-304/01 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-7655
(interpretation of fisheries legislation); Joined Cases T-74/00 etc Artegodan [2002] ECR II-4945 (precautionary
principle), Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-126/01 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769 (polluter pays principle). See
also, the Opinion of AG Alber in Case C-444/00 Mayer Parry Recycling [2003] ECR I-6163.
6 Case C-300/89 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) [1991] ECR I-2867, paras 22 – 24. See analogously,
Case C-17/90 Pinaud Wieger [1991] ECR I-5253 (confirming a similar approach towards the common transport
policy) and Opinion 2/00 [2001] ECR I-9713, where the Court confirmed that Article 6 EC was “in full harmony”
with the Titanium Dioxide doctrine, and Case C-336/00 Huber [2002] ECR I-7699. See also, the Opinion of AG
Kokott in Case C-94/03 Commission v Council (Rotterdam Convention) [2006] ECR I-1 and the Opinion of AG
Geelhoed in Case C-161/04 Austria v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-7183 who concluded that, in cases of
manifest disregard of environmental interests, Article 6 EC should function as a standard of review of the
legality of Community legislation.
7 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431, Case
C-320/03 Commission v Austria (Inn Valley) [2005] ECR I-9871.
8 Thus, a number of Member States have “general principles” of environmental protection in their
constitutions. See, for example, the Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-227/02 Wood Trading [2004] ECR I-11957,
who refers to Belgium, Greece, Spain, Finland and Hungary in this regard, as well as to the Charter for the
Environment recently attached to the French Constitution; and the Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in
Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879.
9 Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981 (in which the ECJ seemed, controversially, to ascribe horizontal
direct effect to the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, though it had not previously
been clear that general principles could have such an effect).
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ECJ’s jurisprudence demonstrates that the effects of Article 6 EC in the Community legal
order clearly go beyond the programmatic,10 entailing,
“an obligation on the part of the Community institutions to take due account of ecological interests in
policy areas outside that of environmental protection stricto sensu.”11
On any natural interpretation, there is no reason why Article 6 EC should not apply to
Community competition policy in the same way as any other Community policy, and indeed
the Commission is of the view that it does so apply.12
Application of Article 6 EC in practice. Though Article 6 EC’s status as a general
principle of Community law may be relatively clear, its application in practice is, as we saw in
Chapter 2, not at all so. From a legal and policy perspective, the principle as defined in the
Treaty suffers from evident indeterminacy. This is not merely due to the uncertainty of
meaning of Article 6 EC itself.13 A far greater problem is that neither Article 6 EC, nor its
subsequent application by the Community institutions, offers an answer to the glaring
question raised by its wording: in the case of irresolvable conflict between environmental
objectives and the objectives of another Community policy, which takes priority?14 In order
to evaluate the potential practical relevance of the integration principle to Community
competition policy, we need to establish a working hypothesis of the answer to the question:
What instruction does the integration principle give to decision-makers?
On this issue, Dhondt has put forward a useful distinction between three potential meanings
of “integration” in this context:
10 The nature of Article 6 EC has been described by Advocate General Jacobs as “not merely programmatic but
[imposing] legal obligations”. Jacobs, “The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the
Environment” Journal of Environmental Law 18 (2006) 185.
11 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-161/04 Austria v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-7183, paras 50-60.
12 See, for example, the speech of Jean-François Pons, “European competition policy for the recycling
markets”, Speech of September 20, 2001, “Community law provides that environmental considerations must be integrated
into all other Community policies. This includes European competition policy”. See also, DG Competition Paper
concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22, 2005, discussed further in
Chapters 10-12.
13 The Treaty offers no definition as such of “environmental protection requirements”, but most commentators
agree that this refers to the Article 174(1) EC environmental policy objectives, as well as the Article 174(2) EC
environmental principles, which seems reasonable. See further, Jans and Vedder, European Environmental Law
(Groningen, Europa, 2008); Borràs Pentinat, “The Process of the Integration of Environmental Protection into
Other European Union Policies” in Fajardo de Castillo et al (eds.), Strengthening European Environmental Law in an
Enlarged Union (Aachen, Shaker 2004), at 29; Dhondt, note 4 above.
14 See further, Alves, “La Protection intégrée de l’environnement en droit communautaire”, Revue juridique de
l’environnement, 2/2003 p. 1 and Nollkaemper, “Environmental Policy integration: greening sectoral policies
in Europe - Three conceptions of the integration principle in international environmental law” in Lenschow
(ed.), Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in Europe (London, Earthscan 2002).
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Possibility 1. A “weak interpretation”, where the obligation to integrate environmental
protection requirements is merely an obligation to take these requirements into account,
leaving decision-makers with a broad discretion as to whether or not to adjust their policies
to those requirements in practice;
Possibility 2. A “strong interpretation”, where the principle requires decision-makers to
pursue environmental objectives in a systematic way alongside the specific sectoral objectives
of each discrete policy area and, where several policy options are available, policy making
should choose the most environmentally friendly option. In other words, environmental
protection requirements must be observed in defining and implementing Community
policies.15
Possibility 3. A “very strong interpretation”, where environmental requirements should be
applied at all times in priority to all other potentially conflicting objectives. This is
reminiscent of the economic concept of “strong sustainability”, a version of the sustainable
development goal which we considered in Part I.
Dhondt concludes that, in her view, the second interpretation - the “strong interpretation” -
should be preferred over the two others, as it is the only interpretation which achieves the
aim of effectively integrating environmental requirements into all other Community policies
in a systematic and proportionate manner. Not all commentators agree. Wasmeier, for
example, seems to espouse a stronger interpretation - more akin to Possibility 3 - arguing
that,
“…in any case where a conflict between the Community’s economic and environmental objectives arises,
the interests involved must be reconciled insofar as possible, in accordance with the principle that all
Community purposes and interests set out in Article 2 are of equal value…Strictly speaking, if [a
Community measure has an environmental impact], it must be either positive or neutral. Essentially,
the Community cannot adopt any measures that lead to deterioration of the quality of the
environment.”16
Similarly, applying this reasoning to competition law, Giorgio Monti argues that Article 6 EC
means that environmental protection is “normatively superior to the core values of EC competition
law” and so “may thereby act as a “trump” to justify even anticompetitive environmental agreements if these
are necessary to safeguard the environment.”17
Like Wasmeier, Monti and Dhondt, the present author would argue that Possibility 1 should
be rejected (i.e., the idea that environmental considerations should merely be “taken into
account” in taking policy decisions in all areas). It is interesting to note that, were Possibility
1 to be accepted, the Community’s present practice of carrying out impact assessments (i.e.,
achieving compliance with the integration principle via procedural means, discussed in
Chapter 2), could be considered to be largely sufficient to comply with the requirements of
the integration principle and sustainable development. It is submitted, however, that to
accept this version of integration would be wrong from a systematic perspective - in
particular given sustainable development’s status as one of the core aims of the Treaties, and
15 Dhondt, note 4 above.
16 Wasmeier, note 4 above, at 160.
17 Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” 39 CML Rev (2002) 1057, at 1078.
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Article 6 EC’s status as a general principle of Community law.18 Rather, the effet utile of
Article 6 EC, as a component of a core aim of the Community and of the Union, demands
that the provision be interpreted in a broad manner - meaning substantive integration, rather
than reliance on the primarily procedural tool of impact assessments.
Equally, like Dhondt, the present author would reject Possibility 3 (i.e., the idea that
environmental requirements should be applied at all times in priority to all other potentially
conflicting objectives). This would mean that environmental protection would become a
kind of an absolute “trump” card, akin, perhaps, to certain fundamental human rights. It
would mean that, where a decision-maker is faced with a conflict between environmental
and other (economic) goals, he or she must always prefer the environmental goal. This view,
it is submitted, goes too far, and goes beyond the wording of Article 6 EC and indeed
beyond the very concept of “sustainable development” itself, on which Article 6 EC is
premised. Though, as we saw in Part I, the meaning of sustainable development is rather
indeterminate, what is at least clear is that it attempts to find a middle ground or “win-win”
solution between economic and environmental concerns, rather than viewing one as
“trumping” the other.19 In this sense, an analogy might be made with the Viking and Laval
cases, which concerned the balance between national labour policies - in particular, the right
to strike - and Community internal market law. In those cases, one argument made was that
the right to take collective action constituted a fundamental right, protected by many
national constitutions, and thus should fall outside the scope of Community internal market
law. These arguments were rejected by the Court, which held that, though protection of
fundamental rights could constitute a valid justification for restrictions of free movement -
where proportionate - it could not remove the restriction from the scope of the internal
market altogether.20
This leaves us with the middle ground of Possibility 2 - i.e., the idea that environmental
protection requirements must, as a matter of obligation, be observed in defining and
implementing Community policies and, where a number of different policy choices are
possible, the choice most consistent with environmental protection should be preferred. In
common with Dhondt, the present author believes that this interpretation of Article 6 EC is
the “best fit”, in the sense described by Dworkin,21 with the scheme and system of the EC
Treaty. This, it is submitted, is sufficient for any situation where there is no real conflict
between environmental and competition objectives, or where any apparent conflict is
resolvable.
However, it does not take us far enough: it fails to provide us with a useful answer to our
initial question: in the case of irresolvable conflict between environmental objectives and
objectives of another Community policy, which takes priority? The principle of Community
18 See Articles 2 EC and EU, and Wasmeier, note 4 above, 164. See, by analogy, the ECJ’s classic reasoning in
Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, in which the ECJ examined the nature, scheme and wording of the
Treaty in concluding that present Article 25 EC has direct effect.
19 Nor does it follow from the presence of environmental protection objectives in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. Clearly, the Charter goes beyond “core” fundamental rights, which are viewed by some commentators
as trumping other interests, and includes broader policy directives, in particular certain broad economic and
social rights which are not found in the European Convention of Human Rights.
20 Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779 and Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767. The Court’s
approach follows that in, for instance, Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609.
21 See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977) and Dworkin, Law’s Empire
(London, Fontana 1986), discussed further in Chapter 7.
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law which provides us with a potential solution to this question is a general principle of
Community law: the principle of proportionality.22 This is the classic means, integral to the
system of the Treaty and codified by the Treaty of Maastricht in Article 5(3) EC, of
reconciling the Treaty’s potentially conflicting policy goals. As is well known, the two-
limbed formula typically used by the ECJ in, for example, free movement cases,23 as well as
cases seeking to annul Community measures for breach of a general principle of Community
law,24 is that an impugned measure is “proportionate” (and thus acceptable) where: (1) the
measure is suitable (or “apt”) to achieve a legitimate aim under the Treaty (the “suitability”
test); and (2) the measure is the least restrictive of the conflicting Community goal as is
possible (the “necessity” test).
This takes us to the final stage in the analysis: What concrete instruction does the integration
principle, then, give to competition authorities (whether national competition authorities or
the Commission) and courts applying Community competition law? It is submitted that,
applying the systematic logic developed above as to the meaning of the integration principle,
the best answer to this question is as follows:
22 See likewise, Vedder, note 1 above, Wasmeier, note 4 above.
23 See, for example, Joined Cases 133-136/85 Rau [1986] ECR I-2289. See further, Barnard, The Substantive Law
of the EU (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007).
24 See, for example, Joined Cases 154 and 155/04 Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451.
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1. As a procedural matter, where environmental considerations could be relevant to a case,
the question whether they should be taken into account must be considered in coming to
a decision.
2. Where there is, on their wording, no scope at all for interpreting the Treaty competition
provisions in a way that favours environmental protection, the integration principle is
not relevant. This is because, as a principle of Community law, it can only be used as a
tool of interpretation insofar as a provision is sufficiently open-textured.25 One
(obvious) outcome of this conclusion is that, where behaviour is environmentally
damaging but does not restrict competition, it cannot be sanctioned by the Treaty
competition rules where these expressly only apply to competitive restrictions.
3. Where it is possible to interpret the Treaty competition provisions in a way that favours
environmental protection, and there is no conflict with the goals of competition policy,
the Treaty provisions must always be interpreted in that manner.
4. Where it is possible to interpret the Treaty competition provisions in a way that favours
environmental protection, and there is a conflict with the goals of competition policy,
then the proportionality principle applies. That is to say, where a (private or State)
measure is suitable to achieve the Community’s environmental policy objectives, and
there is no way of achieving these objectives that is less restrictive of competition, the
measure should be allowed under Community competition law.26
Figure 1: Working hypothesis of the practical implications of the Article 6 EC integration principle in the
context of Community competition law
These four points form our “working hypothesis” on the implications of Article 6 EC, to be
applied concretely in Part III in the context of the specific Treaty competition rules.
ii. The Systematic Links between Competition Policy and Free
Movement Policy
The second limb to what we have termed the “systematic” argument may be called an
“internal comparative” approach: the argument that, as competition policy and free
movement of goods policy form part of the Community’s internal market law, they do and
should, to a certain extent, converge in their aims and complement each other. This
argument has three distinct aspects.
The first is inspired by ordoliberal economic theory. As discussed in Chapter 5, from an
ordoliberal perspective, Community competition policy can only be understood in the
context of the Community’s broader economic policy: regulators must adopt a
Ganzheitsbetrachtung (integrated policy perspective), viewing each individual economic
25 See by analogy cases such as Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285, which makes clear that such
interpretative requirements (in that case, in the context of the doctrine of indirect effect) cannot require a judge
to interpret contra legem. See also, Winter, “On the effectiveness of the EC administration: the case of
environmental protection” 33 CML Rev (1996) 689, at 700.
26 See Steenbergen, “Proportionality in Competition Law and Policy” (2008) 35(3) Legal Issues of Economic
Integration 259, at 266, who argues that, when assessing the relationship between competition policy and other
EU policies, the Courts apply a “somewhat diluted” indispensability test. The application of the proportionality
principle in practice in environment-related cases will be dealt with in detail in Part III.
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decision as part of the greater economic constitution.27 Recognition of the effects of one
policy decision on other policy areas and on the economic order as a whole is fundamental
to ordoliberalism’s Ordnungspolitik.28 This approach, by its nature, sees competition law and
internal market law as complementary elements forming part of the same system of
economic constitutional law. Similarly, Baquero Cruz has argued forcefully that the
competition and free movement rules, as the “oldest layer of the Community constitution”, should
“not be seen as isolated and independent groups of norms, but rather as inextricably linked in a functional
sense.”29 In a manner reminiscent of the post-Chicago criticism of Eleanor Fox in the US,30
he criticises a “growing tendency among competition specialists to treat their topic in a highly technical way,
as distinct from the economic constitutional law of the Community”.31 As part of the same overarching
body of economic constitutional law, therefore, the two sets of rules should be considered to
have the same ultimate aims, though with some differences of application - such as their
personal scope and the presence of the de minimis rule in competition law, which does not
apply in free movement law.
The second aspect to the systematic link between the Community’s competition and free
movement policies is based on empirical observation of current trends in the case law of the
Community courts. As Mortelmans has noted, and as will be discussed further in Part III,
there is a trend towards convergence between the areas of free movement and competition
in the case law of the Community courts, though they have not yet adopted a systematic
approach to such convergence.32 He points, first of all, to convergence in the scope of the
basic Treaty prohibitions of restrictions to free movement and competition, citing, inter alia,
examples of case law in which the ECJ took a similar approach to the scope of the Article 81
27 See Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Principles of economic policy) (7th ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck,
2004), at 304, and the discussion in Chapter 5.
28 See further, Sally, “Ordoliberalism and the Social Market; Classical Political Economy from Germany (1996)
1(2) New Political Economy 233.
29 “As the law now stands…the competition rules contained in the Treaty have a constitutional status and may be interpreted as
shaping a law of economic liberty from restraints of competition and abuses of private economic power, not only a law of economic
efficiency….” Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic Constitutional Law of
the European Community (Oxford, Hart, 2002), at 1. See also, Hervouët, “La dérive de l’Union européenne:
de l’objectif de l’Union entre les peuples à celui de la concurrence” (2008) 514 Revue du Marché commun et de
l’Union européenne 9, who argues that competition has always, in the scheme of the Treaty, merely constituted
a means to attain the EU’s broader objectives, namely increasing the well-being of its people.
30 On which, see Chapter 5.
31 He refers inter alia to the Spaak report, by which the inclusion of competition rules was expressly aimed at
preventing private undertakings from re-erecting the barriers to trade that would fall as a consequence of the
free movement rules. See the Spaak Report, at 16: “Des règles de concurrence qui s’imposent aux enterprises sont donc
nécessares pour éviter que les doubles prix aient le même effet que des droits de douane, qu’un dumping mette en danger des
productions économiquement saines, que la répartition des marchés se substitute à leur cloisonnement.”
32 Mortelmans, “Towards Convergence in the Application of the Rules on Free Movement and on
Competition?” 38 CML Rev (2001) 613. See also, however, Gyselen, The Emerging Interface between
Competition Policy and Environmental Policy in the EC, in Cameron, Demaret and Geradin (eds.), Trade and
the Environment: The Search for Balance (London, Cameron May, 1994), at 242 and Stuyck, “Libre circulation et
concurrence: les deux piliers du Marché commun” in Mélanges en homage à Michel Waelbroeck (Brussels, Bruylant,
1999), at 1478. He notes that the Court almost had the opportunity to develop a systematic approach in Case
2/91 Meng [1993] ECR I-5751, in which, in considering the application of Articles 3(1)(g), 10 and 81 EC to
actions of public authorities which restrict competition, it had asked the intervening parties whether such
public authorities should be able to rely on the justifications set out in Article 81(3) or, alternatively, the
mandatory requirements of public interest in Articles 28 and 49 EC. The matter did not ultimately have to be
decided, however, as there was no violation of Articles 3(1)(g), 10 and 81 EC on the facts. See further, Chapter
14.
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EC prohibition as it famously adopted in Cassis de Dijon regarding the scope of the Article 28
EC prohibition on restrictions to free movement of goods.33 In addition, he notes a
convergence in the permissible “exceptions” to the competition and free movement rules:
“economic” justifications have been accepted for restrictions of free movement,34 and “non-
economic” justifications have been accepted for restrictions of competition.35 Further, he
notes that the Court has accepted (in, for example, Bosman)36 that private parties may rely on
justifications of public policy, public security or public health to justify a prohibition on the
free movement of workers, and that both private parties and the State may rely on Article
86(2) as a justification for breach of the competition rules.37 His conclusion is that such
convergence is necessary to avoid distortions of competition,38 though full convergence is
not desirable due to the still-relevant distinction between public interests (imperium) and
private interests (dominium).39
A third aspect to the argument for convergence in the Community’s competition and free
movement policies is that the line between state action and private action is a fine one,
meaning that the approach to economic behaviour should ideally not depend on the status
of the actor - i.e., whether the actor is a state body or a private undertaking. This approach
draws, inter alia, on Hayek’s view that,
“it seems unwise to draw a sharp distinction between economic and political autonomy, for it is difficult
to distinguish economic action from political action…”40
This point should be seen in the broader current political context, where many Member
States are choosing to “devolve” what would formerly have been viewed as public functions
to private undertakings. In such instances, cases are increasingly being argued before the
Community courts on competition and free movement points.41 As private undertakings are
essentially performing the same functions as previously performed by the State, it would
seem logical that they should be able to rely on similar Treaty derogations when performing
such functions - albeit with perhaps greater deference being paid (for instance in assessing
proportionality) to those policy choices made by Member States enjoying greater democratic
legitimacy and accountability than private actions.42 As a result, the standard of legality for
33 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. See, for example, Joined Cases C-51/96 and
C-191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549, Case 26/76 Metro I [1977] ECR 1875 and Case 161/84 Pronuptia [1986]
ECR 353 and Mortelmans, note 32 above, 627-630.
34 See, for example, Case 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727 and Case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931.
One might also include examples from the Court’s case law on direct taxation, such as Case C-204/90
Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249.
35 Citing cases such as Case C-360/92 P Netbook agreement [1995] ECR I-23 (culture), as well as examples from
the sports and environmental fields.
36 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921.
37 Though the manner in which the justification may apply differs: see Mortelmans, note 32 above, at 645 and
Chapter 14.
38 Ibid, at 648. Further, the trend will be buoyed by “cross-cutting” policy integration clauses such as Article 6
EC and ability of national courts to deal with free movement and competition cases in “one go” given their
post-Regulation 1/2003 power to apply Article 81(3).
39 Ibid, at 649.
40 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960).
41 See, for example, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-
2099.
42 See, for example, Mortelmans, note 32 above. See contra, however (in the context of Article 82 EC) Albors-
Llorens, “The role of objective justification and efficiencies in Article 82 EC” 44 (2007) CML Rev 1727, who
emphasises that the competition rules and free movement rules differ, because achieving the single market is
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the competition and free movement provisions should be viewed as what Gyselen has
termed a “seamless web”, in view, inter alia, of the deregulation of formerly public activities to
private undertakings, blurring the traditional public-private divide.43 Such blurring provides
a convincing rationale for what Baquero Cruz has termed the “privatisation” of the free
movement rules (e.g., the finding in cases such as Walrave and Koch that certain of the free
movement rules have horizontal direct effect) and the “publicisation” of the competition
rules (e.g., the INNO line of cases by which Member States may breach Articles 81 and 82,
read in conjunction with Articles 3(1)(g) and 10 EC).44
It is worth noting that environmental protection is a prime example where, as we have seen
in Part I, economic, “market-based” instruments are increasingly being used in
environmental policy. As we have seen, this forms part of a shift in environmental
governance, away from State-source measures towards governance “through the workings of the
marketplace.”45 In this context, as Vogelaar has noted, the argument for convergence in
approach between Community “public” and “private” law is particularly pertinent.46
To conclude, the implications of this argument, based on convergence between Community
free movement and competition law, bring us squarely back to the conclusions reached
above on the significance of the Article 6 EC integration principle.47 Clearly, as discussed in
Part I, environmental protection has been recognised by the ECJ on numerous occasions as
a potential acceptable justification for Member State measures restricting free movement,
under the Cassis de Dijon formula. Likewise, as we also saw in Part I, the Court has in cases
such as PreussenElektra and Walloon Waste accepted (albeit not explicitly) that environmental
considerations may justify distinctly applicable measures, where normally only express
Article 30 EC derogations would suffice.48 According to the logic of the present argument,
this militates against any exclusion of environmental considerations from the application of
Community competition law. Moreover, as the proportionality principle is key in how the
ECJ resolves conflicts between policy goals in the context of the free movement provisions,
the sole aim of the latter, whereas it is just one aim of the former (along with the aim of ensuring effective
competition), and Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2006).
43 Gyselen, note 32 above, at 242.
44 Baquero Cruz, note 29 above; Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405, Case 13/77 INNO v ATAB
[1977] ECR 2115. Though Article 28 EC is essentially addressed to States and Articles 81 and 82 EC to private
undertakings, Article 28 EC can now also apply to restrictions created by private actors (see, e.g., Case C-
265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959 (“French farmers”) - though ultimately it is still the State which
may be found liable, albeit for the actions of private undertakings) and States can now be found liable for
infringement of Articles 81 and 82 under the INNO doctrine. See, further, Chapter 14 below.
45 See, for example, Cafaggi, “Gouvernance et Responsabilité des Régulateurs privés” Revue Internationale de
Droit Économique (2005) 111.
46 Vogelaar, "Towards an Improved Integration of EC Environmental Policy and EC Competition Policy: An
Interim Report" in 1994 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. (B. Hawk ed. 1995) 529, at 534. He notes that, while state
measures with environmental aims must satisfy Articles 28, 29 or 87 EC, private measures with environmental
aims must satisfy Articles 81 and 82 EC. Vogelaar concludes that, in each of these areas, “the degree of legal
acceptability of the measures taken hinges on the concept of “proportionality” or “reasonableness”. The measures adopted, be they
public or private, should be proportional to the objective pursued.”
47 See, contra, for example, Odudu, note 42 above, at 167 who characterises the use of a teleological approach as
a “Trojan horse”, citing Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford, Hart 2000), at 34-50 and 61-
64 (though on closer analysis, Wesseling’s argument is in fact that non-economic factors may indeed be
relevant to competition analysis overall).
48 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431.
This is further discussed in Chapter 7 infra.
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the present argument adds further force to the validity of our the working hypothesis on the
implications of Article 6 EC in Community competition policy, set out at Figure 1 above.
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Chapter 7: Theoretical Perspectives II - A Governance Argument
1. Introduction
A second argument that goes against the view that environmental considerations should not
be taken into account in Community competition policy is that, from a governance
perspective, any attempt to draw a “bright line” separating the two areas would be
inefficient, unrealistic, and would infringe the principles of good governance, detracting
from the effectiveness and ultimately the legitimacy of Community law. After outlining the
thrust of this argument, this section goes on to apply the argument to the three primary
levels of Community competition law enforcement: (1) the Commission; (2) the Community
Courts; and (3) national authorities applying - post-Regulation 1/2003 - Community
competition law, including national administrative competition authorities and national
courts.
2. Outline of the argument
The argument can be divided into two limbs. First, as a matter of principle, for governance
to be efficient and effective, action across Community policy spheres should interlink and be
coherent. This is fundamental to good governance. Moreover, in the specific context of
environmental protection goals, the coherence imperative is even stronger, because it is laid
down explicitly in the Treaty in the form of the sustainable development principle and, as
part of this, the integration principle discussed in the previous Chapter. Second, in practice,
the position that environmental considerations should be excluded from the analysis in
Community competition enforcement is unrealistic and unlikely to be achieved. As a result,
any push to exclude them from competition analysis is undesirable, as it would inevitably
lead to problems of legal certainty.
a. Coherence of Policy Action as a Requirement of Good Governance
The first limb of the governance argument starts from a simple premise: that, in a system
with multiple policy objectives such as the EC Treaty, the goals of the system overall will be
more efficiently and more effectively achieved where the governance of one part of the
system takes the aims of another part of the system into account.
This is not a new approach at Community level.1 In its 2001 White Paper on European
Governance, which is the main (and one of the only) policy documents setting out the
Commission’s approach to EU governance,2 the Commission identifies the principles of
“effectiveness” and “coherence” of Community policies as two of the fundamental five principles
1 See further, Lamy, “Europe and the future of economic governance” JCMS 42(1) (2004) 5, who identifies
three functions of economic governance: implementing underlying values; efficiency, and legitimacy. He also
points to the problems of “interlinkages” in the context of “single issue” institutions. See also, Van Gerven, The
European Union: A Polity Of States and Peoples (Oxford, Hart, 2005), who identifies integrity and effectiveness as
the guiding principles of good governance, and Kadelbach, “European Administrative Law and the Law of a
Europeanized Administration” in Joerges and Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).
2 COM (2001) 428 final. It defines governance as the “rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers
are exercised at European level” White Paper, at 8. See further, Wincott, “Looking forward or harking back? The
Commission and the reform of governance in the European Union” 39(5) Journal of Common Market Studies
897, and Jachtenfuchs, “The Governance Approach to European Integration” 39(2) JCMS (2001) 245, who
defines governance as “the intentional regulation of social relationships and the underlying conflicts by reliable and durable
means and institutions, instead of the direct use of power and violence” or, more simply, “the ability to make collectively binding
decisions” (at 246).
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of good governance within the EU - along with openness, participation, and accountability.3
The Commission describes the aim of effectiveness of Community policies as follows:
“Policies must be effective and timely, delivering what is needed on the basis of clear objectives, an
evaluation of future impact and, where available, of past experience…”4
Most importantly for the present analysis, the aim of coherence of Community policies is
thus described:
“Policies and action must be coherent and easily understood. The need for coherence in the Union is
increasing: the range of tasks has grown; enlargement will increase diversity; challenges such as climate
and demographic change cross the boundaries of the sectoral policies on which the Union has been built;
regional and local authorities are increasingly involved in EU policies. Coherence requires political
leadership and a strong responsibility on the part of the Institutions to ensure a consistent approach
within a complex system.”5
Thus, the Commission states that one of its principal aims is to “reinforce attempts to ensure policy
coherence.”6 Though the Commission points to cross-cutting policy initiatives which have
helped, identifying in particular the Göteborg strategy for sustainable development launched
by the European Council in 2001, it concludes that,
“more needs to be done. The Institutions and the Member States must work together to set out an
overall policy strategy. For this purpose, they should already refocus the Union’s policies and adapt the
way the Institutions work under the existing Treaties.”7
More broadly, it is evident that increasing the effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the
Community’s policies will, in addition to enhancing the effective attainment of the EU’s
substantive policy goals, increase the output legitimacy of EU’s decisions – i.e., the extent to
which EU decisions are accepted as legitimate and sound, for instance by EU citizens.
Community institutions which do not “talk to each other”, producing conflicting policies
and decisions, will not help in the EU’s continuing quest for acceptance by its public.
Similarly, any attempt to construct the Community’s internal market policies (including its
competition policy) in isolation from the wider social and environmental context in which
they are embedded will face major issues of output legitimacy.8
3 Ibid, at 10.
4 Ibid, at 10.
5 Ibid, at 10.
6 Ibid, at 6. In particular, it observes that, “the step by step integration, which has characterised the Union’s development, has
tended to slice policies into sectoral strands with different objectives and different tools: over time the capacity to ensure the coherence
has diminished. The current working methods of the Institutions and the relations with the Member States prevent them from
showing the necessary leadership.”
7 Ibid, at 28.
8 See, for example, Everson, “The Crisis of Indeterminacy: An “Equitable” Law of “Deliberative” European
Market Administration?” in Joerges and Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2002), at 232: “Few markets…can operate in full isolation from the wider society in which they are
embedded. The European market is no exception…In an uncertain post-national political setting, the ability of the European
market administration and its law to respond to the social will largely determine its long-term success or otherwise in the absence of
on-going political direction, the “technocratic” needs must be administratively balanced against the “ethical”, whilst the
“economically rational” must be weighed against social demands within the administrative process.” She concludes that, “the
sum total of the process of European market integration is…the emergence of a “market” that does not stand in isolation from the
social and political processes of the Member States and Community, but which is, instead, “embedded” within those processes…”
Ibid, at 240.
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In the environmental sphere, the importance of coherence of policy objectives is clearly
provided for explicitly by the principles of sustainable development and Article 6 EC
integration, and is thus given special force. The drive for good governance thus ties in neatly
with the EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy, as well as with the Cardiff process
implementing the Article 6 EC integration principle, discussed in Part I.9 It is fair to
conclude that the sustainability and integration principles require, if they are to be taken
seriously, a sea change in the sectoral paradigm of Community governance.10
b. A Realist’s Perspective
The second limb in the governance argument can be outlined more briefly. Shifting away
from a normative perspective, it holds that, even if one were to accept that it would be better
in theory for Community competition law enforcers to ignore environmental considerations,
it would be unrealistic to expect this to happen (consistently) in practice. Further, such a
lack of consistency would lead to legal certainty problems. This argument has most force, as
we see below, as regards enforcement of Community competition law by the Community
courts and national courts (and, to a certain extent, national administrative competition
authorities), as they may very well neither be minded, nor used, to applying competition
provisions in a way that excludes non-economic factors. It has less force in the case of DG
Competition of the Commission, as a specialised technocratic body which has, subject to the
review of the Community courts, a relatively high degree of autonomy in its approach to
enforcement. However, as discussed below, it may be possible, using public choice theory,
to arrive at a similar conclusion for the Commission.
3. Applying Governance Analysis to the Commission
a. Good governance analysis
As already discussed, the Commission has itself - at least on paper - been one of the main
driving forces in formulating EU policy on good governance (via its White Paper), as well as
on implementing sustainable development (via the EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy)
and the Article 6 EC integration principle (via various Communications and the institution
of impact assessments, for example). Far from intimating that it, as an institution, would be
excluded from the application of these principles, the Commission has, in these documents,
liked to portray itself as leading by example.
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that, in practice and as the number, size and remit of the
Commission’s Directorates General has increased tremendously over the past years, the
interlinkage between its policies has proved increasingly problematic. It is often very
difficult for one arm to know what the other arm is up to. This problem was one of the
issues targeted by the push for Commission Reform which took place during the Prodi
Commission, following the collapse of the Santer Commission. This push resulted in a
9 As mentioned in Part I, policy implementation of these processes include the development of bilateral
integration strategies and programmes for a wide number of Council formations; the publication of a 1998
Commission Communication “Partnership for Integration” (COM(98) 333); the 2004 undertaking of the
Commission to carry out an annual stocktaking of the progress of the Cardiff process; and the more general
undertaking in the EU’s SDS that the Commission will carry out impact assessments as to environmental
impacts when proposing major policy measures. See European Commission, “Integration of Environmental
Considerations into other Policy Areas – a Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process” COM (2004) 394 final.
10 See Alves, “La Protection intégrée de l’environnement en droit communautaire” Revue juridique de
l’environnement, 2/2003 p. 1, who refers to a “renovation de la gouvernance communautaire.”
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White Paper on Reforming the Commission in 2000,11 based on four guiding principles -
efficiency, accountability, service and transparency - and subsequent reform and progress
updates in 2003 and 2005 (the Kinnock reforms). The need for greater internal coordination
between Directorates General was a priority from the beginning for the Prodi Commission.
A paper entitled “Closer Internal Coordination”, presented at the inaugural meeting of the
Prodi Commission in Aartselaar, 1999, notes that,
“closer internal coordination is necessary to ensure the consistency and effectiveness of the Commission's
action, together with the high quality of its initiatives. Recourse should be had to internal coordination
as early as possible so as to avoid technical trade-offs at Chefs de cabinet meetings…”12
The paper proposed that the competent department of the Commission should be primarily
responsible for internal coordination on policy matters, supplemented by the Secretariat
General.13 During his tenure as Secretary-General, David Williamson made significant
efforts to tighten up the programming of activities and improve co-ordination among DGs.14
These steps taken within the Commission represent at least a partial acknowledgement of
the dire need to improve internal policy coordination between Directorates General of the
Commission.15 These difficulties may be termed difficulties of horizontal internal integration
within the Commission.16 The deepening and broadening of European integration has
increased the policy areas in which the Commission is active, leading to greater specialisation
and fragmentation of approach. Such horizontal integration problems are likely to increase
as the size of directorates-general, and their policy remits, grow. Metcalfe comments,
“for an organization whose business is integration, the Commission is embarrassingly poorly integrated.
It lacks the capacities to contain rivalries and jurisdictional disputes among DGs.”17
11 COM (2000) 200.
12 Available (though untitled) at http://ec.europa.eu/reform/pdf/coordin_en.pdf, at 1. On the success of the
Kinnock reforms, see Kassim, “‘Mission impossible’ but mission accomplished: the Kinnock reforms and the
European Commission (2008) 15(5) Journal of European Public Policy 648.
13 Ibid, at 2: the Secretariat General’s position, “recognised by the departments and the Commissioners' offices, enables it to
have a good overview, to stand back a little from the issues it addresses and to act in complete neutrality…”
14 See Metcalfe, “Reforming the Commission: Will Organizational Efficiency Produce Effective Governance?”
Journal of Common Market Studies 38(5) (2000) 817.
15 See, for example, Hofmann and Türk, EU Administrative Governance (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006), who
note the poor coordination between the 24 Directorates-General (at 24); Sand, “Understanding the New Forms
of Governance: Mutually Interdependent, Reflexive, Destabilised and Competing Institutions” 4(3) European
Law Journal (1998) 271, who refers to a “thick interdependency” between different policy areas.
16 The goal of improving horizontal internal integration might be distinguished from the goal of improving
vertical internal integration, which refers to improving linkages within the Commission between the staff of the
Directorates-General and the Commissioners themselves, and the goal of improving vertical external
integration, which refers to improving linkages between the Commission and national bodies who are also
involved in implementing a given area of Community policy, forming a “network” with the Commission. See
Hofmann and Türk, “The Development of Integrated Administration in the EU and its Consequences” 13(2)
European Law Journal (2007) 253. The enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC is, post-Regulation 1/2003, a
good example of a movement towards vertical external integration in this sense. This goal may equally refer to
improving linkages “upstream” between the Commission and the Council.
17 He refers in this regard to a report on “Designing Tomorrow’s Commission” which was presented to the
Prodi Commission in 1999 (the “DECODE” report) as demonstrating the deficiencies of internal co-
ordination and the way in which the workloads associated with co-ordination have grown in recent years.
Metcalfe concludes that the diversification in the Commission’s responsibilities demands better co-ordination
in order to ensure coherence and consistency of policy areas - which is lacking at present within the
Commission.
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Considerable efforts have been made in recent years to increase horizontal coordination
within the Commission.18 However, the continued lack of integration is partly a function of
the very structure of the Commission, comprising large and relatively separate directorates-
general. As Christiansen comments, some of the difficulty in horizontal internal policy
coordination within the Commission is a function of the sheer physical distance between
directorates-general, leading to problems in communication between Commissioners and
their cabinets.19
The fact that, as a formal matter, the Commission acts as a collegiate body provides little
answer to these criticisms. In practice, in the vast majority of cases - save perhaps certain
high-profile matters or matters of particular importance for a given Member State -
Commissioners with another portfolio will not challenge the proposal of their colleague.
The equilibrium between Commissioners, and their “strategy” in this regard, may be viewed
from a game theory perspective: Damien Neven, currently Chief Economist at DG
Competition, has observed that there exists an “equilibrium of mutual deterrence” between
Commissioners, meaning that instances where recommendations from the competition
Commissioner have not been followed by the College are rare.20
These problems of fragmentation clearly have the potential to damage the effectiveness of
the attainment of EU policy goals across the board, especially those goals - including
environmental protection - where a sectoral approach will be ineffective.21 Two conclusions
may, it is submitted, be drawn from this. First, were DG competition to refuse to take any
environmental protection requirements into account in applying Community competition
law, this would simply aggravate the existing problem of internal policy incoherence - a
problem which the Commission has been striving to eliminate. Second, this would breach
the Commission’s own principles of good governance, as well as the Treaty principles of
sustainable development and Article 6 EC integration.
One can imagine that, in response to this conclusion, it might be argued that DG
Competition is a “special case” within the directorates general of the Commission. Using
Chicago School style analysis, it might be argued that, rather than acting as other directorates
general, DG competition should be sectioned off as more akin to an independent
competition agency, enforcing a separate, technical and economics-based area of law with no
interlinkages with other Commission competences. It is submitted that, at present, this
argument does not convince. In contrast to the wishes expressed by some, including
Gordon Brown and Giuliano Amato, DG competition is not an independent agency at
18 See Schout and Jordan, “The European Union’s governance ambitions and its administrative capacities”
(2008) 15(7) Journal of European Public Policy 957, who observe that their interviews with Commission
officials “clearly show a drastic change from a traditionally hierarchical organization with little room for horizontal coordination
into an organization that has become in a short span of time much more informal and open to internal and external coordination”
(at 969).
19 “Previously, meetings and informal conversations among members of different cabinets were a common part of the daily work
routine as they could easily be arranged along the same corridor. Now, given that offices may be at the other end of town, meetings
need to be organized in advance, and informal conversations have all but ceased”: Christiansen, “Intra-institutional politics
and inter-institutional relations in the EU: towards coherent governance?” 8(5) Journal of European Public
Policy (2001) 747.
20 See Neven, “Competition Economics and Antitrust in Europe”, Economic Policy 21(48) (2006) 741. He
notes that these instances “may be rare and the threat of being overturned may not be sufficiently strong to affect the behaviour
of the inquisitors significantly (at least in the field of antitrust, state aids being possibly different).”
21 See more generally outside the EU context, Holder and Lee, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy (2nd ed.,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 167.
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present, and is still very much part of the Commission.22 This point raises the question,
however, of the extent to which DG competition in reality - irrespective of its official role as
part of the Commission - acts independently of the rest of the Commission, to which we
now turn.
b. Realism analysis: A public choice approach
Even if, contrary to the above arguments, it were accepted in principle that the Commission
should exclude environmental considerations in applying Community competition law, it is
realistic to expect it to do so in practice? Though the realism argument is weakest in the case
of the DG Competition, as a specialised, technocratic body relatively well-used (at least in
recent years) to applying economic reasoning, it is nonetheless interesting to raise the
possibility of applying to the Commission certain theories of public choice in bureaucracy.
These theories adopt an economic approach to analysing human behaviour - in this case, the
relevant behaviour being the decisional practice of DG Competition in applying the
competition rules.23
A major plank in public choice theorists’ analysis is the argument that politicians and
bureaucrats have objectives which they attempt to maximise, such as - in the case of
politicians - getting re-elected; or, in other cases, maximising their own influence and thus
their own budget.24 While this theory was initially applied to politicians alone, subsequent
authors such as William Niskanen, have extended this reasoning to bureaucracies and the
administrative side of the state - termed “agencies” - arguing that it would be naïve to
“assume away” political influence at administrative level and to believe in a fully scientific
administrative state, which administers rules wholly neutrally.25 In the US context, for
example, Niskanen argues that the increase in number and power of administrative bodies
results from budget-maximizing behaviour by rational bureaucrats: agency administrators
want “a bigger budget, more employees, and more legal power.”26
This premise leads some - though not all27 - public choice theorists to espouse capture
theory in analysing how bureaucracies work, a theory to which we have referred in discussing
the merits and demerits of direct regulation in Part I. Thus, the so-called “economic
theories of regulation” posit that rent-seeking interest groups “secure agency-enabling legislation
that provides those groups with private benefits while allocating costs (costs that often exceed the benefits) to
22 See Gordon Brown’s proposal reported in the Financial Times of April 20, 2005 and Amato, Antitrust and the
Bounds of Power (Oxford, Hart, 1997). See also, C-D. Ehlermann, “Reflections on a European Cartel
Office”(2005) 32 CML Rev 471.
23 See further on public choice analysis, for example: Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Public Choice Analysis, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 553 (2001); Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Aldine,
Atherton, 1971); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211 (1976); George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
24 See further, Lyon, “Environmental Governance: An Economic Perspective” Working Paper of the
University of Michigan Frederick A. and Barbara M. Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise,
September 2006, at 8.
25 See Spence and Cross, “A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State” 89(1) Georgetown Law Journal
(2000) 97 for a useful overview of literature on public choice theory applied to bureaucracies and the
administration, and Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Aldine, Atherton, 1971).
26 Spence and Cross, ibid, and Niskanen, ibid.
27 See Spence and Cross, ibid, who discount the validity of capture theory.
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the general public.”28 By this argument, bureaucratic action is driven by interest groups that
form to advance their own agendas.
A further “limb” to public choice theory of potential relevance is the “principal-agent”
model. Clearly, numerous varieties of this model exist, and it can be applied in a wide variety
of contexts. One line of principal-agent theory of particular interest is that which seeks to
demonstrate - again primarily in the US context - how politicians can, ultimately, control
even apparently “independent” administrative agencies.29 Under this analysis, politicians (or
legislatures) should be viewed as the “principals” who may delegate their power to the
administration and to whose wishes the administration (the “agent”) may be more or less
obedient. This can affect the outcome of the agent’s decisions as, while agency bureaucrats
will likely have ideological values which are consistent with the agency’s mission (otherwise,
they would not have applied to work there), “politicians’ values remain unconstrained by any
particular institutional focus”.30 Some theorists go further, arguing for a two-stage principal-
agent analysis, whereby the politicians controlling the agencies (stage one of the analysis) are,
in turn, controlled by voters’ wishes (stage two of the analysis); hence, the administrative
agency is, ultimately, heavily influenced by voters’ preferences. Importantly, classic
principal-agent theory recognises that the effectiveness of the principal’s influence is,
ultimately, dependent on the extent to which, in any given situation, the principal’s and
agent’s aims converge or become aligned and the extent to which the principal can monitor
the agent’s activities.31
What, then, can we say is the potential relevance of public choice theory in analysing DG
Competition’s decisional practice and predicting how that will develop in the future? Does it
militate towards a conclusion that, in reality, the Commission will, at least in some cases -
whether explicitly or implicitly - take environmental considerations into account in applying
competition law? Though the above discussion merely scratches the surface of the rich
public choice literature, and space precludes an in-depth discussion of the field, the present
author’s preliminary conclusion is that, for the following reasons, public choice theory does
not point “one way” on this issue.
To begin, some strands of the theory, if accepted, certainly tend towards the conclusion that
it seems unrealistic to think that DG Competition ignores environmental considerations
completely. The major example here is capture theory. Using this analysis, DG
Competition is, each time it takes a decision where environmental concerns are potentially
relevant, susceptible to “capture” by environmental interests. In the context of an individual
case, these interests will, evidently, be represented primarily by the actor undertaking the
environment-enhancing behaviour under review, who will by definition be defending this
behaviour. In the case of private undertakings, however, it would not generally be correct to
describe such undertakings as falling permanently within an “environmental interest group” -
normally, undertakings are likely to choose to invoke environmental benefits in cases only
when it suits them. In other words, most undertakings do not consistently engage in
environmentally-beneficial behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 4, corporate environmental
28 See, Spence and Cross, ibid, and Stigler, note 23 above.
29 See, for example, Matthew McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,
3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 253-64 (1987), and additional literature cited in Spence and Cross, ibid.
30 Spence and Cross, ibid.
31 See, for instance, Church and Ware, Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach (Boston etc, McGraw-Hill, 1st
ed., 2005), at 772.
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initiatives are often susceptible to the criticism that they represent “greenwash”, and that
apparently pro-environment policies may mask a less-publicised, dirtier reality.
In addition, one might conceivably apply a kind of modified principal-agent theory to the
Commission’s decisional calculus, again tending towards the conclusion that it is unrealistic
to think that DG Competition ignores environmental considerations completely. Such an
argument must, however, be viewed in light of the fact that, as Curtin notes, the standard
principal-agent model of delegation, whereby administrative actors have been delegated
power by political actors, and ultimately by citizens, is analytically inadequate when applied
to the EU’s evolving political system.32 For instance, it is not possible to trace an unbroken
chain of delegation stretching from EU voters to EU level administrative actors, including
the Commission.33
Despite this lack of formal accountability in the Commission context, one can nonetheless
formulate a modified two-stage principal-agent analysis in the competition field. Stage one
of the analysis would be that DG Competition case-handlers are ultimately “controlled by”
(i.e., subject to) the views of the Competition Commissioner and, more generally, to the
College of Commissioners when the decision gets put to a vote. Stage two of the analysis
would be that the Commissioners themselves, though not elected politicians, are influenced
in taking competition decisions by the wishes of EU citizens, in two ways. First, the
Commission is increasingly subject to a system of public democratic accountability to the
European Parliament.34 This accountability comprises, for instance, the asking of questions
and establishment of committees of inquiry,35 the supervisory role of the Ombudsman,36 and
the power to participate in the Commission’s appointment and to censure the Commission.37
Secondly, and more broadly, it is strongly arguable that Commissioners are, at least
indirectly, influenced by the wishes of the electorate of the government who nominated
them.38 This “representational linkage” is not exhaustive: it is certainly the case that other
interests also play a role, most importantly the general European interest, and the wish to
champion the interests linked to their respective briefs.39 Nonetheless, though information
on voting patterns in the Commission is relatively limited, evidence suggests that national
32 Curtin, “Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account”(2007) 13(4) European
Law Journal 523, at 525.
33 Ibid.
34 Curtin, note 32 above, at 540.
35 Articles 193 and 194 EC, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht.
36 Article 195 EC.
37 Articles 201 and 214(2) EC.
38 Such broad influence from EU citizens would not, it is submitted, run contrary to Commissioners’
overarching duty set out in Article 213(2) EC to be independent in the performance of their duties, and not to
seek or take instructions from any other body. One might formerly also have made the argument that the
practice of recruiting officials for senior posts within the Commission based on nationality, coupled with the
presence within the Commission of “national experts” seconded to Brussels for some years, increases the
influence of national governments (and thus, indirectly, their electorate) within the Commission. See, however,
Curtin and Egeberg, “Tradition and Innovation: Europe’s Accumulated Executive Order” West European
Politics (2008) 31(4) 639, who conclude that national influence is becoming more limited within the
Commission bureaucracy.
39 See the empirical study of the decisional behaviour of the Prodi Commission carried out by Egeberg,
“Executive politics as usual: role behaviour and conflict dimensions in the College of European
Commissioners” (2006) 13(1) Journal of European Public Policy 1.
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interests play a part on a relatively frequent basis in Commissioners’ behaviour in College.40
One reason for this may be that many Commissioners will seek to regain a prominent
position in the national political sphere at the end of their mandate.41 On these grounds, it is
arguable that, if it were true that “voters” are, by and large, becoming increasingly pro-
environment in their views, these views would have an influence on the Commissioners,
including the Competition Commissioner. As noted above, however, classic principal-agent
theory holds that the effectiveness of such influence would be dependent on the extent to
which voters (via, for instance, the European Parliament) in fact monitor the Commission’s
activities, and the extent to which the voters’ and Commissions’ interests collide.
In contrast, other strands of public choice theory might tend to reinforce the view that it is
realistic to think that the Commission would apply a pure efficiency-based approach. One
might argue, for example, that by doing so, and by holding competition law out as a
“special” area insulated from the various non-economic aims of the Community, DG
Competition is cementing its own power and sphere of influence, such that no other DGs
can fairly insist on having a say in its decisional practice. More generally, this argument
would tie in with the view held by theorists such as Giandomenico Majone who see the EU
as a regulatory state. In this analysis, bodies like the Commission - which he sees as an
example of an “independent fourth branch of government” - are particularly well-suited to
regulatory, efficiency-oriented policy-making, as opposed to redistributive policy-making.
This is because efficiency-oriented policies only require a weak degree of democratic control,
as they aim at Pareto-efficient solutions which are in everyone’s interest; while redistributive
policies, which make some people worse off and some better off, require a high degree of
democratic legitimacy (which the Commission does not have).42
A further public choice argument going in this direction (and against principal-agent theory)
is what has been termed the “agency drift” or “tunnel vision” argument made by scholars
such as Anthony Downs, who maintains that the people who work for a given agency tend
to be those who are ideologically committed to the agency's mission and who may therefore
seek to advance that mission even at the expense of other goals preferred by the general
public. Downs suggests that bureaucrats' views are,
“based upon a ‘biased’ or exaggerated view of the importance of their own positions ‘in the cosmic
scheme of things.’”43
On this argument, any indirect “connection” between administrative agencies and voters is
severed by the extent of agency bureaucrats’ commitment to the agency’s ideology.
In sum, no absolute conclusion is possible here, as delving further into public choice theory
would go beyond the scope of the present research. Nonetheless, it is suggested that it is - at
40 Ibid. The existence, or at least the perception of the existence, of national influence, explains the concern of
the Irish government to secure agreement on keeping one Commissioner per Member State in the European
Council summit of December 11-12, 2008. See also, Wonka, “Technocratic and independent? The
appointment of European Commissioners and its policy implications” (2007) 14(2) Journal of European Public
Policy 169.
41 Wonka, ibid.
42 See, for example, Majone, “The European Community Between Social Policy and Social Regulation” 32(2)
JCMS (1993) 153, and “The European Community: An “Independent Fourth Branch of Government” in
Brüggemeier (ed.) Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1994). See further, Jachtenfuchs,
note 2 above.
43 Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, Little, Brown, 1967), at 107.
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the very least - arguable, on the basis of public choice theory, that the Commission is in
practice unlikely wholly to exclude environmental factors from competition analysis.
4. Applying Governance Analysis to the Community Courts
Both of the governance arguments outlined above (coherence and realism) can, it is
submitted, be applied with forceful effect to the Community Courts in carrying out their
function as ultimate judicial arbiter on how the Community competition rules should be
applied.
Clearly, the Community Courts are engaged in what can be called “governance” of the
Community, as they evidently have the ability to make “collectively binding decisions” for the
Community.44 Given this, do, and should, the Community Courts seek to obey the
principle of coherence – and, in particular, the environmental-specific sustainability and
integration principles – in carrying out their role of “judicial” governance? We will consider
this question using theories of coherence of law and judicial reasoning, applying these to the
Community courts and taking practical examples from the Courts’ own case law.
From the theoretical perspective, the obvious starting point here is the (non-EU specific)
theories of “coherence of law” developed most famously by the Ronald Dworkin. As is
well-known, in work such as Law’s Empire, Dworkin argued that coherence, or “integrity”, in
legal adjudication was crucially important. Thus he writes,
“The adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far as
possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single author – the community personified –
expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness.”45
Under this perspective, judgments should “fit” with a set of principles which are already
implicit in the coherent whole of the legal system. Thus Dworkin uses the now-famous
metaphor of the chain novel to explain the judge’s role receiving past “chapters” of the law
to date and creating new chapters, in particular in “hard cases” where the law does not
provide a solution, or provides contradictory answers. In hard cases, Dworkin argues,
judges do not have unfettered discretion to decide what the law is; rather, they interpret
existing chapters on the basis of the law’s coherent conception of justice and fairness. Thus,
integrity (i.e., coherence) is in itself a virtue of a legal system, alongside justice and fairness,
and procedural due process.46 Drawing on this approach to judicial reasoning, Bengoetxea,
MacCormick and Morel Soriano argue that, in order for a court’s judgment to be accepted, it
must be justified, and coherent, in two senses. First, it must show internal justification,
meaning that the judgment is justified “in law” (i.e., the legal provision being applied is valid
44 Viz. Jachtenfuchs, note 2 above, at 246; see also the White Paper on European Governance’s definition of
governance as the “rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at
European level”.
45 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London, Fontana 1986), at 225. It is important to note that others, such as Raz,
dispute Dworkin’s vision of law as integrity on the ground (amongst others) that it ignores the reality of moral
pluralism. Coherence should not be an instrument to eliminate all value conflicts; rather, it is a “mere by-product
of the consistent application of a sound moral doctrine.” Raz, “The Relevance of Coherence” in Raz, Ethics in the Public
Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon, 1994) at 299. This sound moral doctrine
does not instruct the judge to take the morally best ruling, but rather to take the decision which does not
undermine the “authority of the law”. Raz argues that, as law emerges from the activities of authoritative
institutions, it is, in part, determined by politics, meaning that there is no reason to expect it to be coherent.
46 See Dworkin, at 225 and see further, Morel Soriano, “A Modest Notion of Coherence in Legal Reasoning. A
Model for the European Court of Justice” 16(3) Ratio Juris. (2003) 296, at 303.
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within the legal system at issue, and it is possible to interpret the provision in the manner
adopted in the judgment). Secondly, it must show external justification, meaning that the
judgment is justified not only in law, but also is,
“ethically, politically, or ideologically acceptable…To say that the judgment is justified from an external
point of view is to make a claim as to rational acceptability - the decision has respected formal reasons
or discourse reasons - or even a claim as to material or substantive rightness - the decision is the right
answer, not only in law but also in political morality.”47
Coherence in judicial reasoning has a number of advantages. Clearly, coherence in the sense
of internal justification is beneficial from a practical perspective, making the legal system
workable in practice and increasing the predictability of judicial decisions, thus promoting
legal certainty.48 Going beyond this, coherence in the sense of internal and external
justification increase the legitimacy of a court’s judgments, a factor which is particularly
crucial in the case of the ECJ, as a court outside the state judicial system.
Applying these theories of coherence of law and of legal adjudication to the ECJ context,
there is a strong argument that, in handing down judgments, judges in the Community
Courts ought to, and do, strive to maintain the overall coherence of the Community legal
system, based on the values which they view as inherent in that system. Those values, it is
submitted, certainly include the Article 2 EC goals of sustainable development and a high
level of environmental protection. The presence of the Article 6 EC integration principle –
which, as has been argued above, the ECJ treats as a general principle of Community law –
merely confirms, therefore, the judges’ (pre-existent) duty to interpret Community law,
including competition law, bearing the Community’s environmental law in mind.49
Moreover, this coherence-based argument itself fits with extra-judicial statements by judges
from the Community Courts on what they perceive their role to be. In this way, it is argued,
the realist’s perspective and the governance perspective each arrive at the same conclusion.
A good example is the observation of David Edward, formerly the UK judge at the ECJ,
who, in defending the ECJ against the criticism of judicial activism, surmised that,
“the judge’s role cannot be confined to that of providing an technocratic literal interpretation of texts
produced by others…In a system based on case law, the judge must proceed from one case to another
47 Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Morel Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the
European Court of Justice” in de Búrca and Weiler (eds.) The European Court of Justice (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2001).
48 Morel Soriano, note 46 above, at 298. Indeed, one might even refer to Bork here as (unintentionally)
representing an antecedent of Dworkin, insofar as he argues that, in interpreting the Sherman Act, the Courts
should presume that the legislature intended that the law should be coherent: “There must surely be a canon of
statutory construction holding that, other things being equal, courts should attribute to the legislature a policy
intent which, because of the scope and nature of a body of law, makes that law effective in achieving its goals,
renders the law internally consistent, and makes for ease of judicial administration.” See The Antitrust Paradox:
A Policy at War with Itself (New York, Basic Books, 1978, 1993 reprint with new introduction and epilogue), at
69.
49 Clearly, there is an overlap in the reasoning here and that of the “systematic” argument above, which posited
that the overall scheme of the Treaty leads to the conclusion that competition policy cannot ignore
environmental considerations. However, the coherence argument differs, in that (1) it is specific to judicial
reasoning; and (2) it does not necessarily confine itself to interpreting the wording of the Treaty itself, but seeks
to identify broader values or ethics underlying the European legal order as a factor in coherence.
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seeking, as points come up for decisions, to make the legal system consistent, coherent, workable, and
effective.”50
Similarly, former Advocate General Jacobs has observed extra-judicially, in the context of
the growth in importance of environmental protection requirements as a Treaty goal, that,
“Legal rules, and especially treaty provisions which of their nature are more difficult to amend, should
be interpreted, as far as possible, as a living and evolving text that needs to be adapted to a changing
context.”51
Does this argument itself fit the reality of the Courts’ judicial practice? In the present
author’s view, the answer must be yes. Outside the environmental area, the Community
courts are well-known for their use of “teleological”, purpose-based interpretation: i.e.,
drawing from (the Courts’ view of) the overall purpose of the provision at issue, placed in
the broader context of the Treaty.52 More particularly, the ECJ has displayed a definite
coherence-based approach in environment-related cases. While the competition-specific
cases will be discussed in detail in later Chapters, an excellent non-competition illustration is
the ECJ’s approach to environmental factors in the law of free movement of goods, which
has been discussed briefly in Chapter 2. As mentioned there,53 the ECJ has, in certain cases,
accepted environmental justifications for what arguably amounted to distinctly applicable
Member State measures which restrict the free movement of goods contrary to Article 28
EC. This is despite the fact that, according to its own case law, the only acceptable
justifications for distinctly applicable measures are those set out in Article 30 EC (where
environmental protection, as such, does not feature). Leading examples are the Walloon
Waste, Dusseldorp, Aher-Waggon, PreussenElektra and, more recently, Inn Valley judgments.54
These judgments, it is submitted, go against the grain of the Court’s usual firm approach to
distinctly applicable national measures and demonstrate the Court’s wish to adopt an
approach to interpreting Articles 28 and 30 EC which is coherent with the environmental
goals of the Treaty, thus retaining the integrity of Community law. Thus, former Advocate
General Jacobs writes that the Walloon Waste judgment - in which the Court accepted as
justified a prohibition on the storage or dumping in Wallonia of waste originating in another
Member State, or in a region of Belgium other than Wallonia – indicated,
“the lengths to which the ECJ was prepared to go to save what it regarded as an environmentally
friendly measure, contrasting starkly with its generally very strict approach to restrictions on trade.”55
Another shining example is the PreussenElektra judgment, which concerned a German law
(the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz) obliging electricity supply undertakings to purchase the electricity
produced from renewable sources of energy in their area of supply at a fixed, above-market
price. The Court held this (clearly distinctly applicable) measure to be justified, reasoning on
the basis of (a) the aim of the law, which was “useful for protecting the environment in so far as it
50 Edward, “Judicial Activism: Myth or Reality?” in Campbell and Voyatzi (eds.) Legal Reasoning and Judicial
Interpretation of European Law (London, Trenton Publishing 1996), 29, at 66.
51 Jacobs, “The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the Environment” Journal of
Environmental Law 18 (2006) 185.
52 Examples of this approach are plentiful, including the Court’s classic effet utile reasoning in the early,
foundational, cases of Community constitutional law, such as Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
53 See further, for example Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996).
54 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431,
Case C-320/03 Commission v Austria (Inn Valley) [2005] ECR I-9871.
55 Jacobs, note 51 above.
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contributes to the reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases which are amongst the main causes of climate
change which the European Community and its Member States have pledged to combat” – a “priority
objective” of the Community and its Member States;56 (b) the relevance of the Article 6 EC
integration principle, which it noted had been transferred by the Treaty of Amsterdam from
Article 130r(2) to Part One of the Treaty, headed Principles;57 and (c) the special “nature” of
electricity, whereby “once it has been allowed into the transmission or distribution system, it is difficult to
determine its origin and in particular the source of energy from which it was produced.”58
For present purposes, we are not concerned with the failure of the Court to be open about
accepting environmental protection considerations as a justification for distinctly applicable
measures - though this failure is disappointing, confusing and intellectually rather
dishonest.59 Rather, what is important is that this judgment represents, it is argued, another
example of the Court’s desire to achieve coherence in the Community legal system – and,
more particularly, to give effect (as it does explicitly) to the Article 6 EC integration
principle. Thus, Jacobs concludes that the Treaty’s post-Amsterdam legal framework has led
the ECJ to take special account of environmental concerns in the context of free movement
of goods, meaning that it is effectively,
“ready to accept any consequential effects on trade, however, severe, that may be caused by measures
relating to environmental protection, if those measures are shown to pursue a genuine environmental aim
and to constitute effective means to achieve that aim.”60
It is important to recognise, however, that there are potential counter-arguments to adopting
a coherence-based approach to judicial reasoning in the context of the Community courts’
application of the competition rules. Let us take two examples.
First, from a theoretical perspective, the coherence-based view contrasts with the (at least
formerly) popular theories, taken from certain liberal intergovernmentalist branches of
European integration theory, which take a highly realist approach to the Community courts.
Wincott, for instance, argues that the ECJ acts as a “cipher, or at best a weathervane”61 of
Member States’ own wishes, making the Court a “tightly constrained agent of the member states,
lacking the autonomy to make decisive independent interventions.”62 Though there may be a hint of
truth in this argument in some difficult constitutional cases,63 the present author would
forcefully dispute this approach as a realistic explanation of the Community courts’ action
overall.64
56 PreussenElektra, note 54 above, at paras 73-74.
57 Ibid, para 76.
58 An argument which the Court had essentially rejected in Case C-213/96 Outokumpu [1998] ECR I-1777 on
Article 90 EC.
59 See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in PreussenElektra, note 54 above, and the Opinion of Advocate
General Geelhoed in the Inn Valley case, note 54 above.
60 Jacobs, note 51 above.
61 See Wincott, “A Community of Law? “European” Law and Judicial Politics: The Court of Justice and
Beyond” 35(1) Government and Opposition (2002) 3, at 6.
62 Wincott, ibid, at 7.
63 In such cases, as Timmermans observes, “the Court will inevitably have to take into consideration the possible reception
of its decisions in Member States when ruling on an issue.” Timmermans, “The European Union's judicial system” 41
CML Rev (2004) 393.
64 See similarly, Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Morel Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning
of the European Court of Justice” in de Búrca and Weiler (eds.) The European Court of Justice (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2001), at 82.
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Secondly, and more practically, the scope of the Community courts’ job in applying
competition law depends on whether the matter at issue is an appeal of a Commission
decision or (as will increasingly, under Regulation 1/2003, occur) a question on preliminary
reference. While the ECJ is relatively unconstrained in its reasoning in the latter case
(though subject of course to the questions posed), the CFI’s role is necessarily more limited
when exercising its judicial review function, and the ECJ’s role in hearing appeals from the
CFI’s judgments is also limited. While this is of course true, in the case of the CFI, it is
notable that, in recent groundbreaking judgments such as Tetra Laval, it has chosen to apply
a more intensive standard of review than previously, refraining from a simple application of
the traditional “manifest error of assessment” standard often used in judicial review. In Tetra
Laval, for instance, the CFI famously held that,
“[w]hilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic
matters, that does not mean that the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s
interpretation of information of an economic nature.”65
Evidently, the greater the scope of judicial jurisdiction in a given case, the more potential
there is for judges to adopt a coherence-based approach to judicial reasoning in that case.
Thirdly, it might be argued that the Court of First Instance, as the relevant Community court
with jurisdiction over appeals, is a more technocratic court than the Court of Justice itself,
and is relatively “insulated” from concerns of coherence due to the fact that, at least at
present,66 much of its case load is taken up with relatively limited areas of Community law,
and in particular competition cases. From a realist’s perspective, therefore, it may arguably
be more likely to ignore environmental factors than the ECJ, who deals on a daily basis with
the whole gamut of Community law fields, including environmental policy. Put otherwise,
the argument would be that, as the CFI’s judges have to deal with Community
environmental law on a less regular basis than those of the ECJ and may thus be less familiar
with it, as a practical matter achieving coherence between Community environmental and
competition law may not be foremost in their mind when deciding competition cases.
While, again, there may be some truth to this argument, it does not detract from the fact
that, in principle, the notion of coherence in judicial reasoning, as well as the requirements to
interpret the Treaty systematically and in accordance with sustainability and the Article 6 EC
obligation, apply to the CFI in precisely the same way as they do to the ECJ. Put otherwise,
though the CFI might arguably be more likely to ignore environmental considerations in
competition cases than the ECJ, it ought not to do so.
5. Applying Governance Analysis to National Courts and National Administrative
Competition Authorities
The third and final “layer” of Community competition law enforcement is enforcement by
national courts and national competition authorities (NCAs). As is well-known, since the
entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 modernising the enforcement of Community
65 Case T-80/02 Tetra Laval [2002] ECR II-4519, para 39. Thus, in merger cases, the burden is on the
Commission to prove using “convincing” evidence that “in all likelihood” the merger will have anti-competitive
effects. Though the Commission appealed this judgment partly on the ground that the CFI had raised the
standards, the ECJ confirmed the approach of the CFI, suggesting that the economic analysis should be
“plausible”: Case C-13/03 P Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-1113. See further, Bay and Calzado, “Tetra Laval II: The
Coming of Age of the Judicial Review of Merger Decisions” 28(4) World Competition (2005) 433.
66 This would probably change if the possibility provided for by the Treaty of Nice for the CFI to have
competence to deal with some preliminary references were to be implemented.
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competition law, national courts and NCAs have had full power to apply Articles 81 and 82
EC: in particular, the Commission’s former monopoly over taking decisions applying Article
81(3) EC has been abolished.67 It is submitted that many of the governance arguments set
out above apply forcefully to NCAs and national courts, for the following reasons.
NCAs. Beginning with NCAs, the first point to note here is the wide variety of types of
NCA designated by the Member States. An important distinction in this regard is that
between “monist” and “dualist” models of NCA.68 “Monist” models consist of integrated
independent administrative NCAs, which have full powers to hear, decide and impose
penalties, subject to review by national courts. Examples include the German
Bundeskartellamt, the Italian Autorità garante della concorrenza e del commercio, the Greek Epitropi
antagonismou, the Dutch Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, the Portugues Autoridade da
concorrência and the UK Office of Fair Trading. In contrast, “dualist” models of NCA consist
of, on the one hand, a body in charge of investigations and, on the other, a body with
decision-making power, which may be administrative or judicial. Most Member States (as
well as the US) have this model, including Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland,69 Spain
and Sweden.70
It is clear that, in principle, all NCAs enforcing Community competition law are bound by
the same Community norms requiring coherence between Community competition and
environmental policies as any other Community institution. As such, the “good
governance” limb of the argument applies, it is submitted, with the same force to NCAs
applying Community competition law as it applies to the Commission. However, the
realist’s side of the governance argument may, it is admitted, differ in force depending on the
NCA at issue. One might imagine that, save perhaps in cases such as Ireland where the
ordinary courts are designated NCAs, NCAs may not be as familiar with (Community or
national) environmental policy as, for example, some general national courts which may deal
with environmental law on a relatively regular basis. Further, some (though not necessarily
all) NCAs are, of course, highly sophisticated in their economic analysis and well-used to
applying competition economics, and hence would - if so minded - be in a position to apply
a purely scientific, efficiency-based approach. Nonetheless, and certainly in the absence of
specific guidance from the Commission on the relevance of environmental factors to
Community competition analysis, there is no reason to think that they would be naturally
inclined to adopt a “hard line” efficiency-based approach excluding such relevance per se.
Moreover, the fact that some national competition laws expressly allow for account to be
taken of environmental or other non-economic factors may well, it is submitted, result in
spill-over in their analytical approach to the application of Community competition law.71
67 See Articles 1, 5 and 6 of Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L 1/1.
68 See Komninos, “Article 234 EC and national competition authorities in the era of decentralisation” EL Rev
29(1) (2004) 106, at 108.
69 In Ireland, unusually, competition cases are dealt with by the ordinary courts – there is no specialised
competition court – though there is a dedicated High Court judge in charge of a separate competition list.
70 Komninos, note 68 above, at 109.
71 See, for example, the Spanish, German and Finnish systems, and WT/WGTCP/W/172 6 July 2001 WTO
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade And Competition Policy - exceptions, exemptions and
exclusions contained in Members’ Competition Legislation, which contains a list of those members where
general public interest exemptions may be granted by Ministers. See, Boute, “Environmental Protection and
EC Anti-Trust Law: The Commission’s Approach for Packaging Waste Management Systems” RECIEL 15(2)
(2006) 146, who holds the view that, “it is very likely and even desirable that national courts and competition authorities will
deviate from the Commission’s approach [to] Article 81(3) in order to integrate environmental protection as such in their
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Part III discusses some specific examples of NCA approaches under national law to
environmental factors.
National courts. In the case of national courts, governance arguments are even stronger.
First, as with NCAs, when enforcing Community competition law, these are bound by the
above-described Community norms requiring coherence between Community competition
and environmental policies.72
Second, from a realist’s perspective, a distinction should be made between national courts
acting as NCAs, discussed above, and national courts acting within their general jurisdiction,
applying directly effective Community competition law. In the former case, such courts may
be well-used to economic, efficiency-based argument (though, as noted above, this does not
necessarily mean that they would be minded to exclude environmental considerations). In
the latter case, however, it is submitted that such courts would be disinclined to ignore
apparently relevant environmental considerations in favour of a purely economic analysis in
competition cases. Rather, they will seek to apply their normal (coherence-based) means of
interpretation and judicial reasoning.73 Moreover, the sheer variety of such courts, and their
physical distance from the Commission, in itself unavoidably dilutes the impact of any shift
towards an exclusively efficiency-based approach in DG Competition - even if (which is
disputed in the next Chapter) the implications of this approach is that environmental
concerns are irrelevant to competition analysis. Such a movement, therefore, is bound not
to carry the same force in, for example, a courtroom in Finland, Poland or Greece as it
might have on Rue Joseph II in Brussels.74
Finally, though it is undeniable that national judges are unlikely to be as familiar with the
overall “scheme” of Community law as, for example, the judges of the Community courts,
this does not, it is submitted, lessen the force of the governance argument here. Rather,
most national courts will be well-used to balancing environmental factors with other norms
in the context of their national legal systems. This is particularly so where, as is the case in
many Member States, environmental protection features in the national constitution.75 As a
assessment of restrictive practices. This will inevitably lead to a Community-wide uncoordinated application of anti-trust law” (at
159).
72 Viz. Article 10 EC.
73 See, by analogy, the wave of concern at the time of Regulation 1/2003 that national courts, unused to using
economic analysis, would have difficulty in applying Article 81(3) EC: see Lenearts and Gerard,
“Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement: Judges in the Frontline” World Competition 27(3)
(2004) 31.
74 Note, however, that Regulation 1/2003 provides for a possibility for Commission to file amicus briefs and for
the NCAs to ask the Commission’s or an economist’s opinion possible. See, Lenaerts and Gerard, ibid. Due to
the small number of environment-related competition cases decided by national courts to date, however, it is
too early to conduct any empirical analysis of the approaches taken. See, for the few environment-related
judgment to date reported on DG Competition’s website of national court judgments, the judgment of the
Oberlandesgericht of Düsseldorf of March 16, 2005 on recycling services for used glass – confidential version only
(34 0 (Kart) 54/03 [VI – U (Kart) 39/03]), and the judgment of the Landgericht of Potsdam of September 23,
2004 on recycling/disposal services for used tyres of cars and trucks (51 0 204/03).
75 See, for example, the Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-227/02 Wood Trading [2004] ECR I-11957, who refers
to Belgium, Greece, Spain, Finland and Hungary in this regard; as well as to the Charter for the Environment
recently attached to the French Constitution, and the Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-176/03
Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879, who noted the emergence in national constitutional traditions of, “a
right to enjoy an acceptable environment, not so much on the part of the individual as such, but as a member of a group, in which
the individual shares common social interests” (at para 53). He refers to Article 20a of the German Basic Law, Article
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result, it is argued, the coherence arguments set out above in principle apply with equal force
to national courts’ reasoning as to that of the Community courts.76
45 of the Spanish Constitution, Article 66(1) of the Portuguese Constitution, Article 18(3) of Chapter II of the
Swedish Law of 24 November 1994, Article 20 of the Finnish Charter of Government, Article 24(1) of the
Greek constitution, and Article 21 of the Dutch constitution.
76 The weight which different national courts might assign to environmental factors and competition factors
will, of course, differ. This problem applies, however, to all aspects of Articles 81 and 82 EC, and is an
unavoidable consequence of decentralisation of enforcement.
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Chapter 8: Theoretical Perspectives III - An Economic Argument
The final argument to examine, in asking whether environmental considerations should
be excluded from Community competition policy, is a microeconomic one. While the
previous arguments have presumed (as is standard practice) that environmental
considerations constitute “non-economic” factors, this section investigates the possibility
of taking environmental considerations into account in the economic calculus of
competition decisions, i.e., the possibility of achieving Article 6 EC integration within the
framework of competition economics. It will conclude, after looking at the limits of the
welfare concept and drawing on the theories and techniques of environmental and
ecological economics, that - at least in some cases - this seems to be a real possibility.
The implications of this conclusion, it is submitted, are that the current drive towards a
more “economic approach” at the Commission should not necessarily mean the
exclusion of environmental factors.
The section does not purport to engage in complex economic modelling, which would
go beyond the scope of the present research; rather, its aims are far more modest: it
seeks to apply some of the rich and multifarious literature on environmental economics
in the context of Community competition policy. It is structured in five parts. First, it
recalls the role traditionally attributed to the environment in neo-classical welfare
economics; second, it looks at the limits of the concept of welfare (or “utility”) as a goal
of competition policy under standard neo-classical analysis; third, it examines the
possibility of taking environmental considerations into account in measuring utility using
the approach of environmental economics, and in particular the techniques of valuing
environmental resources developed within that discipline; fourth, it examines the
potential implications of the approach of a further economic discipline, ecological
economics; finally, it asks whether these economic techniques can, and should, be
applied in the context of Community competition policy.
1. Environment, the Market and the Concept of Externalities
Let us turn first to introduce the role which economics has traditionally given to the
natural environment. A key element in examining this role is the notion of
“environmental services”, in the sense of the services provided by the environment to
the economy.
a. The concept of environmental services
Our starting point here is that the environment and the economy are interdependent:
economic activity takes place within the environment. It is clear, without delving too
deeply into natural science, that the environment provides us, and our economy, with
certain services. These services can be divided into four categories:1
 Providing inputs to production in the economy. Here, there is an important
distinction between “stock” resources, where today’s use has implications for
tomorrow’s availability (e.g., plant and animal populations and mineral
deposits),2 and “flow” resources, where this is not the case (e.g., solar radiation
and wind and tide power). “Stock” resources may in turn be broken down into
renewable and non-renewable resources;
 Acting as a receptacle or “sink” for the waste generated by the economy;
1 Perman, Ma, McGilvray and Common, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics (3rd ed., Essex,
Pearson Education Limited, 2003), at 18.
2 Perman et al, ibid, at 11.
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 Acting as an amenity service base, such as swimming at a beach, or viewing wild
flora and fauna;
 Acting as a “life support” for humans, e.g., providing breathable air, a
temperature in which we can survive, a certain amount of water, etc.
In the EU context, a 2007 report commissioned by DG Environment adopted a slightly
different perspective, looking instead directly at the contributions the environment
makes to the EU economy. It concluded that there were three main types of
contribution:
(1) Activities where the environment is a primary natural resource or input
into the economic process (agriculture, forestry, mining, electricity
generation and water supply);
(2) Activities concerned with protection and management of the
environment (waste recycling, pollution & sewage control and
environmental management); and
(3) Activities dependent on environmental quality (environment related
tourism).
The report concluded that, based on a definition of core environmental resources,
environmental protection and management and environmental quality, the total turnover
in the European economy which was linked to the environment was €405 billion along
with 4.4 million jobs. On a broader definition of environmental resources - including,
for example, environment-dependent areas such as agriculture - total direct turnover
would be €3 trillion and 21 million direct jobs. In addition, the report concluded that
broader links, such as biodiversity and ecosystem services, could not be measured
statistically.3
b. The approach of classical economics to the environment4
Early classical economists, such as Adam Smith, envisaged an abundance of natural
resources. As is well-known, Smith emphasised a deep-rooted belief in the efficacy of
the market mechanism - the famous “invisible hand”5 - as a fundamental organising
principle of modern economics. This premise was built upon by Thomas Malthus,
though Malthus believed that natural resources - and in particular land - were limited in
availability and constituted important limits on economic growth. In Malthus’s view, the
fact that only a limited quantity of land was available meant that, ultimately, economic
growth would stop and the economy would reach a stationary state - which, in his view,
would be at a rather bleak subsistence level.6 Though the approach was nuanced by
David Ricardo, he agreed with the Malthusian conclusion that development would
converge to a stationary or “steady” state, determined by the availability and use of land,
on the basis that returns to land input would be diminishing.7 John Stuart Mill added the
3 See “Links between the Environment, the Economy and Jobs”, report of November 2007, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment. On a global scale, in an article published in Nature in 1997, Costanza
estimated the aggregate value of ecosystem services to total $16-54 trillion per year - whereas global Gross
National Product was $18 trillion per year. See “The Value of the Word’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital” 387 Nature 253 (1997).
4 See further, Perman et al, note 1 above, ch. 1, and Kula, A History of Environmental Economic thought
(London, Routledge, 1998).
5 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London, Methuen, 1776), Book IV, Ch.
2, at 477.
6 See, for example, Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population (London, Ward Lock, 1798).
7 Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London, Everyman, 1817, reprinted 1926), Book IV.
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final “layer” to the approach of classical economics in this regard, by viewing the value of
land not simply in terms of its agricultural and extractive uses, but also as a source of
amenity values (e.g., the intrinsic beauty of the countryside). Mill writes, in an excerpt
remarkably prescient of the modern conservation movement,
“There is room in the world, no doubt, and even in old countries, for a great increase in population,
supposing the arts of life to go on improving, and capital to increase. But even if innocuous, I
confess I see very little reason for desiring it…If the earth must lose that great portion of its
pleasantness which it owes to things that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would
extirpate from it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a happier or better
population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they will be content to be stationary long
before necessity compels them to it.”8
c. The approach of neo-classical economics to the environment and the
concept of externalities9
With the movement in the 1870s to what has since come to be known as “neoclassical”
economics, a new conception of value was adopted: value was determined in exchange,
thus reflecting preferences and costs of production. As such, neo-classical economics
was, at least initially, not concerned with the aggregate level of economic activity as had
been the case with classical economic theory - i.e., the question whether or not there
were “limits to growth” resulting from natural resources. Instead, neo-classical
economics was more concerned with the structure of economic activity and its allocative
efficiency.
It was Marshall who first came up with the notion of “externalities” as we know them in
modern economics. Externalities can generally be defined as situations of market failure
where the production or consumption decisions of one agent has an impact on another’s
utility, but no compensation is given for this. One of the most important “negative”
externalities - where this impact takes the form of a decrease in utility - is, of course,
environmental damage. In Marshall’s analysis, externalities were left unpriced, as they
were uncompensated. Later, as we saw in Chapter 3, Pigou added to this analysis by
proposing that the state should take an interventionist stance to externalities such as
environmental damage, by using taxation to “internalise” the externality into the price
mechanism.10 This was followed by the Coasian approach of market environmentalism
based on property rights, which rejected taxation as a “solution” to externalities in favour
of having well-defined property rights, so that individuals would negotiate payment
which would induce those generating externalities to adjust their behaviour. Thus, for
example, the solution to the externality of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on
neighbouring land is to make the cattle owner liable for damage caused. This, Coase
argued, was the socially optimal way of internalising (certain) externalities, as it avoided
the problem that the state did not know what the optimal level of tax should be.11
“Environmental” economics may be defined as the study of problems caused by
environmental externalities, and ways to remedy such market failure within the neo-
classical economic model.12 This is to be differentiated from “ecological” economics,
which is concerned more broadly with the interdependence between the economic and
8 Mill, Principles of Political Economy (6th ed., New York, Augustus M. Kelly, 1865).
9 See generally, Perman et al, note 1 above, and Kula, note 4 above.
10 See further, Baumol and Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy: Exernalities, Public Outlays and the Quality
of Life (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall 1988).
11 Coase recognised, however, that the property rights approach works best where market transactions are
costless.
12 See, for example, Oates: “From Research to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics” University
of Illinois Law Review (2000) 135.
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natural systems, and which rejects many of the axioms of neo-classical economics. The
implications of each of these disciplines will be examined below.
2. The Concept of Consumer Welfare and its Limits
As we concluded in Chapter 5, an important goal of Community competition policy is
maximising consumer welfare. To recap, consumer welfare was defined in terms of
economic efficiency, with three dimensions to such efficiency, each present in the idyllic
conditions of “perfect competition”:
 Allocative efficiency where, in conditions of perfect competition, consumers can
obtain the goods or services they need13 at the price which they are willing to pay,
meaning that resources are allocated exactly according to their wishes;
 Productive efficiency where, in conditions of perfect competition, goods and services
are produced at the lowest cost possible, meaning that as little of society’s resources
are used as possible in the production process.
 Dynamic efficiency, which, moving away from the static perspective, takes into
account the benefits of innovative activities which lead to new markets and new
industries.
Consumer welfare is at its greatest when society’s economic resources are allocated so
that consumers are able to satisfy their wants “as fully as technological constraints permit.”14 As
we saw, in neo-classical economic theory, consumer welfare is generally indicated by the
amount of “consumer surplus”, that is, the aggregate measure of the surplus of all
consumers, indicated by the difference between the consumer’s valuation of the good
considered (or his willingness to pay for it) and the actual price.15 This “use-value”
concept of consumer surplus, takes account of the price and quality of the good. Other
factors relevant to consumer welfare include the amount of consumer choice in the
market, and the amount of innovation in the market.16 We also concluded that, though
there is no definite consensus on the relevance of producer surplus in Community
competition policy, the most widely-held view is that, in the Community context,
consumer surplus is valued above producer surplus in this regard.
In practice, however, markets rarely, if ever, attain conditions of perfect competition,
meaning that consumer welfare is not maximised. This occurs when a market is not
operating efficiently in its allocative, productive and dynamic dimensions, resulting in the
“deadweight loss” to society of consumer (and producer) surplus.17 While this may occur
for many reasons, including barriers to entry, information failures, or inefficient taxes,
the reason which concerns us particularly in the present context is the presence of
negative externalities, such as environmental damage.
13 “Allocation” of goods thus covers what goods are produced, in what quantities, which combinations of
resource inputs, how outputs of goods are distributed, etc: see Perman et al, note 1 above.
14 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, Basic Books, 1978, 1993 reprint with
new introduction and epilogue), at 429.
15 Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules (2nd ed., The Hague, Kluwer, 2002).
Consumer surplus is often measured by economists using a demand curve. See further, Willig, “Consumer
Surplus without Apology” 66 American Economic Review (1976) 589; Stennek, “The expected consumer’s
surplus as a welfare measure” 73(2) Journal of Public Economics (1999) 265; and Schlee, “Expected
consumer’s surplus as an approximate welfare measure” 34 Economic Theory (2008) 127.
16 See further, Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2006), at 1-
003.
17 See Carlton and Perloff, Modern Industrial Organisation (4th ed., Essex, Addison Wesley, 2004).
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In principle, then, it is important to distinguish between two ways in which
environmental considerations might be taken into account in evaluating whether
consumer welfare - or “utility” - is maximised by a transaction or arrangement under
review for compliance with Community competition law. First, it might be possible to
value environmental benefits and take these into account in the evaluation of the likely
effect of the transaction. Secondly, it might be possible to value environmental harm and
take this into account in this evaluation.
How might this be done? This requires us to look more closely at the measurement of
consumer welfare, and in particular consumer (and producer) surplus. Let us take, as our
starting point the static, use-value definition of consumer surplus as the difference
between the consumer’s valuation of the good considered - normally measured by his
willingness to pay for it - and the actual price. Using environmental economics
techniques, it may be possible to incorporate the environmental benefits or detriments
(which we will term the good’s environmental “performance”) into estimating the
consumer’s valuation of what he or she would be willing to pay for the good following a
post-transaction change in environmental performance. Hence, an increase in the
consumer’s valuation or willingness-to-pay - through better environmental performance
of the product - may mean that, even if actual prices increase slightly, consumer surplus
nonetheless increases overall. Using the neo-classical terminology of rational choice
theory, a consumer’s expected utility preferences may be maximised by a situation where
a product’s environmental performance is higher.18 This would occur, for example, if the
value of the continued presence of essential environmental resources in the future were
incorporated in the individual’s utility function on an intertemporal analysis.19
In the context of integrating environmental considerations into Community competition
law, however, this approach should, however, be limited in an important sense. As
argued in Chapter 6, the limits of the integration obligation are reached where a
transaction would lead to environmental damage but is not otherwise anti-competitive
(i.e., does not otherwise decrease consumer welfare). For Community competition law
to prohibit an activity in this situation would go beyond the scope of the competition
laws as defined by the wording of the Treaty, which refers to the prohibition of practices
which “restrict competition”. Moreover, it would create a situation of unacceptable
uncertainty. In practical terms, this means that, using an economic integration approach,
Community competition enforcers should take into account: (1) post-transaction
additions to or conservation of environmental resources (i.e., environmental benefits);
and (2) post-transaction damage to the environment, but the latter only when
competition is in any event restricted.20
In addition to this static use-value perspective to consumer welfare, it may also be
possible to take environmental considerations into account in considering the dynamic
18 See, for example, Frank, Microeconomics and Behaviour (6th ed., New York, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2006),
chapter 3 and at 78. Similarly, a decrease in a consumer’s willingness-to-pay, where the environmental
performance of a good decreases, might mean a decrease in consumer surplus, even where actual prices
remain the same or fall.
19 An alternative way of incorporating environmental performance in the utility function might be on the
basis that a consumer’s willingness-to-pay for an environmentally superior product might be greater if
increased environmental awareness means that the consumer gains less pleasure from consuming a good
where environmentally-friendlier substitutes are available. However, this seems a weaker position, as price
remains a major factor in utility. For a model based on this hypothesis, see Conrad, “Price Competition
and Product Differentiation When Consumers Care for the Environment” 31(1) Environmental and
Resource Economics (2005) 1.
20 In effect, this means that, in such cases, the damage to the environment will have little effect on the
enforcer’s decisions in the second category of case.
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efficiency perspective. This is a narrower point, but may also be relevant depending on
the competitive issue at hand: many environmentally-friendly products may be seen as
“creating” markets, as the product of innovation, and as introducing another dimension
of competition.21 The potential of market creation in the EU context is illustrated by a
2002 report commissioned for DG Environment, which analysed the EU’s “eco-
industries” - defined as “activities which produce goods and services to measure, prevent,
limit, minimise or correct environmental damage to water, air and soil” - as supplying (in
1999 values) € 183 bn of goods and services a year. As it is undisputed22 that any
dynamic efficiency benefits may be taken into account in environment-related cases, just
as in other cases, dynamic efficiency will not be considered further in this section.
3. Measuring Consumer Surplus: An Environmental Economics Approach
How, then, might we measure consumers’ own valuation of a product, or their
willingness-to-pay, so as to take environmental performance into account? To answer
this question, we can draw on the findings of environmental economists, who have tried
to value environmental resources as a means of internalising environmental externalities.
At the outset, it must be recognised that environmental valuation is a very rapidly
developing field, and a rather controversial one. This is so in two senses. First,
environmental economists may disagree as to the best way of valuing the environment -
which technique should best be used; and the ultimate figure arrived at. The second
aspect to the controversy over environmental valuation is that some “deeper green”
economists and non-economists reject the notion of putting prices on environmental
resources at all, as this implies commensurability of natural and other capital. This view,
consistent with the “strong sustainability” viewpoint discussed in Chapter 2, is the view
taken by many ecological economists.
a. The approach of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Environmental economists have, since the 1970s, developed a number of methods of
environmental valuation. These were originally developed for use in “cost benefit
analysis” (CBA), so as to enable decisions to be taken, for example, on whether to go
ahead with projects or legislation. CBA is inherently based on neo-classical welfare
economics, as it is aimed at identifying “Potential Pareto Improvements” from projects
(i.e., Kaldor-Hicks improvements).23 In this context, environmental valuation is
essentially premised on the “commodification” of the services provided by the
environment, considered above, and their insertion into the utility and production
functions of consumers and firms, respectively.24
Taking the cost of environmental benefits and damage into account, therefore, enables
correction for market failure, resulting in what is termed an “environmental CBA (or
21 See further, Porter and Van der Linde 1995;and Alves, “La Protection intégrée de l’environnement en
droit communautaire”, Revue juridique de l’environnement, 2/2003 p. 1 (“L’environnement n’est-il pas devenue
“une nouvelle donne économique”?).
22 At least in the post-Chicago era: as considered in Chapter 5, the focus of the Chicago School approach
was, at least originally, on static, rather than dynamic, efficiency.
23 As already discussed, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion holds that, if the magnitude of the gains from moving
from one state of the economy to another is greater than the magnitude of the losses, then social welfare is
increased by making the move even if no actual compensation is made to the “losers”. See further,
Gowdy, “The revolution in welfare economics and its implications for environmental valuation and policy”
80(2) Land Economics (2004) 239, and Stavins, Wagner, and Wagner, cited in Gowdy, "[the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion] is the fundamental foundation -- the normative justification -- for employing benefit-costs
analysis, that is, for searching for policies that maximize the positive differences between benefits and
costs."
24 See Perman et al , note 1, at 400.
136
ECBA). In the first place, this requires measurement of the “environmental cost” (EC)
of a project. This is often done by looking at the environmental benefits arising from
not going ahead with a project. Four types of benefit may be identified:
(1) The “use value” of the service, arising from the actual or planned use of
the service by an individual (e.g., for recreation);
(2) The “existence value” of the service, arising from knowing that the
service exists and will continue to do so, even though the individual is
not likely ever to use it;
(3) The “option value” of the service, arising from willingness of the
individual to pay in order to guarantee that the service will be available
for future use to him or her; and
(4) The “quasi-option value” of the service, arising from the individual’s
willingness to pay to avoid an irreversible commitment to development
now, due to his or her expectation that, in the future, we will have greater
knowledge of the implications of such development.25
The final three benefits are often called the “non use value” of the environmental
service. An ECBA approach to the question whether a project should go ahead entails:26
 measuring the costs and benefits of the project, including the environmental
costs and benefits. This is normally done on a net present value (NPV) basis,
meaning that future costs and benefits are discounted;
 Where there is risk or uncertainty as to a cost or benefit actually transpiring,
factoring this in. The difficulties inherent in risk and discounting are discussed
further below.
b. Techniques of environmental valuation27
Following an environmental economics approach, valuing these benefits can be achieved
by using techniques of “non-market valuation”, which essentially try to ascertain what
affected individuals collectively would be willing to pay if there were markets for
environmental services.28 There are two main approaches to estimating the monetary
value of environmental damage for individuals.29
The first approach is indirect, which entails arriving at estimations from the observed
behaviour of individuals in the context of commodities where, in contrast to
environmental services, markets do exist.30 Thus, if an improvement in water quality was
followed by an increase in demand for fishing licences, one might try to use the observed
increase in demand for licenses to put a value on the change in water quality.31 One
example of this method is the “travel cost method” (TCM), which attempts to measure
the value placed by visitors on an amenity by the cost they incurred in travelling to get
there. A further example might be observing the increase in the price of a house due to
25 Perman et al, ibid, at 402.
26 Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (New York,
the New Press, 2004).
27 See further, Perman et al, note 1 above and Gowdy, note 23 above.
28 See Perman et al, note 1 above, at 373.
29 Perman et al, ibid, at 402.
30 See further, on the detailed economic techniques used to infer the monetary value of a change in the
price, quality or quantity of a given environmental service, Perman et al, ibid, 403-409.
31 See Perman et al, ibid, at 409.
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its proximity to a beach. Environmental economists generally accept that such
techniques can only be used to estimate the “use value” of environmental services.
The second approach of non-market valuation entails asking individuals questions
directly about the affected environmental services. This approach can be used to
estimate use and non-use values. An example of this method is the “contingent
valuation method” (CVM), which involves asking a sample of the relevant population
questions about what they would be willing to pay or give up to keep an environmental
service, thus creating a surrogate or “shadow” price for the resource. This may be done
on an existence value or option value basis.32 While these techniques are more developed
in the US, they are now increasingly being used in the EU, including in particular in
Scandinavian countries. They have also been used by the Dutch, UK and German
governments in making policy decisions.33 Thus, Bonnieux and Rainelli give the example
of the natural amenity value for visitors or potential visitors to the UK’s Yorkshire Dales
National Park being measured, via CVM techniques, on average at £24 per annum.34 A
further potential use of CVM techniques is in the difficult issue of valuing biodiversity,
though this has not been hugely successful to date.
Such environmental valuation techniques are now beginning to become widespread and
more accurate. Things have moved on since the Economist magazine wrote back in
1994 that,
“[i]f the environment is one of the world’s bloodiest political battlefields, economics provides many of
the weapons. Environmental lawsuits and regulatory debates would be starved of ammunition if
economists did not lob their damage estimates into the fray. The trouble with these number wars is
that the estimate’s accuracy is often more akin to that of second-world-war bombers than precision
guided missiles.”35
Just over ten years later, the same magazine reported a huge improvement in
environmental valuation techniques, including a growing phenomenon of environmental
entries appearing on firms’ balance sheets,36 putting cash values on environmental,
ecosystem and ecological services.37
c. Difficulties with the approach: the intertemporal perspective and the
problem of uncertainty
Prior to drawing any conclusions on the applicability of environmental valuation
techniques in measuring consumer surplus for Community competition decisions, it is
important to note the difficulties with the approach.
32 See Bonnieux and Rainelli, “Contingent Valuation Methodology and the EU Institutional Framework”
and, on option value, see Sunstein, “Two Conceptions of Irreversible Environmental Harm”, Chicago,
John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 407 of May 2008.
33 Ibid. The Netherlands was the first country to use CV techniques in 1973, followed by the UK under
Conservatives and Germany.
34 Citing Willis and Garrod 1991 “Landscape Values: A Continent Valuation Approach and Case Study of
the Yorkshire Dales National Park”, ESRC Countryside Change Initiative, Working Paper 21, University of
Newcastle upon Tyne.
35 The Economist, December 3, 1994, at 106, quoted in Perman et al, note 1 above, at 399.
36 The Economist, April 23rd 2005: “Are you being served?”. This is also a phenomenon at macro-
economic level. For example, in 2005, the World Bank published a report arguing that current measures of
a country’s economic welfare, such as gross national product, are inadequate as they ignore the value of a
country’s natural assets. See the Economist, “Greening the books”, September 17, 2005
37 This phenomenon, discussed in Chapter 4, is helped by informational improvements such as the
publication by the World Bank every year of a book entitled the “Little Green Data Book”, which acts as a
benchmark in green accounting.
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The most obvious difficulty is that of risk and uncertainty.38 It is hard to estimate what a
consumer would be willing to pay for an environmentally-friendlier product if the
potential cost to the consumer of depleted natural resources from a more damaging
product is unknown. Yet, this is often precisely the case in environmental matters. In
particular, it is often unknown whether any given environmental damage is irreversible,
or the point at which it becomes irreversible. For example, though one recent high-level
report has estimated the global cost of biodiversity destruction at €2 trillion per year,39
many economists hold the view that eco-system benefits and biodiversity cannot, at
present, be valued to any degree of accuracy. This is due mainly to uncertainty
difficulties; for example, removing or adding one species to an eco-system may affect
other species and the overall integrity of the system in ways which cannot be predicted .40
To deal with this problem, environmental economists such as Weisbrod developed the
benefit measures, to which reference was made above, of “option value” - the willingness
of the individual to pay in order to guarantee that an environmental service will be
available for future use to him or her - and “quasi-option value” - the individual’s
willingness to pay to avoid potentially irreversible commitments to development now.
This branch of environmental economics is complex, using game theoretic approaches -
“games against nature” - to try and predict which decisions consumers (or states) will
make in situations of uncertainty.41 However, some environmental economists have
concluded that the best way to deal with such uncertainty is to adopt a “safe minimum
standard of conservation” (SMS) of the environment, an extremely conservative rule
whereby current gains, however large, are foregone in order to avoid future losses of an
unknown, but presumed very large, size.42 An alternative, and less conservative,
standard, is a modified SMS whereby current gains are foregone in order to avoid future
losses of an unknown, but presumed very large, size, unless this entails unacceptably
large costs.43
38 See the distinction made by Knight in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1921),
defining risky situations as those where the possible consequences of a decision can be completely
enumerated and probabilities assigned to each possibility; and uncertain situations as those where the
possible consequences of a decision can (or, in the case of “radical” uncertainty, cannot) be fully
enumerated, but where the decision maker cannot assign probabilities. See further, Perman et al, note 1
above, at 445, Jensen, “Innovation, adoption and welfare under uncertainty” 40(2) Journal of Industrial
Economics (1992) 173, and Lange, “A note on decisions under uncertainty: The impact of the choice of
the welfare measure” 51(1) Theory and Decision (2001) 51.
39 See the interim report on “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity”, May 2008, commissioned
by the EU and the German federal government by Mr Pavan Sukhdev of Deutsche Bank and presented to
the Bonn meeting of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/economics/index_en.htm.
40 See, for example, Dore and Webb, “Valuing Biodiversity: Reality or Mirage?” 86(1-2) Environmental
Monitoring and Assessment (2003) 91 and the 2007 report prepared for the Commission, “Links between
the Environment, the Economy and Jobs”, report of November 2007, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment.
41 Thus, four possible decision rules in “games against nature” for the government are (a) the maximin rule,
where government selects the strategy which maximises the minimum possible outcome (the “least-bad
worst outcome”, i.e., making the worst outcome as good as it can be); (b) the maximax rule, where
government selects the strategy with the best of the best outcomes; (c) the minimax regret rule, where
government chooses the strategy with the least amount of regret in case of failure; and (d) the assignment
of subject probabilities by the government, which then adopts the strategy with the pay-off of the greatest
value. See Perman et al, note 1 above, at 460-461 and Lange, “A note on decisions under uncertainty: The
impact of the choice of the welfare measure” 51(1) Theory and Decision (2001) 51.
42 Perman et al, note 1 above, at 462.
43 Ibid. These standards bear similarities to the precautionary principle familiar to us from Community
environmental policy.
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A further difficulty in placing a value on future environmental damage, or benefits, is the
necessity - according to some economists - of discounting utility that will (or might) only
occur in the future. This requires the adoption of an intertemporal approach to
efficiency in allocation, and is necessary, it is argued, because individuals as consumers
are observed to require an incentive (e.g., the payment of interest) to postpone
consumption - and hence utility (e.g., by saving).44
As with environmental valuation under uncertainty, discounting is a complex and
controversial area, detailed discussion of which lies outside the scope of the present
research.45 The importance of making these points for present purposes lies in the
difficulties they could raise for competition enforcers trying to estimate consumer
surplus using the techniques of environmental economics. It is clear that such difficulties
have significant implications for the administrability of any approach based on
integrating environmental concerns into competition policy. More ecological economic
approaches, however, deny the necessity to discount future utility of the environment in
this way, distinguishing between the individual as consumer and the individual as citizen,
and concluding that, as citizens, individuals may not wish to discount the future, given a
commitment to future generations.46
A final difficulty with the above environmental valuation techniques is more general: the
rejection of such techniques in sum or in part by economists who argue that some
environmental resources are, quite simply, priceless.47 The approach of ecological
economics, which we turn briefly to look at now, is one such example.
4. Going Further? An Ecological Economics Approach
Since the 1980s, an additional branch of economics has emerged which rejects many of
the tenets of neo-classical welfare economics, in favour of an approach based on the
premise of interdependency between the natural and economic worlds - viewing the
human economy as “both a social system, and as one constrained by the biophysical world”.48 This
branch has come to be termed ecological economics, and has been fêted by its
supporters as a veritable “revolution” in welfare economics:49
“…of all the conventional and heterodox schools of economic thought, ecological economics is the
only one poised to address the problems of human survival in the coming centuries.”50
Ecological economics takes issue with the neo-classical assumption of self-interested,
exogenous preferences, and in particular: (1) the theory of human behaviour embodied in
the axioms of rational consumer choice and the individual as a selfish price-taker (homo
economicus), with its goal of efficiency in utility maximisation in a Pareto-optimal
44 Perman et al, ibid, at 68.
45 See Perman et al, ibid, at 67 onwards.
46 See the arguments of Sen, discussed under ecological economics below.
47 Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (New York,
the New Press, 2004).
48 Gowdy and Erickson, “The approach of ecological economics” Cambridge Journal of Economics 29
(2005) 207. The first issue of the publication Ecological Economics appeared in 1989. See further,
Mayumi, “Reformulating the foundations of consumer choice theory and environmental valuation” 39
Ecological Economics (2001) 223, Costanza (ed.), Ecological Economics: The Science and Management of
Sustainability (Columbia University Press, New York, 1991).
49 See Gowdy, “The revolution in welfare economics and its implications for environmental valuation and
policy” 80(2) Land Economics (2004) 239.
50 Gowdy and Erickson, note 48 above.
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equilibrium;51 and (2) the theory of production based on the model of perfect
competition, with its concomitant assumptions of firms’ behaviour. These premises,
ecological economists argue, are outdated, and should be replaced by modern
behavioural models.52 In particular, models of consumer choice should not be limited to
choices in the market place, as this fails accurately to characterise human preferences.
Indeed, the model of a rational actor making decisions without a social or environmental
context is itself disputed. Thus, many preferences for environmental features may be
termed “lexicographic” - not subject to trade-offs at all.53 Many ecological economists,
drawing on the analysis of Amaryta Sen, rely on what Sen terms the “fundamental dualism of
persons” in distinguishing between man acting as a consumer and as a citizen.54 In this
analysis, sympathy may be reflected in an individual’s utility function: my utility may
increase if a change improves another’s lot. Further, using the concept of
“commitment” - concern for others based on ethical principles - to the extent that I am
committed to other(s), I may approve of a change though it reduces my own utility.55 In
this way, it is suggested, individuals may have multiple - and possibly conflicting -
preference orderings, rather than just one.56
Moreover, ecological economists reject the very goal of achieving allocative efficiency in
the marketplace. In particular, they argue that citizens often wish to achieve more than
simply reaching the “optimal” level of pollution.57 Indeed, they dispute the selection of
allocative efficiency as a goal as based, in essence, on a value judgment rather than on any
objective scientific justification.58 In this respect, ecological economics rejects the
approach of environmental economics, insofar as the latter focuses on valuing price
externalities in the context of the neo-classical economic model (i.e., assigning a value to
environmental resources in market exchange).59 Similarly, ecological economists reject
51 See Stigler and Becker, “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum” The American Economic Review, Vol. 67, No.
2 (Mar., 1977), 76. In terms of the axioms of consumer choice theory, ecological economics rejects the
notion that tastes are not a matter of dispute.
52 See Gowdy and Erickson, note 48 above, who argue that, “Neoclassical theorists have by and large abandoned
economic man and perfect competition; however, the policy recommendations of economists are still based on these outdated
representations of human behaviour and commodity production…In new game theoretic and behavioural models of consumer
behaviour Homo economicus is being out-competed by other special of economic actors…Likewise, the neoclassical theory of the
firm as independent of historical time, space and the behaviour of other firms is being replaced by more realistic models…The
heart of the neoclassical theory of the firm, profit maximisation, has failed the predictability test and is being replaced by more
sophisticated models of cooperation and altruism.”
53 See Costanza, note 48 above.
54 See further, Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987) and Nyborg, “Homo Economicus
and Homo Politicus: Interpretation and aggregation of environmental values” 42(3) Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization (2000) 305.
55 See Perman et al, note 1 above.
56 See Nyborg, note 54 above, “This distinction between consumers and citizens seems to suggest that every individual
may have two distinct and possibly conflicting preference orderings over social states, one associated with each role…”
57 See Verchick, “Feathers or Gold? A Civic Economics for Environmental Law” 25 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
95 (1995) at 117, who writes that, “[w]hile acknowledging our use of nature’s services, many citizens aspire to more than
reaching the “optimal” level of pollution, or viewing nature as, to use Martin Heidegger’s phrase, one “vast gasoline station.”
But the principle of economic efficiency will accept nothing less.”
58 See further, Gowdy and Erickson, note 48 above, at 217.
59 Taking the example of climate change, neo-classical economics would hold that using society’s scarce
resources to moderate climate change would only be justified if this were to result in an increase in
economic output overall and in the long run (after discounting for the valuing of a stable climate in the
future), resulting in a Potential Pareto Improvement. From an ecological economist’s perspective,
however, this overriding focus on efficiency improvement is too simplistic, as it fails to take broader,
ethical considerations into account.
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the neo-classical assumption that future utility from environmental resources should be
discounted.60 In so doing, they rely on the precautionary principle.
If, however, environmental valuation techniques are to be used, ecological economists
argue that such techniques should be broader. One of the leading writers in the area,
Robert Costanza, has suggested that valuation techniques should be based on the
contribution of the resource to the goals of:
(1) ensuring sustainability of human activities (which Costanza terms “whole
system” fairness);
(2) Distributing resources fairly intergenerationally and between species (which
he terms “Community” fairness); and
(3) Efficiently allocating resources, based on current individual preferences and
estimates of what would be paid in a well-functioning market.61
In the case of goals (1) and (2) - sustainability and intergenerational fairness - the
efficiency-based value of homo economicus, based on current, fixed individual preferences,
would be rejected in favour of a wider, sustainability-based value. This value “would
require an assessment of the contribution to the ecological sustainability of the item in question”,62 and
would be connected to their physical, chemical, and biological role in the long-term
functioning of the global system.
5. Can these techniques be applied to Community competition policy?
This Chapter set out to examine whether it is possible to integrate environmental
considerations into the economic calculus of competition decisions. Having looked at
two, very different, strands of economic thought which might enable us to do this -
environmental economics and ecological economics - we turn now to ask whether these
techniques can (realistically) be applied to Community competition policy.
Dealing first with ecological economics, it is the present author’s view that the methods
of this discipline cannot, in its current state of development, realistically be applied by
competition enforcers. Ecological economics’ wholesale rejection of the neo-classical
model on which present competition policy is based necessitates that it offer a workable
alternative to this model in order for the discipline to be applied by enforcers in practice.
While the overall goals of the discipline are laudable - it attempts to translate the reality
of the economy/environment interdependency into economic doctrine - its techniques
are not, on the basis of the present research, sufficiently developed to offer such a
workable alternative.
This is not, however, the case for the mature discipline of environmental economics. We
have seen that, at present, it is fair to say that Community competition economics views
a transaction’s effect on consumer welfare as the preponderant factor in deciding
whether the transaction is anti-competitive. This Chapter has argued that, in forecasting
post-transaction consumer welfare, it is possible to take account of the beneficial post-
transaction environmental performance of a product.63 This can be done using
environmental valuation techniques developed in the context of environmental cost-
60 See, for example, Heinzerling, who finds that empirical studies do not suggest that most people believe
present lives are any more valuable than future ones (107 Yale L J (1998) 1981 “Regulatory Cost of Mythic
Proportions”).
61 See Costanza “Valuing the Earth: Reintegrating the Study of Humans and the Rest of Nature” in
“Managing the Earth” Linacre Lectures 2001 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) and Costanza, “Social
Goals and the Valuation of Natural Capital” 86(1-2) Environmental Monitoring and Assessment (2003) 19.
62 Costanza, 2003, ibid.
63 This would be in addition to any dynamic efficiency benefits which the transaction may or may not have.
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benefit analysis, a method long used by policy-makers in deciding whether to proceed
with a given project. Put otherwise, if assessing the consumer welfare effects of an
agreement or practice in a competition analysis, the product’s beneficial post-transaction
environmental performance can be factored into individuals’ expected utility functions,
to see whether the transaction would increase their utilities. Moreover, the Chapter has
argued that this should be done, not just because of the Treaty’s integration principle, but
because the level of post-transaction consumer surplus is ultimately dependent on the
level of remaining environmental resources.64 For these reasons, it is concluded that, in
cases where discrete economic efficiency analysis is made in a competition assessment
(which, in practice, by no means occurs in all cases), environmental considerations can
and should be taken into account in this assessment.65 In effect, the result would be to
internalise environmental externalities in competition analysis, within the measure of
post-transaction consumer surplus.66
In the present research, space has not permitted going beyond the rudiments of
environmental valuation, which is a huge field. Nonetheless, the Chapter has attempted
to draw attention to two major difficulties with the above approach. The first is the
difficulty in valuing post-transaction utility in situations of risk and uncertainty - which
almost always apply in the context of environmental factors. The second is the difficulty
of deciding on an appropriate rate of discount for future environmental benefits and
damage. These difficulties, it is admitted, can make environmental valuation very
complex in practice, and its results controversial. There is, therefore, an argument that
using environmental valuation techniques in a competition enforcement context would
make competition policy too uncertain, and thus unadministrable.67 A further argument
might be that competition policy cannot and does not adopt such a long-term approach
to consumer welfare as environmental economics implies: rather, it is concerned - again,
for reasons of administrability and predictability - with short- and medium-term effects
on utility.
There are, it is submitted, two principal counter-arguments to these points.
Dealing first with the argument that competition policy cannot take a long-term
approach, it is admitted that the requirement to analyse long-term harm (or benefits)
makes a competition enforcer’s job more difficult. It is easier to confine oneself to the
short- and medium-term. Nonetheless, it is submitted that, in non-environmental
64 See, likewise, Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” 39 CML Rev (2002) 1057.
65 See also Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” 39 CML Rev (2002) 1057, at 1075, who argues that,
“the economic value of environmental assets is now just as relevant to consumer welfare as productive
efficiency. Thus the definition of efficiency is widened to take into account an agreement’s positive impact
on sustainable development”.
66 This would be consistent with the polluter pays principle, which the OECD and the Commission have
stated is the key to integrating competition and environmental goals. See OECD, Competition Policy and the
Environment (Paris, OECD, 1996), “[The polluter pays principle] is in itself is consistent with competition policy to the
extent that it remedies a market failure, internalising the pollution externality” (at 5) and the paper from the EC
Commission in that Report, which (at 77) states that the polluter pays principle is best way of internalising
pollution costs and finding the best balance between competition and the environment. See also,
Wasmeier, The integration of environmental protection as a general rule for interpreting Community law
(2001) CMLRev 159, at 163.
67 A further potential argument, which was noted in Chapter 7 as a counter argument to our governance
argument, is that, insofar as the suggested economic approach is not that used by the US competition
enforcers at the moment, the divergence between the two regimes would, in itself, lead to a certain amount
of inefficiency and extra cost for companies (see, e.g., Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division US DOJ, “Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It’s a Long Way from Chicago to
Brussels” (2001)). However, as stated before, the possibility of such divergence is not in itself, in the
present author’s view, a good enough argument for maintaining the status quo in the EU.
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contexts, the Commission and the Community Courts have not shied away from
consideration of long-term effects. Obvious examples are merger decisions, where the
Commission and the Courts have to engage in a prospective analysis of future events,68
and the evaluation of potentially anti-competitive practices under Article 82 EC. Thus,
Commissioner Kroes has, in the context of the ongoing review of Article 82 EC,
observed that,
“[w]e need to take account not only of short term harm, but also medium and long term harm
arising from the exclusion of competitors…We cannot just wash our hands of responsibility and
say that competition law cannot or should not protect the consumer against negative medium to long
term effects, just because it is difficult to assess.”69
Secondly, dealing with the more general concern about the administrability of
competition law, it is, admittedly, undeniable that administrability, predictability and
speed of decision-making are all important characteristics which a well-functioning
competition regime should have. Clearly, the interest in maintaining such characteristics
must be balanced against the interest in a competition enforcer arriving at the “right”
answer in any given case. It is also admitted that the use of environmental valuation
techniques can, depending on the case and on the level of detail entered into, be
complex. However, it is argued that, in those cases where environmental valuation
proves difficult, an approximation of the environmental benefit or detriment flowing
from the transaction at issue would be a better solution than leaving environmental
consequences out of the utility function altogether. Moreover, in practice, difficulties in
valuing post-transaction consumer welfare abound in competition cases, and are of
course not confined to environment-specific factors - an example being the difficulties in
trying to place an exact value on the benefit of dynamic efficiencies in measuring welfare
changes. More generally, it is submitted, it follows from the importance of the Article 6
EC integration principle within the system of the Treaty that administrability problems
must be examined on a case-by-case basis and in a proportionate way. It would be
disproportionate to invoke such problems in a blanket manner to justify ignoring
environmental considerations across the board.70
68 See, for example, the judgment of the ECJ in Tetra Laval II, in which the Court recognised (at para 44)
that the need to consider “a lengthy period of time in the future” increased the difficulties in a prospective
analysis of the effects of a conglomerate merger. Case C-13/03 P Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-1113.
69 “Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82”, speech at the Fordham Law Institute,
September 23, 2005 (SPEECH/05/537). See also, the DG Competition discussion paper on the
application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005.
70 Note also that, since the “economisation” of the Commission via the increase in recent years in the
number of economists in the Commission’s staff, and the creation of the office of Chief Economist, there
has been a large development in the complexity of economic theories used in the Commission’s decisional
practice. See further, Chapter 5.
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Part III: A Perspective from Competition Practice
We turn now to the final stage of our analysis. In the previous Part, we examined the
present goals of Community competition law and its approach to “non-economic”
factors in principle (Chapter 5). We then examined, and accepted as convincing, three
theoretical arguments - which we called the systematic argument, the governance
argument and the economic argument - each of which concluded that environmental
goals should, where possible, be taken into account in decision-making by competition
law enforcers (Chapters 6-8).
This final Part applies these theoretical conclusions to the individual competition law
rules: Articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 EC and the merger control rules. Its Chapters examine,
first, the environment-related case law in these areas to date as an empirical matter and,
second, the implications of the theoretical conclusions of Part II for these areas.
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Chapter 9: Some Preliminary Issues - Definition of an Undertaking; Market
Definition; Effect on Inter-State Trade
1. Introduction
This Chapter deals with the relevance of environmental factors to three concepts which
are pertinent to more than one area of Community competition law. These are: (1) the
definition of an undertaking; (2) market definition; and (3) effect on inter-state trade.
2. Relevance of Environmental Concerns to the Definition of an Undertaking
A first potential issue is the extent to which environmental actors fall within the
definition of an “undertaking” within the meaning of Articles 81 and 82 EC. Clearly,
actors falling outside this definition are not covered by Community antitrust law as such,
though their activities may still in some cases give rise to a breach of the Treaty
provisions by the state. It is well-established that the definition of an ‘undertaking’
covers,
“any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of that entity and the way
in which it is financed.”1
It is evident from the functional nature of this definition that it can include public bodies.
Essentially, therefore, the test is whether the relevant activity consists in offering goods
or services on a market - i.e., involves something that could, in principle, be carried out
by a private entity for profit. In principle, therefore, this could include legal or natural
persons offering environmental goods and services on a market. However, an activity
may fall outside the definition of an undertaking where it involves the exercise of a task
in the public interest forming one of the essential functions of the state. These two
aspects of the concept of an undertaking, and their potential relevance in the
environmental context, will be considered separately.
a. Does the activity consist in offering goods or services on a market?
The first criterion used by the ECJ in deciding whether a body qualifies as an
“undertaking” is whether the activity consists in “offering goods and services on a given market
as an economic activity”.2 This may be contrasted with activities undertaken on the basis of
the principle of solidarity, where no “market” would exist. Examples of the Court’s use
of this approach are include cases in the area of social security, such as Poucet & Pistre,3
Albany4 and Pavlov;5 and cases in the area of health, such as FENIN.6 In particular, if
participation in the activity in which the entity is engaged is compulsory, and/or the
entity has little or no control over its costs of production or the price which it charges,
1 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, para 21, and Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01,
C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK-Bundesverband and Others [2004] ECR I-2493, para 46.
2 See, for example, Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851, para 36, Case C-180 & 184/98
Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451 and Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089.
3 In Joined Cases C-159-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637 (French regional social security offices
administering sickness and maternity insurance scheme and an old-age insurance scheme, set up under
French law, were not undertakings).
4 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751 (Dutch pension funds established by collective agreements in
various industrial sectors, affiliation to which was required by Dutch law, were held to amount to
undertakings).
5 Joined Cases C-180 & 184/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451 (medical specialists, in deciding through their
representative body to contribute to a compulsory supplementary pension fund, were acting as an
undertaking).
6 Case T-319/99 FENIN [2003] ECR II-357 (management bodies of the Spanish health system (SNS) were
not acting as undertakings when purchasing from FENIN the medical goods and equipment which they
require in order to provide free services to SNS members).
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the Court is likely to take the view that its is an activity based on solidarity rather than
being offered on a market basis. In making this analysis, the Court takes into account
the extent to which the body bears the risk of its activities. The flip side to this is that, in
order to be active on a “market”, there must be (at least in theory) the potential for an
entity to make profit from its activity.7 In Albany, though the Court was not prepared to
hold that the Dutch pension funds at issue fell outside the concept of an undertaking, it
made clear that the social objective of the funds meant that the competition assessment
was ultimately likely to be favourable.8 The Court has confirmed that agricultural bodies
and sporting bodies may qualify as undertakings, insofar as they are active in what can be
called a “market”.9
b. Is the activity in the public interest and one of the essential functions
of the State?
The second aspect to the concept of an undertaking is that, if the body is performing a
task which is in “the public interest which forms part of the essential functions of the State”,10 it does
not qualify as an undertaking.11 Thus, in Calì & Figli, anti-pollution surveillance in
relation to loading and unloading of acetone products, which surveillance was carried out
by a private company (SEPG) in the Port of Genoa set up by the public port authorities,
did not qualify as an economic activity. This was on the ground that the surveillance
constituted a task in the public interest, forming part of one of the “essential functions of the
state”12 in protecting the maritime environment. In the Court’s view,
“Such surveillance is connected by its nature, its aim and the rules to which it is subject with the
exercise of powers relating to the protection of the environment which are typically those of a public
authority. It is not of an economic nature justifying the application of the Treaty rules on
competition.”13
This meant that the situation did not fall under Article 82 EC. This was so despite the
fact that the company’s activities were financed by dues paid by port users – and not by
the public authorities – as the levying of charges formed an “integral part” of SEPG’s
duties, and its tariffs were approved by the port authorities.14 In so holding, the Court
followed the Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas, who concluded that SEPG was “run
according to operating criteria that are not appropriate to a private undertaking.”15 As a result, the
proceedings brought by the port user Diego Calì to challenge the monitoring dues
demanded by SEPG on competition law grounds failed.16
7 See Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2006), 36-42.
8 Albany, note 4 above, para 86: “Undoubtedly, the pursuit of a social objective, the abovementioned manifestations of
solidarity and restrictions or controls on investments made by the sectoral pension fund may render the service provided by the
fund less competitive than comparable services rendered by insurance companies. Although such constraints do not prevent the
activity engaged in by the fund from being regarded as an economic activity, they might justify the exclusive right of such a body
to manage a supplementary pension scheme.”
9 See respectively, for example, Joined Cases T-217/03 and 245 FNCBV [2006] ECR II-4987 and Case T-
193/02 Piau [2005] ECR II-209.
10 Case C-343/95 Calì & Figli [1997] ECR I-1547, para 22.
11 In his opinion in FENIN, Advocate General Maduro termed this a “comparative” criterion, as it
requires a comparison between the activity at issue and activities which are capable of being carried out by
a private undertaking. Opinion of AG Maduro in Case T-319/99 FENIN [2003] ECR II-357, paras 11-12.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, para 23.
14 Ibid, para 24.
15 Ibid, at 50.
16 Contrast, for example, Höfner and Elser, note 1 above, where the Court held that the activity concerned -
a public placement office, which had an exclusive right under domestic law to act as an employment agency
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Likewise, bodies considered to be acting purely in the interest of public safety do not
qualify as undertakings, as was the situation in the Eurocontrol case, concerning an
international organisation responsible for air traffic control.17 In contrast, in Ambulanz
Glöckner, health organisations providing services on the market for emergency and
ambulance services were held to be undertakings, because “such activities have not always
been, and are not necessarily, carried on by such organisations or by public authorities.”18 More
recently, in Coname, municipalities concluding concessions for the management of a
public gas distribution service were held not to constitute undertakings, as they were
acting in their capacity as public authorities; similarly, concessionaires entrusted with
responsibility for a public service fell outside the scope of the undertaking concept.19
In addition, bodies who are acting purely in a regulatory role do not fall within the
concept of an undertaking, insofar as such regulation is considered to have a social, and
not an economic, objective. Examples are the Meca-Medina20 case in the sporting context
and the AOK21 case in the health context. However, the scope of the “public interest”
criterion in this context is interpreted narrowly. Thus, for example, in Wouters, the Court
rejected the argument of the Dutch bar that its function as regulator of lawyers
constituted an activity in the “public interest”.22
c. Discussion
Applying these tests in the environmental context, the question is to what extent bodies
supplying environmental goods and services may be viewed as “offering goods and services on
a given market as an economic activity.”23 The OECD’s definition of environmental goods
and services is a useful starting point in this respect:
“activities which produce goods and services to measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correct
environmental damage to water, air and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and eco-
systems.” 24
Under this definition, it is submitted, many environmental goods and services are now in
fact or at least potentially supplied on a market. This is due, at least in part, to the major
increase in the use of economic instruments which, in aiming to put a “price” on
pollution, tend to create markets for pollution abatement or reduction, and create at least
the possibility of making a profit in the industry. As noted in Chapter 3, however, major
differences exist at present in the extent to which Member States have chosen to use the
market to achieve environmental protection goals. Some Member States have chosen to
open up their environmental services sector to the market far more than others. For
- was economic in nature, since “employment procurement has not always been, and is not necessarily, carried out by
public entities.”
17 Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft [1994] ECR I-43.
18 Note 2 above.
19 Case C-231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I-7287.
20 Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina [2004] ECR II-3291. See also, Distribution of Package Tours During the 1990
World Cup OJ [1992] L 326/31 and Latty, “L’arrêt, le livre blanc et le Traité: La lex sportiva dans l’ordre
juridique communautaire - développements récents” (2008) Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union
européenne 43.
21 Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK-Bundesverband and Others [2004] ECR I-
2493.
22 Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577 (paras 57-59).
23 See the cases cited in note 2 above.
24 OECD Observer, September 2005, at 2. See also, the discussion of this issue in Chapter 8.
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example, some Member States have chosen to open up the waste and recycling services
sector to the market; others have not.25
Nonetheless, as Calì & Figli illustrates, the provision of environmental services may, in
certain cases, be considered to be an “essential function of the state”, thus falling outside
the definition of an undertaking. It follows that, in cases where the state ensures the
provision of a particular environmental good or service, which provision would not
otherwise be profitable, it may be possible for an entity (whether public or private in
form) to fall outside the scope of the competition rules completely.
The question is how far this concept extends in the environmental service area. It is
rather unclear, at present, in what circumstances the provision of an environmental
service amounts to an “essential function of the State” within the meaning of the Court’s
case law.26 Moreover, there is relatively little ECJ case law which expressly considers this
issue. In considering the issue, it is useful to examine two approaches - one judicial, one
academic - which have been taken in this regard to date.
The first approach is that of Advocate General Cosmas in Calì & Figli, who considered
the matter in some detail. After analysing the relevant Treaty provisions on the
environment (including, in particular, present Article 174 EC, which sets out the
principles on which the Community’s environmental policy is based), and relevant
secondary Community law on the environment, such as the Directive on transfrontier
shipment of hazardous waste, he concluded that,
“Analysis of the Treaty and secondary Community law seems to me to indicate that protection of
the environment, particularly where based on prevention, constitutes a public authority activity that
cannot be understood as anything other than a core State activity.27
As a result, supervision and control intended to gauge compliance with legislation that is
designed to prevent environmental damage from serious accidents resulting from the
transport of dangerous or polluting goods by sea constituted “public authority activities
exercised in order to meet an essential public interest.”28 Moreover, the fact that the service was
“provided for the benefit of the whole of the community” was also, in the Advocate General’s view,
“apparent from the fact that the surveillance has to be exercised regardless whether the fees owed by any
particular vessel have been paid.”29 This observation is reminiscent of the Court’s reasoning
in the social security cases such as Poucet and Pistre considered above, where one of the
factors taken into account by the Court is whether the benefits paid out by a social
security scheme were proportionate to the level of compulsory contribution by the
members of the scheme.
It is submitted that this approach - by which all “environmental protection” activities
might, in principle, fall within the notion of an essential function of the state - is too
broad. Though not a term of art, the notion of environmental protection activities
would seem roughly equivalent to that of environmental services, discussed above. As
25 In Ireland, for example, four of Dublin’s local authorities decided in April 2008 to revert from a situation
where household waste and recycling collection was open to competition from private operators, back to a
situation where only the Council (i.e., part of the State) is permitted to do so (or, in some cases, private
operators who have won a tender). The reasons cited for this are the space limits on recycling bins outside
private houses, as well as the extra pollution and fuel usage involved where a number of companies can
collect bins. The decision is under challenge on competition law grounds before the Irish High Court.
26 This is not a problem specific to environmental services. The outer limits of the notion of an “essential
function of the State” are dogged with controversy. See Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The
Scope of Article 81 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), at 55.
27 Note 10 above, at 56.
28 Ibid, at 62.
29 Ibid.
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such, given the recent increase in use of economic instruments at Member State and
Community level discussed in Chapter 3, the Advocate General’s approach is clearly too
extensive to be of practical use in determining the limits of the concept of an undertaking
in the environmental context.
A second approach to the concept of an “essential function of the state” has been put
forward by academic commentators such as Odudu. Odudu suggests that the test of
whether an activity is an essential function of the state should be whether the activity
ensures the provision of a “public good” in the economic sense - i.e., the provision of a
good which is non-rivalrous (so an infinite number of consumers can use the good
without diminishing others’ enjoyment) and non-excludable (so other consumers cannot
be prevented from using the good once produced).30 Though the suggestion may
perhaps have some merit as regards activities unconnected to environmental protection,
it is submitted that, in the environmental sphere, this attempt to inject more certainty
into the area fails. This is because, as discussed in Chapter 8, a clean(er) environment
always amounts to a public good in the economic sense. As such, the usefulness of the
“public good” concept in delimiting the concept of an undertaking in the environmental
sphere is limited.
In sum, it is submitted that the question of which environmental services constitute an
activity in the public interest can only be answered on a case by case basis, by analysing
whether it would be possible for the service at issue to be provided profitably. As
demonstrated above, efforts to create an alternative test, or to categorise all
environmental protection activities as being in the public interest - though
understandable from a legal certainty perspective - have not been successful. In the case
of Calì & Figli itself, for example, the Court’s conclusion was effectively that, given the
obligations to which SEPG was subject in carrying out port surveillance, it would not be
possible at all for the job to be done profitably.31 In this regard, the judgment confirms
that competition law will not interfere with Member States’ choices where they have
chosen to set the parameters of public service obligations such that private undertakings
would not find it profitable to perform an important environmental service.32
Notwithstanding this, the Calì & Figli exception for environmental services carried out in
the public interest should, it is argued, be narrowly construed. A conclusion that there is
no scope whatsoever for profit is an extreme one, which demands clear evidence to this
effect.33 This is so for public policy reasons: in general, submission of the environmental
services sector to the competition rules – at least in principle – should improve their
quality and efficiency, as well as incentivise innovation within the sector. Put in the
terms of the arguments made in Part II, such an interpretation follows in particular from
30 See Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81, note 7 above.
31 Ibid, para 23.
32 See, for similar reasoning in the healthcare context, the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Joined
Cases C-264/01 etc AOK [2004] ECR I-2493, para 25 onwards (though the ECJ ultimately came to a
different conclusion on the facts of that case). In the case of healthcare, one may draw an analogy between
the Court’s broad approach to the concept of an undertaking in the meaning of the competition rules and
its broad approach to the concept of an economic activity in the meaning of the free movement of services
provisions (in, for example, Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473 and Case C-
372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325). See similarly, Slot, “Applying the competition rules in the healthcare
sector” (2003) 24(11) European Competition Law Review 580. As noted below, this analogy fits well with
the systematic argument made in Chapter 6.
33 Contrast, for example, the lower threshold applicable in order for the Article 86(2) EC justification to
apply (i.e., undertakings are permitted to operate under “economically acceptable” conditions - which
includes some margin of profit - and still rely on the justification: see, for example, Case C-159/94
Commission v France [1997] ECR I-5815.
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Chapter 6’s systematic argument, and in particular from the third point of our “working
hypothesis” on the meaning of the Article 6 EC integration principle in the competition
sphere. In other words, this constitutes a situation where it is possible to interpret the
concept of an undertaking in a way that favours environmental protection, and there is
no conflict with the goals of competition policy.34 Moreover, it also follows from
Chapter 7’s governance argument, insofar as the Community courts, as ultimate arbiter of the
scope of the concept of an undertaking, will seek to interpret the concept in a way that is
most coherent with the aims of both competition and environmental policies - in this
case, meaning a narrow construction of the notion of essential functions of the State.
As such, it is generally undesirable to exclude the provision of environmental services
from the scope of the competition rules,35 unless the service, because not profitable,
would genuinely not be provided at all on a competitive market. Rather, a less severe
solution, and one ultimately more in keeping with the interests of environmental
protection, is to treat the provision of services as falling within the scope of the
competition rules, subject of course to possible justification where it is shown that strict
application of these rules would obstruct the performance of the environmental service
within the meaning of Article 86(2) EC.36
3. Definition of the “relevant market”
A second issue of broad relevance is whether environmental factors can be relevant
when defining the relevant product and geographic markets in a given case. Such a
market definition exercise is relevant, inter alia, in carrying out an analysis under Article 82
EC and under the Merger Regulation,37 and can also be relevant to the assessment of
market power in the context of Article 81 EC. Due to the nature of market definition as
a preliminary issue faced in many competition cases, it is useful to consider the broader
issue of the potential effect of environmental factors on the application of these
concepts, and thus the present discussion is not confined to the narrower issue of
considering which interpretation might best achieve environmental protection goals.
General framework. The starting point in any analysis of market definition is the
Commission’s Notice on Definition of the Relevant Market (the “Notice on Market
Definition”). In assessing the competitive constraints to which an undertaking may be
34 One might also make an argument based on the systematic links between competition policy and free
movement policy (i.e., the “internal comparative” approach), drawing an analogy, for example, with the
broad manner in which the Court currently interprets the notion of services “provided for remuneration”
within the meaning of Articles 49 and 50 EC. See, for example, the medical service cases such as Case C-
157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473 (medical services paid for by a patient abroad falls
within the scope of the Treaty, even where reimbursement is applied for under a home state system of
benefits-in-kind), and Case C-51/96 and 191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549 (amateur athletes may be
considered as engaging in economic activities).
35 See, similarly, the Commission’s approach in Eco-Emballages, OJ 2001 L 233/37, point 70.
36 See, for example, the Court’s solution in cases such as Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp [1998] ECR I-4075 and
Case C-209/98 Sydhavnens [2000] ECR 343, which each concerned situations where special or exclusive
rights had been granted to private undertakings to guarantee the provision of certain (respectively,
hazardous and building) waste disposal services, and which were analysed under Article 86(2) EC. On
Article 86(2), see Chapter 14.
37 Though the approach to market definition is the same in the context of Article 82 EC and the Merger
Regulation, clearly the assessment of the competitive constraints is different: under the Merger Regulation,
the focus is on the competitive constraints which exist at pre-merger prices, whereas Article 82 EC analysis
focuses on whether the relevant firm has market power, requiring analysis of the competitive constraints
which would exist at competitive prices. Further, the Commission is more likely to use quantitative and
econometric techniques in the merger context than in the Article 82 EC context. See O’Donoghue and
Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC (Oxford, Hart 2006), at 65-67.
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subject, the Notice on Market Definition distinguishes between product and geographic
markets. Thus, the Notice defines relevant product and service markets as,
“all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the
consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use.”38
The relevant geographic market is defined as,
“the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products
or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be
distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different
in those area.”39
More particularly, the Notice refers to three types of competitive constraint to which
undertakings are subject.40
The first is demand substitution, defined as “a determination of the range of products which are
viewed as substitutes by the consumer”.41 This is often assessed using the so-called SSNIP or
“hypothetical monopolist” test, which asks whether the parties’ customers would switch
to readily available substitutes or to suppliers located elsewhere in response to a
hypothetical small (in the range of 5% to 10%) but permanent relative price increase in
the products and areas being considered.42 The second competitive constraint identified
in the Notice is supply-side substitutability, which indicates that “suppliers are able to switch
production to the relevant products and market them in the short term without incurring significant
additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices”.43 The final
competitive constraint identified in the Notice is potential competition.44
Evidence relevant to product market definition includes: whether there is evidence of
substitution in the recent past; the extent of own-price and cross-price elasticity;45 the
degree of functional interchangeability of the product; customers’ and competitors’
views; evidence of consumer preferences (such as consumer surveys); product prices;
whether and how the area is regulated; and switching costs, such as regulatory barriers.46
Evidence relevant to geographic market definition may include: present distribution of
market shares;47 pricing variations; trade flows and buying patterns; the cost of transport;
regulatory barriers; and national preferences.48
38 Notice on the definition of the relevant market OJ 199 C 32/5, at point 7.
39 Ibid, at point 8.
40 Ibid, at point 13.
41 Ibid, at point 15.
42 If substitution is enough to make the price increase unprofitable because of the resulting loss of sales,
additional substitutes and areas are included in the relevant market. Ibid, at point 17. Though the
hypothetical monopolist test may be particularly appropriate in merger control, it may be less appropriate
in the Article 82 EC context, in particular in a situation of “cellophane fallacy” – i.e., where a monopolist is
already charging a monopoly price, meaning that if it were to raise its price further, its customers would
cease to buy from it at all. See, for example, DG Competition discussion paper on the application of
Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, 281.
43 Ibid, at point 20.
44 This, the Commission states, is not taken into account at the market definition stage. Rather, “if required,
this analysis is only carried out at a subsequent stage, in general once the position of the companies involved in the relevant
market has already been ascertained, and when such position gives rise to concerns from a competition point of view.” Point
23.
45 I.e., the extent to which demand for the product changes in response to a change in its own price or
another product’s price.
46 See further, Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2006),
O’Donoghue and Padilla, note 37 above.
47 Notice on Market Definition, note 38 above, point 28.
48 See further, Lindsay, note 46 above and O’Donoghue and Padilla, note 37 above.
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Environment-specific issues. Having set out this basic framework, let us turn to
consider environment-specific issues of market definition in the context of defining the
relevant product and geographic markets, respectively. As a preliminary matter, it is
submitted that the arguments put forward in Part II do not, as such, lead to the
conclusion that a “special”, or different, approach to market definition is necessary where
environmental issues arise. Using a systematic approach, for example, it is not possible to
argue, as a general matter, that a given method of market definition in environment-
related cases would per se favour environmental protection more than another. This
means that point 3 of Chapter 6’s working hypothesis (which covers issues, such as
market definition, which are not dealt with expressly by the Treaty) does not apply here.
In particular, the adoption of a wider market definition in the case of environment-
related issues would not necessarily be in the interests of environmental protection.
Rather, it is submitted that environmental protection aims can be achieved most
effectively if the exercise of market definition is carried out as objectively as possible,
with environmental factors being taken into account where relevant at the next stage of
the competitive analysis. For similar reasons, the governance and economic arguments do
not, it is submitted, lead to the conclusion that any per se different market definition
approach should be used.
a. Relevant product and service markets
i. Demand-side substitutability
Defining relevant product markets. The essential question is whether
environmentally friendlier, or more damaging, products are regarded as “interchangeable or
substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended
use.” A number of issues arise in this regard.
First, a question which arises increasingly frequently is whether recycled goods form part
of the same product market as “original” goods.49 This will be the case if they satisfy the
SSNIP test, i.e., if a consumer would switch between the products in the event of a 5-
10% price increase.50
However, in some cases, recycled or otherwise environmentally friendlier products may
be considerably more expensive than “original” products (indicating failure of the price
mechanism due to externalities), thus forming separate markets.51 This may lead to
relatively narrow market definitions for recycled goods, meaning that producers of such
goods may run a greater risk of being viewed as holding positions of market power. The
Dutch system of implementing the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive by means
of legislation combined with binding agreements, discussed in Chapter 4, provides an
interesting example of an attempt to counter this problem. Under that system, an
environmental surcharge was paid by producers, which was paid into a fund in exchange
49 See DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling system of September
22, 2005, “it is clear that the markets for recycled materials will become a major if not the key resource market of the future”
(at point 4).
50 See Lindsay, note 46 above, 3-051. Likewise, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognise that
recycled goods may be included in the product market if their sale would be a competitive constraint on
the activities of a hypothetical monopolist: para 1.31. See, for example, Case COMP/M.1779 Anglo
American/Tarmac, decision of January 13, 2000.
51 Examples include Case COMP/M.4495 Alfa Acciai/Cronimet/Remondis/TSR Group, decision of February
6, 2007, and Case IV/M.753 Anglo American Corporation/Lonrho, decision of April 23, 1997 (recycling and
recovery of platinum group metals was very long and costly in comparison to primary metals, and this was
unlikely to change within the next five years).
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for a guarantee that their waste would be taken back and recycled.52 Participating
recyclers could draw from this fund in cases where the recycling of the waste had no
commercial value (i.e., could not be done profitably), meaning that without the fund the
recycling would not be done. Where, however, recycling of the waste had a commercial
value (i.e., could be done profitably), recyclers could not draw on the fund.53 As a result,
the cost of otherwise unprofitable recycling processes was borne by the producers, rather
than being incorporated by the recyclers in higher prices for the recycled material,
meaning higher prices for goods produced from such material. As noted in Chapter 4,
this system has inspired others, discussed further in Chapter 10.
Further, one can envisage a situation in which environmentally-friendlier products form
separate markets where consumers, for reasons of taste or conscience, would not switch
to a “dirty” equivalent - one might make an analogy to the more traditional example of
the distinction between cheap and expensive perfume.54 Clearly, this depends on the
product, and the relative popularity of “green consciousness” in relation to that product.
Thus, one can imagine that consumers who choose to purchase a “hybrid” engine car
may not view traditional, more polluting, cars in a similar price category as being
interchangeable.
Evidence as to consumer preferences will be important here, such as consumer surveys.
While, as Bishop and Walker note, this method “suffers from arbitrariness”,55 it means that,
as long as a “reasonable” number of consumers would be willing to switch in response to
a relative price change, “the existence of other consumers who would not switch (even if
these account for the majority of consumers) does not imply a narrow market.”56
Second, from a decisional perspective, though the environmental performance of a
product has been a decisive factor in defining separate product markets in numerous
Commission decisions to date57 - due sometimes to differing environmental regulatory
regimes58 - it has not always been a conclusive factor where the characteristics of the
products were otherwise similar.59
The result may be that, as consumers become more environmentally-conscious, it may be
more likely that environmentally-friendly products will form separate markets. This may
52 See Vogelaar, “Verpakkingen en verpakkingsafval: de richtlijn 94/62/EEG en haar tenuitvoerlegging in
Nederland” in Deketelaere and Wiggers-Rust, Actualiteiten Europees Milieurecht, Brugge, Die Keure, 1997, at
126.
53 Ibid.
54 See, by analogy, Yves Saint Laurent Parfums OJ 1992 L 12/24.
55 Bishop and Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (2nd ed.,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at 4.55.
56 Ibid, at 4.57. They takes the example of Case COMP/M.431 Medeol/Elosua, in which bottled olive oil
was distinguished from bottled sunflower oil, partly as the two products appealed to different groups of
consumers.
57 See, for example, Case COMP/M.2690 Solvay/Montedison-Ausimont, at 70 (product market was hydrogen
peroxide, as no other substitute (eg sodium hypochlorite or chlorine) was environmentally friendly);
Commission decision of December 11, 2001 Zinc Phosphate OJ 2003 L 153/1, at 44 (separate product
markets for zinc chromate and zinc phosphate as the former environmentally unfriendlier).
58 See, for example, Case COMP/M.2588 Reinbraun Brennstoff/SSM Coal, decision of September 17, 2001,
where fuel grade petcoke was found not to be a substitute for coal to a sufficient degree, because national
environmental regulations on sulphur dioxide emissions constrained the amount of fuel grade petcoke that
could be used in a blend with coal. See further, Case COMP/M.4742 Oxbow/SSM, decision of August 7,
2007.
59 See, for example, Case COMP/M.1882 Pirelli/BICC (fluid-filled power cables and XLPE cables were
substitutes, despite the fact that XLPE cables were more environmentally friendly, as there was no risk of
leakage), and Case COMP/M.1356 Metsä-Serla/UK Paper, at 11 (pulp made from wood and pulp made
from waste paper or recycled fibres form part of a single market).
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lead to the irony that incumbent undertakings in those markets for environmentally-
friendly goods are - in principle - more likely to be judged to occupy a dominant position
under Article 82 EC,60 or to be prohibited from merging under the Merger Regulation.
Similarly, where innovative, environmentally-friendlier products are being developed,
they may create new, separate product markets, resulting in very large market shares for
the innovator(s).61 However, this problem is, as we have seen, tempered by the fact that,
as long as a “reasonable” number of consumers would still switch between the products,
no separate market should be found to exist.62
Defining relevant service markets. The major issue here has been the definition of
markets for collecting, processing, recovering or recycling waste.63
First, a distinction will generally be drawn based on the type of waste at issue. Thus, for
example, the following have been accepted as constituting relevant markets:
 A market for servicing hazardous waste, in contrast to “ordinary” waste;64
 Within the category of ordinary waste, a distinction has been made in some cases
between servicing ordinary household waste, on the one hand, and ordinary
industrial and commercial waste, on the other, though the Commission has in
other cases left the question open;65
 A market for the processing of waste oil and products contaminated with waste
oil has been accepted;66
 Separate markets have been accepted for recycling gold and silver materials, as
against platinum materials.67
Secondly, the regulatory framework may be crucial, whether set at EU or national level.68
In particular, the Commission has made clear that separate markets may exist for
collection, sorting and recovery services in the context of recycling arrangements.69 This
is made very clear, for example, in the Commission’s 2005 Waste Management Paper,
60 Though this in itself is not prohibited, and the environmental qualities of the product may be taken into
account at the abuse stage: see Chapter 12.
61 See likewise, the (non-environmental) “new product” cases, where products or services have yet to be
supplied, but there is clear customer demand for the product and a reasonable likelihood of the product
becoming available in the reasonably foreseeable future: Bishop and Walker, note 55 above, at 3-052.
62 A further point arises in the case of pollutants which do not themselves constitute a separate product
(i.e., capable of commercial exchange). In such cases, the Commission has indicated that the relevant
market encompasses that of the product into which the pollutant is incorporated: Horizontal Cooperation
Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, point 182.
63 There is, of course, an overlap between goods and services here, as waste has been accepted to be a
“good” by the Court: see, for example, Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431.
64 See Case M.1059, Suez Lyonnaise/BFI, at para. 11; Case M.2897, Sita SverigeAB/Sydkraft Ecoplus, at para.
10, and Case COMP/M.4318 Veolia/Cleanaway, decision of September 21, 2006, at point 31.
65 Case M.916, Lyonnaise des Eaux/Suez, at point 25 (issue left open). See also, however, Case
COMP/M.4318 Veolia/Cleanaway, decision of September 21, 2006 (separate markets for municipal waste
management and industrial and commercial waste management).
66 See Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp [1998] ECR I-4075. Contrast Case C-209/98 Sydhavnens [2000] ECR 343,
where the Court declined to form a view on whether the processing of non-hazardous building waste
constituted a separate market, leaving this to the national court.
67 Case COMP/M.3213 Umicore/OMG/Precious Metal Group, decision of July 29, 2003.
68 See DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September
22, 2005, at para 8; Case IV/M.266 Rhone Poulenc/Chimie/SITA (Commission took special nature of waste
and environmental regulations into account in defining market).
69 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, point 182. See, for example, Case COMP/M.4318
Veolia/Cleanaway, decision of September 21, 2006 (separate markets for municipal waste management and
industrial and commercial waste management).
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which takes three specific EU-based regulatory frameworks by way of illustration: the
End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) Directive, the Packaging Waste Directive, and the Waste
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive.70 The Commission typically distinguishes
between:71
 The market(s) for the organisation of systems to fulfil undertakings’ obligations
under the Directives.72 Where it is much more difficult to set up one type of
system than another type of system, these system types may form different
markets.73 Similarly, where the practical organisation or legal requirements
involved in setting up systems is very different, they may form different markets.
An example is the distinction under the Packaging Waste Directive’s regime
between setting up systems to collect household packaging waste and setting up
systems to collect commercial packaging waste.74
 The market(s) for the collection, sorting and treatment of the relevant waste
product.75 Collection and sorting may, for example, form different markets.
Further, the markets for collecting and sorting different types of waste may form
separate sub-markets. Examples are household vs. commercial waste;76 or, within
household or commercial waste, packaging vs. non-packaging waste,77 or
electronic vs. other waste. Depending on Member States’ sorting and recycling
facilities, distinctions may be made between different materials, such as glass,
paper and plastic.
 The market(s) for the recovery and marketing of secondary material. In this case,
each material to be recovered (for example, glass, metal or plastic) may form a
70 Directive 2000/53/EC on end-of life vehicles OJ 2000 L 269/34, as amended, Directive 94/62/EC on
packaging and packaging waste OJ 1994 L 365/10, Directive 2002/96 on waste electronic and electrical
equipment OJ 2003 L 37/24, as amended.
71 DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22,
2005.
72 Under the End of Life Vehicles Directive, for example, Member States have to ensure that the reuse and
recovery targets are attained by the economic operators and that the producers and importers pay for the
costs of the free take-back of ELVs.
73 See, for example, DSD OJ 2001 L 166/1. In that case, the German Packaging Ordinance, which made
packaging producers responsible for the collection and recycling of waste packaging, gave producers a
choice between setting up individual, collective system or self management system or, alternatively, joining
an “exemption system” set up via s.6(3) of the Ordinance. As exemption systems had to cover at least one
Land and meet high collection and recycling quotas, they were, in the Commission’s view, more onerous to
set up than the first option. As a result, a separate product market existed for the provision of services via
exemption systems - which in turn gave DSD, as the only body offering an exemption system in Germany,
a 100% market share (para 80).
74 Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste OJ 1994 L 365/10.
75 Under the ELV Directive, for example, the Commission states that this market may in turn be
subdivided into markets for dismantling the ELV and “shredding” (sorting out and recovering) ferrous and
non-ferrous material. Further submarkets may exist for individual car brands where producers or
importers set up their own dismantling and/or shredding systems: DG Competition Paper concerning
issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22, 2005.
76 Major differences include: differences in logistical requirements of collection (household waste having
many collection points, small amounts of waste, and thus strong network economies); and differences in
materials collected (tin, aluminium and plastic being recovered from households, but not normally from
industry): ibid.
77The Commission reasons that packaging and non-packaging household waste are collected and sorted
separately; packaging waste can and is recycled, whereas non-packaging waste is sent to landfill. Similarly,
as regards commercial waste, companies generally have reporting obligations as regards packaging waste,
but not for other types of industrial waste: ibid.
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separate market. Where the same operator provides collection, treatment and
recovery services, these may constitute a single market.
ii. Supply-side substitutability
The issue of supply substitutability has arisen on numerous occasions in environment-
related cases. Suppliers or producers may be incapable of switching to environmentally-
friendlier production within the short term, or unwilling to do so, for a number of
reasons. For example, it may take a long time to switch (as with the production of
organic produce, in comparison to “regular” produce).78 It may require very different
equipment, which cannot be acquired in the short term. In addition, producing
environmentally-friendlier products may be more costly, dissuading any such switching.
Inversely, it may be the case that suppliers or producers would not readily switch to
environmentally-unfriendlier alternatives. For example, the alternative may be less easy
to recycle,79 or more costly to process in an environmentally-friendly way.80 Again, it may
require radically different equipment, with an example being the different types of
equipment which may be necessary to process different types of waste.81
Again, the regulatory framework may be very important in this regard. For example,
where regulation is based on the polluter pays principle, meaning that producers are
subject to more onerous responsibilities if their product is environmentally unfriendly,
this may diminish supply-side substitutability.82
b. Relevant geographic market
Environmental considerations may also be relevant to the definition of the geographic
market. A number of factors bear particular mention.
First, once again, variations in environmental regulatory systems, at a regional or Member
State level, may be a major consideration in defining the relevant geographic market.83
Thus, for example, the Commission has indicated that the markets for organising systems
to deal with undertakings’ obligations, and the collection and sorting of packaging waste,
ELVs84 and WEEE,85 are national or regional markets at present, due to differences in
regulatory frameworks. In the case of general (non-packaging) waste, markets may be as
78 See, however, in the US context, FTC v Whole Food Market Inc (Unreported, August 23, 2007)(DG Cir
(US)), where the US Court of Appeals in Washington DC refused to block the merger of Whole Foods
Market and Wild Oats Markets on the ground, inter alia, that the FTC had failed to prove that “premium
natural and organic supermarkets” was an appropriate relevant product market. Rather, the relevant
product market had to be at least as broad as the retail sale of good and grocery items in supermarkets.
79 See Giotakos, “The Commission’s Review of the Aluminium Merger Wave” 2000 Competition Policy
Newsletter 2, 8 (aluminium and tinplate kept apart, as tinplate cans are less attractive to recycle).
80 See, for example, Case IV/M.402 Powergen/NRG Energy/Morrison Knudsen/Mibrag, decision of June 27,
1994 (brown coal more costly to process in an environmentally-friendly manner than other types of coal).
81 See, for example, Case COMP/M.3213 Umicore/OMG/Precious Metal Group, decision of July 29, 2003
(different technology required to recycle different types of waste).
82 See, for example, Case COMP/M.2588 Reinbraun Brennstoff/SSM Coal, decision of September 17, 2001,
where fuel grade petcoke was found not to be a substitute for coal to a sufficient degree because national
environmental regulations on sulphur dioxide emissions constrained the amount of fuel grade petcoke that
could be used in a blend with coal.
83 See in the environmental context, DSD OJ 2001 L 319/1 and M.575 Orkla/Volvo (Norway was a
separate geographical market due inter alia to environmental taxation scheme concerning packaging).
84 DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22,
2005, para 109.
85 DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22,
2005, para 150.
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narrow as municipal, due inter alia to the public procurement rules at issue.86 In contrast,
geographic markets for recovery of packaging waste, ELV, WEEE and secondary
material may, in the Commission’s view, be EU wide - though the Commission gives no
substantial reasoning for this conclusion.87 Similarly, restrictions on export of waste may
contribute to separate geographic markets.88
A second factor which the Commission has accepted to be important in defining the
relevant geographic market, and which may be of particular relevance here, is the
variation in national preferences and culture. As then-Commissioner Monti observed,
“Factors such as national preferences or preferences for national brands, language, culture and life
style…are all important factors in defining the relevant geographic market.”89
This could, it is argued, ultimately lead to different geographic market definitions in a
case where consumers in some (groups of) Member States have a definite preference for
environmentally-friendlier goods, if this is not the case in some other Member States.
A final area where environmental considerations may be relevant in defining geographic
markets is transport costs.90 Customers may not be willing to pay for the cost of
transport over and above a certain distance, meaning that the geographic market reaches
its limits.91 However, the importance of transport costs in defining the relevant market
will depend on the proportion which such costs comprise of the overall price.92 In
estimating acceptable shipping distances, for example, the Commission may examine the
average distance between a supplier and its customers and the radius within which a large
proportion of customers is located.93 On this point, one might imagine, changing
consumer preferences might, in the future play a role: should consumers, for
environmental reasons, shift strongly to prefer goods produced “closer to home” in the
case of foodstuffs, for example, this may ultimately lead to narrower geographic markets
86 See, for example, Case COMP/M.4318 Veolia/Cleanaway, decision of September 21, 2006, where a
market definition of the collection of municipal waste for London was considered – though not ultimately
decided upon – by the Commission. The distortionary effects of differing “green” public procurement
rules is to be tackled in an action plan announced by the Commission in 2008: Commission
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the regions, on the Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable
Industrial Policy Action Plan COM (2008) 397/3 and Communication on Green Public Procurement
COM (2008) 400/2. The Commission intends to link public procurement standards with standards
established by, for example, the Energy Labelling Directive, Directive 92/75 OJ 1992 L 297/16.
87 DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22,
2005, para 46. The Commission notes that some smaller Member States do not have recycling facilities
and have to export their waste to other Member States. See, in contrast, decisions such as Case
COMP/M.3213 Umicore/OMG/Precious Metal Group, decision of July 29, 2003, in which the markets for
recycling of platinum, gold and silver materials were held to be world wide.
88 Ibid, para 47. Case COMP/M.4318 Veolia/Cleanaway, decision of September 21, 2006 (geographic
market for processing hazardous waste is national, due to regulatory barriers to inter-state export)
89 Speech of October 5, 2001 “Market Definition as a cornerstone of EU Competition Policy”. An
example would be a national preference for Danish pork in Denmark. See also, Notice on Market
Definition, note 38 above and Case M.1313 Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier.
90 See DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September
22, 2005, para 46 and Case COMP/M.4318 Veolia/Cleanaway, decision of September 21, 2006.
91 See Bishop and Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (2nd ed.,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), 4.68 referring to cases in which the Commission has used the “Elzinga-
Hogarty” test on the relevance of transport costs.
92 See Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2006), at 3-076,
Notice on Market Definition paras 29 and 50 and M. 603 Crown Cork & Seal/Carnaud Metalbox.
93 See, for example, M.3431 Sonoco/Ahlstrom (Commission identifies proportions of parties’ sales by volume
to customers within particular radii and rejected parties’ argument that relevant geographic market covered
EEA as proportions of sales shipped more than 600 km was very small).
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being defined. In addition, should transport costs rise due, for example, to increased
taxation on polluting vehicles (e.g., road haulage), or indeed to increased petrol costs, this
could lead to narrower geographic market definitions.
4. Effect on inter-State trade
Another requirement of broad relevance for the application of much of Community
competition law - in particular, Articles 81, 82 and 87 EC - is the jurisdictional criterion
that the competitive restriction must have an effect on trade between Member States.94
The Commission’s 2004 Guidelines on the Effect on Trade criterion divide the effect on
inter-state trade requirement into three sub-concepts: the requirement of “trade between
Member States”; the requirement that the restriction “may affect” trade; and the requirement
that the effect be appreciable.95
a. Trade between Member States
An important point in the environmental context is that, in principle, purely
“environmental” agreements may not necessarily, in themselves, actually or potentially
restrict trade.96 The 2004 Guidelines take a broad view of the notion of trade:
“The concept of ‘trade’ is not limited to traditional exchanges of goods and services across borders.
It is a wider concept, covering all cross-border economic activity including establishment…the
concept of ‘trade’ also encompasses cases where agreements or practices affect the competitive
structure of the market.”97
Vedder, for instance, takes the example of an agreement between undertakings in
different Member States to reduce emissions as being unconnected with inter-state
trade.98 A further example of an agreement unconnected with “trade” was that at issue in
the EUCAR decision, which concerned an agreement between car manufacturers to
engage in research into environmentally friendlier cars.99 Nonetheless, as the polluter
pays principle is increasingly implemented at Community and Member State level and by
private undertakings, thus internalising environmental externalities within the pricing
mechanism (as described in Chapters 3 and 4), it will become increasingly difficult to
argue that environmental agreements are wholly unconnected with trade.100 Moreover, it
is submitted that the arguments set out in Part II confirm the validity of adopting a broad
notion of “trade” in this context. The interests of environmental protection favour such
a broad notion for the same reasons as they favour a broad interpretation of the concept
94 Note that the practical importance of this requirement has certainly become less relevant in recent years,
as many Member States’ national competition laws are now modelled on, and mirror closely, the equivalent
Community competition law provision. Nonetheless, the distinction between Community and national
competition law still retains relevance - for example, insofar as the initiation of proceedings by the
Commission for the adoption of a decision under Articles 81 or 82 EC automatically relieves national
competition authorities of their power to apply these articles (see Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 OJ
2003 L 1/1).
95 OJ 2004 C 101/81, point 18. Restrictions which do not satisfy the inter-state trade criterion may of
course, however, fall within the jurisdiction of national competition law - whether of Community or third
country states.
96 This may have been the conclusion, for example, in the Pro-Europe notification of 2001 C 153/4 –
COMP/38.051, which comprised inter alia a general licensing agreement where DSD granted to Pro
Europe the right to control the trademark outside Germany.
97 Note 95 above, points 19-20.
98 Vedder, Competition Law and Environmental Protection in Europe: Towards Sustainability? (Groningen, Europa
Law Publishing, 2003), 118.
99 See the Commission’s Annual Competition Report 1998 at 132.
100 Similarly, an agreement, for example, on an private “eco-label” might lower the economic output of
certain producers, or make it harder for non-labelled products to enter the market.
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of an undertaking - that is to say, subjecting a practice to competition rules in principle
increases efficiency in the provision of environmental goods and services.
b. “May affect” inter-state trade
As is well-known, this criterion was interpreted by the Court very early on in an
extremely broad fashion, as extending to any restriction,
“capable of constituting a threat, either direct or indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade
between member states in a manner which might harm the attainment of the objective of a single
market between states.”101
In its Notice on Effect on Trade, the Commission summarised the case law here as
requiring proof of:
(1) “A sufficient degree of probability [of an effect on trade] on the basis of a set of
objective factors of law or fact”;
(2) An influence on the “pattern of trade between Member States”;
(3) “A direct or indirect, actual or potential influence” on the pattern of trade.102
The very broad nature of the jurisdictional criterion means, for example, that the mere
fact that all parties to an (environmental) agreement are situated in one Member State,103
or that all parties to an (environmental) agreement are situated in non-EU countries,104
does not in itself take the agreement outside the scope of the Community competition
rules.105 One might also imagine that an agreement to export waste outside the
Community might also potentially restrict inter-state trade insofar as it might incidentally
restrict the re-importation of that waste for recovery.
In contrast, however, in the Dutch Stibat case, a (purely national) agreement on battery
take-back and recycling, including a standardised levy charged to producers for these
services, was found not to satisfy the inter-state trade criterion.106 As a result, the
Commission granted a comfort letter – despite the fact that the agreement involved over
90% of Dutch industry.107 An interesting comparison can be made between the outcome
in Stibat and that in the VOTOB decision,108 discussed further in Chapters 10 and 11, in
which the Commission chose to deal with an agreement between the six undertakings
with storage capacity for chemicals in the Netherlands whereby the undertakings decided
to impose a set “environmental surcharge” for their services, which varied according to
the polluting qualities of the chemical to be stored. It will be clear from the factual
similarities outlined above that the difference in approach between these two cases is
difficult to explain on objective grounds. Rather, it is submitted, it reflects an essentially
101 See, for example, Joined Cases 56, 58/64 Consten & Grundig [1966] ECR 429 and point 23 of the
Guidelines on Effect on Trade, note 95 above.
102 Ibid, point 24.
103 See, for example, the Eco-emballages (France), DSD (Germany), and VOTOB (the Netherlands) cases,
discussed in Chapters 10 and 11.
104 See for example, the negative clearance for equivalent commitments by the Association of Japanese
Automobile Manufacturers and the Association of Korean Automobile Manufacturers. See the
Commission’s Annual Competition Report 1998, at 160.
105 Thus, the Commission states that, “in many cases involving a single Member State the nature of the alleged
infringement, and in particular, its propensity to foreclose the national market, provides a good indication of the capacity of the
agreement or practice to affect trade between Member States.” Guidelines on Effect on Trade, note 95 above, point
77.
106 See the decisions of the Dutch competition authority (the NMa) of December 18, 1998 and May 31,
1999 in Case 51/98 Stibat and Case 3142/02 (on prolongation of the exemption).
107 The case then fell to be assessed by the Dutch competition authority.
108 XXIInd Competition Report 1992, paras 177-186.
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political decision on the Commission’s part. Though Stibat may, therefore, be rather
surprising from a substantive perspective, it is in this sense analogous to the (heavily
politically influenced) approach adopted by the Commission in another non-economic
area – culture – when considering the German resale price maintenance scheme for
German language books.109
c. Appreciable effect on inter-state trade
It was established early on in the Court’s case law that only restrictions with an
appreciable effect on inter-state trade would fall within the scope of the Community
competition rules.110 In effect, this constitutes the outer limit of the jurisdictional scope
of Community competition law. In its 2004 Notice on Effect on Trade, the Commission
states that, “the assessment of appreciability depends on the circumstances of each individual case, in
particular the nature of the agreement and practice, the nature of the products covered and the market
position of the undertakings concerned.”111 In that Notice, the Commission sets out
quantitative indications of its view of the market share and turnover thresholds which an
agreement must fall below if it has no appreciable effect on inter-state trade.112 However,
the more serious the restriction which is at issue - such as cross-border cartels, cross-
border horizontal agreements or cross-border abuses - the more likely it is that the effect
on inter-state trade will be judged appreciable.
The notion of appreciable effect on inter-state trade should be distinguished from the
Commission’s quantification, as set out in its Notice on Agreements of Minor
Importance, of situations where it will not consider a restriction to have an appreciable
effect on competition, meaning that it will not institute proceedings in such
circumstances (the de minimis rule).113 Again, it sets out market share thresholds as
guidance for situations where a restriction is unlikely to be considered to have an
appreciable effect on competition. Agreements containing hard core restrictions will not
be considered to be de minimis.
These criteria apply in the same way to environment-related activities as to other
activities. Moreover, it is submitted, the arguments set out in Part II are, in themselves,
neutral on the issue of how these appreciability elements should be interpreted. The
reason for this is that, as these elements essentially delimit the boundary between the
application of Community competition law and national competition law, the interests of
environmental protection are not per se favoured by interpreting them in a broader, or
indeed narrower, fashion.114
109The German government had called upon the Commission to keep in mind cultural policy in deciding
whether to prohibit the resale price maintenance scheme for German language books, a position which had
been reinforced by the Council (see the Council Resolution on fixed book prices in homogeneous cross-
border linguistic areas OJ [1999] C 42/3). The ultimate solution - that the agreement did not have an
effect on trade between Member States, so that Article 81(1) EC did not apply in the first place - was
announced by Commissioner Monti, then Competition Commissioner, as having been arrived at by
maintaining “regular contacts” with the Commissioner for Education and Culture, and was fully supported by
that Commissioner (IP/00/183).
110 See, for instance, Case 22/71 Béguelin Import [1971] ECR 949, at para 16.
111 Guidelines on Effect on Trade, note 95 above, point 45.
112 In that Notice, the Commission indicates that it generally considers there to be no appreciable effect on
trade in the case of horizontal agreements, for instance, where the parties’ combined market share on any
relevant market within the Community is less than 5%, and the aggregate annual turnover of the parties
concerned in the products covered by the agreement is less than €40 million. Ibid.
113 Notice on agreements of minor importance OJ 2001 C 368/13.
114 One might imagine an argument that environmental interests favour a broad interpretation of the
jurisdictional requirement, on the ground that bringing a practice within the scope of competition law
increases efficiency in production and the provision of services. Such an argument fails, however, as
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practices which fall outside the scope of Community competition law may still, of course, fall within the
scope of national competition law.
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Chapter 10: Article 81(1) EC
1. Introduction
Article 81(1) EC provides:
“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.”
This Chapter considers whether, and how, Article 81(1) EC can be applied in the context of
agreements with environmental protection objectives. It deals in turn with the two elements
of Article 81(1): (1) an agreement, decision by an association of undertakings, or concerted
practice; which (2) has the object or effect of restricting competition.1
As a preliminary point, the main type of environmental protection instrument which may
engage Article 81(1) is what are termed “voluntary environmental agreements”, which we
considered in Chapter 4. As noted there, “environmental agreements” was defined very
broadly by the Commission in its Horizontal Guidelines, as well as in a 2002
Communication, as,
“those by which stakeholders undertake to achieve pollution abatement, as defined in environmental
law, or environmental objectives set out in Article 174 EC.”2
As also noted, such environmental agreements may be divided broadly into two types: self
regulation (where an agreement is put in place solely by undertakings on a voluntary basis)
and co-regulation (where the legislator establishes the key elements of the regulation). As we
saw, the Commission - in DG Environment-led documents - signalled its approval and
encouragement of the use of environmental agreements in Communications of 1996 and
2002.
2. Agreements, decisions by an association of undertakings, or concerted practices
Clearly, in order to fall within the concept of an “agreement” between undertakings, it is not
necessary for the agreement to be legally binding, as long as there is a common intention
1 Effect on trade and the scope of the concept of an undertaking have been dealt with in the previous Chapter.
2 Communication on Environmental Agreements, COM (2002) 412 final. See also, Horizontal Cooperation
Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, at point 180: “the target or the measures agreed need to be directly linked to the reduction of a
pollutant or a type of waste identified as such in relevant regulations” and does not extend to “agreements that trigger pollution
abatement as a by-product of other measures.”
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expressed in a way that gives rise to an obligation.3 In contrast, a concerted practice, while
requiring common intention, does not require a legally or morally binding obligation. As
indicated in Chapter 4, environmental self-regulatory agreements may take the form of
binding agreements or “gentlemen’s agreements”. As long as the arrangement contains a
common intention expressed in a way that gives rise to an obligation, it will qualify as an
“agreement” within the meaning of Article 81(1); if a common intention can be proven but
no legally or morally binding obligation, it will qualify as a concerted practice.4 A point of
some interest in the environmental context is that, in order to fall within Article 81(1), the
agreement, decision or practice must be voluntary. This is of particular relevance to co-
regulation, as it raises the issue of whether the “state action” defence, discussed further in
Chapter 14, applies.
3. Object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition on the market
a. Overview of the concept of “restriction of competition”
The Commission’s current thinking on the concept of “restriction of competition” under
Article 81(1) EC is set out in its 2004 Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) (the
“Article 81(3) Guidelines”).5 The Guidelines are an example of the Commission’s
movement towards economics-driven, consumer-welfare focused6 reasoning. Clearly, any
agreement with the object of restricting competition falls within Article 81(1) EC.7 As
regards agreements with an alleged restrictive effect, the Commission will make its
assessment “within the actual context in which competition would occur in the absence of the agreement
with its alleged restrictions.”8 The focus at all times is on “how and to what extent the agreement affects
or is likely to affect competition on the market”.9 The Commission will look, in particular, at two
issues:
(1) Does the agreement restrict actual or potential competition that would have existed
without the agreement? If so, the agreement may be caught by Article 81(1), as it restricts
inter-brand competition.
(2) Does the agreement restrict actual or potential competition that would have existed in
the absence of the contractual restraint(s)? If so, the agreement may be caught by Article
81(1), as it restricts intra-brand competition.10 In the Guidelines, the Commission takes
3 See generally, Bellamy and Child, European Community Law of Competition (6th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell,
2008), 2.022 onwards.
4 Note the Commission’s warning that the meaning of “agreement” within Article 81(1) does not necessarily
correspond to the definition of an “agreement” in Commission documents dealing with environmental issues,
such as the Communication on environmental agreements COM(96) 561 final: see Horizontal Guidelines, note
2 above, footnote 50.
5 OJ 2004 C 101/97.
6 Ibid, for example, at point 21.
7 Ibid, points 20-23. The Commission indicates that “hard core” restrictions will normally be presumed to have
a restrictive object, i.e. per se restrictions – price fixing, sharing markets, limiting output, fixing minimum resale
prices, imposing export bans.
8 Ibid, point 17.
9 Ibid, point 18.
10 As Kjolbe, a Commission official, clarifies, “In the absence of restrictions of inter-brand competition, the agreement can
only restrict competition created by the agreement, namely intra-brand competition. If in the absence of a particular restraint the
agreement would not have been concluded, no competition would have been created in the absence of the restraint. Consequently,
there is no competition to restrict…” Kjolbye, “The New Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article
81(3): An Economic Approach to Article 81” (2004) European Competition Law Review 570, at 568.
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the example of a situation where a supplier restricts its distributors from competing with
each other, so that (potential) competition that could have existed between the
distributors absent the restraints is restricted. Such restrictions include resale price
maintenance and territorial or customer sales restrictions between distributors.11
A further aspect to the economic approach adopted in the Article 81(3) Guidelines, as well
as in the Vertical and Horizontal Guidelines, is the emphasis on the importance on market
power in assessing whether competition is restricted.12 As a result, the Commission states
that it will normally be necessary to define the relevant market in order to apply Article
81.13
In addition, even where the main transaction is non-restrictive of competition, the
Commission states that it may also be necessary to examine any individual “ancillary
restraints” present in the agreement, to see whether they are “directly related and necessary to the
implementation of a main non-restrictive transaction and proportionate to it.”14 In contrast to Article
81(3), application of the “ancillary restraint” concept does not as such involve any weighing
of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects.15
b. Restrictions “objectively necessary” for an agreement to exist and the
“rule of reason” debate
In the Article 81(3) Guidelines, the Commission also indicates that some restraints may
not be caught by Article 81(1) when the restraint is “objectively necessary for the existence of an
agreement of that type or that nature.” Such an analysis can,
“only be made on the basis of objective factors external to the parties themselves and not the subjective
views and characteristics of the parties. The question is not whether the parties in their particular
situation would not have accepted to conclude a less restrictive agreement, but whether given the nature of
11 Examples one might point to from the case law illustrating this principle include Case 56/65 Société Technique
Minière [1966] ECR 235 and Case 26/76 Metro I [1977] ECR 1875, where the Commission decided that
restrictive provisions contained in a selective distribution system may fall outside Article 81(1) where they
satisfy objective, qualitative criteria and are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. On appeal, the Court
upheld the Commission decision, as the interest in maintaining the channel of distribution “forms one of the
objectives which may be pursued without necessarily falling under the prohibition contained in Article [81(1)]…This argument is
strengthened if, in addition, such conditions promote improved competition inasmuch as it relates to factors other than prices.” This
approach has since been confirmed, inter alia, in the Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints OJ 2000 C
291/1. See further, the cases cited by Bellamy and Child, note 3 above, at 2.089 onwards.
12 Article 81(3) Guidelines, note 5 above, point 25.
13 Ibid, point 27. See also, the Vertical Guidelines, point 11 above, and the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
OJ 2001 C 3/2.
14 Article 81(3) Guidelines, note 5 above, point 29. Note that the term “ancillary restraints” is also common in
merger analysis. See Eijsbouts, Jans, Vogelaar, Europees Recht: Algemeen Deel (Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2006), at 171-172, where Vogelaar argues that the concept of “ancillary restraints” is in fact a
species of the genus “inherent restriction” (discussed below), whereby an acceptable ancillary restraint must be
limited in time, but an acceptable inherent restriction need not be.
15 A final point to note is that, where agreements tend to frustrate the single market goal – such as market-
partitioning agreements - they will normally be found to restrict competition within the meaning of Article
81(1). However, in Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline [2006] ECR II-2969, the CFI clarified that, in order to fall
within Article 81(1), agreements restricting parallel trade must still be shown to have as their object or effect
the restriction of competition: see para 120, clarifying Cases 56 & 58/64 Consten and Grundig [1966] ECR 299, at
340.
165
the agreement and the characteristics of the market a less restrictive agreement would not have been
concluded by undertakings in a similar setting.”16
Among the examples given by the Commission in the Guidelines is a prohibition imposed
on all distributors on sale to certain categories of end users where the restraint is “objectively
necessary for reasons of safety or health related to the dangerous nature of the product in question.”17
Some commentators have described this principle as a type of “rule of reason.”18 The
meaning of the rule of reason concept, and whether the concept exists within Community
competition law, has given rise to considerable controversy in the Community courts, the
Commission and academia. It remains a considerably murky area of Community
competition law. However, a number of points are clear.
First, it is vital in any debate in this area to clarify what is meant by a “rule of reason”.
There is no one, universally accepted, meaning of the “rule of reason” concept. Hence,
commentators who dispute its existence in Community competition law are often arguing
at cross-purposes.19
Second, if by “rule of reason” is meant a US-style20 balancing process between the pro-
competitive and anti-competitive effects of an agreement, the CFI has made clear in
judgments such as Van den Bergh, Métropole, and European Night Services21 that no such
concept exists in Community law. Rather, such balancing occurs within Article 81(3).22
Third, if by “rule of reason” is meant a role for certain non-economic factors to be taken
into account in assessing whether a restriction of competition exists under Article 81(1),
the Community courts - and, in particular, the ECJ - have, in certain judgments,
confirmed such an approach. This can be seen as an application of the “objective
justification” analysis referred to, as noted above, in the Commission’s Article 81(3)
Guidelines. The use of the term “rule of reason” to describe such an approach in the
Community law context is easily understandable, given its analogy to the so-called “rule of
reason” approach adopted by the ECJ in its free movement of goods judgments on the
16 Article 81(3) Guidelines, note 5 above, point 18.
17 The Commission also refers to case law such as Case 258/78 Nungesser [1982] ECR 2015.
18See, for example, Bourgeois and Bocken, “Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty or
How to Restrict a Restriction” 32(2) Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2005) 11.
19 See further, Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules (2nd ed., The Hague, Kluwer,
2002), at 220, Robertson, “What is a restriction of competition? The Implications of the CFI’s judgment in O2
Germany and the Rule of Reason” (2007) European Competition Law Review 28(4) 252, and Wesseling, “The
rule of reason in EC competition law” in Rethinking another Classic of EC Legal Doctrine (Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005).
20 As adopted by the US Courts in interpreting the Sherman Act prohibitions, beginning with Justice White in
the Trans-Missouri case of 1897, discussed by Bork in Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New
York, Basic Books, 1978, 1993 reprint with new introduction and epilogue), at 22. See further, Elhauge and
Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics (Oxford, Hart, 2007), at 174.
21 Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods [2003] ECR II-4653, para 106, Case T-112/99 Métropole [2001] ECR II-
2459, paras 73-76, Case T-34/94 European Night Services [1998] ECR II-314, para 136.
22 Guidelines on Article 81(3), note 5 above, point 10. Nicolaides summarises the “consensus” here as follows:
“Although an agreement is assessed on all the relevant economic facts and often this requires a determination of whether the
restrictions contained in an agreement are necessary for the placing of a product on the market, the weighting of any efficiency gains
and pro-competitive effects, which is an indispensable element of the US rule of reason is left for Art. 81(3). The assessment in
Art. 81(1) is about the necessity of restrictions rather than the efficiency or competition impact of restrictions. It is certainly not
about the weighing of pro- and anti-competitive effects…” Nicolaides, “The Balancing Myth: The Economics of Article
81(1) & (3)” 32(2) Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2005) 123, at 131.
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scope of Article 28 EC, starting with the classic judgment Cassis de Dijon.23 In other words,
only restraints which are, in the context of the objective pursued, “unreasonable”, fall
within the scope of Article 81(1). However, due to the risk of confusing what is meant
with the US “rule of reason”, the doctrine might more clearly be described as the
“inherent restriction” principle. One can point to a variety of judgments as illustrative of
this principle, including early cases such as Gøttrup-Klim and Campari.24 More recently,
leading judgments include those on labour policy and collective bargaining in cases such as
Albany, Brentjens, Drijvende Bokken and Pavlov; and the judgment on lawyers’ regulatory rules
in Wouters.25
i. Early cases
In Gøttrup-Klim, for example, the Court held that a provision in the statutes of a Danish
cooperative purchasing association, which forbade its members from participating in other
forms of organised cooperation in direct competition with it, did not necessarily restrict
competition. In the Court’s view, the provision would not be caught by Article 81(1) if it
was proportionate (i.e., limited to what was necessary to ensure that the co-operative
functions properly and maintains its contractual power in relation to producers).26 The
Court and/or Commission also accepted, in earlier cases, that prima facie restrictions on
competition could be “objectively justified” by reasons such as the need to maintain quality
control (in, for example, Campari, Pronuptia and Windsurfing International);27 the need to avoid
damaging the product itself (in, for example, D’Ieteren Motor Oils) 28 and the need to safeguard
consumer health (in, for example, Kathon Biocide and Tetra Pak)29. If the restriction was
objectively justified and proportionate to its aim, it would fall outside the scope of Article
81(1).30
ii. More recent cases: Albany and Brentjens
In Albany, the ECJ held that, in principle, collective bargaining between organisations
representing employers and employees falls outside the scope of Article 81 EC. In so
holding, the ECJ reasoned that the Community’s activities within the meaning of Article 3
EC included not only a competition policy, but also a “policy in the social sphere.” The Court
conclusion was heavily based on the social policy aspect of the cases, reasoning that
certain competitive restrictions are inherent to collective agreements and for this reason
fall outside Article 81(1) EC:
“It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements
between organisations representing employers and workers. However, the social policy objectives pursued
by such agreements would be seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to Article
23 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649.
24 Case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim [1994] ECR I-5641, Campari OJ 1978 L 70/69.
25 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, Joined Cases C-115-117/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025, Case C-
219/97 Drijvende Bokken [1999] ECR I-6121, Joined Cases C-180 & 184/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451, Case C-
309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577.
26 Gøttrup-Klim, note 24 above.
27 Campari, note 24 above, Case 161/84 Pronuptia [1986] ECR 353, Case 193/83 Windsurfing International [1986]
ECR 611.
28 OJ 1991 L 20/42.
29 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II [1994] ECR II-755.
30 More broadly, earlier judgments such as Société Technique Minière, Metro I and Nungesser (notes 11 and 17 above)
may, to a certain extent, be viewed as illustrations of this principle in an intra-brand context, dealing with the
objective justification for exclusive or selective distribution networks.
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[81](1) of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and
employment. It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which
is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations between
management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be
regarded as falling outside the scope of Article [81](1) of the Treaty.”31
The Court has confirmed this “inherent restrictions” approach in numerous subsequent
social policy cases, including Brentjens (concerning, as was the case in Albany, a collective
agreement setting up a supplementary pension scheme managed by a pension fund to which
affiliation may be made compulsory) and Pavlov (also concerning a collective agreement
regarding a pension fund).32
iii. Wouters
In Wouters, the ECJ seemed to follow a similar approach, this time in the context of a
regulation of the Dutch bar banning multi-disciplinary partnerships. In finding that the
regulation did not constitute a restriction of competition contrary to Article 81(1), it seemed
to apply an “objective justification”-style approach:
“[N]ot every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which
restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid
down in [Article 81(1)] of the Treaty. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular
case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of
undertakings was taken or produces its effects. More particularly, account must be taken of its
objectives, which are here connected with the need to make rules relating to organisation, qualifications,
professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure that the ultimate consumers of legal
services and the sound administration of justice are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to
integrity and experience…It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of
competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives.”33
As accountants, in contrast to lawyers, were not subject to a code of professional conduct,
the Court reasoned, it did not appear that the restrictive effects of the regulation went
“beyond what is necessary in order to ensure the proper practice of the legal profession.”34 In other words,
“reasonable” regulatory rules did not fall within the scope of Article 81(1) EC.35 In so
holding, the ECJ rejected the approach of Advocate General Léger, who had concluded that
the regulations amounted to a restriction of competition under Article 81(1). AG Léger had
argued that Article 81(1) only allows for an assessment whether, in view of all the
circumstances, an agreement on balance restricted competition: it allowed for,
“a purely competitive balance-sheet36 of the effects of the agreements…The only legitimate goal which
may be pursued in accordance with that provision is therefore exclusively competitive in nature.”37
iv. Discussion
31 Albany, note 25 above, paras 59-60.
32Brentjens and Pavlov, note 25 above. Likewise, in Van der Woude, the Court held that a collective agreement for
a health care insurance scheme fell within the de minimis doctrine, as the purpose of the agreement was to
improve working conditions: Case C-22/98 [2000] ECR I-7111.
33 Wouters, note 25 above, para 97. See also, the Commission’s decision in EPI Code of Conduct OJ 1999 L
106/14.
34 Ibid, para 26.
35 See also, Belgian Architects Association OJ 2005 L 4/10.
36 “Bilan économique”.
37 Opinion in Wouters, note 25 above, para 104.
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It is clear that, in view of the earlier decisional practice discussed above, as well as cases such
as Wouters and Albany, it is possible in certain cases to balance (legitimate) non-competition
objectives of a measure against what would otherwise constitute a restriction of competition
under Article 81(1). Where the competitive restrictions are deemed inherent in an
agreement’s legitimate non-competition objectives, such that the agreement would not have
been concluded in the absence of the restriction, Article 81(1) is not infringed. The question
is to what extent can the reasoning in such judgments apply by analogy to restrictions
inherent in environmental protection measures. On this issue, a number of points can be
made.
First, in the case of judgments like Albany and Brentjens, the Court’s use of the concept of
inherent restrictions can be seen as aimed at achieving a balance between the Community’s
competition policy, as an activity set out in Article 3(1)(g) EC, and principles of the
Community’s social policy, including a respect for the outcome of collective bargaining
procedures. As such, from Chapter 6’s systematic perspective, the Court rightly sought to
achieve a compromise between these two policy fields, making clear that competition policy
does not “trump” social policy, and that restrictions inherent in, and proportionate to the
aim of, collective agreements fall outside the scope of Article 81(1) EC. From Chapter 7’s
governance perspective, such cases support the “realist’s” argument made there, insofar as they
constitute good examples of the Court’s taking non-economic factors (in this case, the aims
and means of the Community’s social policy) into account in interpreting and applying the
competition provisions of the Treaty. As a result, though on their facts these cases concern
the specific legal context of collective bargaining, the Court’s reasoning is also implicitly
encouraging as an indication of its potential approach to the interrelation between
competition and environmental policy objectives. Were the Court to be faced with a
competitive restriction in an environmental agreement which is objectively necessary to the
achievement of the agreement’s environmental objective, such that these objectives would
be “seriously undermined” were the restriction to fall within Article 81(1) EC, Albany and
Brentjens should be interpreted by analogy to mean that Article 81(1) EC does not apply.
Secondly, in the case of the Wouters judgment, in contrast, the Court applies a “rule of
reason” in a different context - that of regulation of a profession - holding that restrictions
necessary to ensure the “proper practice of the legal profession” did not come under the Article
81(1) EC prohibition. There seems no reason why this reasoning should be confined to the
regulation of professions.38 Rather, the Court’s reasoning here could apply in the context of
any public interest regulatory tasks being performed by private undertakings or associations
of undertakings, at least where such regulation would otherwise likely have had to be carried
out by the state. Thus, it is submitted, privately-run regulatory systems set up for
environmental protection purposes, where such regulation would likely otherwise have been
undertaken by the state, be viewed as falling within the Wouters logic. This would mean that
what would otherwise amount to competitive restrictions would, if inherent in, and
38 As Giorgio Monti argues, Wouters “introduces a “new generation” of public policy arguments which can now be used to
exclude the application of the competition rules.” Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” 39 CML Rev (2002) 1057,
at 1088. See also, the Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège
[2000] ECR I-2549, who reasoned that, “rules which, at first sight, reduce competition, but are necessary precisely in order to
enable market forces to function or secure some other legitimate aim, should not be regarded as infringing the Community provision
on competition” (para 110). The ECJ did not consider the issue.
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necessary for, the achievement of the regulation’s environmental protection goals, fall
outside the scope of Article 81(1).39
On this point, I must disagree with Loozen, who has argued that the Wouters reasoning
cannot be applied by analogy to environmental protection regulation as,
“competition rules merely protect the public interest of effective competition. The protection of the
environment covers another public interest safeguarded by the state in other policies…”40
With respect, this approach is too simplistic. It takes as its starting point the view that “the
basic assumption underlying the EC Treaty is that the state safeguards the public interest, whilst
undertakings act in their own, private interests.”41 As has been argued consistently above, this
dichotomy between public and private interest, while superficially attractive, is inappropriate
and outmoded in the area of environmental protection. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4,
one of the key features of modern environmental policy, and one viewed as crucial if
effective environmental protection is ever to be achieved, is the privatisation of
environmental policy making, via the enrolment of private actors in situations where state-
led action has proven to be ineffective. Loozen’s approach ignores this development which,
as argued in Chapter 6, has blurred the distinction between the public and private sectors in
this area. Moreover, her approach runs counter to the imperative, as also argued in Chapter
6, of interpreting the Treaty’s competition rules in a systematic manner and in conformity
with Article 6 EC.42 Further, it is submitted that Chapter 7’s governance argument suggests
that the Court would, in practice, be more likely to adopt a more holistic, systematic
approach were the matter to arise before it (and judgments such as Albany are good
examples of such an approach).
A further issue arising from Wouters is the question of which body has the final say as to
what restrictions are necessary and essential in order to carry out the regulatory task at hand.
In Wouters, the Court accepted that the ban on multi-disciplinary partnerships could, as the
Dutch Bar contended, reasonably be considered to be essential to the sound administration
of justice, as it was consistent with the fundamental principles of independence and
professional secrecy governing the Dutch Bar. This can be contrasted, for instance, with the
decision of the Dutch competition authority (the NMa) in its NOVA decisions. In NOVA
I, the NMa considered the compatibility of the Dutch bar’s prohibition on contingency fee
(i.e., no win, no fee) arrangements with the Dutch equivalent of Article 81(1) EC. Rejecting
the Dutch Minister of Justice’s position that the rule followed from the fundamental
principles applicable to members of the Dutch bar, so that lawyer should not have a financial
interest in the outcome of a case, the NMa considered that the prohibition constituted a
restriction of competition which was not objectively necessary for the sound administration
of justice (as it did not follow directly from the bar’s fundamental principles).43 The NMa’s
39 Giorgio Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” 39 CML Rev (2002) 1057. See also, Wesseling, The
Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford, Hart, 2000).
40 Loozen, “Professional Ethics and Restraints of Competition” (2006) 31(1) EL Rev 28, at 46.
41 Ibid, at 33.
42 See, for instance, the approach in Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879, at paras 41-43
(discussed in Chapter 6), where the Court uses Article 2 EC (providing that one of the goals of the Community
is the achievement of a high level of protection of the environment) and Article 6 EC (the integration principle,
discussed in Chapter 2) to interpret Article 47 EU and Article 175 EC.
43 Decision of the NMa of Feb.21, 2002 in Case No. 560 (NOVA I ), at points 65-75. See also, on further
developments following NOVA I, the 2005 Annual Report (Jaarverslag) of the NMa, at 11.
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position seems right, and transposable to the interpretation of Article 81(1): the Wouters test
asks what is objectively necessary for the regulatory task to be performed, rather than what
the regulator views as being necessary.
As a result, it is submitted that, where a competitive restriction is objectively necessary to the
achievement of an agreement’s environmental objectives, such that the agreement would not
otherwise have been entered into (Albany, Brentjens), or is necessary to carry out an
environmental regulatory task (Wouters), it falls within point 4 of Chapter 6’s working
hypothesis on the implications of the Article 6 EC integration principle. In other words, it
constitutes a situation where it is possible to interpret Article 81(1) in a way that favours
environmental protection, and there is a potential conflict with the goals of competition
policy, such that the proportionality principle applies to resolve this conflict. As argued in
Chapter 6, this means that, where a private measure is necessary to achieve the Community’s
environmental policy goals, and there is no less restrictive means of achieving this goal, the
measure should be allowed under Article 81(1) EC. In effect, it is submitted, the Court’s
reasoning in these judgments demonstrates precisely this kind of proportionality-based
approach.
One can also arrive at this conclusion on the basis that, from an economic perspective as
discussed in Chapter 8, the environmental benefits flowing from an agreement should,
where reasonably quantifiable, be taken into account in assessing whether the agreement
leads to economic inefficiency, and thus is restrictive of competition. Article 81(1) is
engaged only where such benefits are outweighed by the agreement’s restrictive, utility-
reducing effects. However, it should be noted that such economic reasoning is not
immediately apparent from judgments like Albany and Wouters, which are more evidently
explained on the basis of the Court’s systematic, coherence-based approach to judicial
reasoning.
Thirdly, it is admitted that a possible doctrinal criticism of this approach is that, even though
it has indisputably been adopted in a variety of cases to date, it could potentially elide the
analyses of Article 81(1) and Article 81(3). If the analysis under Article 81(1) extends to
considering whether a prima facie restriction is objectively justified and proportionate, how
does this differ from the function of Article 81(3)? This is indeed a valid question. To
answer it properly requires us to take a view on the function of Article 81(3), which will be
discussed in greater detail in the following Chapter. For the present, however, three points
are important.
To begin, it is arguable that the function of the inherent restriction doctrine, as described
above, is different to the function of Article 81(3) EC - though the Court has never been
explicit about this. By this argument, the inherent restriction doctrine under Article 81(1)
would apply where an agreement aimed at achieving a legitimate non-competition objective
would not have been entered into in the absence of the restriction. In contrast, Article 81(3)
EC would apply where, while the measure might have been entered into without the
restriction, the presence of the restriction generates greater efficiencies within the meaning
of Article 81(3) EC and is indispensable to achievement of the objective. In addition, Article
81(1) and 81(3) remain very different as, in order to evade prohibition under Article 81(3),
four conditions must be satisfied, rather than a pure proportionality test, as is the case for
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public policy objective justifications under Article 81(1).44 Finally, and in any event, since
Regulation 1/2003 and the “modernisation” of the enforcement of Article 81, the practical
distinction between escaping Article 81(1) altogether via objective justification, and escaping
prohibition via Article 81(3), has decreased. The burden of proof in each situation lies on
the parties to the agreement. Further, since the abolition of the exemption system, parties
do not receive formal Article 81(3) exemption decisions in response to notifications to the
Commission;45 similarly, national courts can now apply the whole of Article 81, not just
Article 81(1).
It is important to admit, however, that Part II’s arguments are to a certain extent agnostic
as to whether environmental protection requirements are taken into account in the
context of Article 81(1) or 81(3), as long as the practical outcome is the same - that is,
non-prohibition of agreements the competitive restrictions of which are proportionate to
their environmental benefits. The argument is confined to the point that, to the extent
that an inherent restriction approach has been adopted for other non-economic objectives
(e.g., social policy in Albany) and other regulatory tasks (Wouters), it should also be adopted
for environmental protection measures in similar situations.
Fourthly, it is interesting to note that the Albany, Brentjens and Wouters judgments bring the
Court’s interpretation of the scope of Article 81(1) closer to its approach to justifications for
indistinctly applicable measures which restrict free movement of goods under Article 28 EC
(as epitomised by Cassis de Dijon), as well as indirectly discriminatory measures which restrict
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services under Articles 43 and 49 EC.46
In each instance, the outcome of the Court’s case law is to enable a restrictive measure to be
justified otherwise than by recourse to the express derogation(s) set out in the Treaty (i.e.,
Articles 81(3), 30, 46 and 55 respectively). Indeed, on the basis of the systematic argument set
out in Chapter 6, it is submitted that the rapprochement between the two areas in itself
supports the validity of the Court’s reasoning in these cases. Moreover, it is submitted, the
ECJ’s reasoning in these cases is an excellent example of the governance argument – positing
coherence in judicial reasoning between separate areas of Community law - in action.
Arguably, however, the Viking and Laval judgments demonstrate that the Court has gone
even further in taking non-economic considerations into account in assessing the scope of
Article 81(1) in judgments like Albany and Brentjens than it is prepared to do in assessing the
scope of Articles 43 and 49 EC.47 In Viking, for example, the Court expressly dismissed the
Finnish trade unions’ arguments that the reasoning in Albany should be applied in the Article
43 EC context such that restrictions on establishment inherent in collective action flowing
from a collective agreement should fall wholly outside the scope of Article 43 EC. In
44 See Mortelmans, who argues that the Article 81(1) route may be more attractive for environmental
justifications for this reason: Mortelmans, “Towards Convergence in the Application of the Rules on Free
Movement and on Competition?” 38 CML Rev (2001) 613, at 641.
45 It is, however, still open to the Commission to give a finding of “inapplicability” under Article 10 of
Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L 1/1, to the effect that Article 81 of the Treaty is not applicable to an agreement,
a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice. However, such a finding may be made
either because the conditions of Article 81(1) of the Treaty are not fulfilled, or because the conditions of Article
81(3) of the Treaty are satisfied.
46 See Mortelmans, note 44 above.
47 Case C-438/05 Viking, judgment of December 11, 2007, not yet reported, and Case C-341/05 Laval,
judgment of December 18, 2007, not yet reported.
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particular, the Court refused to accept that it was inherent “in the very exercise of trade union
rights and the right to take collective action” that freedom of establishment would be restricted.48
More generally, the whole idea of objective justification and inherent restriction in this sense,
it should be noted, sets the Community regime firmly apart from that of the US. Most
commentators would agree that, in accordance with Chicago School theory, the US regime
does not allow for non-competition policy factors to be taken into account in deciding
whether competition is restricted: rather, as noted above, the inquiry is restricted into
assessing whether the pro-competitive effects of an agreement or provision outweigh its
anti-competitive effects.49
Finally, it is interesting to note that Albany and Wouters, as applications of the inherent
restriction doctrine, were decided by the ECJ, and not the CFI. It was admitted in Chapter
7’s governance argument that the realist limb of that argument may be more forceful in the
case of the ECJ than the CFI (i.e., the argument that, in practice, the Community courts are
not likely to refuse to take environmental protection factors into account in competition
analysis), because the ECJ deals more frequently with environmental policy and cross-cutting
issues involving a variety of Community policy areas, whereas the CFI is more specialised in
terms of time devoted to competition cases. However, the fact that the CFI was not the first
to come out with judgments such as Albany and Wouters may equally, it is submitted, be
explained on the ground that it is not open to the CFI, to the same extent, to make new
departures (as these cases were) in fundamental competition law principles of Treaty
interpretation.
c. Relevance of environmental factors to the concept of “restriction”: some
practical examples
Having surveyed the applicable theoretical framework, we move now to consider some
examples of situations in which environmental agreements can be considered to restrict
competition within the meaning of Article 81(1), considering in turn agreements with actual
or potential competitors (“horizontal” situations) and agreements with undertakings which
are not actual or potential competitors (“vertical” situations).
i. Horizontal situations
The starting point here is the Commission’s 2001 Horizontal Guidelines, chapter 7 of which
is devoted to “environmental agreements”. The Commission distinguishes between three
categories of environmental agreement: those which do not fall under Article 81(1); those
which may fall under Article 81(1); and those which “almost always” fall under this provision.
48 Viking, ibid, para 52. The Court added, at para 53, that “the fact that an agreement or an activity are excluded from the
scope of the provisions of the Treaty on competition does not mean that that agreement or activity also falls outside the scope of the
Treaty provisions on the free movement of persons or services since those two sets of provisions are to be applied in different
circumstances.” Nonetheless, there remains a certain degree of similarity between the Court’s reasoning in Albany
and Viking/Laval judgments: the Court’s acceptance, in principle, of the validity of a justification on grounds of
protection of workers and maintenance of employment conditions in Viking and Laval was based on its
observation that the Community has “not only an economic but also a social purpose” (Laval, para 105). This was also,
as we have seen, the basis for its conclusion in Albany.
49 Thus, Elhauge and Geradin suggest that, if Wouters had been decided under US law, the US courts would not
consider the justification to be pro-competitive, as it amounts to an argument that competition should be
decreased to increase quality. Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics (Oxford, Hart, 2007),
at 180 and see Chapter 5’s discussion of the difference in relevance of the Chicago School approach in the US,
compared to the EU.
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An environmental agreement is “not likely” to fall under Article 81(1), irrespective of the
aggregated market share of the parties, in three situations.
First, this is so if “no precise individual obligation is placed upon the parties or if they are loosely
committed to contributing to the attainment of a sector-wide environmental target.”50 This will be assessed
by looking at the extent of the discretion left to the parties as to the means that are
technically and economically available in order to attain the environmental objective agreed
upon. The more varied such means, the less appreciable the potential restrictive effects. In
ACEA, for example, the Commission found an agreement between members of the
European association of automobile manufacturers to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from
cars did not appreciably restrict competition. This was for a number of reasons: the parties
had only agreed on a sector-wide emissions reduction aim, rather than a binding obligation
for individual parties; and parties were left free to decide the technical means by which they
would meet the aim.51
Secondly, if the agreements set the environmental performance of products that “do not
appreciably affect product and production diversity in the relevant market or whose importance is marginal for
influencing purchase decisions.”52 This may apply, for example, where categories of a product are
in any event banned from the markets.
Thirdly, if the agreements “give rise to genuine market creation…provided that and for as long as, the
parties would not be capable of conducting the activities in isolation, whilst other alternatives and/or
competitors do not exist.”53 The Commission gives the example of recycling agreements in this
regard (though, interestingly, does not deal with the tricky areas of environmental covenants
and surcharges). A further example might be an agreement to develop and produce an
environmentally-superior product which the contracting parties would not otherwise have
sufficient resources to be able to develop otherwise.54 Viewed in the economic terms of
Chapter 8, the dynamic efficiency of such agreements is such that they increase consumer
welfare.
50 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, points 184-185.
51 Commission Press Release IP/98/865 and XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy (1998). See also, the
negative clearance for equivalent commitments by the Association of Japanese Automobile Manufacturers and
the Association of Korean Automobile Manufacturers. Competition Report 1998, at 160. A further example is
CEMEP, where the Commission granted negative clearance to an agreement to improve energy efficiency of
electric motors for similar reasons: Commission Press Release IP/00/508 and Martinez Lopez, “Commission
Approves an Agreement to Improve Efficiency of Washing Machines”, Competition Policy Newsletter 1, 13
(2000). The agreement set an overall reduction target of 50%, rather than precise individual obligations. One
might also include within this category certain agreements between undertakings to set up private eco-labels (on
which, see Chapter 4), participation in which is voluntary and which leave participants relatively broad
discretion as to how they satisfy the eco-label’s requirements.
52 Horizontal Guidelines, note 50 above, point 186. An example is the Commission’s clearance by comfort
letter of the hydro power production joint venture between E.ON and Verbund, on the ground that effective
competition in the Austrian and German power markets would not be restricted, as the joint venture would not
appreciably alter the market position of the relevant parent companies: IP/02/62.
53 Horizontal Guidelines, note 50 above, point 187.
54 See, by analogy, the EUCAR case, which concerned an agreement termed the European Council for
Automotive Research and Development between Europe’s leading car manufacturers to engage in R&D in
environmentally-friendlier projects in the industry at the pre-competitive stage, meaning that the products
obtained from the research would not be directly usable in a specific type of vehicle. See Competition Report
1998, at 150.
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It is worth noting here that, clearly, an agreement which does not restrict competition in any
way, but which is damaging to the environment, cannot on any reading fall under Article
81(1). As observed earlier, this would run counter to the express wording of Article 81(1),
and none of the three arguments made in Part II suggests a different conclusion.55 For
instance, Chapter 6’s systematic argument concluded that where there is, on its wording, no
scope for interpreting a Treaty competition provision in a way that favours environmental
protection, the integration principle is not relevant.
In contrast, an environmental agreement will “almost always” fall under Article 81(1) where
“the cooperation does not truly concern environmental objectives, but serves as a tool to engage in a disguised
cartel” or “if the cooperation is used as a means amongst other parts of a broader restrictive agreement which
aims at excluding actual or potential competitors.”56 Clearly, evidence as to the aim of the parties is
crucial in this regard: cases where the parties have a genuine environmental protection
objective for their agreement do not, it is submitted, fall within this category. An example of
such a “disguised cartel” is the IAZ case, where the Belgian Association Nationale des Services
d’Eau agreed with Belgian manufacturers and sole importers of washing machines and
dishwashers that all appliances sold in Belgium should have a conformity label showing that
they complied with technical requirements of Belgian law. The Commission found that an
ulterior purpose of the agreement was in fact to hinder parallel imports, as the labels were
only available to Belgian manufacturers or sole importers. In upholding this finding, the
Court held that the agreement “clearly expresses the intention of treating parallel imports less
favourably”.57
Agreements fixing a proportion of costs or prices, reducing output or allocating markets
thus always fall under Article 81(1), even where the parties have an ostensibly genuine
environmental protection motivation. This was the case in VOTOB, where the Commission
held to fall under Article 81(1) EC an agreement between the six undertakings with storage
capacity for chemicals in the Netherlands whereby the undertakings decided to finance
investments via a set “environmental surcharge” on their services. The surcharge depended
on the product to be stored according to its polluting qualities, and there was an obligation
to pass the charge on completely to consumers and detail the charge separately on their bills.
In the Commission’s view, this constituted horizontal price-fixing contrary to Article 81 EC.
The fact that the charge amount to only 4% of average total costs of storage was irrelevant.58
55 See Chapter 6 and, similarly, Winter, “On the effectiveness of the EC administration: the case of
environmental protection” 33 CML Rev (1996) 689.
56 Horizontal Guidelines, note 50 above, point 188.
57 Joined Cases 96-102 etc/82 IAZ [1983] ECR 3369, at para 23. See also, Decision 82/371 Anseau-Navewa and
Olieranches Faellerad XXIVth Report on Competition Policy (1994) at 368 and, for example, the raids of the
German cartel office on more than 140 German-based waste management companies on suspicion of bid
fixing for waste disposal contracts from DSD (see Financial Times September 12, 2003). Since Case T-168/01
GlaxoSmithKline [2006] ECR II-2969, however, the CFI has clarified that, in order to fall within Article 81(1),
agreements restricting parallel trade must still be shown to have as their object or effect the restriction of
competition: see para 120, clarifying Cases 56 & 58/64 Consten and Grundig [1966] ECR 299, at 340.
58 See XXIInd Competition Report 1992, paras 177-186. See also, the Dutch competition authority’s decision
in Case 51/98 Stibat, which concerned a Dutch system (Stibat) set up to collect and recycle used batteries,
pursuant to individual battery producers’ obligations under the Dutch legislation implementing the Batteries
Directive, Directive 91/157 OJ 1991 L 78/38 (since replaced by Directive 2006/66 OJ 2006 L 266/1). Part of
the case concerned the legality of Stibat’s charging a standardised levy to producers for its services. The fact
that the levy amounted, in Stibat’s contention, to less than 5% of the batteries’ sale price did not, in the NMa’s
view, prevent it from amounting to a restriction of competition within Dutch legislation’s equivalent to Article
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More recently, a similar conclusion was reached in the Commission’s Industrial and Medical
Gases decision, concerning a fixed “environmental and safety” surcharge imposed on the sale
of cylinder gases by participants in a cartel.59 Other serious restrictions might include a
collective refusal to deal with “dirtier” suppliers;60 or an agreement to clean up pollution in
line with the “source” principle of Community environmental law (i.e., the principle that
pollution should be remedied at source) amounting to allocation of markets to local
undertakings.61 However, such restrictions may, depending on the features of the
agreement, be saved by Article 81(3). This approach, it is submitted, tallies with the
arguments made in Part II, and in particular with the systematic argument by which the Article
6 EC integration principle requires Article 81 to be interpreted so that environmental
objectives are achieved in the manner least restrictive of competition.62
Finally, the Commission identifies a category of “borderline” cases, which may fall within
Article 81(1) depending on the effect of the agreement on the market. This may occur in
situations where an environmental agreement made between parties with substantial
market shares appreciably restricts the parties’ ability to “devise the characteristics of their
products or the way in which they produce them”, or “substantially affects” the output of third
parties, as suppliers or as purchasers.63 It is in this borderline category of cases where, it is
submitted, the possibility of relying on the inherent restriction doctrine of otherwise
restrictive measures, discussed at length above, becomes relevant. As argued above,
therefore, where a restriction is inherent to achievement of an agreement’s environmental
protection goal, such that the agreement would not otherwise have been entered into
(Albany, Brentjens), or where a restriction is necessary in order to perform an environmental
regulatory task (Wouters), it may fall outside Article 81(1) EC.
Many types of environmental agreements may fall within the category of horizontal
agreement categorised as “borderline” by the Commission. Common examples include
agreement on environmental standards, specialisation and production agreements,
agreements on quota allocation, and exclusive recycling agreements.
Environmental standards. A first example of a borderline case, and one taken in the
Horizontal Guidelines, is an agreement which aims at defining environmental standards for
products or production processes, and which “significantly affects a large proportion of the parties'
sales as regards their products or production processes”.64 As with non-environmental standards,
where based on non-discriminatory, open and transparent procedures and open to all market
players, such agreements fall outside the scope of Article 81(1) EC.65 An example in the
environmental context would be an agreement to create a (private) eco-label, or creating a
81(1). However, this part of the Stibat system was ultimately exempted under the Dutch equivalent to Article
81(3).
59 Commission decision in Industrial and Medical Gases OJ 2003 L 84/1. See also, Commission decision of
December 3, 2003 C/38.359 Electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products (environmental surcharge used as
pretext for price rises in cartel).
60 Note, however, that a national agreement phasing out a pollutant or waste identified as such in relevant
Community directives may not be assimilated to a collective boycott on a product which circulates freely in the
Community: see footnote 51, Horizontal Guidelines, note 50 above.
61 See, for example, Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp [1998] ECR I-4075.
62 See point 4 of the working hypothesis on the integration principle, Figure 1, Chapter 6.
63 Horizontal Guidelines, note 50 above, point 189.
64 Horizontal Guidelines, note 50 above, point 189.
65 Ibid.
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set of environmental management standards, participation in which is voluntary and open to
all, and which sets out a transparent set of standards to be followed by participants in
producing a large proportion of their products.66 However, standardisation agreements
aimed at excluding actual or potential competitors from the market are generally caught - for
example, where a national manufacturers’ association sets a standard and puts pressure on
third parties not to market products that do not comply with the standard. In APB, for
example, it was held that an environmental quality mark cannot be used to create exclusive
sale or purchase networks; rather, it should relate to an objective standard, and other market
players should be free to participate in the network.67 In CECED, the Commission
considered that Article 81(1) EC applied to an agreement on energy efficiency standards
between importers and producers of washing machines in the Community because the
parties held over 95% of the market.68 Further, the Commission found that energy
consumption was “not negligible” as a factor which would be taken into account in making
decisions to purchase a washing machine.69 Similarly, in EACEM, an agreement between
manufacturers of television sets and video cassette recorders to reduce the electricity
consumption of televisions and video recorders when in “standby” mode was found by the
Commission to fall under Article 81(1).70
A further issue here, as with many environmental agreements, is the potential competitive
restrictions which may arise from information exchange which takes place as a result of
environmental agreements. This may, for example, mean that undertakings know more
about the products which their rivals intend to develop; or more than about their rivals
strategies and pricing structures, than they would otherwise have known. Clearly, if entering
into the environmental agreement is a pretext for such information exchange, Article 81(1)
will apply. However, it is submitted that, by analogy to Albany, where information exchange
is limited to what is absolutely necessary to achieve an environmental aim, and the
environmental agreement would not otherwise have been entered into without the
information exchange provisions, it falls outside Article 81(1).71
Specialisation and production agreements. A second example of environmentally-
motivated restrictions might include specialisation or production agreements. One can, for
example, imagine a production agreement analogous to that at issue in Ford/Volkwagen,72
such as where two major manufacturers agree to form a joint venture to develop
environmentally-friendlier cars, though environmental performance constitutes an important
way in which to compete. Where the parties have a significant market share, it is submitted,
66 See the discussion in Chapter 4 of eco-labels and environmental management ventures as voluntary
corporate initiatives.
67 APB OJ L 18/35(1990).
68 Commission Decision 2000/475 OJ 2000 L 187/47.
69 Ibid, para 42.
70 See the Annual EC Competition Report 1998, at 152.
71 See, for example, the approach of the Dutch competition authority in Case 51/98 Stibat which, as mentioned
above, concerned a Dutch system (Stibat) set up to collect and recycle used batteries, pursuant to individual
battery producers’ obligations under the Dutch legislation implementing the Batteries Directive, Directive
91/157 OJ 1991 L 78/38 (since replaced by Directive 2006/66 OJ 2006 L 266/1). The NMa concluded that
the information exchange which might result from the Stibat system did not amount to a restriction of
competition within the meaning of the Dutch equivalent to Article 81(1), as Stibat’s members provided data
(on the number of batteries sold, divided by type) to an independent body, meaning that the information would
not be accessible to Stibat’s members as such.
72 OJ 1993 L 20/14.
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such an arrangement should fall within Article 81(1), unless they could show that there was
no less restrictive way of achieving such environmental benefits (i.e., that the restriction was
proportionate).
Quota allocation. A third example is agreements to allocate individual pollution quotas.73
Such agreements may fall within Article 81(1) where a market for such quotas exists - i.e., a
tradable permit scheme, one of the economic instruments discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
In the context of the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), for example, it is conceivable
that Article 81(1) may cover situations of allowance “pooling”, for which Member States
may choose to provide under Article 28 of the ETS Regulation - though few have as yet
chosen to do so.74 As discussed in Chapter 4, this Article allows Member States to enable
operators of installations to form a “pool” of installations from the same activity for Phase I
and/or 2 of the ETS, on application to the competent authority. If such a pool is allowed,
the operators must nominate a trustee to “take over” the individual operators’ ETS
responsibilities – e.g., to be issued with the total allowances for the group, to be responsible
for surrendering allowances, and to be liable to penalties in the event of failure to do this.
Any penalty which the trustee fails to pay falls to be paid, however, by the constituent
individual members of the pool. In the context of Article 81(1), such allowance pooling may
be significant because, clearly, the number of allowances held by an installation has a direct
and substantial effect on its (permitted) output levels. By forming a pool, therefore,
installations are coordinating on an important factor in production levels. As a result, such
pooling would seem prima facie to fall within Article 81(1).75
Exclusive recycling agreements. A fourth example, and one mentioned by the
Commission in its Horizontal Guidelines, is an agreement by which a group of competitors
appoint a single undertaking as exclusive provider of collection and/or recycling services for
their products, where other potential providers exist.76 This brings us to a major area to date
in the interface between competition and environmental protection: the competition
assessment of national systems set up to implement the EU’s Packaging Waste Directive of
1994.77 As these systems raise both horizontal and vertical issues, they are discussed below.
ii. Vertical situations
Environmental agreements may also, of course, be concluded in vertical situations. Here, as
with all vertical agreements, major guidance on competition assessment can be found in the
Commission’s Vertical Guidelines. Adopting an economic approach, the Vertical Guidelines
specify that “for most vertical restraints, competition concerns, exemption and the disapplication of the
73 Horizontal Guidelines, note 50 above, point 190.
74 Pooling was advocated by Germany, who wished to reconcile the EU ETS with domestically binding
negotiated voluntary agreements with major industries for carbon reduction. Sweden and Finland do not
permit pooling as such; the UK allows it only for the second phase of the ETS. As the same monitoring
obligations and liability regime apply, it is thought unlikely that many applications for pooling will be made. See
Chapter 4 and Anttonen, Mehling and Upston-Hooper, “Breathing Life into the Carbon Market: Legal
Frameworks of Emissions Trading in Europe” (2007) European Environmental Law Review 96, at 111.
75 In addition, such pooling does not seem objectively justifiable using the Albany--based reasoning set out
above, in that the environmental goal could be achieved using means less restrictive of competition, i.e., the
installations’ complying with their ETS obligations singly. Pooling arrangements may, of course, be open to
justification under Article 81(3) and, potentially, to application of the State action defence, discussed in
Chapters 11 and 14, respectively.
76 Horizontal Guidelines, note 50 above, point 191.
77 Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste OJ 1994 L 365/10.
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Block Exemption can only arise if there is insufficient inter-brand competition, i.e. if there is some degree of
market power at the level of the supplier or the buyer or at both levels.”78 Vertical agreements will be
assessed in their “legal and economic context”, save for hardcore restrictions79 where it is not
necessary to examine the effect on the market. However, the Commission recognises that
vertical agreements may often have positive effects, by promoting non-price competition
and improved quality of service via optimising distribution and manufacturing processes.80
As a result, where environmental vertical agreements contain any hardcore restrictions -
price fixing, reduction of output or allocating markets - these will always fall within the scope
of Article 81(1), as long as there is an appreciable effect on inter-state trade and on
competition.81 For the same reasons as discussed in the context of horizontal agreements,
the arguments put forward in Part II do not tend to any other analysis of such restrictions.
In all other cases, where the supplier’s (or, in the case of exclusive supply agreements, the
buyer’s) market share is 30% or less, a full competition analysis is not necessary, as the
agreement falls within the scope of the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation.82
Where this market share threshold is exceeded, Commission has indicated that the following
factors are most relevant in assessing whether a vertical agreement falls within Article 81(1):
the supplier’s market position; competitor’s market positions; the buyer’s market position;
entry barriers; the market’s maturity; the level of trade; and the nature of the product.83
In the context of environmental agreements, the existence of barriers to entry may be of
particular relevance. For example, environmental regulation, first mover advantages for
environmental innovation, or environmental government subsidies may all constitute
barriers to entry. A further potential factor of particular relevance may be market maturity:
where the markets for environmental products and services are innovative and rapidly
changing, it is less likely that competition will be restricted under Article 81(1). Vertical
restraints which are necessary to open up new markets are not generally considered by the
Commission to restrict competition.84 Moreover, it is submitted, proportionate
environmentally-motivated restrictions inherent to the conclusion of the environmental
agreement should be considered to fall outside Article 81(1) EC for the same reasons as
argued above in the context of horizontal agreements.85
One type of potentially restrictive clause sometimes found in vertical environmental
agreements is the exclusive distribution clause. Exclusivity is often the competitive issue in
vertical environmental agreements, in particular in the case of waste collection, discussed
further below. While it may lead to reduced intra-brand competition and market
partitioning, exclusive distribution may also have beneficial effects, such as achieving
efficiencies and economics of scale.86 An example is the International Fruit Container
Organisation case, where German food retailers set up a system for reusable plastic fruit
78 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints OJ 2000 C 291/1, point 6.
79 See Article 4 of the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation, Regulation 2790/1999 OJ 1999 L
336/21.
80 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, note 78 above, point 115.
81 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, ibid, points 9-10.
82 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, ibid, point 121.
83 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, ibid, point 121.
84 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, ibid, at p 25.
85 Indeed, as vertical restrictions are generally less competitively damaging than horizontal restrictions, they are
in general more likely to be proportionate.
86 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, note 78 above, Section 2.2.
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containers. The Commission objected to a proposed exclusivity provision whereby only
fruit in IFCO containers would be accepted by the system. However, when this was
removed from the agreement and some other amendments were made, the arrangement fell
outside Article 81(1) EC.87 In contrast, selective distribution is normally viewed more
favourably, and is less likely to be restrictive under Article 81(1), where distributors are
selected on the basis of objective qualitative criteria, as established by the ECJ in the Metro I
judgment.88 This could conceivably apply in the context of environmental agreements, if
distributors were, for example, selected on the basis of their environmental performance to
date.
iii. Focus on National Packaging Waste Disposal Systems
A category of environmental agreement to which much attention has been paid in recent
years by the Commission is the agreements stemming from obligations imposed on
undertakings under national law in implementation of the Packaging Waste Directive.
Similar systems have been set up pursuant to obligations under the End of Life Vehicles
Directive and the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive, which raise similar
competition issues, though they have not given rise to much decisional practice yet.89 The
national systems to which most attention has been paid by the Commission so far have been
those of Germany (via DSD), France (via Eco-emballages), Austria (via ARA), and the UK
(via Valpak).
Germany. DSD was founded following the imposition of a take-back obligation for all
sellers and producers in the German Packaging Waste Ordinance. The German government
agreed not to apply the obligation to undertakings participating in a private collection system
of packaging waste with blanket coverage and which was easy for individuals to use. This
led, in 1990, to the foundation of a system by a coalition of 95 undertakings from packaging
and filling industries, packaging producers and traders, run by the private undertaking DSD,
which commenced operations in 1992.90 DSD is the only undertaking operating a
nationwide system for collection and recovery of sales packaging within the meaning of the
Packaging Ordinance. The system is termed “dual” because collection and recovery is
outside the public waste disposal system, operated by a private undertaking. The
Commission assessed the compliance of DSD’s system with Article 81 by decision in 2001,
some months after its (separate) decision on Article 82 issues, discussed in Chapter 12.91 At
the request of the German Bundeskartellamt, DSD is no longer owned by the obligated
87 IFCO, see Press Release IP/93/430, XXIII Competition Report (1993) at 102, XXVIII Competition Report
(1998) at 165 and Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation 17 OJ 1995 C 48/4.
88 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, note 78 above, Section 2.3 and Case 26/76 Metro I [1977] ECR 1875. In
addition, selective distribution systems benefit from the safe haven of the Verticals Block Exemption
(Regulation 2790/1999 OJ 1999 L 336/21).
89 Directive 2000/53/EC on end-of life vehicles OJ 2000 L 269/34, Directive 2002/96 on waste electronic and
electrical equipment OJ 2003 L 37/24, Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging
waste OJ 1994 L 365/10, all as amended. See generally, DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste
management in recycling systems of September 22, 2005.
90 See generally, Lehmann, “Voluntary Environmental Agreements and Competition policy: The case of
Germany’s private system for packaging waste recycling”, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Nota Di Lavoro
78.2000 (2000) and Boute, “Environmental Protection and EC Anti-Trust Law: The Commission’s Approach
for Packaging Waste Management Systems” RECIEL 15(2) (2006) 146.
91 Commission Decision 2001/837 OJ 2001 L 319/1, confirmed by Case T-289/01 DSD, judgment of May 24,
2007.
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packaging producers, but was acquired by an independent US investor company.92 The
system is financed by fees from the undertakings participating in system. Undertakings that
pay a fee are exempted from the Ordinance’s obligation to take back and recover packaging.
They also receive the right to use the “Green Dot” trademark on their sales packaging.
The DSD system comprises several “layers” of agreement. The first layer is DSD’s
constitution and shareholder agreement. As this agreement contained no exclusivity clauses
- meaning its shareholders are free to enter into other contracts with competing
organisations if they wish - and as its membership is open to all German and foreign
distributors, bottlers, packagers, manufacturers of packaging and suppliers of packaging
material, it was found not to result in an appreciable restriction of competition under Article
81(1).93
The second “layer” of agreement comprises (vertical) service agreements with downstream
local collecting undertakings, by which the collecting undertaking has the exclusive task of
collecting and sorting used sales packaging in a certain area. As a result, DSD refuses to
contract with any other undertakings within a given area. However, collectors may, if they
wish, work for undertakings other than DSD.
In the Commission’s decision, such service agreements were held to fall within Article 81(1),
as their exclusivity provision meant that access to the market for the collection and sorting
of household packaging waste by domestic and foreign collectors was obstructed. This was
particularly so because the network of DSD’s service agreements covered the whole of
Germany; DSD was the only undertaking in Germany with an extensive packaging take-back
operation; and the exclusivity was “particularly long lasting”. Given these (rather extreme)
restrictive factors, it is submitted, the arguments put forward in Part II would not suggest
any other conclusion. However, the restriction was exempted under Article 81(3) EC, as
considered in Chapter 11.
A further potential restriction in the service agreements was the “zero-interface” principle,
whereby collecting undertakings were prohibited from marketing the materials collected, but
were obliged to pass them free of charge to the undertakings recovering used packaging.
While DSD removed this clause for most materials, the clause remained in the case of
plastic.94 On this point, however, the Commission found that, “in view of the exceptional
circumstances and conditions surrounding the establishment of a new, functioning market” in the recovery
of sorted plastics, this clause did not appreciably restrict competition on the market for
recovery services and secondary raw materials, and fell outside Article 81(1).95 This
reasoning demonstrates the Commission’s sensitivity to the dynamic efficiencies justifying
the zero-interface clause, the particular technological difficulties in recovering plastics, and
the environmental interest in nurturing such a recovery market. Similarly, there was no
92 See Commission Decision of 07/01/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common
market (Case No IV/M.3638 - KKR / DSD). This removed concerns that informal discriminatory practices,
such as treating shareholders of DSD more leniently with regard to overdue licence fees, could be taking place.
See, for example, Lehmann, “Voluntary Environmental Agreements and Competition Policy” 28
Environmental & Resource Economics (2004) 435.
93 DSD, note 91 above, point 107.
94 Ibid, point 111.
95 Ibid, para 114. The exceptional circumstances were that plastics had a negative market value at the time,
meaning that without the zero-interface principle there was a risk that plastics would be channelled into a
cheaper disposal method, which would breach the Packaging Ordinance.
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restriction as regards competitors’ access to collectors’ infrastructure (e.g., recycling bins), as
DSD’s competitors were free to use these facilities.96
The third “layer” of agreement comprises agreements between DSD and its so-called
“guarantee” undertakings, which accept and recover used packaging on a long-term basis
depending on quotas imposed. As there was no exclusivity clause in these agreements, they
were found not to fall under Article 81(1).97
France. Following French legislation laying down producer responsibility for packaging
waste, a similar collective take-back and recycling scheme to that in Germany was set up.
The scheme is run by Eco-Emballages and was considered by the Commission in parallel to
DSD.98
In this case, there are five levels of agreement:
The first is Eco-Emballages’ articles of association which, as they did not contain any
competitive restrictive, was found to fall outside Article 81(1).99
Secondly, Eco-Emballages concludes contracts with producers who use packaging, licensing
them the right to print a “green dot” on their packaging in return for a licence fee. Prior to
the Commission’s decision, Eco-Emballages undertook to make clear to manufacturers that
they may choose to join the system for just certain types of packaging if they wish, and that
they may terminate their contract each year with no penalty.100 As a result, these agreements
were found to fall outside Article 81(1).101
Thirdly, Eco-Emballages acquired the right to license the Green Dot from the Community-
wide licensee “Pro-Europe”.102 As Eco-Emballages agreed to sub-license this right to other
collecting systems,103 this agreement did not fall within Article 81(1).104
Fourthly, Eco-Emballages concludes contracts for a duration of six years with local
authorities, which have a statutory obligation to ensure that waste in their locality is disposed
of in an environmentally sound manner. By these contracts, Eco-Emballages agrees to
finance the local authorities in exchange for an undertaking to give the waste collected to a
recovery company of the local authority’s or Eco-Emballages’ choice. Prior to the
Commission’s decision, Eco-Emballages undertook to ensure that local authorities could
terminate their contract unilaterally at any time, meaning that only Eco-Emballages was
actually bound for six years. Hence, competition was found not to be restricted.105
Fifthly, Eco-Emballages concludes contracts with sectoral recovery undertakings for six
years, by which the undertakings undertake to recover and recycle the household waste in
96 Ibid, point 139. Such access was, however, made a condition of the Commission’s decision: point 164.
97 Ibid, point 120.
98 Eco Emballages, OJ 2001 L 233/37.
99 Ibid, point 72.
100 See Article 19(3) Notice, OJ 2000 C 227/3, at 92 onwards.
101 Eco-Emballages, note 98 above, point 75.
102 Pro-Europe (short for Packaging Recovery Organisation Europe) licenses the Green Dot trademark from
DSD and is run by various national producer responsibility organisations. Its constitutive agreements were
notified in OJ 2001 C 153/4. The Commission did not raise any objections.
103 Other smaller schemes which existed at the time included Adelphe (glass and multimaterial collection),
Cyclamed (pharmaceuticals) and Edouard Leclerc (plastic bags).
104 Eco-Emballages, note 98 above, point 82.
105 Eco-Emballages, ibid, point 78.
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certain sectors (e.g., steel, aluminium, paper, plastic, glass). Only one contract is concluded
per sector. The sectoral take-back undertakings in turn sub-contract this responsibility to
individual take-back undertakings. As with the local authorities’ contracts, because the
exclusivity was unilateral (Eco-Emballages was obliged to present the contracted sectoral
undertaking to the local authorities, but these undertakings were free to collect for other
systems), they did not restrict competition. As a result, negative clearance was granted to all
of the notified agreements. This conclusion is, it is submitted, perfectly in line with the
arguments put forward in Part II.
Austria. Somewhat later, the Commission considered the Austrian system for producer
responsibility in packaging waste, run by Alstoff Recycling Austria AG (ARA).106
First, as with the DSD system, participating undertakings enter into a dispensation and
licence agreement, whereby their obligations under the Austrian Packaging Ordinance are
transferred from the obligated undertaking to ARA, with the payment of a fee. However,
obligated undertakings need to provide evidence of the use of another disposal system or
self-disposal in order to be exempted from the ARA obligations. This requirement was
found not to be contrary to Article 81(1).107 Similarly, the fact that the licence fee was
compulsory did not restrict Article 81(1), as the fee was in every case for a dispensation
service actually provided, rather than for the use of the Green Dot trademark per se; hence,
the “no service, no fee” rule was respected. Further, ARA undertook not to invoke its
licence rights to the Green Dot mark in Austria against undertakings participating in other
Green Dot schemes, or which are required to affix the Green Dot to their packaging, as long
as those undertakings could show that such packaging complied with their Packaging
Ordinance obligations.108
Secondly, ARA concludes waste disposal contracts with sectoral recycling undertakings - e.g.,
those in charge of plastic, aluminium, wood, ferrous metal and paper packaging recycling -
which give these undertakings the task of organising the collection, sorting, transport, and
recycling of specific categories of packaging. As in the DSD decision, these contracts were
considered to fall under Article 81(1) because they were concluded exclusively with one
undertaking per locality. Moreover, and even more restrictively than in DSD, such
undertakings were not entitled to work with non-ARA systems.109
Thirdly, sectoral recycling undertakings conclude contracts with regional disposal
undertakings to perform actual collection, sorting, and recycling functions (the “collection
partner” agreements). These contracts contained exclusivity clauses for the benefit of the
collection partners,110 whereby ARA sectoral recycling undertakings only worked with one
collection partner per region. Due to the substantial network effects, and the fact that these
106 ARA, ARGEV, ARO, OJ 2004 L 75/59, under appeal as Case T-419/03.
107 ARA, note 106 above, point 197.
108 ARA, ibid, point 202. In contrast to the situation in Germany and France, national law in Austria does not
require undertakings to affix a mark, such as the Green Dot, to all packaging falling under a collective system.
109 ARA, ibid, points 208-209.
110 In the Commission decision, those sectoral companies which had previously included “most favoured
company” clauses in their existing contracts with disposal companies - meaning that repeat business would be
awarded to those undertakings - undertook to remove these clauses. Moreover, disposal companies were not
to be prevented from working for competitors of the ARA system.
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agreements generally lasted five years, this constituted a barrier to entry for new collection
partners, and was found to be restrictive of competition under Article 81(1).111
The United Kingdom. The UK has a slightly different regulatory framework for
implementing the Packaging Waste Directive, as set out in its Producer Responsibility
Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 1997.112 By this system, individual producers do
not necessarily have to take back their own packaging waste. Rather, each undertaking is
allocated an obligation to recover packaging waste per packaging material, based on the
volume it brought into circulation. Undertakings are free to decide how to discharge their
responsibility. They can collect their waste themselves and conclude individual contracts
with recyclers; or they can participate in compliance schemes which organise collection and
recycling. Alternatively, as the confirmation from recycling undertakings that a particular
quantity of packaging waste has been recycled (called a “Packaging Recovery Note” or PRN)
is tradable, they can purchase PRNs to discharge their obligations. In the UK, Valpak is the
largest non-profit-making industry-led compliance scheme set up to discharge the packaging
waste recovery and recycling obligations of members. Following examination by the
Commission,113 Valpak’s membership agreements were found to restrict competition under
Article 81(1), as they obliged businesses wishing to join the scheme to transfer all their
obligations for all packaging materials (an “all or nothing” approach), thus restricting
material-specific competition between Valpak and other schemes. This conclusion, it is
submitted, accords with the arguments put forward in Part II, as the competitive restrictions
went beyond what was necessary to achieve the environmental benefits at issue.
111 ARA, note 106 above, point 229. The same conclusion followed for similar exclusive agreements between a
sectoral recycling undertaking and sorting partners.
112 See further, DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of
September 22, 2005, point 25.
113 See the Annual EC Competition Report 1998, at 153.
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Chapter 11: Article 81(3) EC
1. The scope and function of Article 81(3) EC: general
Article 81(3) EC provides:
“The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
— any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
— any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.”
The application of Article 81(3) is not an area overly characterised by clarity.1 This is
partly due to the fact that, as will be argued below, the Commission’s 2004 Article 81(3)
Guidelines are sometimes difficult to reconcile with the approach of the Community
courts, and indeed with the Commission’s own past practice.2 Nonetheless, subject to
this caveat, the Guidelines currently form a useful starting point for any consideration of
the Commission’s approach to application of Article 81(3). At least two areas of
controversy in relation to the scope and function of Article 81(3) EC are relevant to the
present discussion.
First, there is disagreement over whether the function of Article 81(3) is to allow for
agreements which increase consumer welfare,3 or whether something more must be
demonstrated.4 Some commentators, for instance, argue on the basis of neo-classical
economics that the Article 81(1) exercise - assessing whether competition is restricted in
the first place - focuses on consumer welfare, whereas Article 81(3) must be about
something more, in order to have an independent purpose.5 Odudu, for example, argues
1 See, generally, Nicolaides, “The Balancing Myth: The Economics of Article 81(1) & (3)” 32(2) Legal
Issues of Economic Integration (2005) 123 (who argues that Article 81(3) is “the least understood component of
the EC competition policy”) and Lugard and Hancher, “Honey, I Shrunk the Article! A Critical Assessment of
the Commission’s Notice on Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty” (2004) 7 European Competition Law Review
410.
2 See similarly, for instance, Pijnacker Hordijk, “De richtsnoeren inzake de toepassing van artikel 81 lid 3
EG” (2004) 4 Markt en Mededinging 129, Vogelaar, “Modernisering, Self-Assessment en Horizontale
Overeenkomsten” in Actualiteiten in het Europese Mededingingsrecht (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006),
Ehlermann, “The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution” 37 CML Rev
(2000) 537, at 549, Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford, Hart, 2000), at 104, Monti,
“Article 81 EC and Public Policy” 39 CML Rev (2002) 1057, at 1083, Mortelmans, “Towards Convergence
in the Application of the Rules on Free Movement and on Competition?” 38 CML Rev (2001) 613 at 641,
and Boute, “Environmental Protection and EC Anti-Trust Law: The Commission’s Approach for
Packaging Waste Management Systems” RECIEL 15(2) (2006) 146.
3 Kjolbye, “The New Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3): An Economic Approach
to Article 81” 9 European Competition Law Review (2004) 570.
4 Hawk, for instance, observes that, “the bifurcation of what ideally should be a single anti-trust analysis into the double
tests of Article [81(1)] and Article [81(3)]” results in “near anarchy”. Hawk, “The American (Anti-Trust)
Revolution: Lessons for the EEC?” 9 European Competition Law Review (1981) 53, at 69.
5 Nicolaides, note 1 above, Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2006).
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that Article 81(3) allows account to be taken of productive efficiency benefits, i.e.,
producer welfare.6 The Article 81(3) Guidelines take the approach that Article 81(3) is
concerned with net consumer welfare, with the Commission stating its view that the
function of Article 81(3) is to determine, where an agreement is found to be restrictive of
competition under Article 81(1), the “positive economic effects” of the agreement, i.e.,7
“to determine the pro-competitive benefits produced by that agreement and to assess whether these
pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-competitive effects.”8
By “pro-competitive effects”, the Commission means efficiency gains, which “may create
additional value by lowering the cost of producing an output, improving the quality of the product or
creating a new product.”9 Where the pro-competitive effects of an agreement outweigh its
anti-competitive effects, the “net effect of such agreements is to promote the very essence of the
competitive process, namely to win customers by offering better products or better prices than those offered
by rivals.” 10 Nonetheless, the Guidelines have not settled this controversy over the
economic function of Article 81(3), and how this fits with the function of Article 81(1).
This fundamental ambiguity is of clear relevance to the question of interest to the present
research: the extent to which Article 81(3) allows account to be taken of environmental
considerations.
A second area of controversy is the role of what we termed in Part II “non-economic”
factors - factors other than economic efficiency - in Article 81(3). In the Article 81(3)
Guidelines, the Commission indicates its view that, for this exception to apply, the
agreement must offer “objective economic benefits”. Thus, it states,
“[t]he four conditions of Article 81(3) are…exhaustive. When they are met the exception is
applicable and may not be made dependant on any other condition. Goals pursued by other Treaty
provisions can be taken into account to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four
conditions of Article 81(3).”11 (emphasis added)
As will be discussed below, the Commission sees economic efficiency benefits to be at
the core of the first of these four conditions - the promotion of technical and economic
progress. Similarly, in its White Paper on the modernisation of the rules implementing
Articles [81 and 82] of the Treaty, the Commission observed that the purpose of 81(3) is
“to provide a legal framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow the
application of the competition rules to be set aside because of political considerations”.12
As mentioned above, however, many argue that the Commission and Community courts
have in practice gone beyond economic efficiency considerations in applying Article
81(3) in the past, and that this is the correct approach.13 They refer to judgments like
Métropole Télévision, where the CFI held that,
“the Commission is entitled to based itself on considerations connected with the pursuit of the public
interest in order to grant exemptions under Article [81(3)]”14
Wesseling, for example, argues that the Commission’s “assertion” that applying Article
81(3) is a pure economic test is not simply at odds with the case law of the Community
6 Odudu, ibid, at 7.
7 OJ 2004 C 101/97, point 32.
8 Ibid, point 11.
9 Ibid, point 33.
10 Ibid.
11 Article 81(3) Guidelines, note 7 above, point 42.
12 White Paper on the modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, Brussels,
April 28, 1999, at para 57.
13 See, for example, the literature referred to in note 2 above.
14 Case T-112/99 Métropole [2001] ECR II-2459, para 118.
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courts; it also flies in the face of the general trend towards increasing cross-cutting policy
integration within the Community institutions.15 In the context of restrictive provisions
with an environmental protection aim, this argument is, essentially, similar to the
systematic argument put forward in Chapter 6. In his view, the purpose of Article 81(3) is
“to provide a legal framework within which the bodies competent to apply it may pursue certain non-
competition policy objectives provided that competition is restricted as little as possible.”16 Again, as
discussed further below, in the environmental context this conclusion mirrors point 4 of
Chapter 6’s working hypothesis on the practical implications of the integration principle
(i.e., applying the proportionality principle where Article 81(3) can be interpreted in a way
that favours environmental protection, but where there is a potential conflict with
competition goals). Boute takes a similar position, suggesting that Article 81(3) should
be interpreted in the same way as Article 30 EC, so that environmental protection would
in itself be sufficient to justify a competitively restrictive agreement, provided that the
restrictions of competition are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objectives.17
Other commentators, however, would assign a slightly different role to non-economic
factors in Article 81(3). Giorgio Monti, for example, argues that non-economic factors
are never in themselves sufficient to bring an agreement within Article 81(3); rather, they
may do so only in combination with efficiency-enhancing factors.18
The dispute has, of course, not been confined to the potential relevance of
environmental considerations to Article 81(3), but has extended to a range of non-
economic considerations, including culture,19 sport,20 and social and employment policy.21
2. The Article 81(3) conditions and their application to environmental
agreements
We turn now to focus on how the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) may be
applied to environmental agreements.22 To date, most case law has concerned the
application of the last two conditions (proportionality and non-elimination of
competition). One of the aims of the Article 81(3) Guidelines was to place more
emphasis on first two conditions and “to bring the application of all four conditions in line with
the realities of Regulation 1/2003.”23
As the Commission makes clear in the Guidelines, consistently with its adoption of a
more economic approach,24 each case will be assessed in its own context and in light of
15 Wesseling, note 2 above, at 105. He concludes that, “If the application of the Community antitrust rules, in
particular Article 81(3) EC, would be reduced to a “pure” competition test this would go against this trend. The
Commission might ultimately not be able to consider, for example, environmental policy concerns under Article 81(3) which
would be contrary to Article 6 EC…”
16 Ibid.
17 Boute, note 2 above, at 158.
18 Monti, note 2 above, at 1094, concluding that, “[i]n this way, “exempting private agreements which contribute to
achieving the policies of the Commission will continue to be an important mechanism to achieve the Treaty goals…”
19 See, for example, Psychogiopolou, “EC Competition Law and Cultural Diversity: The Case of the
Cinema, Music and Book Publishing Industries” 30(6) EL Rev (2005) 838 and Mayer-Robitaille, “Le statut
ambivalent au regard de la politique communautaire de concurrence des accords de nature culturelle et des
aides d’Etat relatives à la culture” RTD Eur 40(3) (2004) 477.
20 See, for example, the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921.
21 See, for example, Synthetic Fibres OJ 1984 L 207/17; Case 42/84 Remia [1985] ECR 2545, and
Ford/Volkswagen OJ 1993 L 20/14.
22 See generally, Vedder, “Voluntary Agreements and Competition Law” Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei,
Nota di Lavoro 79.2000 (2000) and Rehbinder, “Environmental Agreements: A new instrument of
environmental policy” (European University Institute, Jean Monnet Chair Paper RSC No 97/45).
23 Guidelines on Article 81(3), note 7 above.
24 See further, Chapter 5.
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all the circumstances.25 Where a block exemption applies, however, the presumption is
that the agreement satisfies the conditions of Article 81(3), though the benefit of a block
exemption may be withdrawn for any given agreement where necessary due to its
competitive effects.26 There is no block exemption for environmental agreements,
though this has been called for by some commentators.27 However, naturally, certain
environmental agreements may fall within the scope of general block exemptions, with
obvious examples including the Vertical Block Exemption (where the supplier, or the
buyer in the case of exclusive supply agreements, holds a market share of 30% or under
and the agreement does not contain hard core restrictions); the Block Exemption for
Research and Development Agreements; and the Block Exemption for Specialisation
Agreements.28 We will not look in detail at the features of these block exemptions here,
but focus instead on the four substantive conditions of Article 81(3).
a. The agreement must improve the production or distribution of goods
or promote technical or economic progress
This interpretation of this first condition is, certainly, the crux of the issue as regards
environmental agreements. Does the provision of environmental benefits constitute
improving the “production or distribution of goods” or promoting “technical or economic progress”?
Let us begin with the Commission’s approach to this issue which, since its movement
towards an efficiency-based approach, is ambiguous.
Article 81(3) Guidelines. From its Article 81(3) Guidelines, where it devoted
substantial space to analysis of the scope of this condition, it would seem that its answer
may be in the negative. In those Guidelines, it gave the following observations about the
first Article 81(3) condition.
First, in the Commission’s view this condition concerns objective economic efficiencies,
or “pro-competitive effects”, achieved by the agreement.29 Efficiencies are defined as
stemming
“from an integration of economic activities whereby undertakings combine their assets to achieve
what they could not achieve as efficiently on their own or whereby they entrust another undertaking
with tasks that can be performed more efficiently by that other undertaking.”30
The Commission distinguishes between “cost efficiencies” and “efficiencies of a qualitative nature
whereby value is created in the form of new or improved products, greater product variety etc.”31 Cost
efficiencies, for example, may follow from the development of new production
technologies and methods, synergies resulting from the integration of existing assets, or
economies of scale and scope. Qualitative efficiencies, in contrast, may flow from
research and development agreements, combinations of assets creating synergies, or
distribution agreements. Examples of qualitative efficiencies accepted in past case law
25 Ibid, point 6.
26 Ibid, point 35.
27 See, in the context of horizontal agreements, Vogelaar, “Towards an Improved Integration of EC
Environmental Policy and EC Competition Policy: An Interim Report” in 1994 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. (B.
Hawk ed. 1995) 529.
28 Regulation 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) to certain categories of vertical agreements and
concerted practices OJ 1999 L 336/21, Regulation 2659/2000 on the application of Article 81(3) to
categories of research and development agreements OJ 2000 L 304/7, Regulation 2658/2000 on the
application of Article 81(3) to categories of specialisation agreements OJ 2000 L 304/3.
29 Guidelines on Article 81(3), note 7 above, point 59. See similarly, Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
OJ 2001 C 3/2, point 32.
30 Guidelines on Article 81(3), ibid, point 60.
31 Guidelines on Article 81(3), ibid, point 59. The Commission notes that the types of efficiencies
mentioned in the Guidelines are “only examples and are not intended to be exhaustive” (point 63).
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include health and safety improvements;32 new, improved, production processes or
improved production structures;33 and the satisfaction of subjective consumer desires, in
the case of agreements to protect a product’s image where the image is valued by
consumers.34
Secondly, efficiencies are not to be assessed from the subjective point of view of the
parties, so an increase in producer profits, for example, is irrelevant.35
Thirdly, a key issue in assessing whether the condition is fulfilled is evidentiary. The
parties must provide evidence of the nature of the claimed efficiencies; the link between
the agreement and the efficiencies; the likelihood and magnitude of each claimed
efficiency; and how and when each claimed efficiency would be achieved.”36 The value of
the efficiencies must be calculated as “accurately as reasonably possible” and must describe in
detail how the amount has been computed, using verifiable data.37
In the light of this, it seems, the Commission’s position in its Article 81(3) Guidelines is
that, where a non-economic goal cannot be translated into efficiency gains, it can only be
of ancillary relevance in assessing whether the first condition is satisfied - i.e., efficiencies
must always be proven as well (viz. Giorgio Monti’s view mentioned above). The
Commission backs up its position on this by reference to the Matra case, where the
Commission stated in its decision that the impact of a joint venture on public
infrastructure, employment and European integration “would not be enough to make an
exemption possible unless the conditions of Article [81(3)] were fulfilled, but it is an element which the
Commission has taken into account.”38 In this respect, the Commission seems to differ
significantly from the view of the ECJ in judgments such as Metro II, which held that
objectives of a “different nature” to those of competition law may justify competitive
restrictions, if proportionate.39 More broadly, the Commission’s view is inconsistent with
its own past decisional practice, when it considered a variety of non-economic factors as
very important in assessing the first condition of Article 81(3), including social policy and
employment,40 culture,41 and industrial policy.42
32 See, for example, the arguments put forward in Case 39.165 Asahi/Saint-Gobain (safer glass in cars).
33 See, for example, Stichting Baksteen OJ 1994 L 131/15.
34 See, for example, Yves Saint Laurent Parfums OJ 1992 L 12/24.
35 Guidelines on Article 81(3), note 7 above, point 49. This position seems, to a certain extent, to belie
Odudu’s argument that Article 81(3) is concerned with productive efficiency, to which reference was made
above.
36 Ibid, points 50-51.
37 Ibid, point 56.
38 Ford/Volkswagen, OJ 1993 L 20/14. In that case, the joint venture under review was the largest ever
single foreign investment in Portugal, estimated to lead, inter alia, to the creation of about 5,000 jobs and
indirectly to create up to another 10,000 jobs, as well as attracting other investment in the supply industry.
The Commission concluded that it “therefore contributes to the promotion of the harmonious development of the
Community and the reduction of regional disparities which is one of the basic aims of the Treaty. It also furthers European
market integration by linking Portugal more closely to the Community through one of its important industries” (point 36).
On appeal, the CFI held that, even if these circumstances had not been referred to, the operative part of
the decision adopted would have been exactly the same as that of the contested decision.
39 Case 75/84 Metro II [1986] ECR 3021, para 20.
40 See, for example, Ford/Volkswagen, note 38 above.
41 For example, Commissioner Monti confirmed in 1999 that, in the Commission’s view, cultural benefits
may justify exemption having regard to the amended Article 151(4) EC, which provides that, in exercising
its competences under other Treaty provisions, the Community shall take cultural aspects into account “in
particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.” See the Parliamentary Answer by
Commissioner Monti to Written Question E-1401/99 OJ 2000 C 27E/46.
42 See, for example, Synthetic Fibres OJ 1984 L 207/17; Case 42/84 Remia [1985] ECR 2545, Bayer/BP
Chemicals OJ [1976] L 30/13, Stichting Baksteen OJ [1994] L 131/15, KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITT OJ 1991 L
19/25
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In the case of the goal of market integration, however, it would seem that the
Commission believes that this goal can be included within efficiency aims. Thus a
Commission official has commented that this aspect of the Guidelines,
“should not be taken as an indication that the market integration goal is being de-emphasised or
abandoned. It merely reflects the fact that in the context of Art. 81(3) market integration and the
benefits flowing from the internal market must and normally will translate into the types of
efficiencies that are covered by Art. 81(3).”43
Horizontal Guidelines and previous Commission statements. Though it did not
deal with the issue expressly in the Article 81(3) Guidelines, in its 2001 Horizontal
Guidelines the Commission accepted that environmental benefits may, in themselves,
satisfy the first condition of Article 81(3), insofar as they can be valued economically. Its
view then was that,
“Environmental agreements caught by Article 81(1) may attain economic benefits which, either at
individual or aggregate consumer level, outweigh their negative effects on competition. To fulfil this
condition, there must be net benefits in terms of reduced environmental pressure resulting from the
agreement, as compared to a baseline where no action is taken. In other words, the expected
economic benefits must outweigh the costs.”44
This encouraging statement makes clear that the Commission is willing to go beyond a
narrow conception of economic benefits in the case of environmental improvements,
and to engage in (some form of) environmental valuation, as has been argued for the
economic argument set out in Chapter 8. This interpretation is backed up by the
footnote added by the Commission to the above statement, which notes that this
approach “is consistent with the requirement to take account of the potential benefits and costs of action
or lack of action set forth in Article 174(3) of the Treaty and [the Fifth environmental action plan].”
The Commission even gives a view on how valuation might take place, suggesting a two
stage process. In cases where consumers “individually have a positive rate of return from the
agreement under reasonable payback periods”, there is “no need for the aggregate environmental benefits
to be objectively established.” In other cases, however, a “cost-benefit analysis may be necessary to
assess whether net benefits for consumers in general are likely under reasonable assumptions.”45 In its
worked example of an environmental agreement in the Horizontal Guidelines, the
Commission goes even further, suggesting that the evaluation should weigh up the
benefits for the environment against the damage to the environment caused by the
agreement.46 This approach is to be commended.
Prior to this, the Commission had confirmed on multiple occasions that environmental
benefits are relevant to the Article 81(3) assessment. In its XXVth Report on
Competition Policy, the Commission summarised its approach to environmental
agreements under Article 81(3) as follows:
43 Kjolbye, “The New Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3): An Economic
Approach to Article 81” 9 European Competition Law Review (2004) 570, at 573.
44 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, at 193.
45 Ibid, at 194.
46 Ibid, at 198. The Commission takes an example modelled on the CECED case. See similarly, Geradin,
“EC Competition Law and Environmental Protection” 2 Yearbook of European Environmental Law
(2001), Jacobs, “EEC Competition Law and the Protection of the Environment” Legal Issues of
Economic Integration 1 (1993) 37 and Vogelaar, “Modernization of Competition Law, Economy and
Horizontal Co-operation between Undertakings” (2002) 1 Intereconomics 19, who suggests that it is
unlikely that a national court applying Article 81(3) would be comfortable with declaring an environmental
agreement compatible with Article 81(3) in similar circumstances. See contra, the realist’s limb of the
governance argument made in the context of national courts, Chapter 7 above.
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“When the Commission examines individual cases, it weighs up the restrictions of competition
arising out of an agreement against the environmental objectives of the agreement, and applies the
principle of proportionality in accordance with Article [81(3)]. In particular, improving the
environment is regarded as a factor which contributes to improving production or distribution or to
promoting economic or technical progress.”47
Likewise, in its submissions to the OECD’s 1996 Review of the interaction between
competition policy and environmental policy, the Commission stated that it tried to
strike a balance between competition and environmental policy, a task which it submitted
was “relatively easy” to ensure by using Article 81(3) and applying the proportionality
principle.48
Decisional practice. A large number of examples exist in the decisional practice of the
Commission and Courts in which environmental benefits have been included in the
concept of “technical or economic progress.” Such “progress” has, for example, been found to
include better energy efficiency (CECED and EACEM),49 better waste management
(VOTOB, DSD),50 a reduction in use of raw materials and volume of waste
(Exxon/Shell),51 and the development of environmentally-friendlier production
techniques (Assurpol, Carbon Gas Technologie, BBC Brown Boveri),52 including the emission of
less pollution in manufacturing (ZVEI/Arge Bat, Philips/Osram).53 In some cases,
traditional “narrow” economic efficiency benefits were present also; in others, this was
not (at least on the face of the decision) the case.54
The Commission has not often, however, explicitly engaged in the cost-benefit analysis
which it propounds in the Horizontal Guidelines. A rare, and oft-cited, example is the
CECED55 decision, where the Commission granted an individual exemption to an
agreement between producers and importers of washing machines which together
47 XXVth Report on Competition Policy, points 83-85.
48 OECD, Competition Policy and the Environment (Paris, OECD, 1996), at 74.
49 CECED, Commission Decision 2000/475 OJ 2000 L 187/47, EACEM, Competition Report 1998, at
152.
50 VOTOB, XXIInd Competition Report 1992, paras 177-186, DSD, Commission Decision 2001/837 OJ
2001 L 319/1, confirmed by Case T-289/01 DSD, judgment of May 24, 2007.
51 Exxon/Shell OJ 1994 L 144/20.
52 Assurpol OJ 1992 L 37/16, Carbon Gas Technologie OJ 1983 L 376/17, BBC/Brown Boveri OJ 1988 L
301/68.
53 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) ZVEI/Arge Bat OJ 1998 C 172/13, Philips/Osram OJ 1994 L 378/37.
54 For other environmentally-motivated Article 81(3) decisions, see Decision 68/319 ACEC/Berliet OJ
1968 L 201/7, Decision 76/248 United Reprocessors OJ 1976 L 51/7, Decision 82/371 Navewa Anseau OJ
1982 L 167/39, Decision 91/38 KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITT OJ 1991 L 19/25, Decision 91/301 Ansac OJ
1991 L 152/54, Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) EEIG EFCC OJ 1993 C 351/6, Notice pursuant to
Article 19(3) IFCO OJ 1997 C 48/4, Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) EUCAR OJ 1997 C 185/12;
KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITT OJ 1991 L 19/25, and the comfort letter on the European Wastepaper
Information Service (EWIS), reported in 18th Report on Competition Policy (1988), para 63. In some
cases, environmental factors were of an ancillary nature to the reasoning: for example, ACEC/Berliet,
BMW OJ 1975 L 29/1, para 24, United Reprocessors, LEWA OJ 1976 L 51/15; DSD (where, at paras 143-
145, the Commission found that the agreement gave “positive network effects in the collection of household packaging
waste, and substantial scale and scope advantages can be achieved”, giving efficiency gains and generating economies
of scale), KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITT, para 27, and ARA, ARGEV, ARO, OJ 2004 L 75/59. See generally,
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998 para 129, “The Commission regularly grants exemptions on the basis
of the environmental benefits caused by product improvements.” See also, the Dutch competition authority’s decision
in Case 51/98 Stibat, where the NMa expressly considered (in the context of a battery collection and
recycling system) that environmental protection benefits satisfied the Dutch equivalent of the first Article
81(3) condition, on the grounds that (1) preventing environmental damage is cheaper than trying to remedy
it thereafter in later generations; and (2) in any event, improving environmental protection contributes to
improving the production or distribution of goods and to economic and technical progress (paras 63-64).
55 EACEM, note 49 above.
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accounted for more than 95% of European sales. The agreements aimed, inter alia, at
discontinuing production and imports of the least energy efficient washing machines,
which represented around 10-11% of then-Community sales, and pursuing joint energy
efficiency targets, improving consumer information on energy-efficiency use and
developing more environmentally friendly machines. On the “cost” side, the agreement
removed one of the dimensions on which sellers competed - and thus might restrict
competition and increase prices by up to 14% (as generally speaking, “dirtier” machines
are cheaper and more environmentally-friendly machines are more expensive).
Nonetheless, the “collective” environmental benefits for society (i.e., a reduction in
energy consumption) outweighed these costs, 56 so the agreement was exempted. 57 At
the time, this decision was heralded by Commissioner Monti as clearly illustrating the
principle, “enshrined in the Treaty”, that environmental concerns are “in no way contradictory
with competition policy.”58
A further example of the Commission engaging in this type of cost-benefit analysis is the
EACEM case,59 in which a comfort letter was granted to an agreement between EACEM
setting out a voluntary commitment to reduce energy consumption by televisions and
video recorders when on stand-by mode. A report prepared by the Commission's DG
XVII (Energy) quantified the power use of these televisions and recorders in stand-by
mode and found that, simply by reducing average standby power use from 10W to 6W,
total power use could be reduced by 3.2 TWh a year by 2005 and by 4.9 TWh a year by
2010. As a result, the cost of energy saved would ultimately outweigh the maximum cost
per unit of reducing the standby power use of a television or video recorder, which was
estimated at ECU 3.
Comment. It is submitted that, insofar as they can be substantiated and economically
valued, environmental benefits - in themselves - constitute “technical and economic progress”
within the meaning of Article 81(3).60 In the present author’s view, this follows from
each of the arguments put forward in Part II.
More particularly, it clearly follows from Chapter 8’s economic argument, which posited
that, where reasonably quantifiable, environmental benefits should be taken into account
in assessing the efficiencies flowing from a transaction. Indeed, as we have seen, this is
precisely the approach adopted by the Commission in the Horizontal Guidelines, where
it envisages the use of cost-benefit analysis “to assess whether net benefits for consumers in general
are likely under reasonable assumptions.” Clearly, therefore, the Commission is in principle
willing to engage in estimating environmental value, despite the quantification difficulties
inherent in this process discussed in Chapter 8.
Moreover, this approach also follows from Chapter 6’s systematic argument, in that this is
an instance where the Treaty (i.e., the terms “technical and economic progress”) may be
56 Press Release IP/01/1659 of November 26, 2001. For an illustration of CECED standards in action,
see Case COMP/38.380 Whirlpool + BSH + Electrolux + Merloni OJ 2002 C 139/5.
57 Similarly, in CEMEP, the Commission cleared an agreement between 20 manufacturers of low voltage
electric motors to reduce the sales of motors with low energy efficiency by at least 50% by the end of 2003
in order to reduce CO2 emissions. The case was distinguished from CECED, as the CEMEP agreement
imposed no individual obligation on each manufacturer’s behaviour, and achievement of its aims could be
monitored without disclosing individual companies’ data. Commission Press Release IP/00/58 of May 23,
2000.
58 IP/00/148.
59 EACEM, note 49 above.
60 See similarly, Vogelaar, “Modernization of Competition Law, Economy and Horizontal Co-operation
between Undertakings” (2002) 1 Intereconomics 19 and Vogelaar, “Modernisering, Self-Assessment en
Horizontale Overeenkomsten” in Actualiteiten in het Europese Mededingingsrecht (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser
Press, 2006).
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interpreted in a way that favours environmental protection, and there is no conflict with
the goals of competition policy. As a result, inclusion of environmental benefits is
required by the third point of our working hypothesis on the Article 6 EC integration
principle. A further question is whether, by a systematic argument, environmental
benefits should only be considered to be “technical and economic progress” if they are
reasonably economically quantifiable. As discussed in Chapter 8, an approximate
economic valuation can, under modern environmental economics, be given of virtually
all environmental benefits, though accurate valuation of some benefits - such as
biodiversity - is fraught with difficulty. However, it is submitted that any such difficult in
economic quantification should, on a systematic approach, not preclude the acceptance
of the environmental benefit as “progress” under Article 81(3) EC.61
Finally, it is submitted, Chapter 7’s governance argument also confirms this approach,
insofar as institutions applying Article 81(3) are obliged to do so in a manner coherent
with Community environmental policy. Further, it leads us to conclude that, even if the
Commission attempted to exclude environmental benefits from the scope of Article
81(3), the Community and national courts, as well as many national competition
authorities, may realistically not be inclined to follow.
It is true, however that the Article 81(3) Guidelines seem to cast some doubt on the
inclusion of environmental benefits as “technical and economic progress”. This is particularly
so because of the statement therein that its analysis supersedes that of the Horizontal
Guidelines as regards Article 81(3).62 If the purported effect of the Article 81(3)
Guidelines is to rule out the relevance of environmental benefits in the assessment of the
first Article 81(3) condition - which is not clear - this is, for the reasons set out above,
wholly misguided. Rather, the Commission’s approach in its Horizontal Guidelines was,
it is submitted, an enlightened one.
b. Consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefit
The application of the second Article 81(3) condition to environmental agreements can
be dealt with more briefly.
i. The meaning of “consumers”
A first important issue is the scope of the term “consumers” from a geographic and
temporal perspective. Environmental benefits are typically diffuse and do not adhere,
for example, simply to the “consumers” of a product or service in the relevant
geographic market; nor do they necessarily adhere with immediate effect. Can
environmental benefits nonetheless satisfy this condition? In the Article 81(3)
Guidelines, the Commission stated that,
“the concept of ‘consumers’ encompasses all direct or indirect users of the products covered by the
agreement, including producers that use the products as an input, wholesalers, retailers and final
consumers, i.e. natural persons who are acting for purposes which can be regarded as outside their
trade or profession. In other words, consumers within the meaning of Article 81(3) are the
customers of the parties to the agreement and subsequent purchasers.”63
Prima facie, this definition would seem to exclude consideration of environmental benefits
to the broader group of “consumers”, outside the relevant geographic market but inside
61 See, however, Maks, “The “New” Horizontal Agreements Approach in the EU: An “Economic”
Assessment” (2002) 37(1) Intereconomics 28, who suggests a cost-benefit economic analysis of
environmental benefits in the first stage of Article 81(3), in order to assess whether, on balance, an
agreement will result in “technical and economic progress.”
62 Article 81(3) Guidelines, note 7 above, point 5.
63 Article 81(3) Guidelines, ibid, point 84.
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the EU (or indeed beyond). Once again, however, such a conclusion does not follow
from the wording of the Treaty, nor indeed from the Commission’s own prior decisional
practice. Though the Commission’s decisions on environmental agreements frequently
gloss over this issue,64 the CECED decision is exemplary in its clarity. In that case, the
Commission explicitly acknowledged that it was taking into account the “collective
environmental benefits” of the agreement: the “environmental results for society would adequately
allow consumers a fair share of the benefits even if no [economic] benefits accrued to individual
purchasers.”65 In particular, the Commission estimated that the saved external costs (to the
environment) exceeded the increase in purchase costs of washing machines by around
seven times. Such reasoning was confirmed in the Horizontal Guidelines.66
This approach is, it is submitted, wholly correct. Quite apart from the fact that it would
make no sense to include environmental benefits within the scope of the first condition,
only to read “consumers” in a narrow sense in this second condition, the broader
interpretation is, it is submitted, required by each of the arguments set forth in Part II.
In particular, from a systematic perspective, such an interpretation of “consumers” is
required by the integration principle. Again, this falls under point 3 of Chapter 6’s
working hypothesis, where it is possible to interpret the Treaty wording in a way that
favours environmental protection, and there is no conflict with the goals of competition
policy. From a governance perspective, institutions interpreting the term consumers will,
and should, do so in a manner coherent with Community environmental policy, which is
by Article 2 EC aimed at achieving a high level of protection and improvement of the
quality of the environment, without restriction as to the beneficiaries of such
protection.67
One outstanding question is, however, whether environmental benefits to “consumers”
outside the EU may be taken into account. As regards restrictive agreements other than
environmental agreements, this issue is undecided.68 Though it is not necessary to take a
view on this issue in the present research, it suffices to observe that, at least in cases
where the environmental benefits of an agreement for the EU cannot realistically be
disassociated from those for a broader geographic area, such broader benefits should be
taken into account.
A further relevant question is whether benefits to consumers in the future count under
Article 81(3). Here, in its Article 81(3) Guidelines, the Commission is broader in its
approach, stating that delayed benefits are also relevant, though subject to discounting
where necessary. It observes that,
“[t]he fact that pass-on to the consumer occurs with a certain time lag does not in itself exclude the
application of Article 81(3). However, the greater the time lag, the greater must be the efficiencies
to compensate also for the loss to consumers during the period preceding the pass-on.”69
64 See, for example, Philips/Osram OJ 1994 L 378/37, “the use of cleaner facilities will result in less air pollution, and
consequently in direct and indirect benefits for consumers from reduced negative externalities” (point 27).
65 Note 49 above, para 56.
66 See the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, at point 194, which distinguishes between
individual benefits for consumers and cases where “net benefits for consumers in general” are likely, in which
case a cost-benefit analysis will be applied.
67 See further, Chapter 2.
68 In some commentators’ view, it refers only to consumers within the Community - though this has never
been expressly decided in the EU. See Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), at 152 and the Australian authority cited therein.
69 In making this assessment, the Commission continues, the fact that “the value of a gain for consumers in
the future is not the same as a present gain for consumers” must be taken into account. It notes that, “[t]he
value of saving 100 euro today is greater than the value of saving the same amount a year later. A gain for consumers in the
future therefore does not fully compensate for a present loss to consumers of equal nominal size. In order to allow for an
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This approach, it is submitted, fits well with the arguments set out in Part II, and in
particular with the economic argument, which argued for the use of techniques of
environmental valuation developed by environmental economics, most of which
techniques entail some form of discounting for future benefits. As noted in Chapter 8,
however, choosing which discounting measure is appropriate in a particular case will
likely be extremely controversial.
ii. Passing on a “fair share” of benefits
The Commission’s approach. A second issue is how to assess whether a “fair share” of
benefits will be “passed on” in environmental agreements. Insofar as environmental
improvements constitute qualitative “efficiencies” (i.e., new or improved products or
services, in contrast to “cost efficiencies”), the passing on of such benefits is, in the
Commission’s view, generally presumed.70 The Article 81(3) Guidelines state that,
“The availability of new and improved products constitutes an important source of consumer
welfare. As long as the increase in value stemming from such improvements exceeds any harm from
a maintenance or an increase in price caused by the restrictive agreement, consumers are better off
than without the agreement and the consumer pass-on requirement of Article 81(3) is normally
fulfilled.”71
However, the Commission continues, in cases where the likely effect of the agreement is
to increase prices for consumers within the relevant market, it must be “carefully assessed
whether the claimed efficiencies create real value for consumers in that market so as to compensate for the
adverse effects of the restriction of competition.”72 Even where the agreement is not likely to
increase prices, in assessing whether a “fair share” of any benefit is passed on, the
Commission will use a sliding scale, in an approach that seems to elide the second and
third Article 81(3) conditions. Thus, the Commission states that “the greater the restriction of
competition found under Article 81(1) the greater must be the efficiencies and the pass-on to consumers.”
The process of assessing whether qualitative efficiencies will be passed on is, the
Commission admits, vague and, “necessarily requires value judgment. It is difficult to assign precise
values to dynamic efficiencies of this nature…” In this regard, the Commission will take a
reasonable approach to the evidence required from undertakings, only requiring them to
substantiate their claims “by providing estimates and other data to the extent reasonably possible,
taking account of the circumstances of the individual case.”73
In many of the cases on environmental agreements to date - as, indeed, with many non-
environmental cases - this element of Article 81(3) has been assessed only cursorily by
the Commission. In its DSD decision, for example, it confined itself to asserting that
“consumers will…benefit as a result of the improvement in environmental quality sought, essentially the
reduction in the volume of packaging.”74 Even more broadly, in Exxon/Shell the Commission
relied on consumers’ perception of environmental improvements. Thus, such
appropriate comparison of a present loss to consumers with a future gain to consumers, the value of future gains must be
discounted. The discount rate applied must reflect the rate of inflation, if any, and lost interest as an indication of the lower
value of future gains.” Article 81(3) Guidelines, note 7 above, points 87-88.
70 Ibid, points 85-86.
71 Ibid, point 104.
72 Ibid, points 103-104. See, for an example of an acceptable quality improvement, REIMS II OJ 2004 L
56/56.
73 Ibid, point 94. In assessing whether cost efficiencies will be passed on, the Commission will take into
account: (a) The characteristics and structure of the market; (b) The nature and magnitude of the efficiency
gains; (c) The elasticity of demand; and (d) The magnitude of the restriction of competition.
74 Commission Decision 2001/837 OJ 2001 L 319/1, para 148, confirmed by Case T-289/01 DSD,
judgment of May 24, 2007.
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improvements would “be perceived as beneficial by many consumers at a time when the limitation of
natural resources and threats to the environment are of increasing public concern.”75
Comment. This element of Article 81(3) is, as the Commission admits in its Article
81(3), a particularly subjective one and not one which lends itself to an overly scientific,
economics-based approach. However, the following points are at least, it is submitted,
clear. First, this element of Article 81(3) makes it rather difficult to argue that Article 81
EC is neutral as between consumer and producer welfare: it positively requires an
increase in consumer welfare in order for Article 81(3) to apply. Secondly, where the
principal benefits flowing from an agreement are environmental, however, and these
benefits are genuine, it follows ceteris paribus that this condition will be satisfied, as it is
inherent in such benefits that they will be passed on to consumers (defined in the
broader sense set out above). This is so, it is submitted, even where the agreement may
result in price rises. Where, however, the benefits from an agreement are not purely
environmental, but include wider benefits (e.g., economic benefits), it will be necessary to
assess whether a reasonable (“fair”) share of such benefits will accrue to consumers.
c. Agreement must not contain dispensable restrictions
The third condition, that restrictions must be indispensable, is akin to the general
principle of Community law of proportionality.76 According to the Article 81(3)
Guidelines, there are two aspects to the indispensability requirement. First, the
agreement itself must be “reasonably necessary in order to achieve the efficiencies.” Secondly, the
individual restrictions of competition that flow from the agreement must also be
“reasonably necessary for the attainment of the efficiencies.”77 In both cases, “the question is not
whether in the absence of the restriction the agreement would not have been concluded, but whether more
efficiencies are produced with the agreement or restriction than in the absence of the agreement or
restriction.”78 The parties must show “why such seemingly realistic and significantly less restrictive
alternatives to the agreement would be significantly less efficient.”79 Again, the test is a sliding scale:
the more restrictive the restraint, the stricter the test here. Restrictions that are black
listed in block exemption regulations or identified as hardcore restrictions in
Commission guidelines and notices are “unlikely to be considered indispensable.”80
This requirement applies to environmental agreements in the same way as to any other
restrictive agreement.81 Indeed, it is submitted, this fits well with Chapter 6’s systematic
argument, which concluded, in point four of its working hypothesis on the implications
of Article 6 EC integration principle that the principle requires a proportionality analysis
in cases of conflict between competition and environmental goals. In its Horizontal
Guidelines, the Commission adds that this requirement is more likely to be fulfilled by an
environmental agreement if its economic efficiency is objectively demonstrated: if
restrictions seem prima facie not to be indispensable, they “must be supported with a cost-
effectiveness analysis showing that alternative means of attaining the expected environmental benefits,
75 Exxon/Shell OJ 1994 L 144/20, para 71.
76 See Steenbergen, “Proportionality in Competition Law and Policy” (2008) 35(3) Legal Issues of
Economic Integration 259, who views this indispensability test as the second limb of Article 81(3)
proportionality analysis, with the first limb being the “suitability” test of whether the agreement contributes
to improving production or distribution or to promoting technical or economic progress.
77 Article 81(3) Guidelines, note 7 above, point 73.
78 Ibid, point 74.
79 Ibid, point 75.
80 Ibid, point 79.
81 See further, Vogelaar, "Towards an Improved Integration of EC Environmental Policy and EC
Competition Policy: An Interim Report" in 1994 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. (B. Hawk ed. 1995) 529, at 559.
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would be more economically or financially costly, under reasonable assumptions.”82 The Commission
takes the example of a uniform fee, charged irrespective of individual costs for waste
collection (such as in the VOTOB case, discussed below) as a case where indispensability
must be clearly demonstrated.
For some environmental agreements assessed in the past, proportionality has not been a
problem. In CECED, for example, the phasing out of less efficient washing machines
was the only measure that would achieve the intended energy reductions.83 For example,
industry-wide targets, information campaigns or eco-labelling schemes could not achieve
the same result at the same cost. In EACEM, the voluntary agreement to reduce energy
used in stand-by mode of video recorders and televisions discussed above, was found to
be proportionate partly because unnecessary information exchange was eliminated from
the arrangement: an independent consultant was appointed to gather information from
the undertakings on their sales and the power use of units sold, and would simply report
the names of manufacturers not meeting their commitment.84 This concern of the
Commission to avoid “spillover effects” in horizontal environmental agreements has
been increasingly emphasised.85
In numerous decisions to date, however, this condition has been the downfall of
environmental agreements. In most cases, the reason has been that the restriction was
not genuinely necessitated by any environmental goal. An example is Ansac, which
concerned agreements between US soda-ash producers to create a joint export
undertaking under the US Webb-Pomerene Act, on the basis that natural soda ash
(mainly US-produced) is environmentally friendlier than synthetic soda ash. No
Community exemption was granted, as the agreement only concerned setting up a joint
sales agency and thus had no connection to the environmental benefit.86 Although it was
not disputed that, from an environmental perspective, natural soda ash might be
preferable to synthetic soda ash, this did not necessitate, in the Commission’s view, that
Ansac should be the only way for the parties’ products to reach the Community. In other
cases, as mentioned above, the alleged environmental goals of an agreement have been
found by the Commission to be a pretext for the creation of a barrier to entry to the
market.87
In many cases, however, the environmental goals of the agreement have been genuine,
but the agreement’s provisions have been found to be disproportionately restrictive, in
the sense that a less restrictive alternative would (in the Commission’s view) meet the
same goal. An example is the VOTOB case,88 in which the Commission found that a
waste management agreement between six tank storage operators, which was financed by
82 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, points 195-196.
83 CECED, note 49 above, para 59.
84 See similarly, DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of
September 22, 2005, point 61: “As a general principle, it is clear that, to the extent that the cooperation on waste
management would be “abused” by the participants to exchange sensitive information or to fix or align prices of the packaged
products, Article 81 EC would be violated.”
85 Ibid, at point 116.
86 Decision 91/301 Ansac OJ 1991 L 152/54.
87 See, for example, Decision 82/371 Anseau/Navewa OJ 1982 L 167/39
88 XXIInd Competition Report 1992, paras 177-186. The case is similar in some respects to the decision of
the Dutch competition authority in Case 51/98 Stibat, which concerned a battery take-back and recycling
scheme set up by Dutch battery producers to comply with their obligations under the Batteries Directive,
Directive 91/157 OJ 1991 L 78/38 (since replaced by Directive 2006/66 OJ 2006 L 266/1. The NMa
found that two elements of the scheme were disproportionate and failed to satisfy the conditions for
exemption under the Dutch equivalent of Article 81(3): first, the requirement that members pass Stibat’s
fee on to the next level in the distribution chain; second, the requirement that members set out Stibat’s fee
separately on invoices (paras. 65-70).
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a fixed fee (“Environmental Surcharge” or ES) added to all tariffs for storage of
covenant products, constituted a restriction of competition. This was because the fixed
fee harmonized the costs and thus excluded competition on an important price
component. The ES was to have been mentioned separately on operators’ invoices and
was to be paid by the ultimate polluters - the chemical undertakings offering covenant
products for storage. Funds generated by the ES were to be “earmarked” in members’
accounts for environmental purposes. Further, the ES proceeds only amounted to
around 4% of the undertakings’ total costs; the rest of the tariff for storage service could
be negotiated freely. In holding that the charge was disproportionate, the Commission
found that a system of invoicing total price, and stating that this included environmental
costs, would have been a less restrictive solution. Moreover, the flat-fee nature of the ES
did not sufficiently take into account different cost considerations of each VOTOB
member, and could be mistaken for a government-imposed levy, the amount of which as
non-negotiable. Interestingly, as Vogelaar notes, the VOTOB agreement was the direct
sequel of an environmental covenant entered into between the Dutch government and
the VOTOB members (i.e., what we termed in Chapter 4 “co-regulation”).89 In
particular, the Dutch government had been threatening VOTOB members with
imminent and severe legislation should they refuse to comply with their obligations
under the covenant to reduce emissions and invest in new, environmentally friendlier
technology.90
One can appreciate the motivation behind the VOTOB decision – i.e., to maintain
competition even in environmental abatement measures, so that pollution is reduced at
the least cost to society. Nonetheless, on its facts the decision seems, in retrospect,
rather harsh, given the small proportion which the ES represented of the undertakings’
overall costs.91 Moreover, from a transparency perspective, it seems preferable that
environmental costs would be visible to chemical customers on invoices, to incentivise
them in turn to reduce overall pollution for storage. In its 2005 Waste Management
Paper, the Commission gives welcome clarification that, in cases where environmental
agreements lead to a certain amount of commonality of costs,
“it will have to be carefully examined on a case-by-case basis whether price competition in the
markets of the packaged products is appreciably restricted or whether the development of better and
more environment-friendly products is hampered as a result of such cooperation on waste
management.”92
Were VOTOB to be decided today, therefore, it is far from clear that it would be found
to amount to an appreciable restriction of competition. Nonetheless, it is evident that, in
principle, an environmental charge is more likely to be considered proportionate if it is
not in the form of a fixed, flat-rate charge. Moreover, this position seems reasonable,
unless the parties to the agreement can put forward positive arguments why a flat-rate
charge is necessary to achieve the environmental benefits. In ZVEI/Arge Bat, for
example, the Commission exempted an agreement between manufacturers to prefer less-
polluting batteries and to use recyclable materials, where the disposal costs were to be
shown separately on invoices for the batteries, but not in the form of a fixed charge.93
Similarly, in relation to charges imposed on a collective basis to pay for compliance with
89 See Vogelaar, “Towards an Improved Integration of EC Environmental Policy and EC Competition
Policy: An Interim Report” in 1994 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. (B. Hawk ed. 1995) 529, at 549.
90 Ibid, 550. Further, a state aid scheme in Netherlands for investments at time had been withdrawn after
signing of the covenant, so the VOTOB members were faced with an immediate financing problem
91 See similarly, ibid, 560.
92 DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22,
2005, point 60. See also, Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, note 82 above, points 23-24 and 88.
93 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) ZVEI/Arge Bat OJ 1998 C 172/13.
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the End of Life Vehicles Directive94 and the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
Directive,95 the Commission has indicated that flat-rate charges may, in some cases, be
justified.
A further area where proportionality has been critical is in agreements related to
packaging waste management schemes. A major issue here has been whether exclusivity
arrangements are genuinely indispensable to achieve the intended efficiencies and
environmental benefits. In some cases, the Commission has concluded that the
exclusivity clauses are indispensable. For example, in the case of the UK’s packaging
recovery scheme Valpak, the structure of which we looked at in Chapter 10, potential
members of the scheme were obliged to use it for all their packaging (the “all or nothing”
approach). In the Commission’s view, such exclusivity was justified, as it was necessary
in order for the scheme to be viable. A comfort letter was granted, with the Commission
reserving the right to itself to re-examine the case.96 Since this and similar decisions,
however, the Commission has made clear that this principle has its limits:
“the all or nothing rule cannot be exempted when it becomes evident that further substantial
investment in waste collection infrastructure is no longer necessary to fulfil the obligations under the
Packaging Directive and/or the rule may no longer be regarded as an effective means of securing
new investment. Consequently, in all Member States with established systems that reach the
recovery and recycling targets, the all or nothing rule cannot be regarded as indispensable for the
functioning of these systems.”97
In DSD, as we have seen, the Commission found that the clause in DSD’s service
agreements with downstream local collecting undertakings, whereby the collecting
undertaking has the exclusive task of collecting and sorting used sales packaging in a
certain area, restricted competition under Article 81(1). However, the restriction was
exempted under Article 81(3) EC. In particular, such exclusivity was deemed
indispensable in light of the investments which collectors are obliged to make in
collection vehicles, bins and containers, and sorting facilities.98 However, the
Commission took issue with the planned length of the exclusivity in the agreement: after
carrying out “comprehensive calculations of investment and profitability”,99 it stated that, from
2003 onwards (at which point the DSD system would be considered to be “fully
established”),100 an exclusivity period of three years would be considered reasonable in
94 Importantly, the Commission cites with approval a decision of the Dutch NCA that a collective system
based on a voluntary agreement among the interested parties for the recovery and recycling of car wrecks
set up in the Netherlands prior to the ELV Directive and still in operation, did not infringe Dutch
competition law, even though the car recycling system includes a flat fee of €45 to be paid to ARN by car
producers and importers for each registered car. The car producers and importers may obtain an
exemption if they can demonstrate that they take care of their ELVs in an equivalent way: DG
Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22, 2005.
95 With regard to WEEE obligations, the Commission cites with approval the Belgian system set up by
producers and importers of EEEs, Recupel, which is funded through a recycling premium paid by
purchasers of new equipment. The level of the premium is based on an estimate of the number of
appliances returned per year and the estimated costs of collection, treatment and recycling. The premiums
are passed through the chain from the final retailer to his supplier, and then to the manufacturer or
importer who transfers the money to Recupel: DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste
management in recycling systems of September 22, 2005.
96 XXVIII Annual Competition Report (1998), at 165. See also, the comfort letters in the Biffpack,
Wastepak and Difpak cases: XX Annual Competition Report (2000), at 148.
97 DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22,
2005, point 79.
98 Commission Decision 2001/837 OJ 2001 L 319/1, point 153.
99 Ibid, point 155.
100 Ibid.
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order to recoup investments.101 Significantly, it is submitted, the exclusivity only went
“one way” in that case: the collecting undertakings were, if they wished, free to work
with undertakings other than DSD.102
Similarly, in ARA, the Commission found that a requirement of exclusivity in contracts
between sectoral recycling undertakings and regional disposal undertakings (collection
and sorting partners) as regards both household and commercial waste was indispensable
within the meaning of Article 81(3) in order “to ensure lasting and reliable collection services,
which are indispensable for the success of the system as a whole.”103 Given the collection and
sorting partners’ investments in setting up and maintaining the necessary infrastructure
(e.g., collection vehicles, containers), an exclusivity period of between three and five years
was acceptable.104 Clearly, therefore, the Commission was prepared to allow a longer
exclusivity period in the ARA case than it had allowed for DSD. One reason for this, at
least in the case of commercial waste, may have been the lower market share, and
resultant diminished buyer power, enjoyed by the ARA system sectoral recycling
undertakings.105
As regards household waste, however, the Commission simply based its conclusion that
an exclusivity period of three to five years would be proportionate on the reasoning that,
“the special circumstances involved in implementing the requirements of the Packaging Ordinance and, in
that connection, establishing a countrywide take-back and dispensation system”,106 making no
reference whatsoever to the DSD decision. The paucity of reasoning in this regard is
disappointing, and certainly not in the interests of legal certainty. One might observe
that this kind of case - though a recent one - is a good illustration of the subjective way in
which Article 81(3) is still applied, and of how far removed this remains from, for
instance, the narrow Chicago School conception of competition theory.
d. Agreement must not substantially eliminate competition in the relevant
market
The final Article 81(3) condition aims at ensuring that effective competition remains in
the relevant market, indicating, in the Commission’s words, that, “[u]ltimately the protection
of rivalry and the competitive process is given priority over potentially pro-competitive efficiency gains which
could result from restrictive agreements.”107 Thus, “the ultimate aim of Article 81 is to protect the
competitive process.”108 Essentially, it may be viewed as a “long-stop” application of the
proportionality principle, making explicit that a restriction can never be viewed as
proportionate where it eliminates, or almost eliminates, competition. In its Article 81(3)
Guidelines, the Commission specifies that the application of the last condition of Article
81(3) requires a “realistic analysis of the various sources of competition in the market, the level of
competitive constraint that they impose on the parties to the agreement and the impact of the agreement on
this competitive constraint. Both actual and potential competition must be considered.”109 The
101 Ibid, point 157. The Commission claims that the new service agreements reduce DSD’s costs for the
collection and sorting of plastic packaging by more than 20% (about € 200 million per year). This will lead
to a reduction of the fees which DSD charges to its clients. See DG Competition Paper concerning issues
of waste management in recycling systems of September 22, 2005.
102 This was ultimately made a condition of the exemption which, as discussed below, was unsuccessfully
challenged by DSD before the CFI.
103 ARA, ARGEV, ARO, OJ 2004 L 75/59, point 274.
104 Ibid, points 277 and 327. However, as discussed below, this conclusion was reached on the basis that
the collection and sorting partners should be free to deal with systems other than ARA.
105 Ibid, point 327.
106 Ibid, point 277.
107 Article 81(3) Guidelines, note 7 above, point 105.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid, points 108-110.
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Commission goes on to specify that this condition will not be satisfied if competition in
“one of its most important expressions” is eliminated, giving the examples of the elimination of
price competition or competition in respect of innovation and development of new
products.110
More particularly, in the context of environmental agreements, the Commission has
indicated that this condition means that, irrespective of the “environmental and economic gains
and the necessity of the intended provisions”, the agreement must not eliminate competition in
terms of “product or process differentiation, technological innovation or market entry in the short or,
where relevant, medium run.”111 The application of this condition to environmental
agreements is, it is submitted, fully consistent with Part II’s arguments. On a systematic
approach, the wording of Article 81(3) does not allow for any other interpretation, and
hence this falls under point two of Chapter 6’s working hypothesis on the implications of
Article 6 EC. It should be added that it is difficult to conceive of a situation where total
elimination of competition on an important competitive parameter would be
indispensable to achieve the environmental aims of an agreement. For instance, the
elimination of competition in respect of product innovation would, in the long term, run
the risk of harming environmental protection by stifling the development of
environmentally cleaner technology.
As competition on environmental factors normally only forms one of many potential
parameters of competition, however, voluntary standardisation initiatives (e.g., those at
issue in CECED and EACEM or, more broadly, the creation of private eco-labels or
private environmental management standards) are likely to satisfy this condition. Once
again, exclusivity provisions in waste management systems, however, may cause more
problems here. In the Horizontal Guidelines, the Commission stresses that, in such
cases, “the duration of such rights should take into account the possible emergence of an alternative to
the operator.”112 Clearly, the greater the system’s market share, the more likely it is that
exclusivity clauses will eliminate competition.113
In the DSD case, however, a three-year exclusivity clause in its service agreements with
collectors was, “regardless of DSD's position on the relevant markets” not likely to eliminate
competition on the market in the collection and sorting of household packaging waste.
This was because collectors excluded by DSD remain free to offer their services to
undertakings wishing to manage their own waste. In addition, the “marked network effects”
and “special conditions of supply” in the market meant that it was economically advantageous
to entrust the task to one collector in each designated area, as well as practically
unavoidable due to space restrictions and collection logistics as regards bins for
household waste.114 Further, the contracts were legally required by the Packaging
Ordinance to be awarded by competitive tender – a requirement that the Commission
has since emphasised as crucial in the context of exclusivity.115 As a result, competition
would not be substantially eliminated by the exclusivity arrangements, on condition that
there was free and unimpeded access to the collection infrastructure set up by DSD
110 Ibid.
111 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, point 197.
112 Ibid, point 198.
113 For example, where the market share of participating recycling companies is 30% or below, exclusive
arrangements of up to five years fall under the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption, save where network
effects exist in the meaning of Article 6 of the Block Exemption.
114 Commission Decision 2001/837 OJ 2001 L 319/1, points 157-158.
115 Ibid, point 161. See DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling
systems of September 22, 2005, points 76 and 82. Following a large number of uneconomic offers in the
first round of DSD’s tendering procedures in Germany, DSD – at the suggestion of the German
Bundeskartellamt – amended the tender rules.
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collectors.116 However, the Commission imposed two express obligations on DSD in its
exemption decision: first, DSD was obliged to allow its collectors from contracting with
its competitors; second, it was obliged to ensure that access to its collectors’
infrastructure was unrestricted.
Though DSD appealed to the CFI on the attachment of these obligations, the appeal was
rejected in a judgment of May 2007.117 As to the first condition (on collectors’ freedom
to contract with competitors), DSD argued that this was disproportionate as, if collectors
contracted with DSD’s competitors, it would be impossible for DSD to know which of
the collected packaging it had responsibility for under the Packaging Ordinance. This
argument was rejected by the CFI on the facts, after receiving detailed explanations from
the parties on how the exemption systems worked, and on the possibility of dividing up
packaging received by the collectors between different systems on the basis of quotas.118
Further, insofar as collectors worked for non-DSD systems, DSD was free to reduce the
fee it paid to those collectors proportionately.119
As to the second condition (obligatory access to collectors’ infrastructure), DSD had
argued that, as it was the economic owner of the collection infrastructure, an essential
facilities analysis should be used, and that the conditions of the essential facilities
doctrine were not satisfied in the present case. The CFI rejected the contention that
DSD was the economic owner of this infrastructure, as it is the collectors who make the
necessary investments therein and who bear the risks relating to these investments.
Moreover, the CFI confirmed that, in order for competitors to have any real chance of
entering the market, access to this infrastructure was essential, as it would be very
difficult to duplicate.120 The – virtually wholesale – approval by the CFI of the
Commission’s approach to (commitments in) waste management agreements will give
the Commission important reassurance in using this approach to assess other such
systems.121 More importantly, it seems correct as a matter of principle: there were, it is
submitted, no good environmental reasons underlying DSD’s challenge to the
obligations. As such, DSD’s position is not supported by any of Part II’s arguments.
Rather, at the core of the Commission’s decision was simply a concern to ensure that the
increasingly lucrative waste management markets function competitively.
Similarly, in ARA, the exclusive arrangements in contracts with collection and sorting
partners were not such as would substantially eliminate competition.122 Reasoning in
much the same way as in the DSD case, the Commission emphasised that, in the case of
household waste, it was imperative that ARA collectors and sorters should be free to
conclude contracts with other non-ARA systems (i.e., that the exclusivity was unilateral,
only for the benefit of the collectors and sorters). Once again, its reasoning was that
116 Ibid, point 163.
117 Case T-289/01 DSD, judgment of May 24, 2007.
118 Ibid, para 166.
119 Ibid, para 167. The CFI also rejected an argument that the collectors’ use of the “Green Dot” logo on
their facilities, which indicated that those collectors were part of the DSD system, would be confusing for
consumers if those collectors also worked for non-DSD systems. The CFI found, inter alia, that it was not
strictly necessary under the Packaging Ordinance for the collectors to have the Green Dot logo on their
facilities at all: para 190.
120 Ibid, paras 106-107. The CFI held, however, that the obligation to provide access only extended to
other collective exemption systems, and not to self management solutions: para 121.
121 See the comments of the Commission officials heavily involved in this area, Gremminger and Miersch,
“The Court of First Instance confirms Duales System Deutschland’s abuse of dominant in the packaging
recycling system” Competition Policy Newsletter 3 (2007) 47, who state that, “The full confirmation of [this
Commission decision and that on Article 82] gives an important signal to the market players…” (at 49).
122 ARA, ARGEV, ARO, OJ 2004 L 75/59, point 278 onwards.
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there were “substantial practical, legal and economic reservations that militate against setting up either
another parallel collection system or an alternative bring-it-yourself system.”123 A number of
obligations were imposed on ARA in order to ensure this freedom.124 An appeal from
these obligations is currently pending with the CFI.125
The final issue as regards the fourth Article 81(3) condition is its relationship with Article
82. Formerly, the Commission had considered that competition would be eliminated by
an agreement if a party to the agreement will become dominant as the result of an
agreement.126 However, the position has since changed: as has been recently held by the
CFI, it is possible for restrictive agreements entered into by a dominant undertaking to
be exempted under Article 81(3), as long as competition is not eliminated.127 In the
environmental context, this is illustrated by the Article 81 DSD decision itself, which did
not ultimately prohibit any of DSD’s arrangements, despite its dominant position
(though, as discussed in Chapter 12, the Commission also issued an Article 82 decision in
that case).128 The change in approach is particularly important given that, as we saw in
Chapter 9, environment-related markets may well be narrowly defined, making a finding
of a dominant position more likely. Rather, any finding that competition would be
eliminated by an agreement must necessarily be based on a variety of factors, including
the market positions of the parties to the agreement, competitors’ market positions, and
whether or not there are substantial barriers to entry.
123 Ibid, point 286.
124 In particular, any requirement for disposal firms to provide evidence of quantities of packaging that are
not collected for the ARA system was forbidden.
125 Case T-419/03 ARA.
126 See, for example, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints OJ 2000 C 291/1, point 135.
127 See, for example, Joined Cases T-191/98 etc Atlantic Container Line [2003] ECR II-3275, para 939.
Further, the Article 81(3) Guidelines confirm that, “[n]ot all restrictive agreements concluded by a dominant
undertaking constitute an abuse of a dominant position.” Article 81(3) Guidelines, note 7 above, point 106. The
Article 81(3) Guidelines explain, in footnote 92, that henceforth the statement in the Vertical Guidelines
on this point should be understood in this sense.
128 For example, where a recycling system has a de facto monopoly for the recycling and recovery of
household packaging waste, it may be abusing its dominant position in that market by entering into a
network of agreements with downstream collectors of commercial packaging waste, due to potential
leveraging effects. See, by analogy, DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in
recycling systems of September 22, 2005, point 64.
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Chapter 12: Article 82 EC
1. Introduction
Article 82 EC provides:
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contracts.”
Article 82 prohibits abusive conduct by dominant undertakings. Unlike Article 81 EC,
Article 82 EC can apply to unilateral conduct by dominant undertakings, as well as
agreements concluded by them. In comparison to Article 81 EC, the parameters of
Article 82 EC and their interrelation with environmental protection factors constitute
relatively uncharted territory, due primarily to the fact that there has been little case law
on the issue to date. The most important development to date has certainly been the
2001 Commission decision on the DSD system, upheld on appeal in 2007 by the Court
of First Instance.1 This will be discussed in detail below. The potential application of
Article 82 to tradable permit schemes, an economic instrument discussed in Chapter 4,
will also be discussed.
The indeterminate nature of the Article 82 prohibition is not confined to environment-
related cases. Due to the rather amorphous nature of the prohibition - particularly from
an economic perspective - in current decisional practice, the Commission is presently
undertaking a major reform of the Article, commencing with a 2005 Discussion Paper.
One of the primary goals of the reform is to make Article 82 more economically sound:
in the words of Commissioner Kroes, the Commission “simply want[s] to develop and explain
theories of harm on the basis of a sound economic assessment for the most frequent types of abusive
behaviour to make it easier to understand our policy, not only as stated in policy papers but also in
individual decisions based on Article 82.”2 To the extent potentially relevant to environment-
related cases, the reform process will be discussed further below.
2. Dominance: assessment and significance
As is well known, the classic legal definition of dominance is that of the ECJ in Hoffmann-
La Roche as,
“[a] situation where one or more undertakings wield economic power which would enable them to
prevent effective competition from being maintained in the relevant market by giving them the
1 OJ [2001] L 166/1 and Case T-151/01. This judgment is currently itself under appeal: see Case C-
385/07P.
2 Speech to the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Speech/05/537, September 23, 2005.
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opportunity to act to a considerable extent independently of their competitors, their customers, and,
ultimately, of consumers.”3
In its 2005 Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to
Exclusionary Abuses (the “Discussion Paper”), the Commission divides this definition
into three elements:
a) a position of economic strength on a market which
b) enables the undertaking(s) in question to prevent effective competition
being maintained on that market by
c) affording it, or them, the power to behave independently to an
appreciable extent.4
Given these elements, it is clear that market share alone is not sufficient to conclude that
an undertaking is dominant; rather, a wide range of characteristics may be relevant.5
These include the number of competing suppliers of the same products, their market
shares, barriers to entry and expansion (including legal barriers, capacity constraints,
economies of scale and scope for larger undertakings, preferential access to essential
resources, and first-mover advantages), buyers’ market positions, and the degree of
product differentiation. Higher than “normal” profits may also, potentially, be an
indication of market power, though are not a prerequisite for a finding of dominance.
Further, in order for Article 82 to apply, dominance must exist in a “substantial part of the
common market”. This test has been broadly interpreted by the Commission and Court.6
From an environmental perspective, as mentioned when discussing market definition,
the nature of some environment-related markets may result in significant market power.
This may flow from the existence of legal barriers to entry from environmental
regulatory regimes, such as a limited supply of permits to pollute. It may also result from
the innovative and rapidly developing nature of markets for certain environmentally
superior products may result - at least temporarily - in substantial market power for
individual undertakings. Such market power may become more permanent where
barriers to entry exist, such as high costs of developing equivalent environmentally-
friendly technology, or strategic advantages from being the first mover in the market.
As submitted in Chapter 9, however, the arguments in Part II do not in themselves lead
to the conclusion that market definition, market power, and therefore dominance, should
be assessed in any manner different to that normally employed in other cases. Rather, it
is submitted, such arguments become relevant when considering the circumstances in
which environment-related practices carried out by an undertaking in a dominant
position should be prohibited as abusive.
3 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECR 461, para 38. Economically, dominance may be defined as the
possession of substantial market power, where market power constitutes “the ability of a firm or group of firms
to raise price, through the restriction of output, above the level that would prevail under competitive conditions and thereby to
enjoy increased profits from the action.” Bishop and Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts,
Application and Measurement (2nd ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at 3.04.
4 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses,
Brussels, December 2005.
5 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses,
Brussels, December 2005.
6 Including in the environment-related cases Case C-343/95 Calì & Figli [1997] ECR I-1547, where the
Port of Genoa was considered to meet the test, and Case C-209/98 Sydhavnens [2000] ECR 343, where the
market for processing building and construction waste in the municipality of Copenhagen was considered
to meet the test, though no ultimate decision on market definition was taken in that case.
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3. Abuse of a dominant position and environmental protection considerations
a. The concept of abuse - general
The economic rationale of Article 82 EC is, in essence, that undertakings with significant
market power (that is, a position of dominance) have the incentive or ability to engage in
anti-competitive practices and, ultimately, raise prices until their profit is maximised -
resulting in a dead weight loss to society.7 The Community Courts have consistently
approached Article 82 EC by stating that dominant undertakings have a “special
responsibility”, “the actual scope of [which] must be considered in relation to the degree of dominance held
by that undertaking and to the special characteristics of the market which may affect the competitive
situation.”8 The greater the undertaking’s market power, therefore, the greater its
“responsibility”. The boundaries of dominant undertakings’ responsibilities are defined,
on a case by case basis, by the scope of the concept of abuse. In assessing whether
conduct has abusive effects, it is useful to distinguish, as the Discussion Paper does,
between exclusionary abuses (i.e., abuses which are capable of having, and likely to have,
a foreclosure effect on the market)9 and exploitative abuses (i.e., which are directly
exploitative of consumers).10
ECJ’s Definition of Abuse. The concept of abuse within Community competition law
remains, in many cases, rather unclear. The classic definition remains, once more, that
given in Hoffmann-La Roche, defining abuse as,
“an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is
such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to
methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis
of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree
of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.” 11
This definition makes clear that the key elements of abuse are: (a) the objectivity of the
concept; (b) the requirement of a certain anti-competitive effect; resulting from (c) use by
the dominant undertaking of methods “different from those which condition normal competition”.
Consistently with the Commission’s movement towards a more economic approach, the
central focus in assessing whether Article 82 has been infringed is (b) - examining the
actual or likely effects of the allegedly abusive conduct on the market.12 There has been
no general consensus on how to define abusive conduct economically.13
7 Though the various schools of competition theory have differed considerably as to when the behaviour
of firms with significant market power should be prohibited, restraining certain such behaviour is central to
the US (via section 2 of the Sherman Act) and Community competition regimes. For an interesting
discussion on the differences between pre-Chicago, Chicago and post-Chicago approaches to the concept
of abuse, see O’Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC (Oxford, Hart 2006).
8 See, for example, Deutsche Post AG – Interception of cross-border mail OJ [2001] L 331/40.
9 Discussion Paper, point 1. A “foreclosure effect” is defined very broadly in the Discussion Paper as.
“that actual or potential competitors are completely or partially denied profitable access to the market.” A further
distinction is sometimes made between price and non-price based abuse. See, with regard to exclusionary
abuses, point 61 of the Discussion Paper.
10 Ibid, point 59. Analysis of whether conduct is abusive cannot, in the Commission’s view, be carried out
mechanically based on the nature or form of the conduct, but rather takes into account all the features of
the market, such as the degree of dominance, the extent to which the conduct is applied across the market
and (in the case of exclusionary abuses) the existence of network effects and economies of scale or scope.
11 Case 85/76, note 3 above, para 91.
12 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses,
Brussels, December 2005, point 55.
13 See as regard to exclusionary abuses (which comprise the vast majority of Article 82 EC cases to date),
Temple Lang and O’Donoghue: “Neither the Commission’s decisional practice nor the case law of the Community
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Economic theories of abuse. One test of abuse commonly suggested, and that
adopted by the Commission in its Discussion Paper, is whether the dominant
undertaking’s practice has, or is likely to have, a material net adverse effect on consumer
welfare (the net consumer welfare test).14 This test would, therefore, incorporate a
balancing of pro-competitive effects (efficiencies) against anti-competitive effects (e.g.,
an increase in price with no corresponding increase in quality; or a reduction in output,
including a reduction in quality). As the efficiencies side of the equation is considered by
the Commission to be a “defence” (meaning that the burden of proof lies on the
dominant undertaking), it will be considered further below. As Hoffmann-La Roche makes
clear, the notion of protecting consumer welfare extends to protecting the structure of
the market, and does not simply refer to the protection of consumers’ immediate
interests.15
Though the net consumer welfare test is the Commission’s currently preferred unified
definition of exclusionary abuses, a number of other proposals for a unified definition
have also been made by lawyers and economists. The two other leading theories can be
termed the “profit sacrifice” test and the “equally efficient competitor” test.
Under the profit sacrifice test, which has been influential in the US,16 it is presumed that
a firm would not rationally engage in exclusionary conduct unless the short term sacrifice
of profits is considered to be less than expected gains from excluding or discouraging
rivals. As a result, the question whether conduct is abusive depends on whether the
long-term gains from that conduct are likely to outweigh its short-term costs. The classic
example of an abuse that fits this model is predatory pricing, discussed further below.
Under the equally efficient competitor test, exclusionary conduct is defined as conduct
that would exclude an equally efficient rival firm. The theory behind this test - which
originated in Chicago School theory)17 - is essentially that, where a dominant firm’s
conduct excludes a less efficient firm, this is not abusive as the aim of competition law is
ultimately to encourage efficiency. Where, in contrast, a dominant firm’s conduct
excludes an equally or more efficient firm, Article 82 EC should apply - subject always to
the possibility that the exclusionary effect of the dominant firm’s conduct is offset by
efficiency gains.
Recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition. The
scope of the third element of the Hoffmann-La Roche concept of abuse – recourse to
methods different from those governing normal competition – is also controversial, as it
clearly requires some kind of (economic? value?) judgment as to what constitutes
“normal” competition on a given market.18 While the meaning of “normal” competition
Courts provide a clear, consistent definition of exclusionary abuses.” Temple Lang and O’Donoghue, “The Concept
of Exclusionary Abuse Under Article 82 EC” GCLC research papers on Article 82 (July 2005).
14 See, as regards exclusionary abuses, Discussion Paper, point 4. See also, the comments of Neelie Kroes
that, “consumer welfare is now well established as the standard [for] assessing…infringements of the Treaty rules on cartels
and monopolies” (Speech of September 15, 2005, “European Competition Policy - Delivering Better Markets
and Better Choices”). See further, O’Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, note 7
above, 192, in the context of exclusionary abuses. See also, Faull & Nikpay (ed.), The EC Law of Competition
(2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.09.
15 See further, Case T-219/99 British Airways [2003] ECR II-5917, at 68.
16 For instance, this test was essentially relied upon by the US Department of Justice in its submissions as
amicus curiae in Trinko (Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP 540 US 398 (2004).
See O’Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, note 7 above, 186.
17 This is the test propounded, for instance, by Judge Posner in Antitrust Law (2nd ed. Chicago, University
of Chicago Press, 2001), to which reference has already been made in Chapter 5.
18 See O’Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, note 7 above, who argue
convincingly that, “…the terms “normal competition”, “competition on the merits” and “genuine undistorted competition”
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remains highly ambiguous, the essence of this element of the test is, in the Commission’s
view, to ensure that a dominant undertaking’s competitors are also able to expand in or
enter the market and compete therein on the merits, “without facing competition conditions
which are distorted or impaired by the dominant firm.”19 Article 82 does not, however, aim to
protect competitors from dominant undertakings’ genuine competition based on factors
such as higher quality, novel products, opportune innovation or otherwise better
performance.20 To a certain extent, this feeds into the notion of objective justification, to
which we now turn.
b. “Defences”: objective justification and efficiencies
Article 82 contains no “exemption” provision equivalent to Article 81(3). Nonetheless,
in cases where the conduct of a dominant undertaking leads to anti-competitive effects in
the sense discussed above, it may be possible for that undertaking to escape the Article
82 prohibition if it can provide an objective justification for its behaviour, or can show
that its conduct produces efficiencies which outweigh the negative effect on
competition.21 It is important to note that such possibilities, though referred to by the
Commission as “defences”, do not formally constitute true defences as they form part of
the concept of abuse. In that sense, their (suggested) designation as “defences” –
meaning that the burden of proving them lies on the dominant undertaking – is highly
controversial.22 In its 2005 Discussion Paper, the Commission mentions three kinds of
“defences”, two constituting “objective justifications” and the third constituting an
“efficiency” defence.
The first, which it terms the “objective necessity” defence, applies where “otherwise abusive
conduct is actually necessary conduct on the basis of objective factors external to the parties involved and
in particular external to the dominant company.”23 The Commission gives the example of
product-related safety and health reasons, where, without the conduct, the product
“cannot or will not be produced or distributed in that market”.24 This evidently draws on
cases such as Hilti and Tetra Pak I, where it was (unsuccessfully) argued that the
behaviour of the dominant undertaking was necessary in order to make sure that the
product was used safely (in the case of Hilti’s nail guns) or was safe for people to
consume (in the case of the consumable products inside Tetra Pak cartons). The
Commission makes clear, however, that it will interpret this defence strictly: in particular,
a dominant undertaking cannot “take steps on its own initiative to eliminate products which it
regards, rightly or wrongly, as dangerous or inferior to its own product.”25
are not merely vague, but also conclusory. That is, they are defined according to what the Commission, Community Courts, or
national authority happen to conclude is an abuse in each case. This is highly unsatisfactory…”
19 Point 54, Discussion Paper.
20 Ibid. This sentiment has been echoed forcefully by Commissioner Kroes, who has stated, “I like aggressive
competition – including by dominant companies – and I don’t care if it may hurt competitors – as long as it ultimately benefits
consumers. That is because the main and ultimate objective of Article 82 is to protect consumers, and this does, of course,
require the protection of an undistorted competitive process on the market.” Speech at Fordham Corporate Law
Institute, note 2 above.
21 See point 77 of the Discussion Paper, and cases cited therein.
22 See, Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L 1/1, which provides that the burden of proving
infringement of Article 82 rests on the party or authority alleging infringement, the observations of AG
Jacobs in Case C-53/03 Syfait [2005] ECR I-4609, at para 72 of the Opinion, and the criticism of
commentators such as Albors-Llorens, “The role of objective justification and efficiencies in Article 82
EC” 44 (2007) CML Rev 1727.
23 Discussion Paper, point 78.
24 Ibid, point 80.
25 Ibid. Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak [1990] ECR II-309.
See Albors-Llorens, note 22 above, at 1756, who criticises the Commission’s approach as meaning that a
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The second, which it terms the “meeting competition” defence, applies where the
“otherwise abusive conduct is actually a loss minimising reaction to competition from others.”26 This is
illustrated by the rather enigmatic statements by the Community Courts to the effect that
dominant undertakings can take “reasonable steps” to protect its own commercial interests
if they are attacked,27 and are entitled to compete “on the merits”. In order to amount to a
valid defence, the Commission states that such behaviour must be proportionate,28 in the
threefold sense of being suitable, indispensable and constituting a proportionate response
in view of the aim of Article 82 EC. The Court’s judgment in Sot Lelos constitutes a rare
example, couched in the specific legal context of the pharmaceutical industry, of the
success of a defence based on “meeting competition” (in that case, the competition
posed by the activity of parallel importers of pharmaceuticals).29
The third possible defence mentioned by the Commission is the “efficiencies” defence.
This applies where,
“efficiencies brought about by the conduct concerned outweigh the likely negative effects on
competition resulting from the conduct and therewith the likely harm to consumers that the conduct
might otherwise have.”30
In other words, this defence allows account to be taken of pro-competitive effects in
applying a consumer welfare test, as seen above. The Commission suggests that, to
establish this defence, the dominant undertaking must satisfy four conditions, equivalent
to the conditions of Article 81(3), i.e.:
1) the conduct must contribute to improving the production or distribution of
products or to promoting technical or economic progress, for instance by
improving the quality of the product;
2) The conduct must be indispensable to achieve these efficiencies;
3) The efficiencies must benefit consumers; and
4) Competition must not substantially eliminated in the market.31
Most attention is paid by the Commission to the requirement of consumer benefit,
stating that the dominant undertaking must show that “efficiencies brought about by the conduct
concerned outweigh the likely negative effects on competition and therewith the likely harm to consumers
that the conduct might otherwise have.”32 Further, the Commission indicates that it is “highly
unlikely” that a near-monopolist (which it defines as having a market share of over 75%)
could ever make out the efficiency defence for its abusive conduct.33 Example of
efficiencies might include increasing prices reflecting increased quality, cutting prices in
order to expand the overall market or to increase efficiency, conduct to protect
dominant undertaking may be forced to wait for the competent authority to act, rendering “health and safety
considerations rather ineffectual as grounds for justification.”
26 Ibid.
27 See, for example, Case 27/76 United Brands [1976] ECR 207, Case T-203/01 Michelin II [2003] ECR II-
4071.
28 Points 81-83, Discussion Paper. On the notion of proportionality in EC competition law, see Vogelaar,
“Comments on Prof. Jacques Steenbergen’s contribution on ‘Proportionality in Competition Law and
Policy’” (2008) 35(3) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 269.
29 Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot Lelos, judgment of September 16, 2008.
30 Ibid, point 79. The Commission’s recognition of an efficiency defence is in line with its movement
towards a Chicago School approach: see O’Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC,
note 7 above. See also, the discussion of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in Chapter 13.
31 Ibid, point 84.
32 Ibid, point 87.
33 Ibid, point 92.
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customer-specific investment, such as exclusive dealing, or – as was argued in the
Microsoft case – refusal to supply in order to maintain product quality.34 This
confirmation of the relevance of efficiencies analysis to Article 82 EC is to be welcomed.
In the first place, it provides greater clarity and structure to the notion of abuse, and
therefore increased legal certainty for dominant undertakings. Moreover, the presence of
a parallel in analysis between Articles 81 and 82 EC makes eminent good sense, given
that, ultimately, each of these Treaty provisions pursues the same aim.35
To date, however, these defences have been rarely successful in practice when argued
before the Commission and Community Courts - though argued in almost all Article 82
cases.36 In many instances, such arguments have been dismissed with little substantive
reasoning – perhaps because, on the facts, the “defence” was not strong enough.37 In
order for an argument of objective justification or efficiencies to succeed, it is critical that
the undertaking convince the Commission or Court that its conduct is genuinely
motivated by the relevant objective justification. Nonetheless, it is submitted, the
decisional practice to date demonstrates that it will be very difficult to do so. There is,
therefore, a strong argument that, to date, the Community Courts and Commission have
in reality only paid lip service to such defences, depriving them of all substance.38 It
might be hoped that the Discussion Paper - which gives far more detail on the
Commission’s thinking here than has been previously given - is a portent of change in
this regard.
c. Relevance of environmental protection considerations to the notion of
abuse
Relevance to the Theory of Abuse. Theoretically, environmental protection
considerations might be relevant to the concept of abuse in two ways.
First, it might be argued that, if a dominant undertaking is engaged in restrictive conduct
aimed at improving environmental protection, this is (or should be) relevant to whether
such conduct qualifies as an exclusionary abuse. This argument, it is submitted, is in
principle convincing, for a number of reasons.
From a legal theoretic perspective, it follows from Chapter 6’s systematic argument that the
concept of abuse - not being defined in the Treaty - must be interpreted in the light of
34 See Microsoft, decision of March 24, 2004, COMP 37/792, points 704-712.
35 See Commissioner Kroes, who makes the Article 81-82 analogy forcefully: “At the most basic level, the same
conduct can be analysed under both Article 81 and Article 82. It would be rather strange if we concluded that a particular
form of conduct is not anti-competitive under Article 81, but infringes Article 82, with the only explanation for that
divergence being that we cannot work out how to take the pro-competitive aspects into account under Article 82…” (Speech
to Fordham Corporate Law Institute, note 2 above). Despite the analogy, it is still of course possible that
conduct exempted by 81(3) may still be abusive: see, for example, Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak [1990] ECR II-
309.
36 For a rare example, see Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot Lelos, judgment of September 16, 2008,
discussed above. See also Loewenthal, “The Defence of “Objective Justification” in the Application of
Article 82 EC” 28(4) World Competition (2005) 455. For further unsuccessful examples, see, Case 311/84
RTL Télémarketing [1985] ECR 3261, para 26; Portuguese Airports OJ 1999 L 69/31; BBI/Boosey and Hawkes
OJ 1987 L 286/36; BPB Industries OJ 1989 L 10/50; Napier Brown-British Sugar OJ 1998 L 284/41; NDC
Health/IMS Health: Interim Measures OJ 2002 L 59/18. Moreover, as noted above, these cases have
generally not considered the notion of objective justification or efficiencies as a “defence” - rather, they
have been considered as part of the concept of abuse.
37 Exceptions are Hilti and Tetra Pak I, note 25 above, where the arguments were considered at some
length.
38 See, for example, O’Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, note 7, at 232: “[T]here
is something of a disconnect between theory and practice on objective justification. Efficiency defences have typically been rejected
with cursory analysis by the Community institutions and without any indication of the analytical framework in mind. This
deficiency should be addressed, since a defence that is recognised in theory, but not in practice, is the same as no defence.”
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the EC’s Article 2 EC goal of a high level of protection of the environment and the
Article 6 EC integration principle. This means that, where a dominant undertaking’s
conduct restricts competition, but is aimed at achieving environmental protection goals,
this conflict between competition and environmental objectives should be reconciled via
a proportionality analysis. This would mean, as argued in Chapter 6’s working
hypothesis on the implications of Article 6 EC, that where the restrictive behaviour is
suitable to achieve the Community’s environmental policy objectives, and there is no way
of achieving these objectives that is less restrictive of competition, the measure should
not fall within the concept of abuse.39
This position is, it is submitted, supported by Chapter 7’s governance argument, which
argued that the Community and national courts, as well as the Commission and national
competition authorities, are in reality inclined to take an approach to competition law
based on coherence with environmental policy aims, and are obliged to do so by the
principles of good governance.
From an economic theoretic perspective, the question of where environmental factors fit in
depends on which economic theory of abuse one subscribes to. The discussion above
outlined the present three principal economic theories of abuse: the net consumer
welfare test, the profit sacrifice test, and the equally efficient competitor test. Under the
net consumer welfare test, it has been argued in Chapter 8 that the environmental
implications of a dominant undertaking’s behaviour should be taken into account at an
economic level in assessing such behaviour’s impact on utility (and thus on consumer
welfare). It follows that environmental benefits of otherwise restrictive practice should
be taken into account in balancing the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of
that practice.
In the case of the profit sacrifice test, this is, as discussed above, based on the
assumption that an undertaking would not rationally engage in exclusionary conduct
unless it considers that any short-term losses will be made up for in the longer term.
This test is of most obvious relevance in the case of predatory pricing, dealt with further
below. Environmental factors could, it is submitted, also be relevant in the context of
this test, if they provide a genuine and proportionate explanation for what might
otherwise seem to be profit-sacrificing behaviour. For instance, one might imagine that,
where the reason for adopting temporarily lower prices is genuinely environmental
protection (such as the launch of a new environmentally friendlier product which
demands a change in consumer habits, meaning that its adoption requires particularly
strong price incentives for consumers to switch), and there is no less restrictive way of
achieving those aims, this should not be viewed as abusive.
Finally, in the case of the equally efficient competitor test, where conduct should be
categorised as abusive if it excludes or discourages equally or more efficient competitors,
the efficiency of the dominant undertaking should be measured taking into account, in
the manner argued in Chapter 8, the environmental benefits of its conduct. As a result,
environmentally unfriendlier competitors would be less likely to be deemed equally or
more efficient.
A second way in which environmental protection considerations might be relevant to the
concept of abuse concerns the (rarer) concept of exploitative abuse. Such abuses focus
on harm caused directly to consumers (for instance, via excessive pricing), meaning that
conduct need not be restrictive of competition as such in order to be qualified as an
exploitative abuse. In this sense, the scope of the concept of abuse has the potential to
39 See point 4 of Chapter 6’s working hypothesis on the import of the integration principle, ibid.
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go beyond the (restriction-based) scope of Article 81 EC. The boundaries of the notion
of exploitative abuse are, however, unclear. However, it is submitted that, insofar as
discrete categories of exploitative abuse have been developed in Community competition
law - such as excessive pricing, the imposition of unfair contract terms, or exploitative
discrimination of consumers - environmental considerations can be relevant to each of
these categories. From a legal theoretic perspective, the same arguments for taking
environmental considerations into account apply as set out above for exclusionary
abuses. From an economic theoretic perspective, the lack of a unifying economic theory
behind exploitative abuses means that creating a unified economic argument for the
relevance of environmental considerations to such abuses is difficult. However, insofar
as the unifying thread underlying exploitative abuses is the direct exploitation of
consumers, it is submitted that environmental considerations can be relevant in two
ways. First, the imposition of environmentally damaging requirements, or conditions, by
a dominant undertaking, or discriminating against environmentally friendlier customers,
could be exploitative. Secondly, the extra costs which might be entailed in producing
environmentally friendlier products should be taken into account in assessing whether
price levels are excessive, as discussed further below.
Relevance to “Defences”. The Commission’s view that it is possible to justify
otherwise abusive conduct by means of one of three possible “defences” - objective
necessity, meeting competition and efficiencies - has been discussed above.
In this regard, it is submitted that environmental protection reasons may constitute a
defence of “objective necessity”. This would apply, for example, where the allegedly
abusive conduct was necessary and proportionate in order to achieve a vital
environmental objective. In this sense, the analysis would be very similar to that
suggested in Chapter 10 in the context of Article 81(1) - i.e., in the sense of the Article
81(1) Albany judgment, restrictive conduct which is inherent in achieving the
environmental benefit would not be considered abusive.40 The crucial difference is, of
course, that, because the restriction of competition will be greater in an Article 82
situation – where competition is, due to the position of dominance, already weakened to
some extent – than in those Article 81(1) situations where there is no dominance, the
burden of proving that the conduct is proportionate will in the former case be more
difficult to discharge.
Admittedly, this conception of “objective necessity” does not satisfy the Commission’s
requirement in its Discussion Paper that “the dominant company must be able to show that
without the conduct the products concerned can not or will not be produced or distributed in that
market.”41 However, it is submitted that the Commission’s statement is inappropriate
where there is a genuine environmental protection goal justifying the dominant
undertaking’s conduct, and where the competitive restriction is proportionate to that
goal. Such a narrow conception, if it excluded all possibility of reliance on environmental
protection considerations. In turn, this would fly in the face of the Article 6 EC
integration principle, as well as the coherence-based governance imperative, as argued in
Chapters 6 and 7.
In addition, environmental protection reasons may be relevant to an efficiencies defence.
As noted, the Commission views such a defence as having four conditions, analogous to
those of Article 81(3). For the same reasons as set out in Chapter 11, therefore, it is
submitted that environmental protection requirements should, when susceptible to
valuation, be considered to be “technical and economic progress” within the meaning of the
40 Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, para 97.
41 Discussion Paper, point 80.
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first condition of the efficiencies defence. Once again, a proportionality test will be
applied in assessing whether restrictions are indispensable to the environmental objective
at hand, and this accords with the requirements of Article 6 EC on a systematic analysis, as
set out in Chapter 6.42 However, it is undeniable that it will in general be more difficult
for the four conditions to be made out in the Article 82 context than in the Article 81(3)
context: due to the undertaking’s dominance, it is more likely that the fourth condition –
no substantial elimination of competition – will not be satisfied. In addition, the same
problem of discounting future environmental benefits to consumers may arise in the
Article 82 context as we saw in Article 81(3).43 As we noted in Chapter 11, this may be
of particular relevance in assessing whether consumers receive a “fair share” of the
benefits resulting from the agreement.
Practical Relevance of Environmental Factors for Some Individual Abuses. Given
this, and given the above outline of the concept of abuse, it is submitted that the
following constitute examples of individual abuses to which environmental
considerations may be relevant.
 Tying. Article 82(d) provides that it is abusive to make the “conclusion of contracts
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.”44 Where
there is a good reason of environmental protection for only offering two products
together, or for offering the bundled products at a lower price, it is submitted that
such tying is not abusive under Article 82 EC. This would extend to the situation,
for instance, where an environmentally friendlier producer offers two of its products
together at a lower price than if sold separately, even if this underprices a less
environmentally friendly producer of one of the products. Further, should an
environmentally friendlier product be manufactured in a way that only allows
environmentally friendlier products to be used with it, these should be viewed as
products which have a natural connection with each other. An example might be a
washing machine which only functions properly with biodegradable, environmentally
friendly washing powder.
 Exclusive dealing. Obliging a customer to obtain all or most of its requirements
for a product from a dominant undertaking is in principle abusive.45 However, it is
submitted that exclusive dealing motivated by environmental protection
considerations may be objective justified, if proportionate. For instance, dominant
undertaking might legitimately enter into long term exclusive contracts to enable its
contracting party to recoup investments in environmentally-friendly infrastructure.46
However, the limits of exclusivity are evident in the Article 82 DSD decision and
judgment, considered below.
 Refusal to supply or to grant access to an essential facility. A refusal to supply
an existing customer without objective justification may be abusive.47 Likewise, a
refusal to grant access to a facility which is likely to eliminate all competition in a
downstream market, where access to the facility is indispensable for the requestor’s
42 See likewise, Steenbergen, “Proportionality in Competition Law and Policy” (2008) 35(3) Legal Issues of
Economic Integration 259, at 263.
43 As the Commission states, “…it must be taken into account that the value of a gain for consumers in the future is not
the same as a present gain for consumers. In general, the later the efficiencies are expected to materialise in the future, the less
weight the Commission can assign to them…” Discussion Paper, point 89.
44 See, for instance, Case T-30/89 Hilti [1991] ECR II-1439.
45 See, for instance, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECR 461.
46 See, for example, Hoffmann-La Roche, note 3 above.
47 Joined Cases 6 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents [1974] ECR 223.
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business and there is no actual or potential substitute for it, is abusive unless
objectively justified.48 Environmental considerations may be relevant to these
doctrines in at least the following ways. First, one might imagine a situation where
environmental constraints might be taken into account in deciding whether access to
the facility is indispensable to the requestor’s business. In its judgment in Bronner, the
ECJ held that the test of indispensability will depend upon the presence of “technical,
legal or even economic obstacles” to the creation of a similar facility by the requestor, if
necessary in conjunction with other undertakings.49 One might imagine that planning
and/or environmental regulations might, for instance, pose legal obstacles preventing
the building of an additional airport or railway line on a given route. Secondly, a
dominant undertaking might legitimately refuse to supply, or to grant access to an
essential facility, to an undertaking whose practices are objectively extremely
environmentally dangerous. Alternatively, a dominant undertaking might refuse to
grant access to an essential facility, if a natural resource, or might cease supply of this
resource to an existing customer, because it would risk unsustainably exhausting or
overusing this resource. This would, it is submitted, fall within the existing notion of
objective justification inherent in judgments such as Commercial Solvents and Bronner.50
 Discriminatory pricing and abusive discounts. A grant by a dominant
undertaking of loyalty-inducing discounts,51 or discriminating in prices charged to
customers without objective justification,52 is abusive. However, it is submitted that a
dominant undertaking might legitimately distinguish between prices granted to
environmentally-damaging undertakings and environmentally-friendlier undertakings,
as long as this was done on an objective and proportionate basis. Further, a
dominant undertaking may, it is submitted, legitimately take (differing) environmental
costs into account in prices charged to customers.53
 Predatory pricing. As is well known, the test of abusive predatory pricing under
Article 82 EC is set out in the AKZO judgment,54 where the Court held that prices
below Average Variable Cost (AVC) are presumed to be predatory, whereas prices
above AVC but below Average Total Cost (ATC) are not presumed to be predatory,
but will be considered so if they are part of a plan to eliminate a competitor.
Environmental considerations could, it is submitted, be relevant to this abuse in two
ways. In the first place, evidence that the intention of a dominant undertaking
pricing above AVC but below ATC was genuinely pursuing environmental
protection aims in so doing should mean that the conduct is not considered
abusive.55 This follows, however, from applying the AKZO test itself, without
needing to consider the effect of Article 6 EC. In the second place, however,
48 Case C-7/97 Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791. See also, Spa Monopole/GDB, XXIIIrd Report on Competition
Policy (1993) at point 240, where a Belgian mineral water producer was refused access to a pool of reusable
glass bottles set up by the Association of German Sources (GDB). As a result of undertakings accepted by
GDB to open its pool to foreign producers, who had to abide by the GDB’s rules (for example, the bottles
provided by GDB to Spa could only be used by Spa on the German market), the complaint was withdrawn
and no formal decision was taken.
49 Bronner, note 48 above, para 44.
50 Notes 47 & 48 above.
51 See, for instance, Case C-95/04 P British Airways [2007] ECR I-2331, Case T-203/01 Michelin II [2003]
ECR II-4071.
52 See, for instance, Eurofix-Bauco OJ 1988 L 65/19.
53 See, for example, Case T-203/01 Michelin II [2003] ECR II-4071
54 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie [1991] ECR I-3359. See also, Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak [1996] ECR I-
5951 and Case T-340/03 France Télécom [2007] ECR II-107.
55 See Eilmansberger, “How to distinguish good from bad competition under Article 82 EC: In search of
clearer and more coherent standards for anti-competitive abuses” 42 CML Rev (2005) 129, at 139.
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evidence that a dominant undertaking pricing below AVC was genuinely pursuing
environmental protection aims, and that there is no less restrictive way of achieving
these aims, should rebut the AKZO presumption of abuse. As mentioned above, an
example might be the launch of a new environmentally friendlier product which
demands a change in consumer habits, meaning that its adoption requires particularly
strong price incentives, at least initially, for consumers to switch.
 Other ways of limiting the development of products or services. Article 82(b)
qualifies as abusive “limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers.” Aside form the individual abuses considered above, an integrated
approach to interpreting this provision would, it is submitted, mean that it would be
abuse for a dominant undertaking to limit the ability of third parties to develop
environmentally-friendlier production methods or products,56 or to fail to satisfy a
clear demand for an environmental service,57 or to be extremely inefficient in refusing
to use environmentally-friendlier technology, thus increasing environmental costs.58
This also follows from Chapter 8’s economic argument, insofar as that argument posits
that consumers derive benefits from environmentally-friendlier products and
services, such that limiting the development of such products and services will have
an adverse effect on consumer welfare.
 Excessive prices. Article 82(a) provides that an abuse may consist in “directly or
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions.” The
charging of a price by a dominant undertaking which bears no reasonable relation to
the product’s economic value may be excessive.59 This may be determined by, inter
alia, comparing the supplier’s costs with the price charged, and by comparing the
price charged to other prices charged by the dominant undertaking in other markets,
or to prices charged by other firms on the same relevant market.60 As such,
environmental considerations may be relevant in a number of ways. First, a
dominant undertaking using a more costly, environmentally friendlier method of
production should not have the prices that it charges compared with an undertaking
producing in a less environmentally friendly manner. Further, it is theoretically
arguable that a dominant undertaking which factors in the broader environmental
costs of production into its ultimate price charged to customers should be permitted
to use the combined figure of ordinary production costs plus these environmental
costs, where it can prove that the portion of the price attributable to these costs is,
for instance, re-invested in environmental protection projects or the development of
cleaner technologies. From a policy perspective, this would be the equivalent of
implementing the polluter pays principle via imposing a private environmental “tax”
on consumers. However, it would be crucial to prove that the costs so received were
56 By analogy to, e.g., Case 40/73 Suiker Unie [1975] ECR 1663. See also, Stone’s interesting suggestion
(Stone, “Restraints on Competition through the alteration of the environment at the genetic level” 8 NYU
Envtl LJ 704) that organic farmers using competition law to prevent GM companies altering the
environment by introducing genetically altered strains could, in the future, be held to violate section 2 of
the US Sherman Act. Stone argues in effect that this could amount to an abusive limitation of third
parties’ ability to use environmentally friendlier methods, insofar as dominant companies thereby raise
organic farmers’ costs or make their business untenable, resulting in harm to consumers.
57 By analogy to, e.g., P&I Clubs IGA OJ 1999 L 125/12.
58 By analogy to, e.g,, Port of Genoa OJ 1997 L 301/27.
59 See, for instance, , Case 27/76 United Brands [1978] ECR 207 (though the Commission’s case on this
point was not upheld), Case 26/75 General Motors [1975] ECR 1367 (though, again, the Commission’s case
on this point was not upheld), the Commission’s decisions in Case COMP/36.568 Port of Helsingborg and
Deutsche Post - Interception of Cross-Border Mail OJ 2002 L 331/40. See also, the decision of the UK
Competition Appeal Tribunal in Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings [2002] CAT 1.
60 Ibid.
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destined for an environmental use; otherwise, this would allow dominant companies
to reap windfall profits from producing “dirty” products, by passing on the
environmental cost of production to the consumer. Admittedly, this would pose
substantial monitoring and enforcement issues.
 Unfair trading conditions. Finally, a further type of exploitative abuse is the
imposition by a dominant undertaking of unfair trading conditions on its customers.
Environmental considerations might be relevant in this regard if, for instance, a
contractual condition obliged a customer not to object to the environmentally
harmful nature of the product or service.61
4. Principal case law to date: COBAT and DSD
COBAT. One of the few environment-related Article 82 cases to date is the COBAT
case, in which proceedings were informally closed in 2000.62 The Commission had
suspected a consortium which coordinated the collection and recycling of used lead
batteries in Italy (COBAT) of abusing a dominant position on the Italian market for
recyclable lead waste. Italy had given the exclusive right to the COBAT consortium to
collect, stock and sell used batteries and other waste containing lead.63 Owners and
collectors of lead waste were obliged by law to give COBAT their waste, with the aim of
achieving a high collection rate. In effect, COBAT was carrying out an environmental
service of general interest, which was financed by the revenue from selling waste and a
sovrapprezzo (a surcharge on the sale of new batteries charged to final consumers as an
indirect tax). COBAT organised tender procedures for collectors and assigned the
winners exclusive territories; losers could only work as sub-contractors for winners. In
addition, the export of waste abroad was forbidden.
Following a complaint of a “losing” collector undertaking about this exclusivity
procedure and the ban on exporting waste, the Commission investigation found that
COBAT clearly enjoyed a dominant position by virtue of its exclusive rights granted by
legislation. Moreover, any abusive conduct was not justified by its environmental task.
First, the exclusive collection zones gave rise to unnecessary discrimination between
collectors, unfairly excluding third parties. Secondly, COBAT was found to apply
different conditions to its sale of waste to different undertakings, depending on whether
the undertaking was in another Member State or in Italy - in particular, applying more
favourable sales prices to Italian recycling undertakings. As a result of the proceedings,
COBAT accepted a number of changes to the system, so that any undertaking permitted
by law to collect waste could do so, without territorial restriction; COBAT would buy
waste at the same rate from all collectors; and COBAT would sell the waste on to
recycling undertakings at the same, best possible rate, whether the undertakings were
Italian or not. As a result, anti-competitive practices – which were not justified by any
environmental need – were minimised.
This outcome is, it is submitted, perfectly in line with the interests of environmental
protection and, thus, the arguments set out in Part II: in principle, the injection of
competition into collection of waste is beneficial to environmental protection (if such
competition will not obstruct the performance of a service of general economic interest
within the meaning of Article 86(2)). Further, price discrimination based purely on the
61 See, for instance, GEMA II OJ 1982 L 94/12 and Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II [1994] ECR II-755.
62 IP/00/1351. See also, Baccaro, “Collecte et recyclage des batteries usagées en Italie: droits exclusives,
exigencies environnementales et droit de la concurrence” Competition Policy Newsletter 1 (2001) 39.
63 The important role of the state in the COBAT decision means that it may be viewed as not a “pure”
Article 82 EC, but one where Article 86 EC-based reasoning played an important role (see further, Chapter
14).
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purchaser’s nationality is clearly not justified on environmental grounds. In contrast, one
might imagine that charging different prices might potentially be justified if the
differences, for example, corresponded to the distance which the waste would have to
travel to be recycled. In that case, COBAT might have made the argument that it was
implementing the Article 174(2) principle that environmental damage (or, in this case, the
production of waste) should be rectified at source,64 or that the price included the
environmental costs of transporting the waste.
DSD. The second, and more significant, environment-related case to date is, as
aforementioned, the Article 82 EC DSD case. In 2001, the Commission found that
DSD had abused its dominant position on the market for the organisation of the take-
back and recovery from private final consumers of used sales packaging in Germany.65
The abuse concerned a provision in DSD’s agreements with obligated undertakings
under the German Packaging Ordinance (e.g., packaging producers). By this provision
(the “payment” provision), these obligated undertakings had to pay DSD a fee for all the
sales packaging distributed within Germany which bore the Green Dot trademark,
irrespective of whether the DSD system ultimately provided the “exemption service” of
collection and recycling, etc. This meant that manufacturers who chose to have some of
their packaging disposed of themselves, or using a competing exemption system, had to
pay the same amount to DSD as if they had used DSD for all of their packaging (i.e.,
they had to pay for the of some packaging twice). Further, it also meant that
manufacturers who did not use DSD’s exemption system at all, but whose products bore
the Green Dot because they participated in a Green Dot system in another Member
State, had to pay DSD for services they did not receive, unless they set up two sets of
packaging – one for Germany and one for other Member States – which would be
expensive. This provision, the Commission found, infringed the “no service, no fee”
principle, which applied to all waste management services, and prevented undertakings
from contracting with DSD’s competitors. It was thus abusive in two senses: it was
exploitative of customers, in requiring a fee for a service not actually provided; and it was
exclusionary, in making it harder for competing systems to be set up. As a result, DSD
was ordered to stop charging a fee for that part of packaging which was in fact recycled
by a non-DSD system. DSD appealed this part of the decision, and sought interim
measures.66
As to interim measures, the President of the CFI’s 2001 rejection of this application was
rather predictable: very few such applications succeed in satisfying the CFI’s stringent
criteria of urgency and likelihood of irreparable damage. This was similarly the case here:
the President rejected, in particular, DSD’s arguments that its whole exemption system,
and its right to the Green Dot trademark, would be irreversibly jeopardised by the
imposition of the obligation pending the CFI’s final judgment. Moreover, the balance of
interests lay in the Commission’s favour, due to the public interest in bringing
infringements of Article 82 to an immediate end.67
In the CFI’s judgment of May 2007, DSD’s appeal was finally rejected. In a lengthy
judgment, the CFI held first that “mixed” systems – where a packaging manufacturer or
distributors divides its packaging between the DSD system and another system (whether
a self management or exemption system) – were, in contrast to DSD’s submissions,
64 See, by analogy in the free movement of goods context, Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-
4431 (Walloon Waste).
65 OJ 2001 L 166/1. On the definition of the market, see point 92 and Chapter 9 above.
66 On interim measures, see Case T-151/01 R, Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of
November 15, 2001.
67 Case T-151/01, judgment of May 24, 2007, not yet reported, para 220.
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perfectly possible under the Packaging Ordinance. Further, it was not necessary under
the Packaging Ordinance for only that packaging which was to be taken back and
recovered by DSD to bear the Green Dot logo. For example, if DSD assumed
responsibility for taking back and recovering half of a manufacturer’s packaging, DSD
would, in order to satisfy the Packaging Ordinance, simply have to show that it had taken
back and recovered an equivalent quantity of packaging, irrespective of whether that
packaging bore the Green Dot logo.68
Next, the CFI dealt with DSD’s arguments that the Decision effectively required it to
grant a free licence of its Green Dot trademark to any undertaking participating in the
DSD system, because the Decision required that such undertakings be able to affix the
Green Dot logo to packaging irrespective of whether the packaging was in fact recycled
by the DSD system. In particular, DSD had argued that the situation fell outside the
Court’s essential facilities doctrine (as set down in cases like Magill and Bronner) on a
number of grounds.
To begin, DSD had argued that it was not “essential” for undertakings to use the Green
Dot logo on their packaging in order to be able to participate in a non-DSD system; it
was open to undertakings simply to put the logo on that part of their packaging disposed
of by DSD, and not on the rest of their packaging.69 In rejecting this argument, the CFI
held that this would lead to significant additional costs for manufacturers and
distributions wishing to put uniform packaging into circulation across the EU, or wishing
to adopt mixed systems within Germany. In any event, such efforts might be nugatory,
as it was the final consumer who would ultimately decide where to dispose of the
packaging – e.g., within a shop itself, such as a fast-food outlet, using its self-
management system; or in domestic household bins, using the DSD system.70
Secondly, DSD argued that competition was not in fact “eliminated”, as some
undertakings had in fact chosen to set up self-management systems and/or to participate
in other exemption systems - an argument which the CFI held “[could] not suffice” to
call into question the Commission’s conclusion that DSD’s conduct was abusive.71
Thirdly, DSD argued that its refusal to licence the Green Dot trademark was objectively
justified in a number of ways. To start, it was justified by the objectives of the German
Packaging Ordinance, which requires transparency and clear labelling for consumers. If
packaging participating in non-DSD systems were allowed to bear the Green Dot logo,
consumers would not know how they should dispose of their packaging (e.g., bringing it
back to the point of purchase as with self-management solutions, or leaving it to be
collected by the DSD system). Once again, this argument was rejected by the CFI, on
the aforementioned ground that the Packaging Ordinance in no way forbade mixed
systems.72 Finally, DSD claimed that a refusal to licence the Green Dot trademark was
justified by the distinctive function of the trademark itself, which was to indicate to
consumers that the packaging would be disposed of by DSD. The CFI rejected this
argument on the facts, holding that the function of the Green Dot logo is to “identify the
possibility of having the package at issue collected by the DSD system”, which function
was perfectly compatible with the affixing of a competitor’s logo as well.73
68 Ibid, para 135.
69 Ibid, para 93.
70 Ibid, paras 141-145.
71 Ibid, paras 95 and 148. Notably, the Court did not give substantive reasoning on this point.
72 Ibid, paras 151-154.
73 Ibid, paras 156-162.
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Nor did the obligation infringe the general principle of proportionality, as DSD would
still be remunerated for the service it provides, and it would be more expensive and
difficult for packagers to affix the Green Dot logo selectively. However, the CFI
accepted DSD’s argument, which had not been specifically addressed in the Decision, to
the effect that it should be allowed to levy an “adequate” fee for use of the Green Dot
trademark, even where DSD’s services are not otherwise being used for the packaging.74
Analysis. The Commission’s decision and the CFI’s judgment in DSD each
demonstrate a real concern to ensure that, in the developing, lucrative, but normally very
concentrated, area of waste management,75 effective competition is ensured. The
competitive issues here are, on their face, standard, non-environment-specific, Article 82
concerns: the charging of a fee to its customers by a (super-)dominant76 undertaking for a
service it did not in fact provide. In contrast, as the Commission has stated, in waste
management systems such as DSD’s, the fees paid by packagers should depend on the
actual amount of packaging which is exempted as a result of the undertaking’s
participation in the system, the packaging waste volume, the type of material and the
costs of collection and recovery - i.e., the objective characteristics of the waste recovered
and the services provided.77 As such, the DSD case would seem a fairly blatant case of
anti-competitive exploitation and foreclosure - once again, it was not a case where DSD
was putting forward genuine environmental protection reasons for its payment provision.
Rather, the core of DSD’s problems with the Commission’s obligations was essentially a
fear that its systems would be economically unworkable without a guaranteed licence fee
for all Green Dot products, as DSD would end up treating packaging which bore the
Green Dot mark, but for which they were receiving no licence fee. If this were really so
– and thus the obligation would place the continued viability of the main waste
management system in Germany in jeopardy, with no alternative way of organising itself
– the justification should, it is submitted, be accepted. Crucially, however, this was not,
on the facts, the case. Thus, after receiving detailed written and oral submission on this
point from the parties, the CFI rejected (as had the Commission) the contention that
DSD would be obliged to treat packaging over and above the quantities for which it was
paid:78 if and insofar as DSD’s system was in fact used for packaging bearing the Green
Dot, but for which DSD had not received a fee, this could be rectified by compensation
agreements between the different system operators “to share the quantities of material recovered
by the collection undertakings to which they have recourse in respect of the quantities of the material for
which they are responsible under the contracts signed with manufacturers and distributors of
packaging.”79
Vedder criticises the DSD case forcefully, arguing that it, “conveys a very powerful message: the
Commission will not take environmental considerations into account in considering whether or not abuse
74 Ibid, paras 191-196.
75 See, for example, DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems
of September 22, 2005, point 30.
76 The Commission estimated that around 70% of all sales packaging in Germany was covered by the DSD
system, and it held 100% of the “exemption system” sub-market: point 95.
77 DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22,
2005, point 68.
78 For example, DSD’s submission that, “…the contested decision will lead to a situation where almost all packaging
in Germany will bear the [Green Dot mark]. Thus, participation in the DSD system for just 1% of marketed packaging
could enable a user of the logo to use that mark, free of charge, for the remaining 99%. The DSD system therefore is likely,
in the short term, to have to treat packaging brought erroneously to its system and for which DSD does not receive any fee…”
79 Note 67 above, paras 137-138. See also, points 147-148 of the Decision, note 65 above.
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of a dominant position took place.”80 Such criticisms are, it is submitted, misguided on the
facts of the case. It should not be the case that a “diluted” form of Article 82 should
apply to a dominant undertaking simply because it is active in an environment-related
sector: indeed, it is in the very interest of environmental protection that such sectors
should be competitive, efficient and innovative.81 Save insofar as genuinely necessary to
perform its environmental function,82 Article 82 should apply in the normal way to
undertakings such as DSD; for example, if waste management systems give loyalty
rebates to packagers for using their system, these should also, prima facie, be prohibited.83
Rather, the essence of the judgment is essentially the insistence that the link between the
Green Dot logo and the ultimate treatment of packaging by DSD is not required by the
Packaging Ordinance, is anti-competitive and thus should be broken. As such, it is more
of interest as a case on the CFI’s approach to the relevance of trademarks to Article 82
than as a case on the interplay between competition and environmental policy. On the
former issue, the Court’s ruling that DSD should be entitled to charge a fee for use of its
trademark is, it is submitted, significant.
5. Tradable permit schemes and Article 82 EC?
Although not the subject of any case to date, is it interesting to consider, as a footnote to
this Chapter, the potential application of Article 82 to tradable permit schemes such as
the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the functioning of which was considered
above in Chapter 4. In this regard, we might distinguish two different relevant product
markets.84
The first might be a market for the allocation of allowances in the first place. At present,
as we saw in Part I, most of this allocation is carried out on a gratuitous basis by Member
States (at least 95% had to be thus allocated in Phase I; at least 90% in Phase II of the
ETS). The rest of the allowances are allocated by auction. As it is the action of the
Member States, and not that of private undertakings,85 which determines how allowances
are allocated, this market is not susceptible to Article 82 analysis (though it may, as
Chapters 14 and 15 shall examine, be susceptible to Article 86 and 87 analyses).
The second, more obvious, relevant product market might comprise a market for the
purchase and sale of allowances (including, by virtue of the Linking Directive discussed
in Chapter 4, the broader Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism and Joint
80 Vedder, Competition Law and Environmental Protection in Europe: Towards Sustainability? (Groningen, Europa
Law Publishing, 2003), at 332. He goes on to voice the criticism that, “[i]n practice…meting the Commission’s
objections to DSD’s financing structure would boil down to obliging DSD to subsidise the entrant.”
81 See further, the contentions of firms like Wella AG and L’Oréal, which wanted to set up their own
systems to take back packaging on the ground that DSD was not cost-efficient in recycling: International
Herald Tribune, July 13, 2002.
82 For example, one might imagine a situation where Article 86(2) might apply, to avoid a situation of
“cherry picking” of the most lucrative items to recycle. For example, plastics are uneconomical and
difficult to recycle. In many Member States, however, this problem is avoided by placing material-specific
obligations on exemption systems. See further, Chapter 10, which discusses the Article 81 DSD decision
on this aspect (in which greater competitive restrictions were permitted for recovery of plastics, due to the
difficulties inherent in the area).
83 See DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September
22, 2005, point 71. The fee structure of a dominant system can be abusive if it offers rebates designed to
attract the entire amount of packaging of an obliged company.
84 On determining the relevant market(s) in the ETS context, see Bode and Scharifi, “Market shares and
dominant market positions in the case of emissions trading” (2007) 2 Carbon and Climate Law Review
105.
85 If the Commission’s plans come to fruition, allowances will be allocated using criteria harmonised at
Community level from Phase III onwards, thus taking Member States’ NAPs out of the equation: see
further, Chapter 4.
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Implementation allowances).86 It is likely that the relevant geographic market here would
be the EU, combined with the allowance markets of any other countries or states which
may become linked with the EU ETS in the future.87 Despite this broad geographic
market definition, it is - at a push - conceivable that one (or a group) of undertakings
might be found to hold a (collective) dominant position market in the sense of being able
to behave “to an appreciable extent” independently of competitors; where an undertaking
holds considerable market power on the market.88 Clearly, the manner in which a
Member State may choose to allocate allowances may result in one or more undertakings’
holding a large proportion of these allowances. Further, substantial barriers to entry may
exist for new entrants, depending on how the relevant Member State has decided to treat
new entrants in its National Allocation Plan. As seen in Part I, new entrants may have to
purchase emission allowances on the market, instead of receiving them for free - thus
evidently giving them higher operating costs compared to incumbents who received
allowances via the “grandfathering method”. In addition, new entrants’ allocations may
be made on the basis of different, less favourable, criteria than incumbents’ allocations.89
In such a situation, such dominant undertaking(s) would be subject to the Article 82
“special responsibility” not to abuse their position. One might imagine for example -
again, admittedly, at a push - the application of the essential facilities doctrine here, as the
possession of allowances may be indispensable for their competitors to be active in a
related market for the production of (pollutant) products.90 Similarly, a dominant
undertaking could be accused of abusively “limiting production, markets or technical
development” within the meaning of Article 82(b) insofar as it restricts access to allowances
for competing undertakings. Due to the commodity-like nature of the allowances
market, however, it is prima facie difficult to imagine significant pricing abuse taking place.
86 See Bazelmans, “De koppeling van CDM en JI aan het Europese emissiehandelssyteem”, Nederlands
tijdschrift voor Europees recht 6 (2004) 151.
87 As discussed in Chapter 4, for instance, the EFTA countries have already joined in the ETS.
88 See, Chavez and Strandlund, “Enforcing Transferable Permit Systems in the Presence of Market Power”
24 Environmental and Resource Economics (2003) 65 and Newbery, “Climate Change Policy and its
Effect on Market Power in the Gas Market” (2008) Journal of the European Economic Association 727,
who concludes on the basis of economic analysis that one effect the EU ETS in the UK is to amplify the
market power of gas suppliers (by reducing the price elasticity of demand for gas appreciably), resulting in a
Lerner Index increase of up to 50%. Ideally, the ETS is intended to give rise to a liquid, homogenous
market (if working properly) with many market players, making the acquisition of substantial market power
less likely.
89 See Weishaar, “The European emission trading system and competition – anticompetitive measures
beyond reach? An assessment of the grandfathering allocation method and the performance standard rate
system” at 5. An analogy might be made here with the approach taken to licences of the third generation
(3G) telephony standard (via the Universal Mobile Technology System (UMTS), which allows high-speed
transmission of data on mobile phones). Though the network operators are unlikely to be considered to
hold positions of single dominance, the relatively small number of such operators means that competition
problems may nonetheless arise, in particular as these operators control the number of service providers
and the conditions under which such providers operate. As a result, it is possible that the network
operators could be considered to hold a position of collective dominance. See further, Faull and Nikpay
(eds.), The EC Law of Competition (2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), at 13.185 onwards
and Petit, “The Commission’s Contribution to the Emergence of 3G Mobile Communications - an
Analysis of Some Decisions in the field of Competition Law” 7 European Competition Law Review (2004)
429.
90 As is well-known, an abuse may take place on a related market to that in which dominance is held: see,
for example, Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II [1994] ECR II-755.
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Chapter 13: Merger Policy
1. Introduction: Is there a role for environmental considerations in the
Community’s merger regime?
Prima facie, there is considerably less scope for taking environmental considerations into
account in applying the Community’s merger regime than with any other area of
Community law. This is essentially because, despite the transition in Regulation
139/2004 (the “Merger Regulation”) to the test of whether a concentration would
“significantly impede effective competition” (the SIEC test), the Commission has been
clear that, in practice, one of the primary forms of competitive harm in the case of
concentrations remains “the creation or strengthening of a dominant position” (the
“dominance” test).1 This means that, where a proposed concentration will create or
strengthen a dominant position – a test which, as we saw in Chapter 12, is based solely
on whether economic power is significantly increased2 - the possibilities of nonetheless
concluding that the SIEC test is not satisfied are few. Nonetheless, they are not non-
existent, and in this sense the current Merger Regulation offers greater possibilities for
integration than its 1989 predecessor, which relied solely on the dominance test.3 This
Chapter will examine the ways in which it might be argued that environmentally
beneficial concentrations do not satisfy the SIEC test.4
2. Overview
The Merger Regulation provides for a variety of factors to be taken into account in
assessing whether a proposed concentration is compatible with the common market, i.e.,
whether the concentration would “significantly impede effective competition” (the SIEC test).5
Some of these are set out in Article 2, headed “appraisal of concentrations”, though this
is not an exhaustive list. Thus, Article 2 provides that the Commission shall take into
account,
“(a) the need to maintain and develop effective competition within the common market in view of,
among other things, the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential
competition from undertakings located either within or outwith the Community;
1 See Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings OJ 2004 L 24/1 and
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
concentrations between undertakings OJ 2004 C 31/5, points 2 and 4. The extent to which environmental
factors may be relevant to assessing whether a firm is (likely to be) dominant (e.g., regulatory barriers to
entry, innovative and dynamic markets, first-mover advantages, etc) have been discussed in the context of
Chapters 9 and 12 (on market definition and Article 82 EC, respectively), and will not be repeated here.
See, for an example of environmental regulation creating barriers to entry relevant to merger analysis,
M.2533 BP/E.ON (high barriers to entry of market confirmed by fact that environmental regulations
restricted building extra capacity at the coast, at 118) and further cases cited in Chapter 9 on market
definition.
2 See, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ibid.
3 Note that the enaction of the predecessor to the 2004 Merger Regulation, the 1989 Merger Regulation,
followed a debate of some years on what approach should be taken in the Community to mergers, with
countries such as Germany and the UK arguing that mergers should be judged on competition grounds
alone, but countries such as France arguing for industrial policy and social issues to be taken into account.
Though, overall, Germany and the UK prevailed, as Motta notes “…this does not imply that other public policy
considerations will never play any role in the EU merger policy.” Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 14.
4 As with the analysis in Article 81(1) and Article 82, it is submitted that, where a merger would be
environmentally detrimental, but does not otherwise restrict competition, it can never be prohibited by the
Merger Regulation, nor do Part II’s arguments lead to any different conclusion. For an example of a
(likely) environmentally-damaging merger which was (rightly) allowed, see, Case ECSC/1252
RAG/Saarbergwerke/Preussag Anthrazit II.
5 This test is set out in Article 2(2) and (3) of the Merger Regulation.
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(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the
alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other
barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the
intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and economic progress
provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.”
In contrast to some other merger regimes, where environmental protection benefits
may expressly be taken into account in merger assessment, the Community regime has
no such express provision.6 Nonetheless, the final factor listed in the excerpt from
Article 2 above – the requirement to take into account the “development of technical and
economic progress provided that it is to consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle to
competition” – clearly provides a close parallel with three of the conditions set out in
Article 81(3). In fact, the first two Article 81(3) conditions are almost identical
(promotion of technical and economic progress and a fair share of benefits to
consumers), though the final two conditions (proportionality and non-elimination of
competition) are rolled into the single (apparently stricter) requirement that the
concentration should “not form an obstacle to competition”.
Prima facie, this leads us to the conclusion that, for the same reasons as set out in
considering Article 81(3) in Chapter 11, and relying in particular on the systematic and
economic arguments set out in Part II, benefits to environmental protection - or, at the
least, those which can reasonably be valued in some way - must be taken into account
by the Commission in assessing whether a concentration will significantly impede
competition. This conclusion is bolstered by the systematic approach taken in recital
23 to the Merger Regulation, which provides that, in assessing whether a concentration
is compatible with the common market, “the Commission must place its appraisal within the
general framework of the achievement of the fundamental objectives referred to in Article 2 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.”7
In practice, as the Commission has indicated and in a similar manner to our analysis
under Articles 81(3) and 82, such technological and economic progress will be taken
into account in merger assessment using an efficiencies analysis.8 This means that the
best way of taking environmental benefits into account in the merger context is by
viewing them as efficiencies, as we did in the context of Articles 81(3) and 82.
3. Efficiencies
One of the innovations of the 2004 Merger Regulation was its explicit reference to the
requirement for the Commission, in determining the impact of a concentration on
competition in the common market, to take into account any “substantiated and likely
efficiencies put forward by the undertakings concerned.”9 As the Merger Regulation notes,
6 See, for example, the new Spanish merger regime, whereby the authorities should consider the public
interest in otherwise anti-competitive mergers: Law 15/2007 of 3 July for the Defence of Competition
10(3)(d): “protección del medio ambiente” is a public interest to be taken into account. See by analogy, the
situation under the former UK merger regime where public interest concerns could be invoked in merger
analysis: see s.84 Fair Trading Act 1973, Rodger and Goyder, “Public Interest Criteria in the Assessment of
Mergers in the United Kingdom by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission” International antitrust law
& policy proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (1994) 125.
7 This approach, it is submitted, is given further force by th Article 6 EC integration principle, as set out in
Chapter 6’s systematic argument.
8 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, note 1 above, at 76.
9 Recital 23, Merger Regulation, note 1 above. See similarly, the US DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. Originally, the Commission had rejected the relevance of efficiencies to merger analysis: see,
for example, Danish Crown/Vertjyske Slagterier OJ 2000 L 20/1, MSG Media Service OJ 1994 L 364/1, Nordic
Satellite Distribution OJ 1996 L 53/20. See generally, Bishop and Walker, The Economics of EC Competition
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“It is possible that the efficiencies brought about by the concentration counteract the effects on
competition, and in particular the potential harm to consumers, that it might otherwise have and
that, as a consequence, the concentration would not significantly impede effective competition, in the
common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position.”10
The Merger Regulation announced that Commission guidelines on this issue would be
forthcoming, which duly appeared in the form of the 2004 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. In these Guidelines, the Commission confirmed that,
“[i]t is possible that efficiencies brought about by a merger counteract the effects on competition and
in particular the potential harm to consumers that it might otherwise have.”11
In order for such efficiencies to be taken into account, the Commission must be in a
position to conclude, “on the basis of sufficient evidence” that the efficiencies flowing from the
merger are “likely to enhance the ability and incentive of the merged entity to act pro-competitively for
the benefit of consumers, thereby counteracting the adverse effects on competition which the merger might
otherwise have.”12
More particularly, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines set down three conditions which
must be satisfied in order for efficiencies to be taken into account.
First, efficiencies have to benefit consumers. In order for this to be achieved, “efficiencies
should be substantial and timely and should, in principle, benefit consumers in those relevant markets
where it is otherwise likely that competition concerns would occur.”13 It is evident from this
statement that, unlike in some other jurisdictions, consumer welfare is the chosen welfare
standard in the Community’s merger regime: thus, purely productive efficiencies do not
count for these purposes.14 The Commission gives the examples of efficiencies as
including cost savings in production or distribution, giving the merged entity the ability
and incentive to charge lower prices post-merger, or new or improved products or
services,
“for instance resulting from efficiency gains in the sphere of R & D and innovation. A joint
venture undertaking set up in order to develop a new product may bring about the type of efficiencies
that the Commission can take into account.”15
Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (2nd ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), Lindsay, The EC Merger
Regulation: Substantive Issues (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2006), Luescher, “Efficiency Considerations in
European Merger Control - Just Another Battle Ground for the European Commission, Economists and
Competition Lawyers?” (2004) European Competition Law Review 7, Theeuwes, “An Economic Analysis
of the New Regulation 139/2004” 32(2) LIEI (2005) 209 and the seminal article by Williamson,
“Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs” 58 American Economic Review (1968) 407.
Form CO now has a section on efficiency gains: s 9.3.
10 Ibid. Note that this phraseology means that, in Community merger law, efficiencies do not constitute a
true “defence” as such, but rather form part of the assessment whether the SIEC test has been satisfied.
Nonetheless, as is the case with Article 82 “efficiencies”, the Commission has asserted that the burden of
proving efficiencies in the merger context lies on the parties.
11 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, note 1 above, point 76.
12 Ibid, point 77.
13 Ibid, point 79.
14 See, for example, Neven and Röller, “Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy
model of merger control” 23(9-10) International Journal of Industrial Organization (2005) 829, who argue
that a consumer surplus, rather than a total welfare, model is from an economic perspective appropriate in
many cases, as productive efficiencies are rarely generated by mergers and as total welfare is difficult to
measure accurately when competition authorities have a large case load. See, contra, the decision of the
Canadian Federal Appeal Court in Superior Propane, which approved a total surplus standard: see Elhauge
and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics (Oxford, Hart, 2007), 892, 901.
15 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, note 1 above, point 81. See likewise, US FTC Horizontal Merger
Commentary 2006: “Efficiencies in the form of quality improvements also may be sufficient to offset anticompetitive price
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In many cases, it is qualitative efficiencies which will be decisive. Thus, Philip Lowe
(Director General of DG Competition), has stated that in most efficiency cases, the
Commission will use a qualitative assessment of the transaction’s welfare impact.16
Clearly, therefore, improvements in products or services resulting from greater
environmental benefit should be taken into account in this respect. However, the
Commission emphasises that - just as we saw in the context of Articles 81 and 82 - in
order to be taken into account, efficiencies have to be timely. The later the efficiencies
are expected to materialise in the future, the less weight the Commission will assign to
them.17 As discussed in Chapter 8’s economic argument, this aspect of the efficiencies
analysis could, depending on the method of discounting employed, mean heavy
discounting of future environmental benefits. It is submitted, however, that a systematic
approach to choice of discount method demands that this choice should be exercised in
the light, inter alia, of Article 2 EC’s sustainability aim. As we saw in Chapter 2’s analysis
of that aim, there is an important intergenerational component to the notion of
sustainable development.18 This, it is argued, would militate against the use of a heavy
discounting rate.
It is important to note that an efficiencies analysis would not mean that, simply because a
merger takes place in an environment-related sector, it should per se be treated more
leniently in applying the SIEC test. An example might be a merger between waste
collection undertakings which would result in a large degree of market power. The fact
that new entrants would be at a significant cost disadvantage relative to incumbents due,
for example, to incumbents’ economies of scale and network effects, may, in such a case,
make it more likely that prices would go up post-merger without any particular
countervailing environmental benefits.19
Secondly, in order to be taken into account, efficiencies have to be merger-specific, i.e.,
they must be a “direct consequence of the notified merger” and must not be achievable to a
similar extent by reasonably practicable, less anti-competitive, alternatives.20
Thirdly, efficiencies have to be verifiable, “such that the Commission can be reasonably certain
that the efficiencies are likely to materialise, and be substantial enough to counteract a merger’s potential
harm to consumers.”21 Once again, in the environmental context, this may pose certain
problems insofar as the value of present, or future, environmental benefits may, as
discussed in Chapter 8, be difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, as concluded there, as long
as such benefits are reasonably quantifiable using accepted environmental valuation
techniques - albeit not fully quantifiable - they should, it is submitted, satisfy this
requirement.
increases following a merger. Because a quality improvement involves a change in product attributes, a simple comparison of
pre- and post-merger prices could be misleading. A careful analysis of the effects of changes in product attributes and prices on
consumer welfare is likely to be necessary.”
16 Speech, Brussels, February 17, 2003.
17 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, note 1 above, point 83.
18 Viz. the classic definition of sustainable development put forward in the Brundtland Report as,
“development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland et al, Our Common Future (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1987).
19 See, for example, Case COMP/M.4318 Veolia/Cleanaway, decision of September 21, 2006 (proposed
merger resulting in a market share of 85-95% on the market for commercial hazardous waste incineration
raised serious doubts as to compatibility with the common market, though commitments were ultimately
accepted). For an equivalent conclusion in the US system, see Waste Management-Allied (DOJ 2003),
discussed in Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, note 14 above, at 882.
20 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, note 1 above, point 85.
21 Ibid, point 86.
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Where a proposed merger is not horizontal, but vertical or conglomerate, efficiencies
may carry even greater weight. This is due to the fact, as observed by the Commission in
its Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this that countervailing competitive restrictions
are likely to be weaker than in the case of horizontal mergers, because direct competition
is not eliminated.22 Further, the activities and/or products of the undertakings involved
in vertical and some conglomerate mergers tend to complement each other, meaning that
integrating these undertakings may “produce significant efficiencies and be pro-competitive.”23
No mergers have yet been explicitly cleared on efficiencies grounds, due partly to the fact
that the policy was formalised by the Commission relatively recently, but due also
undoubtedly to the stiff probative hurdles with which merging parties are faced in
“substantiating” the likely efficiencies from the merger. The Commission’s first detailed
consideration of efficiencies arguments, Inco-Falconbridge, is - though not itself
environment-related - a good indication of the stringent approach which the
Commission intends to adopt towards efficiencies arguments.24 In that case, the
Commission rejected arguments put forward by the parties that the proposed transaction
would generate efficiency gains because certain of their nickel mines/processing facilities
were close to each other, which would have allowed them to optimize their mining and
processing operations, meaning increased production at lower cost, benefiting nickel
customers. The Commission rejected this on a number of grounds. First, the
efficiencies were not merger-specific, as a joint venture between Inco and Falconbridge
limited to mining and processing operations in a limited locality would have allowed
most of the operating synergies between the two undertakings to materialise, while not
preventing them from competing at the refining and marketing levels. Secondly, the
benefits from the merger would not have been adequately passed on to customers, as the
efficiencies were expected to be achieved at the upstream mining and processing levels
only, so any potential benefit would have been spread between all the merged
undertaking’s finished nickel and cobalt products, a significant part of which were sold
on other markets than the three relevant markets where competition concerns were
identified. Thirdly, as a result of the proposed transaction, the merged undertaking would
have acquired an almost monopolistic position in these markets, and it would thus have
had only limited incentives to share the benefits of the efficiencies with end customers in
these markets. In sum, the parties had failed to satisfy the burden of proof placed on
them to demonstrate adequate efficiencies flowing from the proposed transaction.
Despite this apparently strict approach, one can look to a number of cases under the
old Merger Regulation in which something akin to an efficiencies analysis succeeded,
though not recognised at the time as such. The main example here is the manner in
which the Commission and Court have, in certain exceptional cases, taken social and
industrial policy concerns into account in assessing mergers.
A classic illustration is the Nestlé/Perrier case,25 where the Commission argued before
the CFI that an action by workers’ representatives organisations to annul a
Commission decision approving a takeover, despite fears of job losses, was
inadmissible due to lack of interest. In the Commission’s view, it had no duty to
perform a detailed analysis of employment issues. In rejecting this contention, the
ECJ held that Article 2(1)(b) of Regulation entailed an obligation to draw up “an
22 Ibid, point 12.
23 Ibid, point 13.
24 Case M.4000 Inco-Falconbridge, decision of July 4, 2006.
25 Case T-12/93 Vittel [1993] ECR II-785. See also, recital 45 of the new Merger Regulation: “This
Regulation in no way detracts from the collective rights of employees, as recognised in the undertakings concerned, notably with
regard to any obligation to inform or consult their recognised representatives under Community and national law.”
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economic balance” (bilan économique) which may “entail considerations of a social nature.”26 In
particular, the Commission was obliged to “ascertain whether the concentration is liable to
have consequences, even if only indirectly, for the position of the employees.”27 A further example
one might cite is the “failing firm” defence accepted in exceptional circumstances by
the Commission and Community Courts. The leading case here is Kali + Salz,28 where
the Commission, in its decision allowing a merger to go ahead, referred specifically to
the severe structural weakness of the regions in East Germany affected by the
proposed concentration, and the likelihood of serious consequences for them of the
closure of the former State enterprise, Mitteldeutsche Kali. The ECJ did not criticise
this aspect of the decision and the existence of a limited “failing firm” defence has
been recognised in a number of subsequent decisions, as well as in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines.29
Similarly, in the environmental context, one might point to a (limited) number of cases
where, albeit not considered in the format of efficiencies as such, environmental
benefits have been taken into account by the Commission in assessing the merger. In
many of these cases, however, it is fair to conclude that the environmental benefits
were, as least ostensibly, ancillary to the overarching conclusion that the merger would
not create or strengthen a dominant position.30 Nonetheless, for the systematic and
economic reasons set out above, it is submitted that there is a strong case in principle
that reasonably quantifiable post-transaction environmental benefits should be
considered to be efficiencies in the context of merger analysis. Moreover, it is
submitted, this can be done by analogy with decisional practice in which social factors
were taken into account, such as Nestlé/Perrier and Kali + Salz. Indeed, the case for
taking environmental considerations into account in interpreting the Merger
Regulation is, given Article 6 EC, arguably stronger on a systematic analysis than that for
taking social considerations into account.
4. Applicability of Article 21(4) of the Merger Regulation to national measures
taken in the environmental interest?
Aside from their relevance in efficiencies analysis, a further conceivable way in which
environmental factors might play a role in the Community’s merger regime lies in
Article 21(4) of the Merger Regulation (which corresponds to Article 21(3) of the old
Merger Regulation). This provides that, notwithstanding Articles 21(2) and (3), which
lay down the “one-stop-shop” principle granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
Commission to assess mergers falling within the jurisdictional scope of the Merger
Regulation, Member States may take “appropriate measures to protect legitimate
interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and compatible
with the general principles and other provisions of Community law.” The Article goes
on to specify that public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules shall be
regarded as legitimate interests, but that,
“Any other public interest must be communicated to the Commission by the Member State
concerned and shall be recognised by the Commission after an assessment of its compatibility with
the general principles and other provisions of Community law before the measures referred to above
26 Ibid, para 39.
27 Ibid, para 38.
28 Joined Cases C-68/94 & 30/95 France v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375.
29 See, for example, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, note 1 above, point 89 onwards and
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Première OJ 1999 L 53/1.
30 See, for example, M.2987 Sydkraft/Ecoplus, M.2780 GE Wind Turbines/Enron, M.2712
Electrabel/Photovoltech, Case COMP/M.3213 Umicore/OMG/Precious Metal Group.
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may be taken. The Commission shall inform the Member State concerned of its decision within 25
working days of that communication.”
National measures taken for environmental protection reasons are, evidently, not
expressly mentioned here. Conceivably, however, it might be argued that certain
environmental reasons for a concentration fall within the concept of “public security”:
though, in the context of free movement of goods and services, the term has been
interpreted relatively narrowly, one might reason by analogy with cases such as Campus
Oil, in which the concept was held to justify ensuring the continued security of oil
supplies in Ireland.31 One might, for example, imagine that the concept could extend
to mergers relating to the increasingly emphasised public security risks flowing from
climate change, for example, or the public security benefits of environmentally-
friendlier, domestically-sourced energy sources (such as renewable energies).32
For environment-related cases which could not be brought within the notion of public
security, however, a Member State wishing to take “appropriate measures” would be
obliged to notify the Commission of its intentions in advance and await the
Commission’s assessment of the measure’s compatibility with “the general principles and
other provisions of Community law” - which clearly, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 6,
include the principles of sustainability and integration.33 If this were done, and if the
national measure taken genuinely served environmental protection objectives, it is
submitted that the Commission would – unless it could demonstrate that such
objectives would be protected by a decision under the Merger Regulation - be bound
to take no objection to such a measure.
31 See Articles 30 and 55 EC and Case 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727. For examples of cases falling
under the old Article 21(3), see M.423 Newspaper Publishing and M.1858 Thomson-CSF/RACAL.
32 See further, the paper presented by the High Representative for the Union’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy and the European Commission to the European Council, March 14, 2008, “Climate Change
and International Security”: “Unmitigated climate change beyond 2ºC will lead to unprecedented security scenarios as it
is likely to trigger a number of tipping points that would lead to further accelerated, irreversible and largely unpredictable
climate changes. Investment in mitigation to avoid such scenarios, as well as ways to adapt to the unavoidable should go hand
in hand with addressing the international security threats created by climate change; both should be viewed as part of preventive
security policy” (at 1). The report was welcomed by the European Council (Presidency Conclusions of the
Brussels European Council, March 13-14, 2008); recommendations from the Council on the matter are to
follow. For the potential relationship between climate change and security, see Sindico “Climate Change:
A Security (Council) Issue?” (2007) 1 Carbon and Climate Law Review 29.
33 See, for example, M. 1724 BSCH/Champalimaud.
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Chapter 14: The Relevance of State Action to Articles 81 and 82 EC
1. Introduction
Though, as argued in Part I, private actors play an increasingly significant role in
environmental policy and protection, Member States’ role in reinforcing this role remains
significant. Member States may, for example, seek to reinforce the effectiveness of
voluntary environmental agreements by recognising them in law; or grant special rights
to certain undertakings to perform environmental services which would not otherwise be
profitable. This Chapter deals with Community competition law’s approach to such
Member State efforts.
2. State action as a defence for undertakings
Where undertakings are required by national legislation to act in an anti-competitive
manner, such undertakings may rely on their national law obligations as a defence to
proceedings for breach of Articles 81 or 82 EC. This principle was laid down most
famously in Ladbroke Racing, where the ECJ held that,
“Articles [81 and 82] apply only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their
own initiative…If anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation or if
the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates the possibility of competitive activity on
their part, Articles [81 and 82] do not apply. In such a situation, the restriction of competition is
not attributable, as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the
undertakings…”1
The test for application of the state action is, therefore, strict: all possibility of
competition must be eliminated. Where a state measure restricts the scope for
competition, but leaves a residual field of competition, Articles 81 and 82 EC apply to
this field.2 Similarly, where a state measure simply encourages or gives binding force to
an agreement, but does not require action by law, the state action defence is not made
out (though it may be a mitigating factor in the fine or penalty imposed).3 This is so even
where the conduct takes place following consultation with the national authorities,4 or
where such state measures are subsequently found themselves to contravene Community
competition law.5 Finally, as held by the ECJ in CIF, national competition authorities
(NCAs) are obliged to adopt a decision to disapply national law which contravenes EC
competition law, thereby removing the undertaking’s state action defence as soon as the
decision by the NCA has become definitive.6 Until the NCA takes this step, however,
1 Cases C-359 & 379/95P Commission and France v Ladbroke Racing [1997] ECR I-6265, para 33. See
generally, Blomme, “State Action as a Defence Against 81 and 82 EC” 30(2) World Competition (2007)
243 and Castillo de la Torre, “State Action Defence in EC Competition Law” 28(4) World Competition
(2005) 407.
2 See, for example, Case 40/73 Suiker Unie v Commission [1975] ECR 1663 and Case T-387/94 Asia Motor
France (No. 3) [1996] ECR II-961.
3See also, Joined Cases 240, 241, 242, 261, 262, 268 and 269/82 SSI [1985] ECR 3831, Case C-35/96
Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851 (customs agents) and French Beef Commission decision of April 2,
2003, OJ 2003 L 209/12.
4 SSI, ibid.
5 Ladbroke, note 1 above. For stringent criticism, see Castillo de la Torre, at 414, who argues that the State
action defence “implies that the direct effect of Article 81 EC is in some measure subordinated to national law”: note 1
above.
6 Case C-198/01 CIF [2003] ECR I-8055. See similarly, with regard to Community public procurement
law, Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839. On the potential ambiguity of the idea of
“definitively” setting national measures aside, see Rizza, “The Duty of National Competition Authorities to
Disapply Anti-Competitive Domestic Legislation and the Resulting Limitations on the Availability of the
State Action Defence” European Competition Law Review (2004) 126.
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undertakings enjoy immunity from fines and from claims for damages, at least in the
Commission’s view.7
Clearly, therefore, to the extent that anti-competitive action is in fact required by
environmental legislation, this doctrine provides a defence for the undertakings involved
from any possible Article 81 and 82 EC proceedings. An example would be where a
state measure requires undertakings to operate a price cartel in a market for
environmental reasons,8 or where the state requires an undertaking to collect a potentially
anti-competitive environmental levy.9
More likely, however, is a situation where national environmental measures set out the
overall regulatory framework, but leave more or less important elements to be decided
on by undertakings active in the market. As we saw in Part I, this type of voluntary
agreement, termed “co-regulation”, is common in certain Member States, such as the
Netherlands. Thus co-regulatory initiatives may, for example, involve the State’s defining
the initiative’s objectives, the deadlines and mechanisms relating to its implementation,
methods of monitoring the application of the legislation, and any sanctions which are
necessary to guarantee the legal certainty of the legislation - but leave the rest up to
private undertakings.
The stringency of the Ladbroke test means that the state action defence will rarely be met
in co-regulatory situations. This is, it is submitted, quite correct: as has been argued in
previous Chapters, areas where the competition rules do not apply should be kept to a
minimum, as competition in residual areas will improve consumer welfare while - if the
competition rules are interpreted in the manner propounded by this research - taking
environmental protection requirements into account as appropriate.10 As such, this
approach accords fully with, for instance, Chapter 6’s systematic argument, as an example
of a potential conflict between competition and environmental policy which should be
reconciled using the proportionality principle, i.e., the means least restrictive of
competition which still attains the environmental aim.11 For example, the state action
defence will evidently not be made out in packaging waste management cases, where
Member States legislation transposes the requirements of the Packaging Waste Directive
in a way that enables (or requires) private undertakings to set up collective systems to
fulfil obligated undertakings’ waste recovery requirements, but does not set out the
conditions under which such systems must operate. Examples are the DSD and
EcoEmballages schemes, where competition law applied albeit in the context of national
legislation adopted under the EU Packaging Directive.12
7 DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September 22,
2005.
8 The defence will, evidently, also apply where the legislator decides to act rather than private undertakings,
an example being the replacement of the ACEA voluntary agreement between car manufacturers on CO2
emission limits by legislation: see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community's integrated
approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles COM (2007) 856 final.
9 See Case C-207/01 Altair Chimica v ENEL [2003] ECR I-8875.
10 See similarly, Vogelaar, "Towards an Improved Integration of EC Environmental Policy and EC
Competition Policy: An Interim Report" in 1994 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. (B. Hawk ed. 1995) 529, at 554.
11 See point 4 of Chapter 6’s working hypothesis on the implications of Article 6 EC.
12 See Chapters 10-12 and, similarly, the approach of the Danish competition authority to an agreement on
the collection, recycling and destruction of used refrigerants containing CFC gas (Kølebranchens Miljøordning).
Though the Danish environmental authorities had requested industry to sign up to this agreement, the
agreement was nonetheless held to be anti-competitive, as companies ought to have been free to use their
own recycling system if they wished: see the Danish government’s submissions to the OECD, Competition
Policy and the Environment (Paris, OECD, 1996).
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The question of applicability of the state action defence is particularly interesting in a
situation, such as that under the Dutch Wet milieubeheer, where industry comes up with a
proposal for a voluntary environmental agreement, and requests the Dutch environment
minister to declare the proposal universally binding.13 Prima facie, the input from
participating undertakings in coming up with the terms of the agreement seems such as
to negate application of the defence: insofar as the agreement “eliminates competition”
within the Ladbroke meaning, this is not, therefore, as a result of the action of the state.
Indeed, the Dutch competition authority (NMa) has taken a similar approach in cases
such as Stibat, which concerned a battery collection and recycling system set up by Dutch
battery producers and importers to fulfil their obligations under the Dutch legislation
implementing the Batteries Directive.14 In that case, the Stibat arrangement had been
notified to the Dutch environment minister, who had approved it subject to its being
notified to the Dutch minister for economic affairs for a competition law assessment -
and expressly without prejudice to its being found compatible with Dutch and
Community competition law. In its decision finding part of the Stibat arrangement to
contravene Dutch competition law, the NMa noted that the Dutch legislation
implementing the Batteries Directive did not require any collective agreement between
producers and importers, or lay down the content of any such agreement.15
However, this conclusion may seem harsh in the case of undertakings in the industry
who may not have been party to the original proposal, but who are nonetheless bound by
it following the Minister’s declaration, and who have no scope for obtaining an
exemption from the declaration’s binding force.16 In this case, it would seem that such
undertakings should be entitled to rely on the state action defence. This argument would
reach its limits, however, where it would have been possible for an undertaking to gain
an exemption from the declaration, but no such exemption was in fact applied for.17
A separate potential issue arising out of legislation such as the Wet milieubeheer is the
extent to which the state could itself be in breach of competition law, under the Van
Eycke doctrine discussed below, by declaring proposed agreements universally binding.
This is considered below.
Even where the conditions for the state action defence in the above sense are not made
out, it may in some cases, as discussed in Chapter 9, still be possible for an undertaking
13 See Wet milieubeheer, section 9.40, discussed further below and, in the case of waste management
contribution agreements, section 15.36. See also, the example of the Dutch car wrecks case of the Dutch
Competition Authority, discussed by the Commission in its DG Competition Paper concerning issues of
waste management in recycling systems of September 22, 2005, where a collective system for the recovery
and recycling of car wrecks set up in the Netherlands prior to the ELV Directive (Directive 2000/53/EC
on end-of life vehicles OJ 2000 L 269/34, as amended), an agreement on which was declared binding by
the government for a three-year period, on a renewable basis, to all car producers and car importers under
Dutch law, was found not to be anti-competitive. The system was not granted exclusivity by the
government, as it was possible for the car producers and importers to obtain an exemption if they can
demonstrate that they take care of their ELVs in an equivalent way. See also, for example, Case 51/98
Stibat, decision of the Dutch competition authority of December 18, 1998, where it was open to battery
producers and importers to opt out of Stibat’s battery collection and recycling system, which two importers
had in fact chosen to do (para 12) - though they were far outnumbered by Stibat’s 481 members.
14 Directive 91/157 OJ 1991 L 78/38, since replaced by Directive 2006/66 OJ 2006 L 266/1. This makes
battery producers and importers responsible for battery waste.
15 Case 51/98 Stibat, para 41.
16 See, Wet milieubeheer section 9.40(2): a request for an agreement to be made universally binding can be
made to the Minister by “those persons or organisations representing persons who, in terms of their number and the total
volumes of the substances, preparations or other products concerned, form in the opinion of Our Minister a significant majority
of those performing operations with these products.”
17 See the Dutch car wrecks case, note 13 above.
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to argue that, due to the nature of its activity carried out in the public interest, it falls
outside the definition of an undertaking. Alternatively, undertakings may try to invoke
Article 86(2) as a defence, discussed below.
3. The duties of the State under Articles 10 and 3(1)(g) EC read with Articles 81
and 82 EC
While Articles 81 and 82 EC only apply to undertakings, the Community Courts have
long made clear - beginning with the INNO judgment - that Member States have a duty
to refrain from enacting or enforcing national rules which might jeopardise the
effectiveness of these Articles. This duty flows from Article 10 EC and was summarised
by the ECJ in Van Eycke as follows:18
“…Articles [81 and 82] of the Treaty, read in conjunction with Article [10], require the
Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative nature, which
may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings. Such would be the case…if
a Member States were to require or favour the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted
practices contrary to Article [81] or to reinforce their effects or to deprive its own legislation of its
official character by delegating to private traders responsibility for taking decisions affecting the
economic sphere.”19
There are far more cases on the extent of Member States’ Article 10 EC duties in
conjunction with Article 81 EC, rather than Article 82 EC: indeed, the extract from Van
Eycke, above, takes as its example the Article 81 EC situation. Nonetheless, the same
principles apply by analogy in the Article 82 EC context. In each case, Member States’
obligations in this context may be divided into three categories.
a. Duty not to require or favour the adoption of anti-competitive
agreements, or abuses by a dominant undertaking
In order to breach this duty, there must be an agreement or concerted practice between
undertakings which is contrary to Article 81 EC, or an abuse by a dominant undertaking
contrary to Article 82 EC. As such, the respective elements of the Article 81 or 82 EC
prohibitions must be made out. For example, where the state requests industry to sign
up to a recycling system which does not restrict competition, as it is open to all
participants and self-management is also possible, Article 10 EC is not breached.20
In the case of an Article 81-related breach, there must be an agreement or concerted
practice linked to the state measure at issue: it is not sufficient that national legislation
itself has an anti-competitive effect equivalent to an agreement contrary to Article 81
EC.21 An example of a potential breach of this duty in the environmental sphere might
be a state packaging waste measure that, in addition to providing for the establishment of
collection and recovery systems, recommends or requires that producers of packaged
products cooperate in order to devise identical packaging for their competing products,
18 See Case 13/77 INNO v ATAB [1977] ECR 2115 and, generally, Buendia Sierra, Exclusive Rights and State
Monopolies under EC Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) and Thunström, Carle and Lindeborg,
“State Liability Under the EC Treaty Arising From Anti-Competitive State Measures” World Competition
25(4) (2002) 515.
19 Case 267/86 Van Eycke v ASPA [1988] ECR 476.
20 See, by analogy, the Danish Environmental Refrigerant System case, discussed at note 12 above, where, after
alterations made at the behest of the Danish Competition Commission, a system to which the Danish
ministry had requested that industry sign up was found non-restrictive, as companies could use their own
recycling systems (and would be exempted from environmental tax, just as KMO members), all companies
fulfilling objective reasonable criteria could be approved, and approval was free of charge.
21 See Case C-2/91 Meng [1993] ECR I-5751 and Case C-245/91 Ohra [1993] ECR I-5851.
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leading to communality of costs and price alignment.22 Nonetheless, where an agreement
is in fact adopted by a body acting in the public interest - which may in some
circumstances, as we saw in Chapter 9, include environmental activities - and so does not
qualify as an agreement between undertakings, resultant legislation does not breach
Article 10.23 Further, just as we saw in our discussion of Article 81(1) in Chapter 10, it
may be argued that an agreement is not anti-competitive because it is objectively justified,
including on environmental grounds.24
If this fails, Article 81(3) may apply to environmentally-motivated restrictions, in the
manner we saw in Chapter 11. An interesting question is whether, beyond the standard
objective justification and Article 81(3) “defences” available to private undertakings,
Member States may rely on a wider category of justifications for their action based, for
example, on Article 30 EC. As Mortelmans notes, this was an issue raised, though not
decided, in the Meng case.25 If this is the case, there is no doubt that Member States will
be able to rely on cases such as PreussenElektra to argue that proportionate
environmentally-motivated measures requiring or favouring anti-competitive agreements
are justified.26
In the environmental context, an interesting potential application of this duty could
include abusive conduct flowing from the allocation of allowances by a Member State in
the context of the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme. As discussed in Chapter 12, it may
be possible - in extreme cases - to envisage that the way in which allowances are allocated
by a Member State might lead to a position of dominance as, in the current Phase of the
ETS, 90% of allowances are allocated free-of-charge and, subject to compliance with
rather broad allocation guidelines, at the Member State’s discretion.27 Where abusive
conduct subsequently takes place (for instance, where a dominant undertaking unfairly
restricted competitors’ access to allowances), it could be argued that, where there was
evidence that the Member State “required or favoured” such abuse, this constitutes a breach
of that state’s obligations. An example might be where a dominant undertaking over-
reported its own emissions in order to be over-allocated allowances, and the Member
State subsequently allocated allowances on the inflated basis.
22 See DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of September
22, 2005.
23 See, by analogy, Case C-185/91 Reiff [1993] ECR I-5801, discussed below, where the Court held that
Article 81 EC, read in conjunction with Article 10 EC and Article 3(1)(g) did not preclude a situation
where compulsory tariffs were set by tariff boards and the board members, though chosen by the public
authorities after proposals from trade sectors, were not representatives of these trade sectors, but rather
were acting in the public interest, and where the public authority acted in the public interest in deciding
whether to approve the board’s decision: paras 18 and 24.
24 This has been argued, at times successfully, by numerous Member States, in cases which we have already
considered such as Albany and Pavlov: Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, Joined Cases C-180 &
184/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451.
25 Meng, note 21 above. See Mortelmans, “Towards Convergence in the Application of the Rules on Free
Movement and on Competition?” 38 CML Rev (2001) 613, who notes that the Court raised this issue with
the interveners, which responded variously, but it was not ultimately necessary to decide the issue in that
case. Note there is a certain analogy between this approach and the reasoning in Joined Cases C-267/91
and C-268/91 Keck [1993] ECR I-6097.
26 See Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, and the discussion on this point in Chapters 2
and 7.
27 On which, see Chapter 4.
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b. Duty not to reinforce the effects of anti-competitive agreements, or an
abuse by a dominant undertaking
A first element for this Article 10 EC duty to be breached is that there must be an anti-
competitive agreement between undertakings, or an abuse by a dominant undertaking.
In this regard, the same considerations discussed under section (a) apply.
A second element of breach is that the effects of the anti-competitive agreement(s) or
abuse must be reinforced by the national measure. One way how this might happen is if
the Member State incorporates an anticompetitive agreement into national legislation.
This was the case, for example, in Asjes, where a French law approved certain airline
tariffs.28 It was also the case in Vlaamse Reisbureaus, which concerned a prohibition
against travel agents transferring commission to clients, which had the same effect on the
market as anticompetitive agreement.29 In order to contravene Article 10, the ECJ held,
a number of conditions must be satisfied:
(1) The legislation must give the (pre-existing) agreement a permanent character;
(2) The agreement must be made generally binding through legislation and
undertakings must be able to rely on it before national courts against a third
party;
(3) The legislation must provide effective remedies to be applied against any
undertaking that does not follow the rules set out in the legislation.30 Once
again, if national law simply entails the same effects as an anti-competitive
agreement, without actually implementing it, this is not sufficient to breach
Article 10 EC.31
This category of duty is clearly potentially of application to co-regulatory environmental
initiatives which, as discussed above, are common in certain Member States.32 Taking
once again the Dutch example, where the Minister may declare an environmental
agreement universally binding, upon request by industry (and subject, where requested,
to exceptions), such declarations may be made for up to five years, arguably giving it a
“permanent character”.33 Further, there is provision in the Wet milieubeheer for an
investigation and sanction procedure on the part of the Minister if an agreement declared
universally binding is breached.34 Nonetheless, Member States using a co-regulatory
approach may be saved by the fact that, in order to contravene Article 10 EC, the
agreement being reinforced by national legislation must itself be anti-competitive. As set
out above in the context of Member States’ duty not to require or favour the adoption of
anti-competitive agreements, universally binding agreements may not be anti-
competitive, for example, where exemptions are possible from the universally binding
system.35 Further, as discussed above, it may, depending on the circumstances of the
28 Joined Cases 209/84 etc Asjes [1986] ECR 1425. See also, Case 123/83 BNIC v Clair [1985] ECR 391.
29 Case 311/85 VVR v Sociale Dienst [1987] ECR 3801.
30 Ibid, at para 23.
31 See Van Eycke and Meng, notes 19 and 21 above.
32 On this, note the Commission’s comment in its Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines OJ 2001 C 3/2, at
point 183 and Weishaar, “The European emission trading system and competition – anticompetitive
measures beyond reach? An assessment of the grandfathering allocation method and the performance
standard rate system” (concluding that Member States’ National Allocation Plans under the EU’s ETS are
unlikely to contravene Article 10 EC read with Article 81).
33 Wet milieubeheer, section 9.41 and section 15.39 (waste management contribution agreements).
34 Wet milieubeheer, section 9.44, 9.45 and section 15.41 (waste management contribution agreements).
35 See the Danish Environmental Refrigerant System case, note 12 above. See also, the Dutch submissions to
the OECD 1996 and the approval given by the Commission in its Waste Management Paper to the Dutch
competition authority’s reasoning in the Dutch car wrecks case, note 13 above, where an agreement declared
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case, be arguable that the environmental protection goal of the agreement means that the
competitive restriction should be viewed as inherent to this goal (under Article 81(1) EC)
or that the agreement falls under Article 81(3) EC.
In this regard, an interesting example is that of the Dutch verwijderingsbijdrage (return and
recycling fee), which has been imposed, by virtue of Dutch legislation, on all electronic
goods since 1999. The idea is that consumers, who pay the fee on all electronic goods
purchased, can return such equipment for recycling without charge when they go to
purchase a replacement.36 The level of this fee is set by an organisation of all Dutch
producers and importers of electronic equipment (the Stichting RTA). It is submitted
that, under the above argument, the Dutch state would not be in breach of the Van
Eycke doctrine in this situation as long as it could be shown that such a system was
proportionate, i.e., that there was no less restrictive means of achieving the same
environmental goal as effectively. In this case, the argument would be that only such a
universal system, which obliges retailers to take back old electronic equipment
irrespective of brand, can achieve maximum environmental impact, as it makes life very
easy for consumers. The fact that the EU has since itself made such a system
compulsory EU-wide in its Waste Electronic Equipment Directive is strong evidence
that such a system is, from an environmental policy perspective, necessary to achieve
recycling goals.37 However, as discussed below, it would be important by analogy to
cases such as Reiff that the state retained ultimate decisional power over the fee levels,
and that the Stichting RTA would be obliged to act in the interests of environmental
protection, rather than out of the private interests of its members.
c. Duty not to deprive legislation of official character by delegation
The third category of Member State duty under Article 10 EC comprises a duty not to
“deprive its own legislation of its official character by delegating to private traders responsibility for taking
decisions affecting the economic sphere.” This was the situation in INNO, where the Belgian tax
code allowed manufacturers or importers of tobacco products to set the basic price of
tobacco; they then purchased tax labels to affix to each product.38 In Arduino, however,
the ECJ held that Italian legislation fixing minimum and maximum fees chargeable by
Italian lawyers, after the State was presented with a draft by the professional association
of lawyers, did not constitute delegation contrary to Article 10 EC. This was because
Italy had not waived its power to make decisions of last resort or to review
implementation of the tariff, which could be amended by the relevant Italian minister;
further, national courts could depart from minimum and maximum fees under
exceptional circumstances.39 Similarly, in Reiff, no illegal delegation was found even
where rates were set by committees which included representatives appointed by
undertakings or trade associations, where the legislation required that the public interest
binding for a renewable three year period did not infringe Dutch competition law, even though the car
recycling system was based on a voluntary agreement among the interested parties and included a flat fee
of €45 to be paid to ARN by car producers and importers for each registered car. The system was not
granted exclusivity and exemptions were possible if there was proof that the car manufacturer or importer
could take care of its ELVs in an equivalent way. They were thus free to set up alternative systems or to
adhere to eventual alternative systems. See likewise, the arrangement in the decision of the Dutch
competition authority in Case 51/98 Stibat, in which the Stibat battery collection and recycling system was
not granted exclusivity, and other battery producers/importers were free to undertake their own collection
and recycling.
36 Originally by the Besluit verwijdering wit- en bruingoed, followed by the Besluit beheer
elektrische en elektronische apparatuur implementing the Waste Electronic Equipment Directive.
37 Directive 2002/96 OJ 2003 L 37/24.
38 INNO, note 18 above.
39 Case C-35/99 Arduino [2002] ECR I-1529.
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be taken into account in setting rates and the public authority retained the power to
substitute its own decision on rates for the committee’s decision. As Schepel observes,
the effect of the Court’s interpretation of delegation is that,
“[s]elf-regulatory arrangements are to be protected from antitrust if they can make a plausible claim
to put the “public interest” over narrow private interests.”40
Unlike the first and second categories of duty, the Court did not in Van Eycke mention
the necessity for an anti-competitive agreement or abuse in order for the third category
of duty to be breached. However, it is clear from subsequent cases that this requirement
also applies to the third category. As a result, the same justificatory arguments as set out
above would apply to environmentally-motivated practices.41
Applying this case law to the environmental context, it is submitted that a systematic
approach to the concept of public interest means that genuine environmental protection
requirements ought to be viewed as public interest requirements for this purpose. This
would mean that, where national environmental legislation delegates certain
environmental standard-setting to be decided by industry members, and obliges them to
act on environmental protection grounds, Article 10 would not be breached insofar as
the state retained ultimate power of decision. Moreover, Chapter 7’s governance argument
suggests that the Community courts would be likely to interpret the above jurisprudence
in this manner, using a coherence-based approach to judicial reasoning. As the INNO
line of cases represents the Court’s explicit recognition of the relevance of non-
economic, public interest factors in considering whether Article 10 is breached, this is
not an area where Chapter 8’s economic arguments in themselves need to be made.
40 Schepel, “Delegation of Regulatory Powers to Private Parties under EC Competition Law; Towards a
Procedural Public Interest Test” 39 CML Rev (2002) 31, at 50.
41 See Schepel, ibid, at 48.
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4. Article 86(1) EC – rights granted to privileged undertakings
Article 86(1) provides,
“In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant
special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any
measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules
provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89.”
As is well-established, Article 86(1) essentially represents a particular application, in the
context of so-called “privileged” undertakings, of the general Article 10 EC duty of
Member States not to jeopardise the attainment of the Treaty’s objectives.42
a. Public undertakings and undertakings granted special or exclusive
rights
The first issue in applying Article 86(1) EC is whether the undertaking at issue is a
“public” undertaking or one to which a Member State has granted “special or exclusive
rights”. Though the Treaty does not define the notion of “public” undertaking, the
Commission has defined it as including every undertaking over which the public
authorities may exercise, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence by virtue of
ownership of it, or their financial participation in it or the rules which govern it.43
Defining undertakings to which “special or exclusive” rights have been granted has
proven to be more difficult. Nonetheless, in Ambulanz Glöckner, the ECJ stated that
special and exclusive rights exist where,
“protection is conferred by a legislative measure on a limited number of undertakings which may
substantially affect the ability of other undertakings to exercise the economic activity in question in
the same geographical area under substantially equivalent conditions.”44
Though this definition does not differentiate between special and exclusive rights, a
distinction has been made in at the legislative level in, inter alia, the Transparency
Directive.45
42 See INNO, note 18 above, para 42.
43 See, for example, Notice on the allocation of the competition rules to the postal sector and on the
assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services OJ 1998 C 39/2.
44 Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089, para 24. Examples of cases where the Court has
held an exclusive right to exist include, in Höfner and Elser, an undertaking granted a monopoly over the
provision of recruitment services and, in La Crespelle, a body administering a scheme for the artificial
insemination of cattle in France (Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, Case C-323/93 Centre
d’Insémination de la Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077).
45 See Directive 2006/111 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and their
public undertakings OJ 2006 L 318/17, which (at Article 2(1)(f) and (g)) defines exclusive rights as “rights
that are granted by a Member State to one undertaking through any legislative, regulatory or administrative
instrument, reserving it the right to provide a service or undertake an activity within a given geographical
area” and special rights as “rights that are granted by a Member State to a limited number of undertakings,
through any legislative, regulatory or administrative instrument, which, within a given geographical area: (i)
limits to two or more the number of such undertakings, authorised to provide a service or undertake an
activity, otherwise than according to objective, proportional and non-discriminatory criteria; or (ii)
designates, otherwise than according to such criteria, several competing undertakings, as being authorised
to provide a service or undertake an activity; or (iii) confers on any undertaking or undertakings, otherwise
than according to such criteria, any legal or regulatory advantages which substantially affect the ability of
any other undertaking to provide the same service or to operate the same activity in the same geographical
area under substantially equivalent conditions.”
237
Article 86(1) is clearly of significant potential relevance to the environmental sphere, in
that it is foreseeable that Member States may choose to create special rights for
undertakings carrying out some environmental services (via, for example, licenses or
permits). This is due to the fact that, as we saw in Chapter 8, environmental benefits and
damage may often constitute externalities, meaning that - in the absence of economic
instruments internalising such externalities - performing environmental services may not
be profitable. To date, there have been two principal cases on the application of Article
86(1) in the environmental context: Dusseldorp and Sydhavnens.46 Each concerned the
grant by Member State legislation of what in the Court’s view amounted to an exclusive
right within the meaning of Article 86(1). Dusseldorp concerned Dutch rules requiring
undertakings to deliver their waste for recovery (such as oil filters) to a national
undertaking, AVR Chemie, on which Dutch rules had conferred the exclusive right to
incinerate dangerous waste, unless the processing of their waste in another Member State
is superior to that performed by that undertaking.47 In contrast, Sydhavnens concerned
Danish rules authorising just three undertakings to receive building waste produced
within the boundaries of the Municipality of Copenhagen with a view to recovering it -
the case thus demonstrating the Court’s acceptance that exclusive rights may be granted
“collectively” to a number of undertakings.48 While there are no environment-related
cases concerning “special” rights, one might include in this category any undertakings
which have been granted rights where there are a limited number of operators - in
contrast to situations where any operator which meets certain objective criteria gets
access to the right.49 Under this analysis, situations where national measures limit, for
example, the number of waste processors or purchasers in a locality or territory - for
instance, to try to ensure that each processor had a sufficient amount of waste to allow it
to remain economically viable - would qualify.50
Perhaps more controversially, applying this reasoning to the EU’s Emissions Trading
Scheme, in cases where Member States allocate rights to operators otherwise than in
accordance with objective criteria or by auction - and insofar as their allocation methods
are (or appear to be) discretionary - there would seem to be a real argument that they
qualify as “special” rights.51
Finally, a Member State act granting special or exclusive rights must constitute a
“measure” in order to fall under Article 86(1) EC. This includes administrative directions
and even non-binding recommendations; and can include the very grant of a special or
46 Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp [1998] ECR I-4075 and Case C-209/98 Sydhavnens [2000] ECR 343. See also,
Case 172/82 Inter-Huiles [1983] ECR 555, para 15, where the Court did not decide the question whether an
environmentally-motivated right falls under Article 86(1).
47 Dusseldorp, ibid, para 54. See also, the measure at issue in Case C-343/95 Diego Calì & Figli [1997 ECR I-
1547 (though, as discussed in Chapter 9, the environmental nature of the pollution surveillance services
meant that SEPG did not qualify as an “undertaking”).
48 Sydhavnens, note 46 above, para 53 (by analogy with the concept of collective dominance). Note,
however, that this could perhaps more easily be viewed as the grant of “special” rights (see, for example,
the “special rights-limitation” analysis of Buendia Sierra, note 18 above), though in practice nothing turns
on the special/exclusive rights distinction here.
49 See Buendia Sierra, note 18 above, chapter 2.
50 One might make an analogy here with justifications for systems of quantitative selective distribution,
where it is argued that, without a limit on the number of distributors in a territory, there would be no
guarantee of economic viability for those distributors. Quantitative selective distribution systems are
covered by the Verticals Block Exemption if the other criteria (i.e., market share threshold) set down in
that exemption are met. See Regulation 2790/1999 OJ 1999 L 336/21.
51 See contra, Weishaar, note 32 above, at 27, who (correctly) points out that, where non-objective and
discretionary criteria are used in allocating allowances, the Member State NAP should not, in principle, be
approved in the first place by the Commission.
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exclusive right itself.52 In the Dusseldorp case, for example, it extended to the Dutch
Long-term Plan for the Disposal of Dangerous Waste;53 in Sydhavnens, to a decision of the
Municipality of Copenhagen.54
b. Measures in breach of Articles 81 or 82 EC
The core of Article 86(1) EC is its requirement that Member States refrain, in the case of
privileged undertakings, from enacting or maintaining in force any measure contrary to
the Treaty. For our purposes, measures contrary to Article 81 or 82 are most relevant.55
In practice, however, Article 86(1) tends to be applied in conjunction with Article 82,
with the interrelationship between national measures and Article 81 tending to be
considered under the Van Eycke doctrine, considered above.
Article 86(1) and Article 82. Where the privileged undertaking enjoys a dominant
position in a substantial part of the common market, the national measures may, in
certain cases, be found to breach Article 86(1) in conjunction with Article 82.
The Court normally first considers whether the privileged undertaking holds a dominant
position. Where an undertaking is granted exclusive rights over the whole territory of a
Member State, this condition will always be satisfied. An example is Dusseldorp, which as
we have seen concerned the grant of exclusive rights for the incineration of dangerous
waste on the whole of the Netherlands.56 The issue normally gets more attention,
however, where there is dispute as to the definition of the relevant market, or whether
the relevant market amounts to a substantial part of the common market. An example is
Sydhavnens, where there was a dispute, inter alia, as to whether the relevant geographic
market was the Municipality of Copenhagen, or whether a broader definition should be
adopted. The ECJ left the matter for the national court to decide, though hinting that
the geographic market may be nation-wide, due to the fact that one third of the building
waste produced in Denmark was produced in the Municipality of Copenhagen.57
Originally, it seemed that, in order for there to be a breach of Article 86(1) read with
Article 82, it had to be shown that the privileged undertaking, merely by exercising the
exclusive rights granted to it, could not avoid abusing its dominant position.58 From
more recent cases, however - including Dusseldorp and Sydhavnens - it is clear that a breach
may also occur where the exclusive rights granted are liable to create a situation in which
that undertaking is induced to commit such abuses.59 These tests have been found to be
satisfied in a variety of situations.
A first situation is where the privileged undertaking is led to commit an Article 82(b)
abuse of “limiting production, markets or technological development to the detriment of consumers.”
One illustration of this is where the undertaking is unable to meet demand for a product
or service, as in Höfner and Elser, where the fact that the Federal Employment Office in
Germany enjoyed a legal monopoly acting as an intermediary in the employment market
52 Case C-202/88 France v Commission (Telecommunications Terminal Equipment) [1991] ECR I-1223.
53 Note 46 above, para 12.
54 Note 46 above, para 15.
55 See also, however, judgments like Case T-266/97 Vlaamse Televisie [1999] ECR II-2329 (grant of the
exclusive right to broadcast television advertising to the Flemish community), in which the CFI applied
Article 90(1) EC in conjunction with Article 43 EC on freedom of establishment. In such cases,
justifications on grounds of imperative requirements of the public interest (which, as discussed in Chapter
7, include environmental protection grounds) may, pursuant to the Court’s consistent case law be accepted
if proportionate. In that case, justification on cultural policy grounds was not made out on the facts.
56 Note 46 above, para 60.
57 Note 46 above, para 63.
58 See also, Crespelle, note 45 above.
59 See Sydhavnens, note 46 above, and Dusseldorp, note 46 above, para 61.
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infringed Article 82 EC, as the FEO was manifestly unable to satisfy demand and the
legal monopoly prevented competitors from entering the market to satisfy that demand.60
A further common argument in this category is that outlets have been limited by a grant
of exclusivity. This was the case, for example, in Dusseldorp itself, where the effect of the
ban on exporting oil filter waste was to force Dusseldorp to deliver its filters to AVR
Chemie, “even though the quality of processing available in another Member State was comparable to
that performed by the national undertaking.”61 Such an obligation favoured AVR Chemie, by
enabling it to process waste intended for processing by a third undertaking, and thus
abusively restricted outlets for waste processing.62 From an analytical perspective, this
conclusion is surely correct: the waste processing at the foreign plant at issue was not
found to be of a lower standard than that of AVR Chemie, hence the (extremely harsh)
competitive restriction could not be said to be justified by, or proportionate to,
environmental protection goals.63 Put in the terms of Chapter 6’s systematic argument,
therefore, this is a situation where the Article 6 EC integration principle did not require
AVR Chemie’s exclusivity, as a case where the same environmental result could be
ensured in a manner less restrictive of competition.64 In the terms of Chapter 8’s economic
argument, consumer welfare would have been greater in the absence of AVR Chemie’s
exclusivity even when environmental benefits were included in the utility function, as
such benefits were not necessarily increased as a result of the exclusive right. Limitation
of outlets was also one of the abuses alleged to result from the grant of exclusivity at
issue in Sydhavnens.65 The issue was not, however, ultimately decided by the ECJ, as an
Article 86(2) defence applied there in any event.66
A second situation where Article 86(1) has been found to be infringed is where a national
measure creates a situation of conflict of interest, where a privileged undertaking is put in
a position controlling parts of its competitors’ activities.67 In the environmental context,
an example might be if a privileged waste management undertaking were involved in
deciding which other waste management undertakings should be granted permits. A
related situation is where the national measure helps the privileged undertaking extend its
dominant position to a different market. An example is GB-INNO-BM, which
concerned the extension of market power of the public telephone network operator into
the ancillary market of supply of telephone apparatus, resulting from a national measure
conferring the power on the operator to lay down specifications for, and grant approval
for, such apparatus.68 Again, in the environmental context, one might imagine this
60 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979.
61 Note 46 above, para 62. In Sydhavnens, the Court emphasised that the mere fact of being granted an
exclusive right over part of the national territory was not, in itself, an abuse: note 46 above, para 68.
62 Ibid, para 63.
63 Ibid, para 21 and see the observation of Advocate General Jacobs that a restriction amounting to a
prohibition of export from a Member State would rarely be justifiable under Article 86(2) (Opinion, at para
98). In practice, therefore, one of the main problems with the Dutch rules was that the system effectively
meant that all exports were prohibited, as the Netherlands - rightly or wrongly - did not generally consider
any other state’s processing methods to be as high quality as its own. See the submissions of the Dutch
government to OECD, Competition Policy and the Environment (Paris, OECD, 1996), at 54.
64 See the fourth point of the working hypothesis on the meaning of the integration principle, set out in
Chapter 6 at Figure 1.
65 Note 46 above, para 72.
66 Ibid, para 81.
67 As was the case in Case 260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, for example, where the Court held that the
Greek television and radio station’s monopoly over broadcasting could, if exercised in an abusive manner
(e.g., by discriminating in favour of its own broadcasts), breach Article 86(1) EC read in conjunction with
Article 82 EC. See further, Albany, note 24 above.
68 Case C-18/88 GB-INNO/BM [1991] ECR I-5941. See also, Ambulanz Glöckner, note 44 above, where
the Court held that a law adopted by German Länder on the provision of ambulance services contravened
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occurring where a privileged waste management system is also active in a competitive
downstream collection or recovery market, and has the power to prefer its own activities
in that market to those of its competitors. It should be emphasised that none of Part II’s
arguments suggests that environment-related cases should receive any special treatment
in such situations, as a less competitively restrictive solution is generally available which
achieves the same environmental benefits - i.e., outsourcing the job which creates the
conflict to an independent body.
A third situation where Article 86(1) has been found to be infringed is where the national
measure sets or confirms tariffs to be charged by a privileged undertaking in a way which
amounts to abusive pricing, whether in the form of excessive pricing, exclusionary
rebates, or discriminatory pricing.69 This issue was raised, for example, in Sydhavnens,
though it was not ultimately contested that the prices charged by the three waste
management undertakings in that case were freely determined by those undertakings and,
should they become excessive, would be reviewable by the Danish competition
authority.70 Such an abuse might also occur, for example, where a privileged waste
management undertaking grants fidelity rebates to customers such as to exclude its
competitors.
However, possible breaches are not confined to the above situations, and could be found
in relation to any type of Article 82 abuse. Other examples of potential abuse in the
environmental context might include a state measure leading to the application of
discriminatory membership criteria vis à vis foreign participants by the dominant
collective waste packaging system,71 or tying the conclusion of recycling contracts with
the conclusion of contracts for the sale of recovered material in a manner contrary to
Article 82(d). Importantly, however, genuine environmental protection reasons may
constitute an objective justification for prima facie abusive conduct, just as we saw in
Chapter 12 on Article 82. As submitted there, Chapter 6’s systematic argument leads to
the conclusion that otherwise abusive practices may be justified on genuine
environmental protection grounds, if proportionate. Moreover, using Chapter 8’s
economic argument, quantifiable environmental benefits should be taken into account in
assessing whether a practice is abusive in the first place, insofar as such benefits should
be factored into the assessment of the practice’s impact on consumer welfare.
Even where a Member State measure prima facie breaches Article 86(1), however, it is
possible that the measure may be justifiable under Article 86(2); it is to this provision we
now turn.
Article 86(1) EC, as medical aid organisations with an exclusive right to provide emergency ambulance
services could also offer non-emergency patient transport services, though this could have been carried out
by independent undertakings.
69 See, for example, Case C-242/95 GT-Link v DSB [1997] ECR I-4449 and Case C-163/99 Portugal v
Commission [2001] ECR I-2613.
70 Note 46 above, para 71.
71 An example taken by the Commission in its DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste
management in recycling systems of September 22, 2005.
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5. Article 86(2) EC
Article 86(2) provides,
“Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or
having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules
contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the
application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the
particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such
an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.”
For our purposes, Article 86(2) is important for two reasons: first, it confirms that
undertakings entrusted with “services of a general economic interest” are subject to the Treaty
competition rules; second, and most importantly, it provides a potential derogation to the
application of these rules where this would prevent such undertakings from carrying on
the task entrusted to them by a Member State. In this way, Article 86(2) provides a
potential derogation from undertakings’ obligations under Articles 81 and 82 EC, and
from Member States’ obligations under Articles 86(1)72 and 87 EC. As such, the
derogation may be relied upon as a defence by both undertakings and Member States.
The provision starts from a position of respect for Member States’ legitimate concern to
ensure the continued provision of important, but not necessarily otherwise profitable,
public services, but requires competition to take place to the extent that this allows the
provision of such services to continue.73 As an exception to the competition rules,
Article 86(2) EC is to be interpreted narrowly.74
a. Entrustment with the operation of a service of general economic
interest
In order to fall within the derogation, a service of general economic interest must have
been entrusted to an undertaking by an act of public authority.75 Moreover, the scope of
the duty entrusted will be narrowly interpreted. For example, it will not extend to other
services offered by the undertaking which may be dissociated from the service of general
economic interest, as such services do not make a direct contribution to carrying out this
service.76 The wording of the national measure entrusting the undertaking with the
service will be narrowly construed.
In Commission v France, for example, the Court refused to accept France’s argument that
monopoly importers of gas and electricity were not only entrusted with supplying power
subject to public service obligations such as ensuring continuity of supply, but also with
contributing to environmental and regional policies.77 In rejecting the argument, the ECJ
underlined that the scope of the “services of general economic interest” concept extends
only to obligations which are specific to the undertakings in question - and not,
72 See Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925.
73 See Albany, note 24 above, where the Court underlined the function of Article 86(2) EC as being the
reconciliation of Member States' interest in “using certain undertakings, in particular in the public sector, as an
instrument of economic or fiscal policy with the Community's interest in ensuring compliance with the rules on competition and
preservation of the unity of the common market.” See also, White Paper on Services of General Interest
(COM(2004) 374 final, para 2.1.
74 See the DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling systems of
September 22, 2005.
75 See Case 123/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 313, Case 172/80 Züchner [1981] ECR 2021 (banks’
transfer of customer funds not entrusted by an act of public authority), and Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994]
ECR I-1477 (non-exclusive concession to ensure electricity supply in part of national territory amounted to
entrustment by an act of public authority).
76 See, for example, Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533.
77 Case C-159/94 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-5815.
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therefore, to generally applicable obligations such as environmental obligations.78 This
reasoning, it is submitted, should not be taken too far. It is surely correct that
environmental rules applying across the board to all undertakings, as would seem to have
been the case in Commission v France, should not be sufficient to constitute “entrustment” in
this sense - otherwise, this would open the floodgates to practically all undertakings
subject in some sense to environmental legislation to rely on Article 86(2). Where,
however, specific environmental obligations are placed on a category of undertakings, or
on a particular sector, this should satisfy the entrustment requirement.79 This, it is
submitted, is necessary in recognition of the movement towards use of the market to
achieve environmental goals, as described in Chapters 3 and 4, and follows from Chapter
6’s systematic approach to interpreting “entrustment”.
A second issue is the scope of the concept of services of “general economic interest” - a
concept nowhere defined in the Treaty.80 In its 2004 White Paper on Services of General
Interest, the Commission defined services of general economic interest as,
“services of an economic nature which the Member States or the Community subject to specific
public service obligations by virtue of a general interest criterion.”81
In turn, “public service obligations” are defined as,
“specific requirements that are imposed by public authorities on the provider of the service in order
to ensure that certain public interest objectives are met, for instance, in the matter of air, rail and
road transport and energy.”82
As such, it is clear that services of a non-economic nature are not included in this
category.83 However, bodies which are not engaged in economic activity will not
generally need to rely on the Article 86(2) derogation, as they will not, as discussed in
Chapter 9, fall within the scope of the concept of an “undertaking” in the first place.
It follows that environmental services may fall within the definition of services of general
economic interest, insofar as the services are economic.84 This was specifically confirmed
by the Commission in its 2004 White Paper, making express reference to the EU’s
78 Ibid, para 69.
79 See, for instance, the facts at issue in Case C-343/95 Diego Calì & Figli [1997 ECR I-1547 (though, as
discussed in Chapter 9, the environmental nature of the pollution surveillance services meant that SEPG
did not qualify as an undertaking).
80 Article 16 EC, inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam, confirms “the place occupied by services of general economic
interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion.” The
Commission has published a number of documents on the issue of services of general economic interest,
including Communications in 1996 (OJ 1996 C 281/3) and 2001 (OJ 2001 C 17/4) on services of general
economic interest, a 2002 non-paper on services of general economic interest and state aid (November 12,
2002) and a White Paper on Services of General Interest (COM(2004) 374 final). See also, Article 36 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which affirms respect for access to SGEIs, and Boutayeb, “Une
recherche sur la place et les fonctions de l’intérêt general en droit communautaire” (2003) 39(4) RTD eur.
587.
81 White Paper on Services of General Interest COM(2004) 374 final, Annex I.
82 Examples of activities held to constitute services of general economic interest include the operation of
basic postal services (Corbeau, note 76 above), television broadcasting (ERT, note 67 above), the provision
of a supplementary pension scheme (Albany, note 24 above), and the operation of an otherwise unviable air
route (Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 803).
83 See, for example, Case C-37/92 Vanacker [1993] ECR I-4947, where AG Lenz was of the opinion that
Article 86(2) didn’t apply to the case, as the measure created regional collection and treatment monopolies
for waste oil - as the entities at issue were state bodies, no undertakings were involved.
84 Again, where the services are non-economic, there will be no need to rely on Article 86(2). See, for
example, Case C-343/95 Calì & Figli [1997] ECR I-1547.
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sustainable development policy.85 The leading case here is Sydhavnens, where the ECJ
recognised that waste management may constitute a service of general economic interest
within the meaning of Article 86(2) EC.86 In that case, as noted above, three
undertakings had been entrusted with the task of processing building waste produced in
the Municipality of Copenhagen. In its earlier Dusseldorp judgment, the ECJ had declined
to rule on the issue - in that case, the service being the incineration of dangerous waste.
Though the Dutch government had argued that the exclusivity granted was necessary to
reduce the costs of AVR Chemie, and thus to enable it to be economically viable, the
ECJ left the application of Article 86(2) to the national court.87 In his Opinion, however,
Advocate General Jacobs, foreshadowing Sydhavnens, expressed the view that, “a waste
management function might well be said to constitute a service of general economic interest.”88 Similarly,
in COBAT, though the case was closed by comfort letter, the Commission indicated its
view that an exclusive right granted by Italy to collect, stock and sell used batteries and
other waste containing lead amounted to the entrustment of a service of general
economic interest.89
More recently, in AVR, the Commission found that the treatment of hazardous waste
with a view to disposal constituted a service of general economic interest.90 The
Commission based its decision on a number of factors, which constitute by far the most
explicit formulation of its reasoning in this area to date.91 These were:
(1) the “obvious public interest in appropriate treatment when hazardous waste is
disposed of” and the Community objective of self-sufficiency in the
disposal of waste;
(2) The necessity of public intervention in that case, as otherwise the
treatment depots would have been forced to close down as
unprofitable;92
(3) The fact that the measures did not infringe the “polluter pays principle”,
because waste suppliers were not favoured by the measure;
(4) The fact that the qualification of the activity as a service of general
economic interest did not, in the Commission’s view, circumvent the
state aid rules, as the measures did not constitute prohibited operating aid
to undertakings producing waste;93
85 Note 73 above, section 3.4: “in line with the Union's policy on sustainable development, due consideration has to be
taken also of the role of services of general interest for the protection of the environment and of the specific characteristics of
services of general interest directly related to the environmental field, such as the water and waste sectors.”
86 Note 46, para 75: “The management of particular waste may properly be considered to be capable of forming the subject
of a service of general economic interest, particularly where the service is designed to deal with an environmental problem.”
Advocate General Léger had left the matter to be decided by the national court, on the basis that the
extent of the privileged undertakings’ obligations was unclear from the parties’ submissions: see Opinion,
para 104. See also, by analogy, Inter Huiles, note 46 above, which was the first case where it was held that
environmental protection activities could be a task of general economic interest.
87 Note 41 above, paras 66 and 67. Similarly, in its two DSD judgments, the CFI declined to rule on
whether DSD was providing a service of general economic interest, “in the same way as all exemption systems
approved by the authorities of the Länder” (Case T-151/01, judgment of May 24, 2007, para 208; Case T-289/01
DSD, judgment of May 24, 2007, para 207).
88 Note 46 above, para 103.
89 IP/00/1351.
90 AVR OJ 2006 L 84/37, point 78.
91 Ibid, point 79 onwards.
92 Without the aid the undertaking, AVR, would have closed its rotary kilns by the end of 2001.
93 This part of the Commission’s reasoning is not wholly clear, as in principle operating aid to any
undertaking - whether a waste producer or not - is generally frowned upon in assessment for compatibility
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(5) The fact that the service benefited a broad, not a restricted, number of
users; and
(6) Though there was no market failure in that case, the measure was based
on the legitimate objectives of self-sufficiency in waste disposal and waste
disposal close to the source of the waste.
This reasoning, it is submitted, is to be welcomed as an excellent example of the
Commission’s incorporating environmental policy principles (e.g., the polluter pays
principle and the principles of self sufficiency in waste and disposal of waste close to the
source) into its application of Article 86(2). Once again, such an interpretation of the
notion of “services of general economic interest” follows, in particular, from Chapter 6’s
systematic argument - more specifically, from the Article 6 EC integration principle.
Moreover, insofar as environmental protection has been confirmed as constituting a
“mandatory requirement in the public interest” within the free movement of goods
provisions, such an interpretation also follows from the systematic links between free
movement of goods and competition policies, as argued in Chapter 6.94 Finally, the
decision may be viewed as a good illustration of the Commission’s acting in accordance
with Chapter 7’s governance argument, insofar as it takes express cognisance of
environmental principles, with the outcome being coherence between competition and
environmental policies.
b. Obstruction of the performance of the tasks assigned
General. Article 86(2) states that undertakings entrusted with a service of general
economic interest shall be subject to the Treaty, save “in so far as the application of such rules
does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.”
Moreover, the development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be
“contrary to the interests of the Community.” Essentially, these provisions have been
interpreted to mean that the Article 86(2) derogation only applies to anti-competitive
behaviour by an undertaking, or to anti-competitive State measures, insofar as such
behaviour or measures are necessary to enable the undertaking to perform the tasks
entrusted to it.95 In substance, this amounts to a proportionality test: only anti-
competitive behaviour indispensable for the service of general economic interest to be
carried out falls under the Article 86(2) derogation. The ECJ has interpreted the notion
of necessity broadly in this context, to mean that it must be possible for the undertaking
to perform the tasks entrusted to it under economically acceptable conditions - i.e.,
including, where appropriate, a reasonable element of profit.96
However, the proportionality analysis may apply differently depending on whether
private undertakings or Member States are invoking the Article 86(2) derogation. In
with the State aid provisions. In this sense, the Commission seems to be taking a more lenient approach
than in non-environmental areas. See further, Chapter 15’s discussion.
94 See, for example, such free movement of goods cases as Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-
2099, where environmental protection was held to be a mandatory requirement of public interest within
the Article 28 EC context (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 7)
95 See, for example, Sydhavnens, note 46 above, para 74.
96 In Albany, for example, an exclusive right to manage a supplementary pension scheme was held
necessary to ensure health insurance which covered young and old, and to avoid the risk that young
employees in good health would leave for a private insurer, making performance of the task under
economically acceptable conditions impossible. Albany, note 24 above, paras. 108-111. See also, Ambulanz
Glöckner, note 42 above, where the Court was of the view that a German law protecting providers of
emergency ambulance services against competition from independent operators, which extended to
protection in related non-emergency transport market, could be justified under Article 86(2) EC, if this was
“necessary” for them to perform their tasks in economically acceptable conditions.
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particular, private undertakings may find it easier to satisfy the proportionality test than
Member States as they may, due to their lack of control over the legislative framework,
have less scope to opt for less restrictive solutions than Member States.97 For example,
in Almelo (which concerned contractual restrictions in supply contracts entered into by
Dutch electricity undertakings), the ECJ held that it was necessary to take into
consideration, “the economic conditions in which the undertaking operates, in particular
the costs it has to bear and the legislation, particularly concerning the environment, to
which it is subject.”98 Though Member States may thus have a more difficult task than
undertakings in proving that their anti-competitive measures are proportionate, the Court
made clear in judgments such as Monopolies of Electricity and Gas that it is unnecessary for
Member States to go as far as to demonstrate that there is no other possible less
restrictive measure which would allow the tasks in question to be carried out.99 In
adopting this rather flexible approach, the Court has shown itself sensitive to Member
States’ competence to decide how best to organise their services of general economic
interest, and its unwillingness to second guess such policy choices.
However, in some cases, the Court of First Instance has seemed to demonstrate a stricter
approach than that of the ECJ to the scope of Article 86(2). In Air Inter, for example,
the CFI emphasised that, for the Article 86(2) derogation to be made out, it would not be
sufficient for performance of the task entrusted to an undertaking to be “simply hindered or
made more difficult”: it was necessary, the CFI underlined, that performance be
obstructed.100 Moreover, the CFI has, in cases such as Air Inter and FFSA, adopted an
economic approach to Article 86(2)’s proportionality test.101 Air Inter, for instance,
concerned the grant of an exclusive right by the French government to the public
undertaking Air Inter to operate the routes between Paris Orly airport and Toulouse and
Marseille airports, respectively. In holding that Article 86(2) could not be relied on to
justify Air Inter’s exclusive right, the Court of First Instance underlined that the onus
was on the applicant to prove, using an economic analysis, that the grant of exclusivity
was proportionate. This should be done by calculating the net cost to Air Inter of
providing the - allegedly unprofitable - routes, and comparing this with the economic
advantages inherent in exclusivity (by examining the loss of income which would result
for Air Inter if other carriers were allowed to compete on the routes in question).102 A
similar exercise was carried out by the Commission, and accepted by the CFI, in FFSA.
In that case, which concerned tax exemptions granted to the French public undertaking
La Poste, the CFI upheld the compatibility of such exemptions with Article 86(2) given
that the advantages received by La Poste were less than the costs it incurred in carrying
out the tasks.
A final issue is the relationship between Article 87 and 86(2) EC. In the landmark
Altmark judgment, discussed further in Chapter 15, the ECJ held that, subject to
compliance with the test set down in that judgment, where a State measure compensates
an undertaking for services provided in discharging public service obligations, it does not
fall within the definition of State aid.103 In practice, this has meant that some national
97 See, in this sense, Faull and Nikpay (eds.), The EC Law of Competition (2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2007), at 6.184.
98 Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994] ECR I-1477, Sydhavnens, note 46 above, para 77.
99 Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, Case C-158/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR
I-5789, Case C-159/94 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-5815.
100 Case T-260/04 Air Inter [1997] ECR II-997, para 138.
101 Air Inter, ibid, Case T-106/95 FFSA [1997] ECR II-229.
102 Air Inter, ibid, paras 138-140.
103 Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747. In particular, it does not grant an advantage within the
definition of aid: see Chapter 15.
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measures which might have involved the application of Article 86(2) in conjunction with
Article 87 now can be considered to fall outside the scope of Article 87 altogether.
However, where the Altmark criteria are not satisfied, Article 86(2) may still be invoked
by Member States in the Article 87 context: where the Article 86(2) derogation applies,
the measure will not fall within Article 87(1) and will thus not be notifiable.104 The
Commission’s view of how Article 86(2) applies to State aid in the form of public service
compensation have been set out in detail in a 2005 Commission decision under Article
86(3).105
Environmental cases. In the environmental context, Article 86(2) has been held to
justify exclusivity for waste processors in Sydhavnens, where this was necessary to ensure a
sufficient flow of waste for the new building waste facility. In that case, the ECJ took
into account that, at the time when the exclusive right was granted, the Municipality of
Copenhagen had been faced with a “serious environmental problem”, viz. the burial of most
building waste in the ground.106 Though the waste could have been recycled, this was not
done because there were no undertakings capable of processing the waste. As a result,
undertakings were invited to express an interest in setting up a high-capacity waste
facility. As noted by the ECJ, an exclusive right “limited in time to the period over which the
investments could foreseeably be written off and in space to the land within the boundaries of the
municipality” was granted in order that undertakings would be interested in applying.107
The ECJ considered that no less restrictive means would have achieved the same goal of
ensuring that most of the Municipality’s building waste would be recycled, “precisely
because there was not sufficient capacity to process that waste” before the facility was set up.108 As
a result, the grant of an exclusive right was necessary for the performance of a task
serving the general economic interest.
In Dusseldorp, though the ECJ refrained from making a finding on the applicability of
Article 86(2), it emphasised that the burden fell on the Dutch government to show to the
satisfaction of the national court that the environmental objective “cannot be achieved equally
well by other means”.109 As noted above, this is an application of the classic proportionality
test: the means of achieving the environmental aim must be the least restrictive as
possible of competition. For example, where exclusivity is not strictly necessary for a
waste management undertaking in an area, as a number of undertakings could in fact
carry out the job to the same level under economically acceptable conditions, exclusivity
will not be justifiable under Article 86(2). Similarly, in COBAT, Italy had granted the
exclusive right within Italy to a consortium to collect, stock and sell batteries and other
waste containing lead, with the goal of achieving a high collection rate. Certain of
COBAT’s activities, however, went beyond what was necessary to fulfil its task - for
example, its prohibition on sale of lead waste abroad. Following changes to these
activities, the Commission granted a comfort letter.110 Finally, in the DSD judgments, the
104 See Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to
State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the
operation of services of general economic interest OJ 2005 L 312/67.
105 Ibid.
106 Note 46 above, para 78.
107 Ibid, para 79.
108 Ibid, para 80. See also, DG Competition Paper concerning issues of waste management in recycling
systems of September 22, 2005.
109 Note 41 above, para 67.
110 Note 80 above. See also, Inter-Huiles, note 46 above, which concerned a French scheme for collecting
and treating waste oils; limited number of chosen undertakings in particular regions. AG Rozès was of the
view that the undertaking was performing an SGEI, but that the French scheme was disproportionate.
The ECJ did not decide the matter.
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CFI rejected DSD’s arguments that paying it a fee even where no waste recovery service
was in fact provided by the DSD system, and stopping its collectors collecting for
competitors, were each necessary for DSD to perform any service of general economic
interest.111
As regards the application of Article 86(2) in conjunction with Article 87, the leading case
here is the Commission’s 2005 decision in AVR.112 In that case, the Netherlands sought
to rely on Article 86(2) to justify aid granted to AVR Nutsbedrijf Gevaarlijk Afval
(“AVR”) for treating hazardous waste in the Netherlands with a view to disposal. This
aid was essentially aimed at keeping AVR’s rotary kilns in business, which constitute a
high-cost means of incinerating hazardous waste, but which had seen a drop in waste
supply and thus profitability. While €47.3 million operating aid was approved, €2.4
million - compensation for the cost of acquisition of the hazardous waste - was not.
Before the Commission, the Netherlands argued both that the Altmark judgment applied
- so that the compensation did not constitute “aid” under Article 87(1) - and that, to the
extent that aid was granted, it was justified by Article 86(2). The Commission first
considered whether the test set down in the Altmark judgment was made out. Finding in
the negative,113 the Commission went on to examine whether the Article 86(2) derogation
applied. After, as noting above, finding that the treatment of hazardous waste amounted
to a service of general economic interest, the Commission concluded that the
compensation received by AVR for carrying out this service was, prima facie, directly
related to the carrying out of its public service function. However, the Commission
emphasised that overcompensation must be avoided, and requested the Netherlands for
this reason to,
“verify the actual costs and to adjust the aid level if necessary in order to avoid a situation in which
compensation would allow [AVR] to earn a profit margin on its activities higher than is normal
for this type of activity in this sector.”114
Furthermore, the Dutch measures were proportionate, in the sense that there were no
less restrictive means of achieving their goal.115 As a result, most of the aid was justified,
including aid to compensate for the cost of closure of the facility and aid to compensate
for additional cost resulting from the closure of the rotary kilns earlier than foreseen.
Nonetheless, the Commission made an exception to its generally positive finding, as
regards aid granted to AVR for the acquisition of waste. Although the Commission
accepted that minimising the system’s costs required maximising the volume of waste
treated, and accepted that rebates were justified for this reason, compensation for waste
acquisition constituted a disproportionate distortion of competition,116 as it could lead to
excessive amounts of waste being purchased for processing abroad, even when this waste
111 Case T-151/01 DSD, judgment of May 24, 2007, para 208; Case T-289/01 DSD, judgment of May 24,
2007, para 208. See also Van Calsten, “De Europese Verpakkingsrichtlijn: Oorsprong, Inhoud en
Verhouding met het EG-Verdrag” in Deketelaere and Wiggers-Rust, Actualiteiten Europees Milieurecht,
Brugge, Die Keure, 1997, on the importance of Member States’ complying with Article 86(2) EC when
granting special or exclusive rights to waste operators.
112 AVR OJ 2006 L 84/37. See, Seinen, “State aid for hazardous waste treatment: the case of AVR, the
Netherlands” (2005) 3 EC Competition Policy Newsletter 97.
113 Ibid, point 73: “AVR Nuts was not selected following a public tender procedure, and publication of the concession
decision in the Staatscourant, after which interested parties could raise objections for a period of six weeks, cannot be the
substitute for an open and transparent tender procedure. Secondly, the level of compensation was not determined on the basis of
the costs which an average, well-managed undertaking adequately provided with waste treatment capacity would have
incurred…”
114 Ibid, point 92.
115 Ibid, point 98.
116 Ibid, point 108.
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ought to have been recovered, and as AVR’s competitors did not receive similar
compensation for acquiring waste. In particular, such aid infringed the environmental
principle that waste should be treated as near to its source as possible. Moreover, had
there been persistent shortages of waste for AVR to process, a less restrictive solution
might have consisted in lowering the fees charged for waste processing.117
Analysis. Analysing these cases in the light of Part II’s arguments, it is submitted that
Chapter 6’s systematic argument (from both its Article 6 EC and free movement of goods
policy perspectives) supports the use of a proportionality test in assessing whether
application of the competition law rules would “obstruct” the performance of an
environmental task within the meaning of Article 86(2). As argued in Chapter 6, in the
environmental context the proportionality test requires that, where a private or State
measure is suitable to achieve the Community’s environmental policy objectives, and
there is no way of achieving these objectives that is less restrictive of competition, the
measure must be allowed under Community competition law.118 However, the devil is,
of course, in the application of this test. In this regard, four points are pertinent.
First, where an environmental task is being carried out by the undertaking entrusted in a
way aimed at ensuring a high level of environmental protection, Article 86(2) should
apply as long as there is no less competitively restrictive way of achieving that level of
protection. Put otherwise, it is not, it is submitted, for the Commission or Community
Courts to judge that a lower level of environmental protection is adequate, which would
entail less restrictive measures.119 This is so, it is submitted, even where other Member
States have themselves been satisfied with a lower level of environmental protection -
even where, for example, such Member States may be neighbouring and thus share the
same environmental problems. For example, had the Municipality of Copenhagen in
Sydhavnens decided that a more expensive building waste disposal facility was necessary
than that in fact built, in order to ensure that more building waste was recycled, the
Court’s reasoning - allowing exclusivity for the period of write-off of the facility’s cost of
building - would apply in precisely the same manner.
Secondly, it is submitted that the more flexible approach to applying proportionality,
evident in some of the ECJ’s judgments, is to be preferred in the environmental context.
In judgments such as Monopolies of Electricity and Gas, in emphasising that Member States
were not required to prove that there was no other imaginable way of carrying out the
tasks in question, the ECJ demonstrated a sensitivity to Member States’ primary
competence to choose how to construct their “public” services, and the level at which
such services should be set. This may be contrasted with ostensibly stricter dicta such as
that in Dusseldorp where, as discussed above, the Court contented itself with its standard
proportionality formula to the effect that the burden fell on the Dutch government to
show that the environmental aim could not be achieved equally well by other means.
The Monopolies of Electricity and Gas approach is, it is argued, more appropriate in the
environmental sphere, where there is often considerable scientific uncertainty over which
manner of regulation produces “best” results for the environment. This is particularly so
as regards the new breed of economic environmental instruments, used (as discussed in
Chapters 3 and 4) increasingly by Member States to tackle those environmental problems
which direct regulatory methods failed to reach. Moreover, the reliance of economic
117 Ibid.
118 See the fourth point of the working hypothesis on the import of Article 6 EC, Figure 1, Chapter 6.
119 This also, it is submitted, follows from a systematic interpretation of Article 86(2) in the light of Article
16 EC, which will be affirmed by the Protocol on Services of General Economic Interest to the Lisbon
Treaty. See further, Charles Le Bihan, “Services d’Intérêt économique general et valeurs communes”
(2008) Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 356.
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instruments on market-based solutions will, it is foreseeable, mean an increase in the
number of environment-related Article 86(2) cases. Where there is a dispute on the
evidence over whether a less restrictive alternative would produce the same level of
environmental benefit, the precautionary principle familiar to Community environmental
law should be applied to give the “benefit of the doubt” to the more restrictive
solution.120 Indeed, the more simplistic approach in Dusseldorp is surely explicable on the
ground that the ECJ did not, in that case, have to decide the proportionality question,
leaving this to the national court.
Thirdly, it is submitted that in cases where an economic analysis is carried out - as, for
example, in FFSA and Air Inter - of the costs of carrying out a task, comparing this to
the benefit gained by the undertaking from its advantageous position, environmental
costs alleviated by carrying out the task should, where appropriate, be included in this
calculation. This may be done using the environmental accounting and valuation
techniques discussed in Chapter 8. As this exercise bears strong similarities to that of
calculating the amount of “eligible costs” in the context of Community State aid policy, a
similar argument is made in Chapter 15 below.121
Fourthly, from Chapter 7’s governance perspective, it is interesting to observe that the
more flexible approach to proportionality under Article 86(2) has tended to come from
the ECJ, in contrast to the CFI’s relatively strict approach in cases such as Air Inter. This
may, it is argued, be viewed as an illustration of Chapter 7’s point that, in some cases, the
ECJ may be better positioned and more inclined to adopt a broader, more systematic
approach to interpreting the competition rules, in conformity with coherence-based
models of judicial reasoning. A further notable decision from a governance perspective
is that of the Commission in AVR. In finding that aid for the acquisition of waste,
including from foreign sources, was disproportionate, DG Competition showed itself to
be familiar with principles of Community environmental policy - in that case, the
principle that, where possible, waste should be treated at source. Though this was, of
course, a State aid decision - and thus an area of Community competition policy where
“economisation” is still only beginning to take hold122 - this is to be welcomed as an
example of coherence in decision-making, and thus of good governance in practice.
120 Note that this is also in accordance with the approach to the precautionary principle in the free
movement of goods context, in cases such as Case 174/82 Sandoz [1983] ECR 2445 - and hence is also
supported by Chapter 6’s argument on the systematic links between free movement of goods and
competition policy.
121 See the references in Chapter 15 to the efforts of some Member States to calculate the amount of aid by
reference to the environmentally damaging externalities avoided by, for example, energy saving measures.
An example is the “ExternE” (External Costs of Energy) study funded by the Commission published in
2001 after 10 years’ work from researchers of all EU MS and the US, which concluded that the cost of
producing electricity from conventional sources like coal or oil would double, and cost of electricity
production from gas would increase by 30% if external costs like damage to the environment and to health
were taken into account.
122 See Chapter 15.
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Chapter 15: State Aid
1. Introduction
While the previous Chapter dealt mainly with Community competition law’s response to
non-monetary efforts by Member State to bolster undertakings’ environmental activities,1
this Chapter focuses on its response to monetary efforts. Environmental subsidies and taxes
- which, as seen in Part I, comprise a key environmental market instrument in many Member
States’ policies at present - are dealt with under the Treaty State aid rules. Article 87(1)
defines prohibited State aid as an advantage granted by a Member State or through state
resources, which actually or potentially distorts competition, favours certain undertakings or
the production of certain goods, and has an effect on trade between Member States. Article
87(2) and (3) set out ways in which aid can be exempted from the prohibition.
2. A fundamental difference in perspective between State aid control and the rest of
competition policy
From an analytical perspective, the key distinction between State aid control and the rest of
competition policy is that, while State aid is in principle prohibited (Article 87(1)), the Article
87(2) and (3) exemptions are premised on a recognition that markets may not always work
properly left alone – due, for example, to the present of externalities - and may need some
intervention from the State to work more effectively, and ultimately raise consumer welfare.2
As such, the Treaty expressly provides for certain non-economic reasons – which have been
interpreted to include environmental reasons - to constitute legitimate justifications for the
grant of State aid. In this sense, there are evident parallels between the Treaty State aid rules
and the free movement rules of EU internal market law.3 Nonetheless, there has been a
recent forceful drive from the Commission to develop a more economically rational
approach to the conditions in which State aid may be justified; indeed, Commissioner Kroes
has termed this her “top priority” as Competition Commissioner.4
The question is, therefore, not whether environmental considerations can or should, in
principle, be taken into account in assessing the compatibility of State aid with the Treaty - it
is not disputed that they can and should be. Rather, the question is what the right balance
ought to be in taking them into account. This issue has most recently been dealt with in the
Commission’s 2008 Guidelines on Environmental Aid, discussed below, which emphasises
the importance that State aid can play in achieving the Community’s environmental policy
1 Though, of course, Article 86(2) may also be used as a derogation from the State aid rules, as discussed in
Chapter 14.
2 See Schwalbe, “Welfare Effects of Financing State Aid”, European State Aid Law Quarterly (2006) 55.
3 See, for example, Buendia Sierra, “Not like this: some Sceptical Remarks on the “Refined Economic
Approach” in State Aid, European State Aid Law Quarterly (2006) 59, who comments that “State aid “DNA”
shares more chromosomes with internal market rules than with antitrust rules…State aid rules are, in substance, just a sub-
category of the general rules of the Treaty on the free movement of goods, services and establishment”, at 61-62.
4 Kroes, Speech to Fordham, 2006 (SPEECH/06/499) “My top priority as Competition Commissioner has been a
comprehensive reform of our state aid rules. Our objective is to help Member States to spend only as much taxpayers' money on
subsidies as is absolutely necessary, and to target that expenditure as effectively as possible. So our motto is "less and better targeted
state aid". We look first to the markets to deliver, and only where there are clear gaps does state aid play a role.” See also, the
Commission’s State aid action plan, “Less and better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid reform 2005-
2009” COM (2005) 107 final, and Hildebrand and Schweinsberg, “Refined Economic Approach in European
State Aid Control - Will it Gain Momentum?” 30(3) World Competition (2007) 449.
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objectives and reducing negative environmental externalities.5 However, environmental
factors can also be relevant to the definition of aid, which we consider first.
3. Article 87(1): when do national environmental measures constitute State aid?
a. An advantage granted to an undertaking
In order to constitute aid, the Member State measure must constitute an advantage “intended
to encourage the attainment of the economic and social objectives sought”.6 The “advantage”
requirement means that commercially justifiable measures which a private investor or
investor in a similar position would adopt will not generally constitute aid (otherwise known
as the “market investor” principle). This can raise the issue of whether investment in
environmentally friendlier technologies is commercially justifiable at the time of granting the
advantage. The answer, clearly, will be a question of fact in each case. In Van der Kooy, for
example, in deciding whether a preferential natural gas tariff for horticulturists constituted
aid, the ECJ had to determine whether the tariff was commercially justified by the wish to
prevent a move by users from gas to coal.7 On the facts, the ECJ found that the tariff was
lower than necessary to prevent such a move, and was thus an aid.
One potential question is whether a “market investor” might be read to include a market
investor which has taken its corporate social responsibility seriously, and is motivated not
just by profit, but also by longer-term environmental considerations. While the issue as such
has not arisen before the Community Courts and Commission, a somewhat analogous
argument was rejected by the ECJ in ENI-Lanerossi, in the context of social and regional
motivations for investment.8 The ECJ held that when investments disregarded any prospect
of profitability, even in the long term, this had to be regarded as aid. In the view of
Advocate General Van Gerven, there was no fundamental distinction between how public
and private investors might operate: a private investor would not be wholly uninfluenced by
considerations of a social nature or of regional or sectoral policy. However, an investing
undertaking would be in breach of its obligations towards its shareholders, creditors and
employees if it covered substantial losses of undertakings operating in a sector where there
was over-capacity, without having a serious restructuring plan.
Similarly, Advocate General Jacobs has, in a separate case, given the view that aid is granted
whenever a Member State provides funds which “would not be provided by a private investor
applying ordinary commercial criteria and disregarding other considerations of a social, political and
philanthropic nature.”9 This will require a fine line to be drawn between those environmental
investments which can be considered to make broader commercial sense, in the longer term
or for the reputation of a private investor, for example, and those which do not. In
particular, the market investor principle should, it is submitted, be applied in the light of the
widespread significant changes in attitude within the private sector towards voluntary
corporate environmental initiatives in furtherance of corporate environmental responsibility.
Though, as discussed in Chapter 4, this movement has given rise to some scepticism, what is
5 Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, OJ 2008 C 82/1, points 5-14.
6 Case 61/79 Denkavit [1980] ECR 1205, para 31.
7 Cases 67/85 Van Der Kooy [1998] ECR 219.
8 Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, para 18. See further, Karydis, “Le principe de
l’opérateur économique privé, critère de qualification des mesures étatiques, en tant qu’aides d’Etat, au sense de
l’article 87 §1 du Traité CE” (2003) 39(3) RTD eur 389.
9 Cases C-278/92 Spain v Commission (Hyatasa No. 1) [1994] ECR I-4103.
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at the very least clear is that many CEOs increasingly view environmentally-friendlier
practices as good for business for a variety of reasons - including the rapid growth in
business opportunities in the environmental sector or, more broadly, the ensuing favourable
publicity. Moreover, it follows from Chapter 8’s economic argument that the environmental
benefits themselves may often be economically quantifiable, even when such benefits may
only accrue in the longer term.10 Such benefits should therefore be taken into account,
insofar as they would accrue to a market investor, in assessing whether the “advantage”
criterion is met.
Payment of monies constituting fair compensation for work done will not constitute an
“advantage” and thus will not constitute aid. For example, a Dutch scheme whereby
recycling undertakings were paid a grant to collect and dispose of car wrecks did not
constitute aid, as the undertakings did not receive any advantage, but were granted fair
remuneration for their activities.11 Similarly, where compensation is for the discharge of
public service obligations, the ECJ’s Altmark judgment (discussed briefly in Chapter 14)
provides a test to be met for such compensation to escape classification as aid. This is:
(1) The beneficiary must have a clearly-defined public service obligation to
discharge;
(2) The compensation must be given on the basis of objective and transparent
criteria;
(3) The compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs incurred
in discharging the public service obligations, taking any relevant receipts into
account and allowing for a reasonable profit;
(4) Unless the beneficiary was selected by tender selecting the tenderer capable of
providing the services at lowest cost to the community, the necessary level of
compensation must have been determined on the basis of the costs which a
typical efficient undertaking able to meet the public service requirements would
have incurred in discharging the obligations, taking relevant receipts into
account and allowing for a reasonable profit.
As discussed in Chapter 14 in the context of Article 86(2), the provision of environmental
services may, in principle, fall within the definition of a public service obligation. Once
10 See, by analogy, Case C-395/89 Italy v Commission (Alfa Romeo No. 1) [1991] ECR I-1603, in which the Court
held it appropriate to look at “the conduct of a private holding company or a private group of undertakings pursuing a
structural policy - whether general or sectoral - and guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term” (para 20).
11 See XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy (1998) at 255 (Dutch schemes for recycling of PVC façade and
cardboard, made binding by the Dutch minister pursuant to a voluntary agreement of industry, were found not
to constitute aid for similar reasons), Jean-François Pons, “European competition policy for the recycling
markets”, Speech of September 20, 2001 and London, “Concurrence et environnement: une entente
écologiquement rationelle ?” RTD 39(2) (2003) 267. See also, XXVth Report on Competition Policy (1995) at
234 (Danish scheme imposing a charge on the sale of new batteries containing substances considered to be
dangerous for the environment, and the proceeds of which were used to pay companies to collect and dispose
of the products after use, was not State aid as the charge was imposed on all products in a non-discriminatory
manner, and the payment to the collecting firms was based on normal commercial terms); and XXIVth
Competition Report (1994) at 193 (Danish Waste Tyres, where a tax was imposed on new or renovated tyres
made in or imported into Denmark, the proceeds of which were used to compensate the tyre collection
companies for the costs of collection and transport of the tyres. This was viewed by the Commission as
compensation for a service provided).
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again, therefore, it will be a question of fact whether the Altmark criteria are satisfied in the
case of compensation for such provision; if not, Article 86(2) may be invoked as a defence,
or the Member State may argue that the aid should be exempted under Article 87(2) or (3).
Though the Altmark criteria bear, it will be observed, resemblance to the analysis under
Article 86(2), the Commission’s decisional practice demonstrates that differences remain. In
AVR, for example, benefits to a waste disposal undertaking which failed to satisfy the
Altmark criteria (because not awarded on objective conditions which would have governed
compensation paid to other undertakings in similar situations) nonetheless, for the most
part, fell under the Article 86(2) derogation.12
Nonetheless, it is submitted that environmental factors may in some cases play an important
role in applying the Altmark criteria. In particular, the first option of the fourth condition -
use of a tender procedure - should, it is submitted, allow environmental conditions or factors
to be inserted in the tender document. Moreover, the second option of the fourth condition
- comparison of the compensation with the costs which a “typical undertaking” would have
incurred in providing services - should be read as referring to a typical undertaking providing
environmental services at the same level of quality. Further, application of the third condition
(relation of the compensation to the costs incurred in providing the service) should, it is
submitted, allow for the use of “environmental” accounts where possible (i.e., drawn up to
include environmental costs and benefits, in accordance with the “green” accounting
standards discussed in Chapter 4.
As a final point, where an undertaking has polluted a particular site, a grant by the State to
clean up the pollution will, in compliance with the polluter pays principle, constitute aid
unless the clean-up costs are subsequently recovered from the polluter. In Kiener Deponie
Bachmanning, for example, the Commission held that the owner of a contaminated site was
responsible for decontamination costs. As the Austrian authorities had financed the clean-
up operation, the Commission decided that no state aid would be involved as long as the
costs were recovered from the owner.13 In contrast, in Schmidt Schraubenwerke, the
Commission decided that a grant for the decontamination of an industrial site, which had
suffered past environmental damage as a result of the operation of a chemical plant, did not
confer any advantage on the present owner, who was not responsible for the pollution and
who had not been aware that he would have been responsible for it when he purchased the
site.14
In order to constitute aid, the advantage must be granted to an undertaking. The possibility
of environmental operators’ falling outside the definition of an undertaking was discussed in
Chapter 9.15
12 AVR OJ 2006 L 84/37.
13 Commission Decision 1999/272/EC OJ 1999 L 109/51.
14 XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy (1998) at 256. See further, the observations of AG Jacobs in Case
C-126/01 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769 on the significance of the polluter pays principle for Article 87(1): “the
principle is used as an analytical tool to allocate responsibility according to economic criteria for the costs entailed by the pollution in
question. A given measure will constitute State aid where it relieves those liable under the polluter-pays principle from their
primary responsibility to bear the costs”. He contrasts this with the significance of the polluter pays principle in Article 87(3),
where it “is used by contrast in a prescriptive way as a policy criterion. It is relied on to argue that the costs of environmental
protection should as a matter of sound environmental and State aid policy ultimately be borne by the polluters themselves rather
than by States” (paras 68-70).
15 See, for example, GAV, where the fact that the recipient of the aid was a non-profit making company was
irrelevant, because it carried on an economic activity in competition with other operators. GAV operated on
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b. From Member State resources
Based on the Court’s case law, this element of the definition of aid may be broken down into
two requirements: first, the advantage must be granted directly or indirectly through State
resources; second, the grant must be imputable to the State.16
On the first requirement, the leading case is PreussenElektra, where the ECJ held that an
obligation imposed by German legislation (the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz) on private electricity
undertakings to buy electricity from renewable resources in their region at a higher price
than the electricity’s economic value did not amount to aid. The Court’s reasoning was that
the obligation did not involve any transfer of State resources to the renewable energy
generators.17 The Commission had argued that, if the legislation was not to be viewed as
State aid, it was a measure intended to circumvent the State aid rules, as the measure had all
the harmful effects of State aid in spite of being financed by private resources, and thus
breached Article 10 EC18 as it constituted an equivalent threat to the effectiveness of Articles
87 and 88 EC. Dismissing this argument, the Court held that Article 10 EC could not be
used to extend the scope of Article 87(1) EC. This strict interpretation of State resources is,
it is submitted, supported on a systematic analysis as an instance where interpretation in the
manner suggested by the Commission would not just have gone against the natural meaning
of Article 87(1), but would also have imposed an unnecessary burden on States acting, like
Germany, on environmental grounds.19 Analogously, in a subsequent case, the Commission
declared that a Belgian measure whereby electricity producers were granted free intangible
assets (“green certificates” proving production of renewable energy) by the State which they
could resell to distributors were not advantages granted from State resources.20 The
Commission based its reasoning on PreussenElektra: the transfer of resources was not from
the State to the producers, but was rather from the distributors. In contrast, where a
Member State creates an emissions trading scheme whereby tradable allowances are
distributed free of charge, in a situation where they could have been sold or put up for
auction, this will mean the State has foregone resources, and will thus constitute an
advantage within the meaning of the concept of aid.21
The question of involvement of State resources also arises in the context of the EU’s
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). As we saw in Chapter 4, the EU’s scheme entered into
the market for the collection and recycling of company waste. Though the collection of household waste was
normally done by local authorities, the Commission took the view that this was not the case for the collection,
sorting and marketing of company waste, and that many commercial undertakings were active in the field in
competition with each other: XXVth Report on Competition Policy (1995) at 227.
16 This includes any aid administered by private undertakings, though granted by the State: see Case 7876
Steinike und Weinlig [1977] ECR 595.
17 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, para 58: “…the case law of the Court of Justice shows that only
advantages granted directly or indirectly through State resources are to be considered aid within the meaning of Article [87(1)].”
See similarly, the UK Renewables Obligation and Capital Grants for Renewable Technologies N 504/2000 [2002] OJ C
30/15 – though one aspect of the scheme (a redistribution fund) constituted State aid, but was compatible with
the environmental guidelines.
18 This argument made an express analogy with the Court’s Van Eycke doctrine, discussed in Chapter 14. See
Case 13/77 INNO v ATAB [1977] ECR 2115.
19 Insofar as qualification of the German measure as “aid” would have meant that all States with similar
legislation would have been required to notify such provisions under Article 88 EC, and would be unable to
implement such legislation without authorisation from the Commission.
20 XXXIst Report on Competition Policy (2001), point 363.
21 Case T-233/04 Netherlands v Commission, judgment of April 10, 2008.
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force on January 1, 2005, initially providing for a pilot phase (Phase I) from 2005 - 2007,
with Phase II corresponding to the first commitment period of Kyoto (2008 - 2012). In the
first trading period, it was open to Member States to auction up to 5% of the allowances22
allocated pursuant to their National Allocation Plans (NAPs). In fact, only Denmark chose
to auction this amount. To the extent that other Member States chose not to auction their
5% of allowances, therefore, they were foregoing revenue, thus satisfying the “Member State
resources” criterion under Article 87(1). In the second trading period, however, there is far
greater potential for aid. The Commission, for one, believes that, as all Phase II allowances
must be backed by an Assigned Amount Unit,23 and as Member States can trade these Units
with other Kyoto parties, by allocating any allowances for free or below market price to EU
ETS undertakings Member States are foregoing potential revenue from selling the Units.24
This means, in the view of at least some Commission staff, that around €44 billion of aid per
year (based on 2007 allowance values) will be distributed by Member States under the ETS
in Phase II.25 The logic of this - extremely far-reaching - conclusion is, however, debatable:
as discussed below, there seems to be a good argument that, because Member States are
obliged by the ETS Directive to distribute 90% of allowances for free in Phase II, only the
10% which could potentially be auctioned could amount to aid if distributed for free or at
below market price. However, DG Competition arguably has demonstrated its sensitivity to
environmental concerns (as suggested by Chapter 7’s governance analysis) in choosing not to
act thus far against Member States on State aid matters potentially raised in the initial stages
of the ETS.
On the second requirement – imputability of the grant to the State – the leading case is the
Stardust Marine case, in which the Court held that, even where the grant is made by public
undertakings, it cannot simply be assumed that the State controlled the making of the grant.
Rather, account should be taken of all the circumstances in which the grant was made.26
This was decisive in a 2006 decision of the Commission holding that a compulsory fixed
tariff for electricity from renewable sources in Austria did not constitute aid.27 In that case,
the tariff was calculated to compensate for the difference between the market price for
22 As discussed in Chapter 4, these allowances were to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent.
23 “Assigned Amount Units” constitute units each equal to one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, which
added together make up the amount to which a party to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (i.e., the most
developed countries, including most present EU countries) must reduce its emissions over the (first) five-year
commitment period of Kyoto. See further, Chapter 4.
24 See further, Seinen, “State aid aspects of the EU Emission Trading Scheme: the second trading period”
(2007) 3 EC Competition Policy Newsletter 100 and, by analogy, Case T-233/04 Netherlands v Commission,
judgment of April 10, 2008.
25 Ibid.
26 Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust Marine) [2002] ECR I-4397. The Court relied, inter alia, on the
Van der Kooy case, note 7 above, where preferential tariffs for gas charged by private company Gasunie was aid,
because the Dutch authorities held 50% of the shares and Gasunie did not have autonomy in fixing gas tariffs,
but rather acted under the control of the public authorities.
27 See Renner-Loquenz, “State aid in feed-in tariffs for green electricity” (2006) 3 EC Competition Policy
Newsletter 61 and IP/06/953, OJ 2006 C 221/04. The case concerned the obligation in the Austrian Green
Electricity Act for the so-called eco-balance group representatives (Ökobilanzgruppenverantwortliche) to purchase
green electricity from eligible generators at a fixed feed-in tariff (Einspeisevergütung). The eco-balance group
representatives attribute the purchased electricity to the electricity traders, who are obliged by the law to buy
the attributed electricity at a fixed transfer price (Verrechnungspreis). The difference between the feed- in tariff
for electricity and the fixed transfer price is raised by a levy imposed on the consumption of electricity by final
consumers (Förderbeitrag).
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electricity and the long-term marginal costs of green electricity production. Though the
fixed tariff aspect of the case bore similarities to PreussenElektra, in the Austrian case the
purchase prices paid were channelled to the renewable energy producers through a clearing
mechanism – the Green Electricity Settlement Centre, in which the State played an
important role. For example, the Centre was set up by law and its function was designated
by the State; the State also had power to veto changes in the Centre’s ownership structure.
Further, the electricity purchase obligations themselves were set down by the Austrian
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour. For all of these reasons, the Commission found
that the measures were imputable to the State and constituted aid. In addition, a second way
of financing the renewable energy producers - a levy paid by all electricity consumers, the
proceeds of which are distributed to green electricity producers - also constituted aid. The
Commission found that, because the levy was imposed by the State, its proceeds went to a
State-designated body; the proceeds were used to give an advantage to certain undertakings,
and the proceeds were used in a way prescribed by the State, the levy constituted State aid.28
The case demonstrates the Commission’s belief that enforcement of the State aid rules,
albeit in a way compatible with environmental protection, will be increasingly important in a
liberalising electricity market, in which green electricity may play an ever-greater role.29
A further point here is that, where a Member State is simply implementing Community
legislation, a measure cannot be imputed to the State.30 Thus, for example, insofar as a
Member State implements the EU ETS Directive, giving rise to a difference in treatment
between undertakings covered by that scheme and undertakings not covered by that scheme,
this is not an action imputable to that State.31 Likewise - and as mentioned above - insofar as
this Directive obliged Member States to allocate a certain percentage of allowances for free
in the first and second trading periods (95% and 90%, respectively), such action is not, it is
argued, imputable to Member States.
As a final issue, it is clear that one form of transferring State resources is by granting a tax
exemption, thus waiving tax revenue.32 Environmentally-motivated tax exemptions and
reductions will be dealt with further in the context of selectivity.
c. Distortion of competition; effect on trade between Member States
Two further elements in the definition of aid are that the measure must be capable of
distorting competition and affecting trade between Member States. The Commission has set
down de minimis thresholds for Article 87(1), most recently in Regulation 1998/2006. Where,
therefore, environmental aid granted is below €200,000 (or, in the case of the transport
sector, €100,000), it will fall under the de minimis rule.
d. Selectivity
In order to fall within the definition of an aid, Article 87(1) states that a measure must favour
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. As the Court has held, this means
that, in order to be selective, a measure must be,
28 Applying the Court’s judgment in Steinike & Weinlig, note 16 above.
29 See Renner-Loquenz, note 27 above.
30 Case T-351/02 Deutsche Bahn v Commission [2006] ECR II-1047.
31 See further, Seinen, note 24 above.
32 See, for example, Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877.
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“such as to favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods over others which are in a
legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in
question.”33
Where a difference in treatment is capable of being objectively justified, it will not satisfy this
selectivity criterion.
The notion of objective justification has, however, been interpreted by the Court in a rather
narrow fashion, including in the context of environmental aid. In Spain v Commission, for
example, the ECJ rejected Spain’s argument that its aid scheme for the purchase of
environmentally-friendlier vehicles was not selective. The Spanish scheme at issue granted
aid only to vehicles purchased by natural persons and SMEs, but not to large undertakings,
because, Spain argued, such undertakings could afford to purchase such vehicles in any
event. Rejected this argument, the Court found that this did not constitute a valid objective
justification for differentiating between large undertakings and others.34 Nonetheless, the aid
was, the Court found, potentially exemptible under Article 87(3)(c), as discussed below.
Tax reductions and exemptions. In the case of tax reductions or exemptions, the
Community Courts and Commission have made clear that these will not be considered to be
selective, and so will not constitute aid, if justified on the basis of the “nature or general
scheme of the system.”35 The limits of this doctrine have given rise to considerable
controversy, including in the case of derogations from eco-taxes.36 The leading case here is
Adria-Wien, which concerned an Austrian eco-taxation scheme where electricity and natural
gas consumption were taxed, with a rebate for manufacturing undertakings.37 The Court
held that the supply of energy on preferential terms to undertakings manufacturing goods
constituted aid.38 In particular, the Court rejected the arguments of Austria and Denmark
that such exemptions were justified by the nature and general scheme of Austria’s energy
taxation package, being necessary in order to shield the industry most affected by a tax on
energy. The Court’s reasoning was threefold.
(1) First, there was no evidence that the manufacturing industry would necessarily
be hit harder by the tax than, for example, the service industry;
(2) Second, nothing in the legislation suggested that the rebate was temporary, to
enable the industry to adapt to the new regime;
33 C-409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR I-1487, para 47. For examples of non-selective measures, see, for
example, UK energy efficiency aid (IP/02/1480), which concerned the UK’s Energy Efficiency Best Practice
Programme, providing grants to R&D projects for organisations and information and advice on energy use and
efficiency. The grants for provision of information were not considered aid because they were given to public,
non-profit-making higher education and research establishments, which would benefit all interested parties in a
non-discriminatory way.
34 Ibid, para 53.
35 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to direct business taxation OJ 1998 C 304/03.
36 On eco-taxes and state aid generally, see Van Calster, “Greening the E.C.’s State Aid and Tax Regimes”
European Competition Law Review (2000) 294, Boeshertz, “Community state aid policy and energy taxation”
(2003) 4 EC Tax Review 214 and Renner-Loquenz, “State aid in feed-in tariffs for green electricity” (2006) 3
EC Competition Policy Newsletter 61. Note that Member States’ environmental taxation schemes may also be
assessed for compatibility with Article 90 EC, and so will be prohibited if found to discriminate between similar
products, or to have a protective effect in favour of competing domestic products. The ECJ’s strict approach
to eco-taxes adopted in Case C-213/96 Outokumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, has to a certain extent decreased the
popularity of eco-taxes on energy.
37 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien [2001] ECR I-8365.
38 Ibid, para 40.
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(3) Third, the environmental rationale for the eco-tax did not justify exempting the
manufacturing sector. Rather, the real reason for the tax was to preserve the
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector within the Community.39
While this - rather strict - approach meant that the exemption constituted aid, the Court was
careful to point out that this did not prejudge its compatibility with the Treaty, referring
expressly to the Guidelines on Environmental Aid.40 Since the Adria Wien judgment, the
Commission has adopted a large number of decisions based on the Court’s approach.41
Moreover, it is submitted, this approach is supported by Part II’s arguments, and in
particular Chapter 6’s systematic argument, in representing a strict approach to assessing
exceptions to environmentally beneficial taxation schemes.
The judgment in Adria Wien does not, of course, mean that all eco-tax schemes are selective:
a variety of such schemes have since been held to be justified by the nature and scheme of
the tax system.42 Following the ECJ’s annulment of the CFI’s judgment in British Aggregates,
however, it is clear that Member States constructing eco-tax schemes whereby not all
activities with comparable environmental effects are taxed in a similar manner should expect
that their scheme will be classified as selective. The ECJ’s judgment provides important
guidance on the scope of Article 87(1) for the numerous Member States who have
constructed, or are constructing, eco-tax regimes.43
The case concerned a UK levy on aggregates (i.e., granular materials used in construction).
The Commission had decided not to object to the levy, on the ground that it was justified by
nature and logic of tax system - the levy was intended to contribute to a reduction in the use
of non-renewable resources, and was not levied on recycled material, or on by-products
from other processes, as virgin aggregates have high environmental costs.44 The applicant
appealed this decision, arguing inter alia that the levy was not consistently environmentally-
friendly. For example, there was, the applicant argued, no good reason for its material
scope.45 In dismissing the appeal, the CFI had emphasised that the choice of whether to
39 Ibid, paras 50-54. See, in contrast, the view of AG Mischo, who considered that the tax formed part of the
“new general system of general ecology taxes”, and that there was no derogation from the general rule, as
different primary and secondary sectors of the economy could not be compared. Hence, it should be
considered to be based on objective criteria. See further, Infeldt, “Eco-tax reliefs for companies in Denmark,
Finland and Sweden after the Court ruling in Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH case” 1 Competition Policy Newsletter
(2003) 103.
40 Ibid, para 31.
41 See Infeldt, note 39 above, for a comprehensive list. For an earlier case on environmentally-motivated taxes,
see Decision 82/73 Gasunie OJ 1982 L 37/29, where preferential tariffs for gas supplies to horticulture sectors
were held to be State aid. See also, Vereniging van Exploitanten van Waterleidingbedrijven in Nederland v Nederland
[1995] 2 CMLR 741, where the Dutch Arrondissementsrechtbank (District Court) held that differential tax
treatment could not be justified on environmental grounds, so there was State aid in granting lower tax rates to
certain undertakings; and, under the equivalent provisions from the EEA Agreement, the Decision of the
EFTA Surveillance Authority of July 26, 2002 No 149/02/COL on Norwegian tax exemptions in the context
of eco-taxes on carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide, in which the EFTA Surveillance Authority followed the
Adria-Wien approach.
42 See, for example, Joined Cases C-128/03 and C-129/03 AEM [2005] ECR I-2861, where charges on hydra
and geothermal electricity undertakings to access the network and use it temporarily were not State aid for
those not subject to it, because the exceptions flowed from the nature and economy of the system of charges;
and
43 Case C-487/06 British Aggregates, judgment of December 22, 2008.
44 Case T-210/02 British Aggregates [2006] ECR II-2789, para 25.
45 Ibid, para 88.
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impose environmental levies in the present state of Community law - where environmental
taxes had not been harmonised - was for Member States, which were free to “set their priorities
as regards the protection of the environment and, as a result, to determine which goods or services they are to
decide to subject to an environmental levy.” As a result,
“in principle, the mere fact that an environmental levy constitutes a specific measure, which extends to
certain designated goods or services, and cannot be seen as part of an overall system of taxation which
applies to all similar activities which have a comparable impact on the environment, does not mean that
similar activities, which are not subject to the levy, benefit from a selective advantage.”46
Annulling this part of the judgment, the ECJ adopted a hard-line approach to the scope of
justification of environmental taxation schemes on the basis of their environmental
objectives, referring expressly to its judgment in Adria-Wien. In the ECJ’s view, in order to
be non-selective, an environmental tax scheme must apply in the same way to all similar
activities which have a “comparable impact on the environment.”47 Essentially, the ECJ was
thereby confirming that environmental taxation schemes will receive no special treatment
from the Court in assessing whether they constitute aid: their structure must be fully
consistent with their environmental objective, and only environmental criteria may be taken
into account in structuring the scheme. As in Adria-Wien, therefore, where non-
environmental (e.g., political, industrial or economic) factors have influenced scheme design,
this will mean that the scheme is selective. While the ECJ’s strict application of the
selectivity concept in this field was perhaps to be expected following Adria-Wien, it means
that the bar has been set rather high for Member States’ eco-tax regimes, in the design of
which political and industrial sensitivities can often play an unavoidable role. Further, the
judgment means that Member States may have to be cautious about relying on certain
previous Commission decisions in the more relaxed, pre-British Aggregates line.48
Nonetheless, as discussed below, Member States may well be able to justify such schemes
under Article 87(3), and it might be hoped that, in the long term, the strict British Aggregates
approach will encourage Member States to design schemes as far as politically possible
around genuine environmental considerations.
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). A further topical question with regard to
selectivity in environmental aid is the extent to which allowances granted by Member States
under the EU’s ETS may be considered selective. It has been argued above that, insofar as it
is open to Member States to auction their allowances (which they could do for 5% of
allowances in Phase I and 10% of allowances in Phase II), the grant of allowances for free or
below market price amounts to an advantage granted from State resources. However, the
jury is still out on how the selectivity criterion applies in this context. A number of issues
are pertinent.
First, are undertakings within and without the EU ETS to be considered to be in “in a legal
and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question”? It
is submitted that the answer to this question is in the negative: undertakings within the ETS
- whether there compulsorily or via a Member State’s exercising of an opt-out - are subject
46 Ibid.
47 Case C-487/06 British Aggregates, judgment of December 22, 2008, para 86.
48 See, for instance, the Danish scheme (XXIst Report on Competition Policy (2001), point 381) by which a
company active on land, including road transport firms, but not shipping and air transport firms, could receive
a grant to compensate for an environmental tax. The Commission found that the differentiation between land-
based and other firms was justifiable by the nature and general scheme of the system..
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to a specific regime whereby a market price is placed on their pollution; undertakings
outwith the scheme may not have any such price placed on their polluting activities, or at
least not a price fixed within the same market parameters as the ETS. Put in another way, it
would seem ludicrous for a Member State, in order to avoid selective granting of advantages,
to be forced to grant non-ETS undertakings an equivalent monetary advantage to allowances
granted for free to ETS undertakings: the result would be an even greater distortion of
competition. As a result, the present author would disagree with the suggestion put forward
by some, including a Commission official, that non-ETS and ETS undertakings are
comparable because “both sectors without and outside the scope of [the ETS Directive] are subject to
climate change policy.”49 Such an interpretation of Article 87(1), it is submitted, flies in the face
of any sensible systematic approach based on the Article 6 EC interest of maximising
environmental protection levels.
Secondly, within the scope of the ETS, can any distinction legitimately be made by Member
States between undertakings on the basis of other criteria, such as, for example, sector? In
its 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, discussed in detail below, the Commission seems50
to deal with this issue under Article 87(3)(c) - presumably on the (as argued above,
misguided) premise that all Phase II allowances constitute State aid. Nonetheless, some of
the factors which the Commission states form part of the Article 87(3)(c) test are, it is
argued, very relevant in assessing selectivity. In particular, as regards Phase I of the ETS, the
Guidelines state that, in order to fall under Article 87(3)(c), Member State allocation must,
inter alia, be carried out in a transparent way, “based on objective criteria and on data sources of the
highest quality available”, and the allocation methodology “shall not favour certain undertakings or
certain sectors, unless this is justified by the environmental logic of the system itself or where such rules are
necessary for consistency with other environmental policies”. Similarly, as regards Phase II of the ETS,
part of the test laid down by the Guidelines is whether the choice of beneficiaries is based on
“objective and transparent criteria” and must not favour certain competitors. These elements, it
is submitted, in truth form part of selectivity analysis: where allowances are allocated on the
basis of objective criteria, distinguishing between undertakings on the basis of objective
differences, such allocation does not fulfil the selectivity criterion. Indeed, this requirement
forms one of the core allocation criteria set out in the ETS Directive itself,51 criterion five of
which stipulates that Member States’ NAPs,
“shall not discriminate between companies or sectors in such a way as to unduly favour certain
undertakings or activities in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty, in particular Articles 87
and 88 thereof.”52
49 Seinen, “State aid aspects of the EU Emission Trading Scheme: the second trading period” (2007) 3 EC
Competition Policy Newsletter 100.
50 That this is the approach taken is confirmed by a Commission official in Seinen, ibid, at 101. The Guidelines
themselves are, as discussed below, not clear on this, stating only (as regards tradable permit schemes in
general, and not just the ETS) that, “[t]radable permit schemes may involve State aid in various ways, e.g., when permits and
allowances are granted for less than their market value and this is imputable to the State…” (Guidelines on environmental
aid, note 5 above, point 139).
51 Directive 2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the
Community OJ 2003 L 275/32, Annex III.
52 Thus, for example, the Commission views differentiation in allocation on sectoral grounds as incompatible
aid (though negative discrimination of, for example, the power generation sector has been allowed in Member
State NAPs, presumably for polluter pays reasons): see Seinen, note 49 above, 103-104.
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In practice, admittedly, as proposed allocations are notified to the Commission in any event
in the form of Member States’ NAPs, the distinction between Article 87(1) and Article 87(3)
analysis is perhaps not as crucial as it might normally be.53 However, quite aside from its
importance for clarity of analysis, the distinction is nonetheless still crucial due to the
difference in burden of proof - the burden of proving the elements of Article 87(1) falls on
the Commission, while the burden of proving Article 87(3) justification falls on the Member
State.
National Emissions Trading Schemes. As a final point, it should be noted that national
emissions trading schemes will not be held to satisfy the selectivity requirement, and thus
will not constitute aid, as long as the installations to which they apply is determined on an
objective basis. Thus, the ECJ, in concluding that the Dutch NOx emissions trading scheme
did not fulfil the selectivity test, reasoned that the scheme applied to installations on the
basis of an objective criterion (in that case, all industrial facilities with an installed total
thermal capacity of more than 20 MWth).54 Though the Commission argued that
installations outside the scheme were subject to the same general obligations of Dutch law
concerning environmental management and atmospheric pollution as those inside the
scheme (i.e., a similar argument to that being made by the Commission in the ETS context,
discussed above), this was rejected by the Court.55
e. Application of Article 86(2)
Where the five criteria in the definition of aid outlined above56 are satisfied, it may still, in the
case of compensation for discharge of an environmental public service obligation, be open
to a Member State to argue that Article 86(2) applies, so that the compensation falls outside
Article 87(1). This has been discussed in Chapter 14.
4. Exemption for environmental aid: Article 87(3)
a. Overview: the 2008 Guidelines on Environmental Aid and the Block
Exemption for Environmental Aid
The Guidelines on Environmental Aid. The Commission has issued numerous
Guidelines on its approach to exemption, concerning both sectoral and “horizontal” aid.
The latter category includes Guidelines on Environmental Aid, as issued most recently in
January 2008.57 These represent a modernisation (though, as we note below, arguably not a
53 This situation may change if, as proposed by the Commission, NAPs are abolished in the third ETS trading
period (in which the issue of State aid may not, in any event, arise, if the Commission allocates most allowances
itself). See Commission Proposal for a Directive to extend and improve the functioning of the EU ETS, COM
(2008) 30 final and the discussion in Chapter 4.
54 Case T-233/04 Netherlands v Commission, judgment of April 10, 2008. See also, for example, UK Climate Change
Levy OJ 2002 L 229/15; Danish CO2 quota N 653/1999 OJ 2000 C 322; Belgian Green Electricity Certificates N
550/2000 OJ 2001 C 330.
55 Ibid, para 91.
56 Viz. (1) an advantage (2) granted from State resources capable of (3) distorting competition and (4) affecting
trade which (5) is selective in its application.
57 Note 5 above. Environmental considerations may also, however, come into the analysis of aid under sectoral
and other horizontal guidelines, for example, the guidelines on shipbuilding aid (OJ 2003 C 263/2); the
guidelines on aid in the steel sector (OJ 2002 C 70/21); the guidelines on aid in the agricultural sector (OJ 2006
C 319/1). On the lead up to the adoption of the 2008 Guidelines, see Branton, “Environmental Aid: a Case
for Fundamental Reform (1)”, European State Aid Law Quarterly (2006) 4, Holmes “The Environmental
Guidelines: Black Smoke or Sustainable Development?” ESTAL 1 (2004) 17, and Andersen, “Revision of the
Environmental Guidelines” (2008) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 23.
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sufficient modernisation) of its approach in previous Guidelines of 200158 and 1994,59 which
in turn built on environmental aid “framework” positions adopted in 1974, 1980 and 1986.60
As with the rest of Community competition law, however, integration generally works only
one way: while environmental benefits from aid are relevant to the State aid assessment, the
fact that aid that is otherwise compatible with the common market may damage the
environment does not mean that such aid should be held to breach Article 87. This
approach, which has been confirmed by the Court of First Instance,61 is analysed critically
below.
The 2008 Guidelines take into account the more economic approach announced in the State
Aid Action Plan 2005-2009, as well as significant developments in environmental policy
since 2001.62 The tone of the guidelines is one which emphasises, first, the vital role that
Member State aid can play in achieving Community environmental protection goals and,
second, the importance of integration between the Community’s state aid, environment and
energy policies. Indeed, the Guidelines formed one of the pillars in the Energy Action Plan
for 2007-2009 adopted by the Spring 2007 European Council.63 The Guidelines essentially
take a bi-dimensional approach to environmental aid: aid should be exempted if, first, it
incentivises pollution reduction, via enabling internalisation of environmental externalities by
ensuring that polluters pay for pollution (e.g., in the case of eco-taxes); or second, if it creates
other incentives to achieve a higher level of environmental protection than currently
required under Community or national direct regulation.64
58 OJ 2001 C 37/3.
59 OJ 1994 C 72/3. See also, Regulation 994/98 enabling the Commission to adopt block exemptions for state
aids OJ 1998 L 142/1, which included in Article 1(1)(a)(iii) a possibility to adopt a block exemption in the field
of environmental protection, though no such block exemption was adopted.
60 The Commission first tackled the topic of environmental State aid formally in its fourth Competition Report
of 1974, where it adopted a memorandum on State aid on environmental matters, to the effect that
environmental policies both at national and Community level should be implemented by imposing obligations
on polluters to make them pay for the cost of protecting the environment, rather than granting State aid which
would pass this cost on to the public. This essentially formed the basis of its policy until 1994, though
amendments were made in 1980 and 1986. See Xth Report on Competition Policy (1980), points 222-226, and
XVIth Report on Competition Policy (1986), point 259. In the 1974 Memorandum, a transitional period of 6
years was provided to give Member States time for full implementation of the polluter pays principle, with a
further 6 years being given in 1980. This transitional approach was finally dropped in 1986. See generally, Van
Calster, “Greening the E.C.’s State Aid and Tax Regimes” European Competition Law Review (2000) 294.
61 See, for example, Case T-158/99 Thermenhotel Stoiser v Commission [2004] ECR II-1, where the applicant argued
that the hotel project to which aid had been granted contravened EC environmental law. Rejecting this
argument, the CFI held that the proper mode of recourse was for the Commission to bring an Article 226 EC
action against the relevant Member State for breach of its environmental Treaty obligations - i.e., aid need not
comply with all EU law provisions to be held compatible with the common market.
62 The Guidelines do not apply to some areas, for example the financing of environmental protection measures
relating to air, road, railway, inland waterway and maritime transport infrastructure: see note 5 above, points 58-
69. They may also apply in conjunction with other Guidelines or Block exemptions, for example the Block
exemptions on training aid (Regulation 68/2001 OJ 2001 L 10/20, as amended) and on small and medium
sized enterprises (Regulation 70/2001 OJ 2001 L 10/33, as amended).
63 The energy action plan is based on the Commission Communication, "An Energy Policy for Europe" (COM
(2007) 1). See also, Green Paper on market-based instruments for environmental and related policy purposes,
COM (2007) 140 final and the European Council’s conclusions on the review of the EU’s Sustainable
Development Strategy, asking the Commission to prepare a roadmap for reform of environmentally-harmful
subsidies (Council Document 10917/06 of June 26, 2006 on review of the EU’s Sustainable Development
Strategy).
64 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, points 7-10 and 22.
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The Commission identifies the main aim of State aid control in the environmental field as
ensuring that aid measures “will result in a higher level of environmental protection than would occur
without the aid and to ensure that the positive effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects in terms of
distortions of competition, taking account of the polluter pays principle…”65 The latter aim epitomises
what the Commission considers to be a foundation of its new, more economic, approach to
State aid: the “balancing test” - essentially a version of the proportionality analysis familiar to
us from other areas of Community law.66
This test has three parts. First, the Member State must show that the aid measure is aimed at
a “well-defined objective of common interest”, a concept which includes protection of the
environment.67 Secondly, the aid must be “well designed to deliver the objective of common interest”.
In particular, the aid must be an appropriate policy instrument; there must be an incentive
effect for undertakings, meaning that the undertakings would not have changed their
behaviour without the aid;68 and the environmental objective must not be attainable with less
aid. This principle has led to the doctrine of “eligible costs”: only costs exceeding the
economic benefits which an undertaking receives from an investment can be exempted as
proportionate environmental aid. Indeed, the Commission goes further: to be
proportionate, aid must normally be less than the eligible costs, to take into account broader
benefits from an environmental investment, such as an enhanced “green image”.69 Thirdly,
distortions of competition and effect on trade must be limited, so that the “overall balance is
positive”.70 For example, aid which results in the maintenance of inefficient undertakings, the
distortion of dynamic incentives, the creation of market power or an artificial change in trade
flows will be scrutinised carefully. The Commission asserts, however, that the risks of this
occurring if measures are genuinely targeted to counteract the actual extra cost of a higher
level of environmental protection are “normally rather limited.”71
The Guidelines draw, for the first time, an important distinction between two ways in which
environmental aid can be assessed. The distinction is based on whether the aid exceeds
certain thresholds, which vary depending on the type of aid at issue.72 Where environmental
aid falls below these thresholds, it will be subject to what the Commission terms a “standard
assessment” only; where the aid is above these thresholds, however, it will be subject to a
“detailed assessment” “in order to allow for a deeper scrutiny of the individual cases which have
the greatest potential to distort competition and trade.”73 In particular, in addition to taking
65 Ibid, point 6.
66 Ibid, point 16 and Section 5 of the Guidelines.
67 Ibid, point 16.
68 Ibid, point 27.
69 Ibid, point 32. The Commission notes that greater aid may be justifiable for small and medium sized
undertakings, as the cost of achieving higher environmental protection may be greater for such companies.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid, point 36.
72 These thresholds are: in the case of investment aid, where the aid exceeds €7.5 million for a single
undertaking; in the case of operating aid for energy saving, where the aid exceeds €5 million per undertaking
for five years; in the case of operating aid for the production of renewable electricity and/or combined
production of renewable heat, when the aid is granted to renewable electricity installations in sites where the
resulting renewable electricity generation capacity exceeds 125 MW; in the case of operating aid for the
production of biofuel, when the aid is granted to a biofuel production installation in sites where the resulting
production exceeds 150,000 t per year; in the case of operating aid for cogeneration, where aid is granted to a
cogeneration installation with the resulting cogeneration electricity capacity exceeding 200MW.
73 See MEMO/08/31.
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into account the factors specific to the type of environmental aid set out below, the
Commission will in a detailed assessment apply the “balancing test” discussed above
overtly.74
In practice, the vast majority of environmental aid is considered under Article 87(3)(c) EC
(aid for the development of “certain economic activities or areas”), and as a result the
Guidelines focus on this provision. Some environmental aid, however, may fall under
Article 87(3)(b) (aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European
interest).75
The Block Exemption for Environmental Aid. In another first, the Commission has, for
the first time, included certain types of environmental aid in a general block exemption.76
The Block Exemption sets out a variety of categories of environmental aid which, upon
fulfilment of certain conditions - including maximum monetary thresholds and transparency
requirements - will not need to be notified to it by Member States. Further, Member States
are generally entitled to use a simplified method to calculate the environmental aid amount.
These categories77 by and large correspond to the categories discussed separately by the
Commission in its Guidelines, as set out below. Indeed, the preamble to the Block
Exemption states that it has been possible to include these categories of environmental aid
precisely in view of the experience gathered in the application of the Guidelines.78 The
removal of the notification requirement, as well as the generally simplified calculation
method for the aid amount, should significantly facilitate the ease of granting environmental
aid for Member States in practice, and is thus to be welcomed.
b. Article 87(3)(c) - aid for development of certain economic activities or
areas
In the Guidelines, the Commission identifies a variety of common categories of
environmental aid which may be compatible with Article 87(3)(c). A common theme
throughout is a fundamental difference in approach between investment aid and operating
aid, with the latter being far more rarely found to be compatible. Failure on the part of the
Commission in a State aid decision to categorise environmental aid as investment or
74 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, section 5.
75 Other exemptions may, sometimes (though rarely), also potentially apply to environmental aid. Examples
include the German scheme giving tax exemptions to consumers purchasing cars with catalytic converters. The
Commission found that the measure fell under Article 87(2)(a) as long as it was applied in a non-discriminatory
manner (XXIVth Competition Report, at 170). Article 87(2)(b) may also be relevant insofar as it allows aid to
compensate damage caused by natural disasters, which may allow for compensation for, e.g., localised
environmental damage caused by such disasters.
76 Regulation 800/2008 OJ 2008 L 214/3. The block exemption essentially consolidates the five pre-existing
block exemptions (SMEs, research and development aid for SMEs, aid for employment, training aid and
regional aid) and also applies to environmental aid, aid in the form of risk capital, aid for disadvantaged and
disabled workers, and aid for R&D for large enterprises.
77 Investment aid for environmental protection improving on Community standards or to increase the level of
environmental protection in the absence of Community standards, aid for the acquisition of transport vehicles
which go beyond Community standards or which increase the level of environmental protection in the absence
of Community standards, aid for early adaptation to future Community standards for SMEs, environmental aid
for investment in energy saving measures, environmental aid for investment in high efficiency cogeneration,
environmental aid for investments to exploit renewable energy sources, aid for environmental studies and
certain environmental aid in the form of tax reductions. Block Exemption Regulation, ibid, section 4.
78 Block Exemption Regulation, ibid, recital 46.
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operating aid will amount to a substantial procedural defect leading to annulment of the
decision.79 The common types of environmental aid may be divided as follows.
Aid going beyond Community standards or increasing environmental protection in
the absence of Community standards, i.e., investment aid which provides an incentive for
an undertaking to improve environmental protection.80 This expressly includes aid to eco-
innovation projects81 or for new “transport vehicles” which has this effect.82 The aid
intensity shall not exceed 50% of the eligible investment cost, defined as the extra
investment costs necessary to achieve a higher level of environmental protection than
required by the Community standards.83 This figure may increase by 10% in the case of the
acquisition of an eco-innovation asset or the launching of an eco-innovation project,84 and
may increase to up to 100% where the investment aid is granted in a genuinely competitive
bidding process on the basis of clear, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria.85 Increases
are also possible for SMEs.86 Aid for early adaptation to future Community environmental
standards may also be justifiable,87 as long as the investment is implemented and finalised at
least one year before the standard enters into force.88 However, the permissible aid intensity
is lower in this case.89
Aid for energy saving. Referring expressly to the Community’s climate change policy, the
Commission indicates that aid may be appropriate “where the investments resulting in energy savings
79 Case C-351/98 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I-8031, para 77; Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR
I-1487, para 97.
80 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, points 74-84.
81 Defined broadly at p 20 of the Guidelines. See further, the Commission’s support of eco-innovation
including subsidies, e.g., Commission Communication, “Report of the Environmental Technologies Action
Plan” (2005-2006) COM (2007) 162 final.
82 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, points 43 and 44 and 85-86. See, for example, IP/02/1322
(aid for purchase of electric or hybrid vehicles in Castilla-León approved); Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission
[2003] ECR I-1487 (Court included in this category efforts to renew the Spanish fleet of commercial vehicles
by granting aid for individuals and SMEs to replace their vehicles, as such a scheme “enables the average age of those
vehicles to be lowered, and as a consequence the level of emission of gaseous pollutants (CO2 and NO2 ) to be reduced” (para 82).
As a result, the Commission decision was annulled on this point); IP/03/318 (French aid scheme to promote
more environmentally friendly modes of transport run by French environmental and Energy Management
Agency approved).
83 Ibid, points 76 and 80. Eligible costs are calculated, first, by calculating the investment cost directly related to
environmental protection by reference to the counterfactual situation, and second, by deducting operating
benefits and adding operating costs: point 80 onwards.
84 Ibid, point 78. See, for example, Decision 2003/647 on State aid which Austria is planning to implement for
BMW Motoren GmbH in Steyr, OJ 2003 L 229/24, where part of aid was environmental, as the purpose of the
investment was to bring the inspection technology used to test the engines produced up to “start of the art”,
using “cold control technology”. The ultimate aim was to reduce emissions and to meet future legislative
provisions. BMW was investing €23.4 million in project. Around €6 million was considered to be eligible
investment costs, calculated by deducting saved fuel costs from planning/development costs and extra
investment costs compared to current hot engine testing technology. Total aid of €1.9 million (i.e., an aid
intensity of 30%) was approved.
85 Ibid, point 77.
86 Ibid, point 79.
87 Ibid, point 45.
88 Ibid, point 87.
89 Ibid, point 88; for example, the maximum intensity is 10% for large enterprises when the aid is granted
between one and three years before the date of entry into force or transposition of the Community measure.
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are not compulsory pursuant to applicable Community standards, and where they are not profitable…”90
Both investment and operating aid may be exempted, though in practice exemption of
operating aid is rare. In the case of investment aid, the aid intensity must not exceed 60% of
the eligible investment costs, or more if the aid is granted in a competitive bid process, as
above.91 In the case of operating aid, the aid shall only be granted to the extent that it
compensates for net extra production costs due to the investment, taking energy saving
benefits into account, and it shall only be granted for five years.92
The Commission also refers expressly to aid for co-generation, which saves energy by
producing electricity and heat simultaneously, and aid for district heating, which uses waste
heat from industry or utilities, subject to the fulfilment of various conditions.93
Aid for renewable energy sources.94 Referring to the Community’s target of 20% of
overall EU energy consumption coming from renewable sources by 2020, the Commission
states that this increasingly common form of aid may be justified where two tests are
satisfied. First, aid is justified if “the cost of production of renewable energy is higher than the cost of
production based on less environmentally friendly sources and if there is no mandatory Community standard
concerning the share of energy from renewable sources for individual undertakings.”95 Secondly, the aid
must be for a renewable energy source where the environmental benefit and sustainability
are “evident”. This means, for example, that aid for non-sustainable types of biofuel - defined
as those not fulfilling the sustainability criteria in the Proposal for a Directive on renewable
energy96 - may not be justified. Further, technological improvements in the production of
renewable energy may reduce the need for aid.97
90 Ibid, point 47. See similarly, points 30-32 of the 2001 Guidelines, note 58 above. In some cases, Member
States have tried to calculate the amount of such aid by reference to the environmentally damaging externalities
avoided by, for example, energy saving measures. See the “ExternE” (External Costs of Energy) study funded
by the Commission published in 2001 after 10 years’ work from researchers of all EU MS and the US, which
concluded that the cost of producing electricity from conventional sources like coal or oil would double, and
cost of electricity production from gas would increase by 30% if external costs like damage to the environment
and to health were taken into account. See further, Facenna, “State Aid and Environmental Protection”, in
Biondi, Eeckhout and Flynn (eds.) The Law of State Aid in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2004), who strongly advocates the adoption of internationally recognised external cost measurements of aid, as
an effective way of internalising externalities.
91 Ibid, points 95-97.
92 Ibid, points 99-100.
93 Ibid, point 51 and 112-125. The Commission refers to Directive 2004/8 on the promotion of cogeneration,
OJ 2004 L 3/33, and the Commission Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential, COMP
(2006) 545 final. For example, aid for cogeneration may be exempted provided that the cogeneration unit
satisfies the definition of high-efficiency cogeneration set out in point 70 of the Guidelines. Investment and
operating aid may be justified for co-generation. In the case of energy-efficient district heating, only investment
aid may be justified (point 120 of the Guidelines). See, for example, approval of aid to a scheme promoting the
use of combined heat and power in Denmark, as aid was limited in time and degressive (XXVIIth Report on
Competition Policy (1997) points 286 and 298).
94 Defined at p 20 of the Guidelines as non-fossil energy sources from wind, solar, geothermal, wave, tidal,
hydropower installations, biomass, landfill as, sewage treatment plan gas and biogases. See generally,
Krieglstein, “Renewable Energy Schemes and EC State Aids Provision” (2001) European Environmental Law
Review 51.
95 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, point 48. See similarly, point 37 of the 2001 Guidelines, note
58 above.
96 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the promotion of the use of energy
from renewable sources, COM (2008) 19 final, Article 14(1).
97 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, point 48.
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Investment aid and operating aid may be permissible; in the case of investment aid, with an
aid intensity of 60% (subject to increase for SMEs or where a competitive bidding process
has taken place).98 In the case of operating aid, Member States may choose between
compensating for the difference between the cost of producing energy from renewable
sources and the market price of the energy, which aid is permissible until the plant has
depreciated; and using market mechanisms such as green certificates or tenders, whereby
renewable energy benefits indirectly from a guaranteed demand, which aid may be
authorised for 10 year periods.99
This part of the Guidelines builds on considerable decisional practice, and clearly fits within
the context of the EU’s broader strategy on renewable energy, mentioned above.100 In its
2002 decision in French Biofuels,101 for example, the Commission considered a French measure
reducing the domestic tax rate for biofuels. In granting a six-year exemption, the
Commission took the Community’s renewable energy policy into account, and found that
the reduction did not discriminate in favour of French biofuel producers, and would create
jobs as biofuels were “highly labour intensive.”102 Indeed, the Commission found that the only
way of promoting use of the relevant biofuel as a partial substitute for petrol was to “make
such substitution cost free for the consumer.”103 Though the decision arrives at a similar conclusion
as that suggested under the 2008 Guidelines, it is interesting to note that the Commission
took a broader range of factors - including employment policy - into account in its 2002
decision than it (presumably) might have under 2008’s “economic approach”.
Aid for waste management. The Commission indicates that investment aid to
undertakings managing or recycling waste may be justified, subject to compliance with the
polluter pays principle and if competition on the market for secondary materials is not
distorted.104 In particular, aid may only be permissible if the investment is aimed at reducing
98 Aid intensity is often here, as with other types of environmental aid, crucial to the Commission’s decision on
whether renewable energy aid should be exempted: see for example, IP/02/1405 (Italian renewable energy
production and energy conservation scheme, some part of which were approved, some further investigated
because of the aid intensity involved).
99 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, points 109-111. Member States may also choose to grant
operating aid for renewable energy in the same way as they grant operating aid for energy saving: see point 111.
See Case N326/07 Italian Tax Reduction Biodiesel, where the Commission noted that the combination of a supply
obligation for biofuels with a tax reduction may mean that the normal method of calculating the acceptable
maximum amount of aid (ie, contrasting the market price of corresponding fossil fuel) is not appropriate,
because the supply obligation means that biodiesl is no longer in direction competition with fossil diesel.
100 See generally, the speech by Commissioner Dimas “Credible and serious choice about biofuels”
(SPEECH/07/473) and Seinen and Bernsel “State aid for biofuels” (2006) 2 EC Competition Policy
Newsletter 65.
101 Decision 2003/238 on the aid scheme implemented by France applying a differentiated rate of excise duty
to biofuels OJ 2003 L 94/1. This followed Case T-184/97 BP [2000] ECR II-3145, where the CFI partially
annulled a decision declaring an aid scheme for biofuels compatible, on the ground that the scheme did not
meet the requirements for sustainable biofuel set down in the relevant Community legislation.
102 Ibid, point 337.
103 Ibid, point 371.
104 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, point 52. The Commission initially notes that aid to the
producer of the waste may also be justifiable, but does not discuss this further, and it is hard to see how this fits
with the condition that aid should only be granted for an investment aimed at reducing pollution generated by
other undertakings: see point 127. Presumably it is intended that aid granted to the waste generator will be
assessed on a case by case basis, and will not benefit from the presumptions set out in section 3 of the
Guidelines. On the significance of the polluter pays principle generally for Article 87(3) analysis, see the
observations of AG Jacobs in C-126/01 GEMO, note 14 above.
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pollution generated by other undertakings; if the aid does not indirectly relieve polluters
from a burden they should normally bear; if the investment goes beyond the “state of the
art”; if the treated materials would otherwise be disposed of in a less environmentally
friendly way; and if the investment does not simply increase demand for the materials to be
recycled.105 In expressly accepting that aid may be granted to beneficiaries to reduce
pollution caused by other undertakings, the 2008 Guidelines mark a welcome change from
the 2001 Guidelines, the scope of which had been limited to aid for cleaning up one’s own
pollution. This had given rise to some rather counter-intuitive decisions in which the
Commission had (rather artificially) been forced to consider schemes with broader
environmental clean-up goals under the general provision of Article 87(3)(c), rather than
under the Guidelines.106 Aid intensity is set at 50%, with possible increases for SMEs.107 In
addition, aid for the remediation of contaminated sites may be justifiable if the original
polluter cannot be identified and if the cost of remediation is higher than the resultant
increase in the site’s value.108 This broadly confirms the approach of earlier cases and
previous Guidelines.109 This aid may be up to 100% of the eligible costs.110
Aid involved in tradable permit schemes. The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)
Directive had expressly indicated that it was without prejudice to the application of the State
aid rules. How exactly these rules might apply in the ETS context is a question of some
105 Point 127. For an earlier case, see Decision 92/316 concerning aid envisaged by the Netherlands
Government in favour of an environmentally-sound disposal of manure, OJ 1992 L 170/34 (scheme for
stimulating an environmentally-acceptable disposal of surplus manure, to be financed entirely with the yield of
a levy to be paid by animal husbandry units who produce more manure than their land can take, was covered
by Article 87(3)(c) as, insofar as the scheme reduces manure pollution it is in the “interest of the Community as a
whole”).
106 See, for example, the Decision on the UK WRAP (Waste and Resources Action Programme) OJ 2004 L
102/59, which concerned a UK scheme which, where markets for recycled products are not working properly,
kick starts the market via a grant or lease guarantee for capital equipment. The case was not dealt with under
the 2001 Guidelines as they aimed at reducing “emission and pollution” caused by a “beneficiary in the course of its
production process” - i.e., improving one’s own environmental record, not other environmental protection or more
general contributions to sustainable development. The Commission initially gave an interim decision clearing
SME and regional aspects (IP/03/406) and then issued a final Article 87(3)(c) clearance decision, on the basis
that the scheme had a clear environmental benefit, its means were proportionate to its aims and it would not
distort competition. See also, Ireland’s similar structure (Ireland - Waste Management Infrastructure OJ 2003 C
202/5), which was eventually approved after some delay and after having been reclassified as regional state aid,
and UPM-Kymmene Shotton OJ 2003 L 314/26 (in the case of an individual aid scheme notified under WRAP,
only that part of investment which was aimed at reducing the beneficiary’s own pollution was exempted, and
not the rest of the investment). See further, Holmes “The Environmental Guidelines: Black Smoke or
Sustainable Development?” ESTAL 1 (2004) 17, who criticises the Commission’s approach on the basis that
this situation should have been included within the Guidelines for reasons of certainty and consistency.
107 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, point 129.
108 Ibid, point 53.
109 See, for example, XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy (1998), p. 221 (Commission refused to authorise
aid for investment by a steel producer in measures to prevent pollution from a slag heap used by the
undertaking, as under the polluter pays principle the cost of the investment should have been borne by the
undertaking itself); IP/03/819 (UK scheme to clean up contaminated sites found compatible with common
market, as the polluter pays principle would be respected in giving grants of up to 100% of eligible costs,
defined as the costs of work less the increase in value of land). See also, 2001 Guidelines, note 58 above, para
38 and D’Sa, “When is aid not State aid? The implications of the English Partnerships decision for European
competition law and policy” (2000) 25 EL Rev 139 and Dirkzwager-de Rijk, “Two Dutch cases on State aid
and soil rehabilitation” (2007) 1 EC Competition Policy Newsletter 130.
110 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, point 133.
269
controversy.111 Though the Commission had indicated to Member States by letter of March
2004 that it would not review Phase I allocations individually for compliance with the State
aid rules,112 no such assurance has been given for Phase II. The Guidelines give some -
albeit a rather sketchy - idea of the Commission’s view of the matter, both in relation to the
ETS and other, national tradable permit schemes.113 Recognising that tradable permit
schemes may involve State aid “in various ways”, the Commission sets out two methods of
State aid assessment for tradable permits.
The first relates to the EU’s ETS scheme up to 2012. In this case, the Commission states
that, “to limit the distortion of competition, no over-allocation of allowances can be justified and provision
must be made to avoid undue barriers to entry”.114 This general statement is specified in four
requirements:
(1) The Member State measures must be set up to achieve environmental aims
going beyond the undertakings’ mandatory Community standards;
(2) Member State allocation must be carried out in a transparent way, “based on
objective criteria and on data sources of the highest quality available”, with the total
quantity awarded being less than the undertaking’s expected needs;
(3) The allocation methodology “shall not favour certain undertakings or certain sectors,
unless this is justified by the environmental logic of the system itself or where such rules are
necessary for consistency with other environmental policies”; and
(4) New entrants shall “in principle not receive permits or allowances on more favourable
conditions than existing undertakings” and, at the same time, “granting higher allocations
to existing installations compared to new entrants should not result in creating undue barriers
to entry.”115 The Commission will apply these criteria taking into account the
allocation criteria set out in the ETS Directive and implementing guidelines.116
111 See, for example, Merola and Crichlow, “State aid in the framework of the EU position after Kyoto: An
analysis of allowances granted under the CO2 Emissions Allowance Trading Directive” 27(1) World
Competition (2004) 25, Lorenz, “Emission Trading - the State Aid Dimension” European State Aid Law
Quarterly 3 (2004) 399, Rousseaux, “L’allocation des quotas d’émission de gaz à effet de serre: un aspect
determinant du future marché européen” 484 Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne (2005) 31,
Weishaar, “The European Emissions Trading System and State aid: An Assessment of the Grandfathering
Allocation Method and the Performance Standard Rate System” 28 European Competition Law Review (2007)
371, Mace, “The Legal Nature of Emission Reductions and EU Allowances” Journal of European
Environmental and Planning Law 2 (2005) 123, Torre-Schaub, “La naissance d’un nouveau marché: le système
britannique de commerce d’allocations d’emissions de gaz à effet de serre”, Revue Internationale de Droit
Economique (2004) 227, Anttonen, Mehling and Upston-Hooper, “Breathing Life into the Carbon Market:
Legal Frameworks of Emissions Trading in Europe” (2007) European Environmental Law Review 96,
Bazelmans, “De implementatie van Europese handel in emissierechten in Nederland” Milieu & Recht 31(4)
(2004) 214.
112 Letter of 17 March 2004, HNV C2/PV/amh/D (2004) 420149. The Commission warned, however, that,
taken as a whole, Phase I NAPs might be found incompatible with the State aid rules.
113 As regards situations where companies are subject to environmental taxes and tradable permit schemes at
the same time, the Commission states that the Guidelines do not apply as it has “not gathered sufficient experience”
in this area. As a result, such cases will be assessed on a case by case basis under Article 87(3)(c): Guidelines on
environmental aid, note 5 above, point 68. See also, points 139-150.
114 Ibid, point 55.
115 Ibid, point 140.
116 Directive 2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the
Community OJ 2003 L 275/32, Annex III, Communication from the Commission on guidance to assist
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The second method of assessment concerns the post-2012 ETS period and, more generally,
national tradable permit schemes. In this case, the Commission will assess whether
measures are “necessary and proportional.”117 In particular, in order for aid to be justified:
(1) the choice of beneficiaries must be based on “objective and transparent
criteria” and must not favour certain competitors
(2) Auctioning must mean a “substantial increase in production cost” for each
sector or category of beneficiaries;
(3) Such increase must not be capable of being passed on to customers “without
leading to important sales reductions”; and
(4) Individual undertakings must not be capable of reducing emission levels in
order for the price of the certificates to be bearable.118 This may be
demonstrated, for example, by providing emission levels using best available
techniques in the EEA. As will be clear, this second method of assessment
focuses essentially on better implementation of the polluter pays principle in
tradable permit schemes.
This, it is submitted, forms one of the weakest parts of the Guidelines. Criticism of the
Commission’s approach to State aid in the context of tradable permit schemes has already
been voiced above. Further critical comment is given below.
Aid in the form of reductions or exemptions from environmental taxes. The
Commission recognises that such aid “may be necessary to target negative externalities indirectly by
facilitating the introduction or maintenance of relatively high national environmental taxation.”119 In order
for it to be justifiable, the Member State must show, first, that the exemptions or reductions
are necessary for all the proposed beneficiaries and, second, that they are proportional in
size. This will be presumed if, where the tax is harmonised, the beneficiaries pay at least the
Community minimum tax level (in which case a 10 year exemption will normally be given).120
In other cases, the aid will be considered necessary where the choice of beneficiaries is based
on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria; the tax would otherwise lead to a
substantial increase in production costs for the beneficiaries; and this increase cannot be
passed on to customers without important sales reductions.121 The aid will be considered
proportionate if the beneficiaries pay a proportion of the tax related to their environmental
performance (the better performing the undertaking, the less tax they should have to pay); or
if the beneficiaries pay at least 20% of the tax; or if the aid is conditional on the conclusion
of voluntary environmental agreements between the State and the undertakings, with targets
and periodical review.122
Member States in the implementation of the criteria listed in Annex III to Directive 2003/87, COM/2003/830
final and Communication on Further Guidance on Allocation Plans for the trading period 2008 – 2012 of the
Emissions Trading Scheme COM (2005) 703 final. See further, Seinen, “State aid aspects of the EU Emission
Trading Scheme: the second trading period” (2007) 3 EC Competition Policy Newsletter 100.
117 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, point 56.
118 Ibid, point 141.
119 Ibid, point 57.
120 Ibid, point 41.
121 Ibid, point 158.
122 Ibid, point 159.
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This approach consolidates and builds on the Commission’s practice in a substantial amount
of decisions in the area.123 In the UK Climate Change Levy case, for example, the UK
introduced a climate change levy on the non-domestic use of energy, which included tax rate
reductions and exemptions, including a full exemption for natural gas in Northern Ireland
for five years.124 This was, in the Commission’s view, permissible as the levy would create
further barriers to the development of the burgeoning Northern Irish gas industry.125
Further, aid to incentivise polluting undertakings to relocate to areas where the pollution will
have a less damaging effect,126 and aid for “environmental studies” carried out by undertakings,
127 may also be justifiable.
Where any of these types of aid are applied for by the intended beneficiary after the project
has started, the Member State must, in addition, demonstrate the incentive effect of the aid,
i.e., that the beneficiary has in fact changed its behaviour due to the aid.128
c. Article 87(3)(b) - aid for “important projects of common European
interest”
In the Guidelines, the Commission states that environmental aid may be permissible under
this provision where:129
(1) The aid proposal concerns a specific and clearly defined project;
(2) The project is in the common European interest, meaning that it must
“contribute in a concrete, exemplary and identifiable manner to the Community interest in
the field of environmental protection, such as by being of great importance for the
environmental strategy of the European Union.” This excludes advantages limited
to a single Member State; rather, the advantage “must extend to the Community
123 There are far too many to cite exhaustively. See the 2001 Guidelines, note 58 above, points 48-50 and, for
example, XXVIth Report on Competition Policy (1996), p. 246 (Swedish law on excise duties for energy
approved, which increased the tax of CO2 in fuels, but provided for a temporary reduction in the rate of tax
applied to some industries with high energy consumption and to heating for glasshouse farming purposes, to
allow such firms to adapt); IP/02/240 (German tax reductions from eco-taxes approved so as not to jeopardise
competitiveness of energy intensive industries); IP/96/1129; IP/97/160 (Swedish fiscal measures on CO2
granting exemptions for energy intensive industry approved for a limited 4 year period); XXVth Report on
Competition Policy (1995) at 233 (Danish New Energy tax on industry energy consumption, which was aimed
at reducing CO2 and SO2 emissions and reducing energy consumption, while providing tax relief for energy
intensive firms, approved). See also, Decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority of July 26, 2002 No
149/02/COL (Norway’s tax exemptions for certain sectors from carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide taxes
probably did not satisfy the requirements of the Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement (the equivalent of
Article 87(3)(c) EC), as there was no evidence that the aim of the taxes would ultimately be achieved if the
exemptions remained in place).
124 XXIst Report on Competition Policy (2001) point 382. See also, London, “Concurrence et environnement:
une entente écologiquement rationelle ?” RTD 39(2) (2003) 267.
125 Ibid, point 386. See also, Case N 22/2008 Swedish CO2 tax reduction for fuel used in installations covered by EU
ETS (such a tax reduction was compatible with the Guidelines on environmental aid, as it allowed Sweden to
adopt a general CO2 tax on energy consumption which is largely above the Community minima as required by
the Energy Taxation Directive).
126 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, points 54 and 135-138. See similarly, point 39 of the 2001
Guidelines, note 58 above.
127 Ibid, points 46 and 91-93.
128 Ibid, points 142-146.
129 Ibid, point 147.
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as a whole”. The Commission will consider applications from undertakings
from a “significant” number of Member States more favourably;130
(3) The aid must be necessary and offer an incentive to the undertaking, and the
project “must involve a high level of risk”; and
(4) The project must be of “great importance” in terms of size, producing
“substantial environmental effects.”
Clearly, these criteria are stringent and will be difficult to satisfy, even in the case of relatively
serious transboundary environmental issues. In early cases, however, numerous Member
States tried to argue environmental-related justifications under this provision. An example
of one such failed attempt to rely on Article 87(3)(b) was the Glaverbel decision, which
concerned a Belgian scheme granting investment aid to a Belgian glass producers to improve
a production line, which would save energy and improve working conditions. The
Commission found that this was State aid, and did not fall within Article 87(3)(b), as this
would require it to form part “of a transnational European programme supported jointly by
a number of governments of the member sates, or [to arise] from concerted action by a
number of member states to combat a common threat such as environmental pollution.”131
This did not include aid which helped improve production conditions which, in reality,
amounted to operating aid.132 However, in the UK Emissions Trading decision, the
Commission did not exclude the possibility that emission trading systems could be
considered as projects of common European interest within the meaning of Article 87(3)(b).
If this were accepted to be the case, it is likely that a greater intensity of aid would be
permissible than under Article 87(3)(c).133
d. Comment
On the whole, the 2008 Guidelines and Block Exemption represent very positive
developments in the Community’s environmental aid regime.
To begin, the extension of the Community’s State aid block exemption regime to
environmental aid is eminently sensible. As a category of aid which will, in all likelihood,
continue to increase in popularity with Member States, and which, under certain conditions,
may be vital in achieving the Community’s own environmental goals, it is undoubtedly in the
interests of both the Commission and Member States - and of environmental protection - to
remove the notification obligation and allow a simplified method of calculating the aid
amount.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the new distinction made by the Commission in the
Guidelines between “standard” and “detailed” assessment does not – as one might have
130 Ibid, point 149.
131 See Joined Cases 62 & 72/87 Glaverbel [1988] ECR 1573, paras 20-26.
132 Glaverbel, ibid, para 29. See also, for example, Decision 92/316 concerning aid envisaged by the Netherlands
Government in favour of an environmentally-sound disposal of manure, note 105 above (provision of public
funds to manure bank to finance some of its operation is aid, because animal husbrandry units must bear the
cost (one of their production costs) of environmentally sound disposal of their manure; Article 87(3)(b) does
not apply because, although the 1974 and 1980 framework on environmental matters foresees that during a
transitional period environmental aid should benefit from a derogation, such aid must be for adaptation by
firms to satisfy their environmental obligations - which was not so in that case).
133 See Facenna, “State Aid and Environmental Protection”, in Biondi, Eeckhout and Flynn (eds.) The Law of
State Aid in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004).
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imagined – correspond to the distinction between environmental aid covered by the Block
Exemption and environmental aid not so covered. Though the Block Exemption will make
Member States’ lives easier to a certain extent, therefore, this may be more than
compensated for by the time they will need to spend figuring out how their proposed aid will
fit into the Guidelines’ framework for assessment. In this regard, the 2008 Guidelines are,
strikingly, far more extensive and detailed than their predecessors, running to around four
times the length of the 2001 Guidelines. While not in itself necessarily indicating an
improvement in quality, this undoubtedly improves transparency and legal certainty.
Moreover, it indicates that the Commission is taking this area very seriously, and wished to
do a more comprehensive job than last time around. This it certainly has done, and it is
arguably at least in part attributable to the raised profile of the Guidelines following, for
example, the European Council’s express call for them in the context of the EU’s hugely
important current Energy Action Plan.
From a substantive perspective, the 2008 Guidelines are also, in numerous respects, to be
welcomed, for the following reasons.
In the first place, the Commission’s adoption of a broad, generally-applicable framework for
analysis for all types of environmental aid – in contrast to the more disjointed category-by-
category approach – will surely bring extra consistency of analysis to the area. Moreover, the
“balancing test” set out as the lynchpin of this framework seems, based on the
Commission’s description, to correspond broadly to the proportionality analysis propounded
by Chapter 6’s systematic argument.134 In this sense, the Guidelines are, it is submitted,
illustrative of a practical, balanced implementation of the Article 6 EC integration principle.
Further, as the proportionality principle is - as has been argued in previous Chapters -
destined to play an increasingly important role in other areas of competition law when
balancing competition and environmental objectives, this will also bring a welcome boost of
consistency in approach between State aid policy and other areas of competition policy.
Such consistency of approach is, as argued in Chapter 7, in itself to be valued as a feature of
good governance.
In the second place, in terms of the Commission’s aim of achieving “better targeted” aid as
voiced in the State Aid Action Plan, the Guidelines also represent an improvement. Bonuses
which had been present in the 2001 Guidelines for aid achieving aims rather unrelated to
environmental aims – e.g., for aid to assisted regions, or for renewable energy installations
serving all needs in an entire community – have disappeared from the 2008 Guidelines.
Conversely, for those specific (and tightly constrained) types of aid which are deemed
environmentally beneficial under the Guidelines, the acceptable aid intensities have been
increased. Thus, for example, intensities for large undertakings have increased from a range
of 30-40% to 50-60%, with a further potential intensity increase for eco-innovation (10%).
Some commentators had argued that, in such cases, maximum aid intensity levels should be
scrapped, allowing for full reimbursement of the cost borne by an undertaking in providing a
public good.135 However, the Commission’s reasons for limited aid intensity – viz. the fact
that the calculation of extra investment costs necessary to achieve a higher level of
environmental protection does not take potential operating benefits of the investment into
134 See point 4 of Chapter 6’s working hypothesis on the import of the Article 6 EC integration principle, at
Figure 1 of Chapter 6.
135 See, for example, Branton, “Environmental Aid: a Case for Fundamental Reform (1)”, European
State Aid Law Quarterly (2006) 4, who states that this was the UK’s approach to reform of the Guidelines.
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account; and the possible commercial value to the undertaking of an environmentally-
friendlier image – are in general convincing.
In addition, an intensity of 100% is possible in many instances following a competitive
tender process. In this way, the Commission is providing a welcome incentive to Member
States to inject procedural competition into the State aid area, even where market failure and
externalities may make the substantive competition goals of allocative efficiency and
maximising consumer welfare more difficult to achieve. A final positive point is the
tightening of policy on the circumstances derogations from eco-taxes are permissible: where
undertakings do not pay at least the Community minimum, in the case of long-term
derogations, Member States have the burden of proving that the derogation is necessary and
proportionate. This is a clear improvement in implementation of the polluter pays principle,
insofar as undertakings benefiting from eco-tax derogations are generally significant
polluters.
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the Article 6 EC integration principle requires the
Commission to go further than this in its cost-benefit analysis, by taking into account where
appropriate the environmental costs alleviated where aid is granted for environmentally
beneficial behaviour. This, it is argued, follows from Chapter 8’s economic argument, which
sets out the environmental valuation techniques which might be used in making this
analysis.136
Indeed, the implications of Article 6 EC in this area are, in the present author’s view, even
more far-reaching. As noted above, Article 6 EC in the State aid area - as with other areas of
competition law - has been thought to work only one way. While environmental benefits
from aid are relevant to the State aid assessment, the fact that aid that is otherwise
compatible with the common market may damage the environment has not led to the
conclusion that such aid breaches Article 87 – an approach which has been confirmed by the
Court of First Instance.137 This approach is, it is submitted, incompatible with Article 6 EC.
It is admitted that, where a benefit does not satisfy the components of the Article 87(1)
definition of aid (and where there is no scope for interpreting such components as extending
thus far), such benefit - even if granted for environmentally damaging behaviour - is not
prohibited by this Article. This follows from the limits of the integration principle discussed
in Chapter 6,138 as well as from the principle of legal certainty. However, where a benefit
granted for environmentally damaging behaviour falls within the Article 87(1) concept of aid,
things are different. In particular, to take the Article 6 EC integration principle seriously in
this area requires the Commission to take the environmental costs entailed by
environmentally damaging aid into account in carrying out any cost-benefit analysis prior to
an exemption decision. This follows, once again, not only from Chapter 6’s systematic
argument, but also from Chapter 8’s economic argument. It would, admittedly, require a major
change in the Commission’s present thinking. Nonetheless, it is submitted that such a
136 See the analogous argument made in Chapter 14, in the context of Article 86(2)’s similar cost-benefit
analysis.
137 See, Case T-158/99 Thermenhotel Stoiser v Commission [2004] ECR II-1, note 61 above, where the applicant
argued that the hotel project to which aid had been granted contravened EC environmental law. Rejecting this
argument, the CFI held that the proper mode of recourse was for the Commission to bring an Article 226 EC
action against the relevant Member State for breach of its environmental Treaty obligations.
138 See point 2 of the working hypothesis on the import of Article 6 EC set out in Chapter 6 at Figure 1.
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change is fundamental if internalisation of environmental cost, and economisation of
(environmental) State aid policy, is to progress from slogans to reality.
A third reason to welcome the 2008 Guidelines is that they take into account numerous
changes which have taken place in the landscape of environmental policy since 2001,
recognising trends in Member States’ environmental aid policies and shifts in thinking on the
type of measure which might incentivise better environmental performance on the part of
undertakings.139 As a result, they contain new categories of permissible environmental aid,
such as aid for waste management, aid involved in tradable permit schemes, aid for district
heating, aid for environmental studies and aid for early adaptation to standards.
More particularly, the Guidelines’ approach to tradable permit schemes deserves special
attention. As noted above, the question of which tradable permit allocations by Member
States - whether under Phase II of the EU’s ETS, or under national schemes - might amount
to State aid has given rise to substantial controversy among commentators. In the case of
the EU ETS, it has been argued above that the grant of allowances should only constitute
State aid insofar as (1) of the “pot” of allowances which is it open to Member States to
auction (i.e., 5% of allowances in Phase I and 10% of allowances in Phase II), they grant the
allowances for free or below market price; and (2) they allocate such allowance otherwise
than in accordance with objective, transparent criteria. A first (critical) comment on this part
of the Guidelines, thus, has already been made above: they blur the distinction between
Article 87(1) and 87(3)(c), a distinction which is important for reasons of burden of proof.
Putting this criticism aside, however, the Commission’s tentative setting out of tests for
compatibility with Article 87(3)(c) is a positive step from the substantial uncertainty which
had existed in this area.140 In fact, the tests with which it has come up build on the allocation
criteria of Annex III of the ETS Directive, and the way in which the Commission has
interpreted these criteria in guidance issued to Member States,141 and in its decisions on
NAPs to date. Thus, for example, the Guidelines’ requirement that “no over-allocation of
allowances can be justified142 is also a requirement that the Commission has emphasised flows
from Annex III of the ETS Directive.143 In addition, criterion five of Annex III - the
requirement that Member States’ NAPs “shall not discriminate between companies or sectors in such a
way as to unduly favour certain undertakings or activities” - evidently, as discussed above, brings in
State aid selectivity analysis. To a certain extent, therefore, the Commission’s approach to
State aid analysis is intertwined with, and almost indistinguishable from, its general, non-
State-aid-specific assessment of NAPs. This is, of course, not in itself a bad thing -
139 Indeed, the fast-moving nature of environmental policy and its instruments means arguably that the area is
less suited to a Block Exemption than many other areas.
140 See the 2001 Guidelines, note 58 above, for example, which stated that some of the means adopted by
Member States to comply with Kyoto objectives could constitute State aid, but that it was still too early to lay
down conditions for authorising such aid.
141 See, for example, Communication, “Further guidance on allocation plans for the 2008 to 2012 trading
period of the EU Emission Trading Scheme”, COM (2005) 703 final, at 14.
142 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, point 55.
143 See Communication, note 116 above, at 14, on criteria 1 and 2 of Annex III, for example. See also, the
criteria for assessment set out by Seinen, a Commission official, at 101-102 and subsequent discussion, which -
though ostensibly on the subject of the State aid assessment of allocations, by and large amounts to a non-
State-aid-specific discussion of the Commission’s general approach to acceptability of allocations in NAPs:
Seinen, “State aid aspects of the EU Emission Trading Scheme: the second trading period” (2007) 3 EC
Competition Policy Newsletter 100.
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consistency between general NAP assessment and State aid analysis is crucial - but it does
beg the question what the “added value” of the State aid rules are in this context. This is a
question left in large part unanswered by the Guidelines.
In reality, the answer may be that DG Competition is well aware of the delicacy of the EU
ETS environmental policy “experiment” and its centrality to the EU’s activities if it is, as is
wished, to emerge as a trailblazer in achieving the “sustainable development” paradigm.
There is a strong argument that this lies at the root of DG Competition’s inactivity - despite
repeated warnings - in enforcing the State aid rules to date in proceedings separate from the
Commission’s examination of NAPs.144 Indeed, such a conclusion flows from Chapter 7’s
governance argument, as an illustration of the interplay between DG Competition and
Directorates-General responsible for other policy areas. As a matter of political reality,
therefore, it is submitted that DG Competition would be unlikely to intervene until the ETS
is better established. In practice, this means that, if DG Environment’s announced plans for
Phase 3 of the ETS come to fruition - according to which the Member States are to
relinquish control over allocating free allowances - DG Competition’s role in bringing State
aid proceedings concerning Member States’ implementation of the ETS will likely be
minimal.
In any event, in its very brief discussion of the treatment of new entrants under the
Guidelines, the Commission side-steps one of the most controversial areas of the ETS - by
simply stating that new entrants shall, “in principle not receive permits or allowances on more
favourable conditions than existing undertakings”145 but that “granting higher allocations to existing
installations compared to new entrants should not result in creating undue barriers to entry.”146 The
million dollar question is, of course: what constitutes an “undue” barrier to entry? As has
been well-documented, the “grandfathering” approach to allocation (i.e., whereby
undertakings are granted free allowances based on past emissions) creates, by its very nature,
barriers to entry for new entrants. Where new entrants are charged for allowances (e.g., by
auction), but incumbents are not, this increases such barriers to entry. Yet, the Commission
in its guidance on the ETS Directive has expressly authorised Member States to allocate
allowances for new entrants by auctioning. Presumably, therefore, such barriers to entry are
not what the Commission means by “undue”.
The core of the difficulty, however, is hard to avoid: the allocation of allowances for free on
a grandfathering basis is inherently distortive of competition.147 This is, however, too broad
144 This view is supported, for instance, by the Order of the ECJ of June 19, 2008 in Case C-6/08 P US Steel
Košice, in which the ECJ rejected the appellant’s argument that, by taking a decision that the NAP of Slovakia
was incompatible with the allocation criteria set out in the ETS Directive, this amounted to a decision on the
question of whether the NAP would entail the disbursement of State aid: para 73.
145 An example of what the Commission may mean by this is the phenomenon of long-term allocation
guarantees, proposed for Phase II by Member States such as Germany, the Czech Republic and Hungary,
whereby new installations would be guaranteed a certain level of allocations for a fixed time period. In the
Commission’s view, such guarantees likely constitute aid incompatible with the common market. See Seinen,
ibid, 103.
146 Guidelines on environmental aid, note 5 above, point 140.
147 See further, the arguments of Weishaar, who contends that a “performance standard rate” system, such as
that used by the Netherlands in their nitrogen dioxide tradable permit system, is preferable to a grandfathering
method. Under PSR systems, undertaking’s CO2 savings are accredited in the form of intangible assets with a
market value - ie undertakings that are more CO2 efficient than the benchmark fixed by the governments get
benefits, which amount to aid: Weishaar, “The European Emissions Trading System and State aid: An
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and systematic a problem with the ETS to be solved on a case by case basis via the State aid
rules: a change in legislation is a far more appropriate and effective tool.148 As such, any
Commission attempts to inject undistorted competition into the market via casuistic State
aid decisions is inherently a rather thankless task, doomed at a certain point to become
discretionary and illogical. In fact, the Commission’s plans for Phase III of the ETS - by
which auctioning will become the norm and, for free allocation, allocation criteria will be
harmonised - are the best way of tackling this problem.
Assessment of the Grandfathering Allocation Method and the Performance Standard Rate System” 28
European Competition Law Review (2007) 371.
148 An apt analogy may be drawn in this regard with the problems encountered by the Commission in dealing
with the issue of slot allocation in the air transport sector. To counter distortionary effects which would follow
from varying methods of slot allocation at airports throughout the Community, the solution adopted by the
Community legislator was Regulation 95/93 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports
OJ 1993 L 221/1 (as amended). By Article 4(2)(b) of Regulation 95/93, the Member State responsible for a
coordinated airport “shall ensure the independence of the coordinator…by separating the coordinator functionally from any
single interested party.” Moreover, by Article 4(2)(c) of Regulation 95/93, the coordinator must act in a “neutral,
non-discriminatory and transparent manner” in allocating slots. However, Regulation 95/93 allows for a
system of “grandfather rights”, whereby an air carrier is entitled to claim the same slot in the next scheduling
period as it had been operating in the previous period. Where a slot has been used for less than 80% of the
time for which it had been allocated in a period, the operator must hand it back to the slot pool to be re-
distributed. In this regard, Article 10(6) of Regulation provides that 50% of the slots to be distributed must
first be allocated to new entrants (as defined by Article 2(b)), unless requests from new entrants are less than
50%. The Commission has over the past years engaged in a review of the Regulation on slot allocation: see,
Commission Communication on the application of Regulation 95/93 COM (2008) 227 (emphasising, inter alia,
that the obligation that 50% of the slots to be distributed must be allocated to new entrants applies throughout
the scheduling period). Slot allocation was covered by a separate block exemption (Regulation 1617/93 on the
application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices
concerning joint planning and coordination of schedules, joint operations, consultations on passenger and
cargo tariffs on scheduled air services and slot allocation at airports OJ 1993 L 155/18), the validity of which
was not renewed as it was felt that the slots allocation rules are at present compatible with the competition
rules.
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Part IV: Summary and Conclusion
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Chapter 16: Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was twofold: first, to consider as an empirical matter whether
environmental protection factors presently play any role in Community competition policy;
second, to consider as a normative matter whether they should play a role.
The method of the thesis was to consider the issue from three different perspectives: an
environmental policy perspective, a perspective from competition theory, and a perspective
from competition practice.
Part I. In Part I, taking an environmental policy perspective, we examined the
developments in Community environmental policy to date which are of most relevance to
competition policy. This part of the analysis was aimed at bridging the gap - at times
noticeable in academic writing - between competition policy and environmental policy, to
achieve a properly “integrated” analytical perspective in answering the above questions.
After considering briefly the principal developments in EU environmental policy since its
inception, we focused on two developments which are crucial to competition policy: the
adoption of the sustainable development aim as a fundamental goal of the Community and
the EU, and the adoption of the Article 6 EC principle, which requires environmental
protection requirements to be integrated into the definition and implementation of all
Community policies, as an important means of achieving sustainable development and a core
principle of Community law. We noted, however, that the main problem with the
sustainability goal and the integration principle is, essentially, their indeterminacy: major
conflicts between “weak” and “strong” notions of sustainability, and a lack of clarity over
the practical significance of the integration principle where environmental goals conflict with
other Community goals, have weakened their force in practice.
We then considered another trend in Community environmental policy of great relevance to
competition policy: the trend towards use of “market-based” (also known as economic or
incentive-based) environmental policy instruments, and away from traditional “command
and control” direct regulation. After examining the reasons for this movement, we focused
on the three types of market-based instrument used within the Community which are of
most relevance to Community competition policy: state subsidies and taxes, tradable permits
(looking in particular at the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme), and voluntary environmental
agreements. We concluded that these instruments, though not a panacea for all
environmental issues, can be vital in increasing the effectiveness of environmental policy -
“reaching the parts that direct regulation cannot reach”. Part I finished with an introduction
to some of the implications of environmental regulation for Community competition policy:
in particular, the increase in market-based environmental policy instruments means that
Community competition policy applies to large areas of environmental policy to which, had
direct regulation been used, it would not have applied. This prepared the ground for the
switch in perspective, in Part II, to a perspective from competition theory.
Part II. In Part II, we asked whether, from a theoretical viewpoint, environmental
protection factors can and should play a role in competition analysis. Here, we began by
examining what the goals of Community competition policy are, surveying the principal
schools of competition thought to date. We concluded that, though maximising consumer
welfare is an important goal of Community competition policy at present, Community
competition policy (unlike US antitrust policy) is considered by many to have other goals not
directly related to economic efficiency, which we termed “non-economic” goals. These
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certainly include market integration and the achievement of the single market, but many
commentators consider them to go further, extending to other important Treaty goals such
as that of environmental protection.
Having thus surveyed opinion, we moved to a normative approach. We put forward and
examined the merits of three theoretical arguments why environmental goals should play a
role in Community competition policy.
The first, which we termed the systematic argument, argues that the EC Treaty should be
viewed as a system, or a coherent whole, when interpreting any component policy area under
the Treaty, including the Community’s competition policy. This argument drew on the
classic teleological approach used by the Community courts in Treaty interpretation, and
argued that, in the environmental context, the Article 6 EC integration principle - which also
applies to competition policy - makes a systematic approach imperative. Recognising that
the main problem with the integration principle is its indeterminacy, however, the argument
went further, and set out the concrete implications of the integration principle in the
competition sphere, namely:
(1) As a procedural matter, where environmental considerations could be relevant to
a case, the question whether they should be taken into account must be
considered in coming to a decision;
(2) Where there is, on their wording, no scope at all for interpreting the Treaty
competition provisions in a way that favours environmental protection, the
integration principle is not relevant;
(3) Where it is possible to interpret the Treaty competition provisions in a way that
favours environmental protection, and there is no conflict with the goals of
competition policy, the Treaty provisions must always be interpreted in that
manner; and
(4) Where it is possible to interpret the Treaty competition provisions in a way that
favours environmental protection, and there is a conflict with the goals of
competition policy, then the proportionality principle applies. This means that
where a (private or State) measure is suitable to achieve the Community’s
environmental policy objectives, and there is no way of achieving these
objectives that is less restrictive of competition, the measure should be allowed
under Community competition law.
Aside from Article 6 EC, a further strand to the systematic argument was that the Treaty
competition rules should, where possible, be interpreted consistently with the Treaty free
movement rules (the “internal comparative” approach). As environmental protection is a
valid justification for proportionate Member State measures otherwise restrictive of free
movement of goods, this implies that it should in principle be possible to justify otherwise
anti-competitive restrictions on similar grounds.
Our second theoretical argument why environmental goals should play a role in Community
competition policy was a governance argument. It was divided into two limbs:
(1) the argument that the Community principles of “good governance” demand
coherence and interlinkage between institutions applying and enforcing the
Community’s environmental and competition policies (the “good governance”
argument); and
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(2) The argument that it is unrealistic to think that Community competition
enforcers would, in practice, consistently exclude environmental considerations
from their analysis (the “realist’s” argument).
After examining the merits of these arguments at each of the three levels of Community
competition enforcement - the Commission, the Community courts, and national courts and
competition authorities, we concluded that the good governance argument applies across the
board to each level of enforcement. However, we admitted that the force of the realist’s
argument varies. In the case of the Commission, we concluded that the realist’s argument
might seem prima facie weakest, though we examined public choice arguments which
suggested otherwise. In the case of the Community courts, we concluded that the realist’s
argument was strong, using a coherence-based model of judicial reasoning. Finally, we
concluded that the realist’s argument was also strong in the case of national courts, though
potentially slightly weaker in the case of certain national competition authorities.
Our third theoretical argument why environmental goals should play a role in Community
competition policy was an economic argument. This argument posited that the current drive
towards a more “economic approach” at the Commission should not necessarily mean the
exclusion of environmental factors, as - at least in some cases - environmental factors may
be taken into account in the economic calculus of competition decisions. Using a basic
environmental economics approach, we examined the possibility of taking environmental
considerations into account in measuring utility, i.e., internalising environmental externalities
in competition analysis. We concluded that, in forecasting post-transaction consumer
welfare, the post-transaction environmental performance of a product can be taken into
account, using environmental valuation techniques developed in the context of
environmental cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, we argued that this should be done, not just
because of the Treaty’s Article 6 EC integration principle, but because the level of post-
transaction consumer surplus is ultimately dependent on the level of remaining
environmental resources.
Part III. Armed with these theoretical arguments, we moved to our final perspective in Part
III: a perspective from competition practice. This Part examined the role of environmental
factors in each individual area of Community competition policy from an empirical and,
applying Part II’s theoretical arguments, normative perspective. Without attempting to
repeat the discussion in that Part, our principal conclusions may be summarised as follows.
First, we saw in Chapter 9 that environmental considerations may be relevant to the cross-
cutting issues of defining what is meant by an undertaking and defining the relevant market
in a given case. On the basis of Part II’s systematic argument, however, we submitted that
undertakings performing an environmental service should only in extreme cases fall outside
the definition of an undertaking; in most cases, it is more proportionate for the competition
rules to apply in principle, but for any environmental justification to be taken into account in
the application of these rules.
Second, we considered in Chapter 10 the ECJ’s doctrine whereby proportionate restrictions
inherent to certain social and regulatory goals of an agreement fall outside the scope of
Article 81(1) EC. We argued that this doctrine should extend by analogy to proportionate
restrictions inherent to an agreement’s legitimate environmental goals. Further, in Chapter
11 we argued that environmental improvements should be considered to promote “technical
and economic progress” within the meaning of Article 81(3) and thus, subject to satisfaction of
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the other Article 81(3) conditions, lead to the disapplication of the Article 81 prohibition
from agreements entailing such improvements. Moreover, the requirement that consumers
get a “fair share” of the resulting benefit should be interpreted broadly in the environmental
context to include environmental benefits accruing to society at large, including (subject to
discounting) future consumers pursuant to the intergenerational nature of the sustainable
development aim. We also focused in this Chapter on restrictive practices in waste
management systems, an area examined relatively frequently to date by the Commission and
Community Courts.
Third, we argued in Chapter 12 that environmental protection objectives should be viewed,
in principle, as “defences” to prima facie breaches of Article 82 EC, whether in the form of a
defence based on objective justification (subject to compliance with proportionality) or,
where the environmental benefit is susceptible to valuation, an efficiencies-based defence
(subject to satisfaction of the other Article 81(3) conditions, which the Commission has
indicated apply by analogy to efficiencies-based defences in the Article 82 EC context).
Likewise, we concluded in Chapter 13 that such environmental benefits should be viewed as
efficiencies in the Commission’s analysis of whether a proposed merger will significantly
impede effective competition under the Merger Regulation.
Fourth, we considered in Chapter 14 the relevance of Member State environmental action to
competition analysis, for example by reinforcing the effectiveness of voluntary
environmental agreements by recognising them in law, or by granting special rights to certain
undertakings to perform some environmental services which would not otherwise be
profitable. We examined the situations in which undertakings can rely on such State action
as a defence to Article 81 or 82 EC proceedings and the scope of Member States’ Article 10
EC duty not to enact or enforce national rules which might jeopardise the effectiveness of
Articles 81 and 82 EC in the environmental context, focusing in particular on co-regulatory
situations where the State provides a legal framework implementing voluntary environmental
agreements. We also looked at the operation of Article 86 EC in the environmental context,
examining instances where the ECJ has applied Article 86(1) and 86(2) EC to undertakings
given environmental duties by the State. We noted, in particular, that the proportionality test
used by the Commission and Courts in Article 86(2) analysis has, depending on how it is
applied in practice, the potential to implement the Article 6 EC integration principle well.
Finally, we analysed in Chapter 15 the approach of the Commission and Community courts
to environmental subsidies and taxation under Article 87 EC. Here, we began with
distinguishing State aid control from the rest of competition policy on the ground that, while
State aid is in principle prohibited (Article 87(1)), the Article 87(2) and (3) exemptions are
premised on a recognition that markets may not always work properly left alone - due, for
example, to the presence of externalities - and may need some intervention from the State
for non-economic reasons to work more effectively, and ultimately raise consumer welfare.
We then examined situations in which environmental subsidies and taxation are not
considered to be State aid (for example, when not granted from Member State resources as
in the PreussenElektra case, or when not considered selective as with some types of
environmental taxation). We finished by considering the Commission’s approach to
exempting environmental State aid, as set out in its 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines,
concluding that, though the Guidelines are overall a positive development, in some respects
they do not go far enough. In particular, we argued for a true integration of environmental
costs and benefits into cost-benefit analysis in the State aid context, which would require the
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environmental costs resulting from environmentally damaging aid to be taken into account
by the Commission in carrying out cost-benefit analysis prior to granting an exemption.
Finally, we add that the Guidelines’ approach to the issue of State aid in the EU’s ETS leaves
much to be desired.
Conclusion. In the Introduction, we noted that the question of the role of environmental
factors in Community competition policy would likely elicit one of two diametrically
opposed instinctive reactions: the first, influenced by Chicago School theory, denying any
role to such factors; the second insisting they must have some - albeit undefined - role.
It is hoped that this thesis has provided convincing arguments that the first reaction is
misplaced both as a matter of Community law and from an economic perspective. On
closer analysis, it is submitted that there is no good reason of principle or practice to support
the view that competition policy should, uniquely, enjoy a “special” exemption from the
imperative to integrate environmental protection requirements. Rather, such a position
displays an outdated and, it is submitted, inherently narrow-minded approach to the
environment-economy interplay. When examined closely, it is clear that the aims of
environmental protection and achieving effective competition have a substantial capacity to
be mutually reinforcing. In the environmental policy camp, this has been recognised for
some time with the substantial movement towards market-based instruments, dropping the
traditional instinctive distrust of the “market”, long considered anathema to the
environmental protection cause.
In the competition policy camp, however, the equivalent step has yet to be made with
conviction or consistency. In particular, Part III’s survey of the present approach of the
Community Courts and Commission to date has indicated that environmental factors have
not yet, with some intermittent exceptions, been given sufficient weight in the Commission’s
competition analysis. To a lesser extent, the same is true for the Community courts - and
here primarily for the Court of First Instance. This is disappointing and represents a failure
on the part of competition policy to step up to the mark on what is increasingly viewed as
the major issue of our time. Admittedly, however, difficulty in properly implementing the
integration principle is by no means a problem specific to competition policy. Though
Article 6 EC demands the effective implementation of this principle across all policy areas
covered by the EC Treaty, this remains a long way off. More generally, the original
prevalence of economic goals in the EC Treaty is still arguably, in large part, reflected in its
scheme and structure. For instance, there seems little chance in the near or medium future
that the step will be taken - as suggested by the Avosetta Group - of inserting a provision in
the EC Treaty prohibiting significantly impairing the environment, subject to imperative
reasons of overriding public interest (i.e., mirroring Articles 28 and 30 EC on free movement
of goods).149 To this extent, a certain latent hierarchy of goals remains.
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that, in reality, there is ample scope to integrate
environmental protection factors into Community competition policy in practice, while
remaining true to the wording of the EC Treaty as well as to the axioms of competition
theory. In many cases, this simply requires the sensitive use of a proportionality-based
analysis already used by the Commission and Community courts in relation to other, non-
environmental factors (as, for example, has been argued in the case of Articles 81(1), 81(3),
149 On the proposal, see Krämer, “Thirty years of EC environmental law: perspectives and prospectives”
(2000) Yearbook of European Environmental Law 155, at 157.
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82 and 86(2) in particular). In other cases, it requires a recognition and, to the extent
reasonably possible, quantification of environmental costs and benefits in the context of
cost-benefit and efficiencies analysis (as, for example, has been argued in the case of Articles
81(3), 82 and 87 EC, as well as in merger analysis).
It is not denied that adoption of this approach will necessitate a conscious, and significant,
shift in thinking by those enforcing competition law within the EU. Nor is it denied that
such adoption will be without difficulties, such as the difficulty, in the present state of
development of environmental valuation techniques, in valuing with reasonable accuracy
certain more diffuse forms of environmental benefits or costs. It would be naïve to ignore
such drawbacks, and the problems of legal certainty which may sometimes result, and indeed
the present research has not shied away from highlighting them. On balance, however, it is
submitted that the arguments for a shift in approach are significantly stronger, and
demonstrate that such a shift is crucial if Community competition law is to be truly
“modernised”.
De rol van milieubescherming in het communautaire mededingingsrecht en
-beleid.
Samenvatting
Het doel van dit proefschrift is tweeledig: ten eerste om in empirische zin te bezien of
milieubeschermingsfactoren momenteel een rol spelen in het communautaire
mededingingsbeleid; ten tweede om in normatieve zin te bezien of deze factoren een rol
zouden moeten spelen.
In dit proefschrift wordt het onderwerp vanuit drie verschillende perspectieven
behandeld: vanuit het perspectief van het milieubeleid, vanuit het perspectief van de
mededingingstheorie en vanuit het perspectief van de mededingingspraktijk.
Deel I.
In Deel I, waar het perspectief van het milieubeleid wordt genomen, worden de
ontwikkelingen in het communautaire milieubeleid behandeld die het meest relevant zijn
voor het mededingingsbeleid. Dit deel van de analyse heeft tot doel het gat tussen het
mededingingsbeleid en het milieubeleid, het bestaan waarvan zo nu en dan wordt
opgemerkt in de literatuur, te overbruggen. Zodoende kan bij het beantwoorden van
bovenstaande vragen een voldoende ‘geïntegreerd’ analytisch perspectief worden bereikt.
Nadat kort de voornaamste ontwikkelingen in het milieubeleid van de EU zijn
besproken, richten wij ons op twee ontwikkelingen die cruciaal zijn voor het
mededingingsbeleid: de opneming van duurzame ontwikkeling als een van de
fundamentele doelstellingen van de Gemeenschap en van de EU, en de opneming van
het beginsel in artikel 6 EG Verdrag, dat voorschrijft dat de vereisten van
milieubescherming worden geïntegreerd in de omschrijving en uitvoering van ieder beleid
van de Gemeenschap. Dit beginsel is een belangrijk middel bij het bereiken van
duurzame ontwikkeling en is een van de kernbeginselen van het Gemeenschapsrecht.
Hier wordt echter opgemerkt dat het grootste probleem met de
duurzaamheidsdoelstelling en het integratiebeginsel in wezen hun onbepaaldheid is: hun
kracht is in de praktijk verzwakt door grote tegenstrijdigheden tussen een ‘sterke’ en een
‘zwakke’ definitie van duurzaamheid en door een gebrek aan duidelijkheid over de
praktische betekenis van het integratiebeginsel, waar milieudoelinstellingen botsen met
andere Gemeenschapsdoelstellingen.
Vervolgens wordt een andere trend in het communautaire milieubeleid behandeld die
zeer relevant is voor het mededingingsbeleid: de trend om meer gebruik te maken van
‘marktconforme’ (ook wel economische- of incentive-based) instrumenten in het kader van
het milieubeleid en zich steeds meer te verwijderen van traditioneel, rechtstreeks command
and control beleid. Nadat de redenen voor deze tendens zijn besproken, richten wij ons op
de drie verschillende soorten marktconforme instrumenten die in de Gemeenschap
worden gebruikt en welke het meest relevant zijn voor het communautaire
mededingingsbeleid: overheidssubsidies en belastingen, verhandelbare vergunningen
(waarbij in het bijzonder is gekeken naar de regeling voor de handel in
broeikasgasemissierechten van de EU) en vrijwillige milieuovereenkomsten.
Geconcludeerd wordt dat deze instrumenten, hoewel geen oplossing voor alle
milieuproblemen, van noodzakelijk belang kunnen zijn ter versterking van de effectiviteit
van het milieubeleid - “reaching the parts that direct regulation cannot reach” (‘om die
gebieden te bereiken die rechtstreekse regulering niet kan bereiken' ).
Deel I wordt afgesloten met het aankaarten van een aantal manieren waarop
milieuregulering van betekenis kan zijn voor het communautaire mededingingsbeleid:
vooral de toename van het aantal marktconforme instrumenten voor het milieubeleid
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betekent dat het communautaire mededingingsbeleid van toepassing is op grote delen
van het milieubeleid, wat niet aan de orde zou zijn als rechtstreekse regulering was
toegepast. Dit maakt het ons mogelijk om in Deel II van perspectief te wisselen naar dat
van de mededingingstheorie.
Deel II.
In Deel II wordt de vraag gesteld of vanuit een theoretisch perspectief
milieubeschermingsfactoren een rol kunnen en zouden moeten spelen in de
mededingingsanalyse. Hier wordt begonnen met het onderzoeken van de doelstellingen
van het communautaire mededingingsbeleid, waarbij wordt gekeken naar de voornaamste
visies op mededinging tot nu toe. Geconcludeerd wordt dat, hoewel het zorgen voor een
maximale consumentenwelvaart momenteel een belangrijke doelstelling is van het
communautaire mededingingsbeleid, velen van mening zijn dat het communautaire
mededingingsbeleid (in tegenstelling tot het mededingingsbeleid van de VS) vele andere
doelstellingen heeft die geen betrekking hebben op economische efficiëntie. Deze
doelstellingen noemen wij de “niet-economische” doelstellingen. Hieronder vallen in
ieder geval marktintegratie en de totstandbrenging van een interne markt, hoewel velen
van mening zijn dat ze veel verder gaan en zelfs andere belangrijke
Verdragsdoelstellingen zoals milieubescherming raken.
Nadat aldus de bestaande visies zijn onderzocht, wordt overgegaan op een normatieve
aanpak. De verdiensten van drie theoretische argumenten waarom milieudoelstellingen
een rol zouden moeten spelen in het communautaire mededingingsbeleid worden hier
uiteengezet en onderzocht.
Het eerste argument, dat wordt aangeduid als het systematische argument, stelt dat wanneer
enig beleid van een deelgebied - dus ook het communautaire mededingingsbeleid - wordt
geïnterpreteerd, het EG Verdrag moet worden gezien als een systeem, of een coherent
geheel. Dit argument wordt ontleend aan de klassieke teleologische aanpak die wordt
gebruikt door de gemeenschapsrechters bij het interpreteren van het Verdrag. Het stelt
dat, in het licht van het milieubeleid, het integratiebeginsel van artikel 6 EG – welk
beginsel ook van toepassing is op het mededingingsbeleid – een systematische aanpak
noodzakelijk maakt. Het argument gaat echter verder dan het erkennen dat het
belangrijkste probleem van het integratiebeginsel haar onbepaaldheid is. Het zet de
concrete implicaties van het integratiebeginsel op het gebied van mededinging uiteen,
namelijk:
(1) In procedurele termen moet de vraag worden gesteld of afwegingen op het
gebied van milieubescherming, waar zij relevant zouden kunnen zijn voor een
zaak, betrokken moeten worden bij het komen tot een beslissing;
(2) Voor zover de bewoordingen van de mededingingsbepalingen in het Verdrag
geen ruimte laten voor een interpretatie die gunstig is voor de
milieubescherming, is het integratiebeginsel niet relevant;
(3) Waar het mogelijk is de mededingingsbepalingen van het Verdrag te
interpreteren op een manier die gunstig is voor de milieubescherming, en waar
geen strijd is met de doelstellingen van het mededingingsbeleid, moeten de
Verdragsbepalingen ook altijd op zodanige wijze geïnterpreteerd worden; en
(4) Voor zover het mogelijk is de mededingingsbepalingen van het Verdrag te
interpreteren op een manier die gunstig is voor de milieubescherming, maar waar
strijd is met de doelstellingen van het mededingingsbeleid, is het
evenredigheidsbeginsel van toepassing. Dit betekent dat wanneer een (private of
overheids-) maatregel geschikt is om de doeleinden van het communautaire
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milieubeleid te realiseren, en er geen manier is om deze doelstellingen te
realiseren op een wijze die de mededinging minder beperkt, de maatregel onder
het communautaire mededingingsrecht toegestaan moet zijn.
Naast artikel 6 EG is een ander element van het systematische argument dat de
verdragsregels inzake mededinging waar mogelijk consistent met de verdragsregels over
de vier vrijheden moeten worden geïnterpreteerd (de “intern vergelijkende” aanpak).
Aangezien milieubescherming een legitieme rechtvaardiging is voor proportionele
maatregelen van lidstaten die zonder deze rechtvaardiging het vrij verkeer van goederen
zouden belemmeren, betekent dit dat het in beginsel mogelijk moet zijn anderszins
mededingingsverstorende beperkingen op gelijke gronden te rechtvaardigen.
Het tweede theoretische argument waarom milieudoelstellingen een rol zouden moeten
spelen in het communautaire mededingingsbeleid is een governance argument. Het is
opgedeeld in twee elementen:
(1) Het argument dat de communautaire beginselen van “good governance” vragen
om samenhang en koppeling, interlinkage. tussen de instellingen die het
communautaire milieu- en mededingingsbeleid toepassen en handhaven (het
“good governance” argument); en
(2) Het argument dat het niet realistisch is te denken dat de handhavers van het
communautaire mededingingsbeleid in de praktijk consequent milieutechnische
overwegingen zouden uitsluiten van hun analyse (het “realistische” argument).
Nadat de voordelen van deze argumenten op alle drie de niveaus van communautaire
mededingingshandhaving – de Commissie, de gemeenschapsrechters en de nationale
rechters en mededingingsautoriteiten – zijn onderzocht, wordt geconcludeerd dat het
argument van goed bestuur van toepassing is op alle niveaus van handhaving. Het zij
echter toegegeven dat de kracht van het realistische argument varieert. Geconcludeerd
wordt dat in het geval van de Commissie het realistische argument prima facie het zwakste
lijkt, hoewel wij public choice argumenten onderzochten die iets anders suggereren. In het
geval van de communautaire rechters wordt geconcludeerd dat het realistische argument
sterk is, waarbij een model van rechterlijke toetsing gebaseerd op coherentie is gebruikt.
Tenslotte wordt geconcludeerd dat het realistische argument ook sterk is in het geval van
nationale rechters, hoewel potentieel zwakker in het geval van sommige nationale
mededingingsautoriteiten.
Het derde theoretische argument waarom milieudoelstellingen een rol zouden moeten
spelen in het communautaire mededingingsbeleid is een economisch argument. Dit
argument stelt dat de huidige tendens tot een meer “economische aanpak” bij de
Commissie niet noodzakelijkerwijs zou leiden tot het uitsluiten van milieutechnische
factoren, aangezien – tenminste in sommige gevallen – milieutechnische factoren mee
mogen wegen in de economische berekening van besluiten inzake mededinging. De
mogelijkheid overwegingen omtrent het milieu mee te laten wegen bij nutsmetingen, dat
wil zeggen het doorberekenen van externe kosten betreffende het milieu in
mededingingsanalyses, wordt onderzocht door gebruik te maken van een basale
milieueconomische aanpak. Geconcludeerd wordt dat, om consumentenwelvaart post-
transaction te voorspellen, de milieuvriendelijkheid van een product in overweging kan
worden genomen, door gebruik te maken van milieutechnische waarderingstechnieken
die zijn ontwikkeld met het oog op het analyseren van kosten en baten betreffende het
milieu (cost-benefit analysis). Bovendien wordt gesteld dat dit niet alleen moet worden
gedaan vanwege het integratiebeginsel van artikel 6 EG, maar ook omdat het niveau van




Gewapend met deze theoretische argumenten wordt in Deel III overgegaan tot het
laatste perspectief: het perspectief van de mededingingspraktijk. Dit deel bekijkt vanuit
een empirisch en normatief perspectief – waarbij de theoretische argumenten uit Deel II
worden toegepast – de rol van milieutechnische factoren op ieder individueel terrein van
het communautaire mededingingsbeleid. De voornaamste conclusies kunnen als volgt
worden samengevat.
Ten eerste: Hoofdstuk 9 toont aan dat milieuoverwegingen relevant zouden kunnen zijn
voor de transversale, cross-cutting, problemen van het definiëren van het begrip
onderneming en het definiëren van de relevante markt in een bepaalde zaak. Op basis
van de systematische argumenten die in Deel II zijn besproken wordt echter betoogd, dat
ondernemingen die een milieudienst verlenen slechts in uitzonderlijke gevallen buiten de
definitie van een onderneming zouden moeten vallen; in de meeste gevallen is het meer
proportioneel om in beginsel de mededingingsregels toe te passen, maar bij de toepassing
van deze regels iedere milieutechnische rechtvaardiging te overwegen.
Ten tweede wordt in Hoofdstuk 10 de rechtspraak van het Hof behandeld, volgens
welke proportionele beperkingen die inherent zijn aan bepaalde sociale en regelgevende
doelstellingen van een overeenkomst buiten het bereik van artikel 81 lid 1 EG vallen.
Betoogd wordt dat deze rechtspraak mutatis mutandis ook van toepassing zou moeten zijn
op proportionele beperkingen inherent aan legitieme milieudoelstellingen van een
overeenkomst. Verder wordt in Hoofdstuk 11 betoogd dat milieuverbeteringen
“technische en economische vooruitgang” in de zin van artikel 81 lid 3 bevorderen en
zodoende, voor zover aan de andere vereisten van artikel 81 lid 3 is voldaan, leiden tot
het buiten toepassing laten van artikel 81 voor overeenkomsten die dergelijke
verbeteringen behelzen. Bovendien moet het vereiste dat consumenten een “eerlijk deel”
van de voordelen krijgen op het gebied van het milieu ruim worden geïnterpreteerd. Dit
betekent dat voordelen voor het milieu die de samenleving kan behalen, waaronder
(behoudens kortingen) toekomstige consumenten als gevolg van het intergenerationele
karakter van de doelstelling van duurzame ontwikkeling, er ook onder vallen. Ook wordt
in dit hoofdstuk de nadruk gelegd op beperkende praktijken bij afvalbeheerssystemen,
een gebied dat tot nu toe vrij regelmatig wordt onderzocht door de Commissie en de
gemeenschapsrechters.
Ten derde: in Hoofdstuk 12 wordt betoogd dat milieubeschermingsdoeleinden in
beginsel gezien dienen te worden als "defences" tegen prima facie inbreuken op artikel 82
EG. Dit kan zijn in de vorm van een verweer op basis van objectieve rechtvaardiging
(mits conform het evenredigheidsvereiste) of, in het geval het milieuvoordeel berekend
kan worden, een verweer op grond van efficiencies (mits voldaan wordt aan de andere
voorwaarden van artikel 81 lid 3, waarvan de Commissie heeft aangegeven dat ze analoog
toepasbaar zijn op verweren op grond van efficiencies in de context van artikel 82). Evenzo
wordt in hoofdstuk 13 tot de conclusie gekomen dat in de analyse door de Commissie
van de vraag of een voorgestelde fusie de daadwerkelijke mededinging op significante
wijze zou belemmeren in de zin van de Concentratieverordening, deze milieuvoordelen
moeten worden beschouwd als efficiencies.
Ten vierde wordt in Hoofdstuk 14 gekeken naar de relevantie voor de
mededingingsanalyse van optreden van de lidstaten inzake het milieu, bijvoorbeeld door
het versterken van de werking van vrijwillige milieuovereenkomsten door deze juridisch
te erkennen, of door bijzondere rechten aan bepaalde ondernemingen toe te kennen
zodat zij alsnog milieudiensten verlenen die anders niet rendabel zouden zijn. De situaties
worden onderzocht waarin ondernemingen als verweer in een artikel 81 of 82 procedure
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een beroep mogen doen op dergelijk staatsoptreden, en de reikwijdte van de verplichting
van de lidstaten zich als gevolg van artikel 10 EG te onthouden van het aannemen of
handhaven van nationale regelgeving die het nuttige effect van artikel 81 en artikel 82 op
het gebied van het milieu in gevaar zou kunnen brengen. Hierin wordt het zwaartepunt
gelegd op situaties van mederegulering (co-regulatory situations] waarin de lidstaat een
juridisch kader aanlevert voor de implementatie van vrijwillige milieuovereenkomsten.
Gekeken wordt ook naar de werking van artikel 86 EG op het gebied van het milieu,
waarbij zaken worden onderzocht waarin het Hof van Justitie artikel 86 lid 1 en artikel 86
lid 2 heeft toegepast op ondernemingen aan wie milieuverplichtingen zijn opgelegd door
de staat. In het bijzonder zij opgemerkt dat de evenredigheidstoets zoals gebruikt door de
Commissie en de gemeenschapsrechters in hun analyse op grond van artikel 86 lid 2,
potentieel, afhankelijk van hoe dit in de praktijk gebeurt, het integratiebeginsel van artikel
6 EG kan implementeren.
Tot slot wordt in Hoofdstuk 15 een analyse gemaakt van de manier waarop de
Commissie en gemeenschapsrechters met milieusubsidies en belastingen omgaan onder
artikel 87 EG. Om te beginnen wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de controle op
steunmaatregelen en de rest van het mededingingsbeleid, omdat, hoewel staatssteun in
principe verboden is (art. 87 lid 1), de uitzonderingen van artikel 87 lid 2 en lid 3
gebaseerd zijn op erkenning van het feit dat markten op zichzelf niet altijd goed werken -
bijvoorbeeld wegens het bestaan van externe effecten - en misschien interventie van
staatswege op niet-economische gronden behoeven om effectiever te werken, en
uiteindelijk consumentenwelvaart te verhogen. Daarna wordt gekeken naar situaties
waarin milieusubsidies en belastingen niet als staatssteun beschouwd worden
(bijvoorbeeld omdat ze niet uit staatsmiddelen gefinancierd worden, zoals in de zaak
PreussenElektra, of omdat ze niet aan het selectiviteitscriterium voldoen, zoals het geval is
met bepaalde types milieubelasting). Als laatste wordt ingegaan op de benadering van de
Commissie bij het vrijstellen van steunmaatregelen op het gebied van het milieu, zoals
uiteengezet in haar "Richtsnoeren Milieusteun 2008", concluderend dat, hoewel de
richtsnoeren als geheel een positieve ontwikkeling zijn, zij in sommige opzichten niet ver
genoeg gaan. In het bijzonder wordt gepleit voor echte integratie van milieukosten en
voordelen in een kosten-baten analyse in de context van de lidstaat. Dit zou betekenen
dat de Commissie bij het maken van een kosten-baten analyse ook rekening zou moeten
houden met de milieukosten voortvloeiend uit steunmaatregelen met schadelijke
gevolgen voor het milieu voordat een vrijstelling verleend wordt. Ten slotte voegen wij
hieraan toe, dat de benadering van de Commissie inzake steunmaatregelen in de
communautaire regeling voor de handel in broeikasgasemissierechten verre van
bevredigend is.
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Propositions relating to the dissertation The Role of Environmental Protection in
EC Competition Law and Policy by Suzanne Kingston
1. The goal of sustainable development, and the integration principle set out in Article 6
EC, apply just as forcefully in the field of EC competition policy as in other EC
policy fields.
2. Developments in environmental regulatory techniques in the EU since the 1970s,
such as the greater use of market-based instruments and reliance on voluntary
environmental initiatives, have meant that competition law is increasingly relevant to
EU environmental regulation.
3. The indeterminacy of the sustainable development and integration principles has
hindered the effectiveness of these principles in practice, including in the competition
law field. Greater effectiveness demands relatively precise identification of the
implications of these principles for competition policy.
4. For some schools of competition theory, it is perfectly acceptable to take
environmental protection requirements into account in formulating and applying
competition policy. For others, including the Chicago School, environmental
protection requirements should not be considered in competition policy.
5. The aims, and theory underlying, EC competition policy are different to those
underlying US competition policy. For that reason (amongst others), the Chicago
School has carried less influence in the EU, and the goals of EC competition policy
extend beyond economic efficiency.
6. Even if one takes economic efficiency to be the overriding goal of EC competition
policy, there are strong arguments based on good governance principles, and
environmental economics, that the notion of efficiency should allow environmental
damage and benefits to be taken into account in competition law and policy.
7. The above theoretical arguments demonstrate that it is not only legitimate, but also
obligatory, for environmental protection requirements to be taken into account in
EC competition policy.
8. Analysis of EC competition law to date shows that, though environmental protection
factors have played a role in some cases, in many they have been given insufficient
weight, ignored entirely, or taken into account in an indirect and unclear fashion -
creating significant problems of legal certainty for undertakings in environment-
related areas.
9. Environmental protection factors have been taken into account in an insufficient, or
insufficiently clear, manner in virtually all areas of EC competition policy, but
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